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Abstract: 
 
This thesis examines children’s work on the formal, informal and family based labour 
markets in a developed capitalist economy. Using a unique dataset of approximately 11,000 
young people aged between 12 and 16 years, this thesis argues that structural factors are 
determinative of specific experiences of work, which reflect the nature of social relations 
within each labour market. This argument is a response to two prevailing themes in the child 
work literature. First that age based development has been the overarching ‘structure’ that 
determines experiences of work. Second, that the effect of structural position and the 
institutions of ‘work’ hinder children’s agency and ‘free will’. It is shown that these structural 
factors not only delimit children’s capacity to assert their agency, but enable action by 
providing the social environment that make possible certain types of activities to be 
understood as work. In so doing the thesis contributes to understanding children’s economic 
agency through an analysis of children’s work, and consequently children as economic 
agents.  
 
The data set provides a robust statistical outline of the fields of children’s work (formal, 
informal and family based) and an assessment of the quality of work children perform, 
applying ILO measures of decent work standards to evaluate children’s work conditions. 
The analytical framework adopted involves a synthesis of child work literature with aspects 
of economic sociology and the sociology of work that emphasise the embeddedness of social 
action and institutions within systems of social relations. These analytic tools assist identify 
the specific ‘fields’ or labour markets of children’s work (i.e. the formal, informal and family 
based labour markets) and sensitise us to what the relevant structural transformations in each 
field are. In so doing the thesis draws upon work used in understanding the ‘adult world of 
work’ to aid our understanding of children’s labour markets. The thesis finds that skill 
utilisation on the formal labour market, the strength and particularity of labour relations on 
the informal labour market, and whether work is oriented towards use or exchange value on 
the family based labour market are in large part determinative of the distribution of material 
and social rewards for children who work.  Furthermore economic agency is embedded and 
expressed through the structural and relational factors specific to each labour market.  
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Chapter One: Introduction – the multiple contexts of children’s work 
 
1.1. Introduction 
In developed economies children’s work is treated as a special social category, unlike the adult world 
of work and often as a cause for concern. Children’s rightful place is as students and as dependants. 
When children work this is often seen as a transgression of the proper role of children and a proper 
childhood. More sympathetic voices argue that working is beneficial for children – it develops 
character, independence and teaches young people the value of money. In fact children should be 
encouraged to work, not only so they can earn money, but more importantly because work 
contributes to turning young people into future productive adults. While on face appearance these 
two positions seem almost diametrically opposed, what is common to both is the individualisation of 
work and work experience for children. While the adult world of work is the sphere of labour 
movements, economics and industrial relations, the world of children’s work is about individual 
cognitive, social and behavioural development, or more recently about the ability of children to 
exercise choice and autonomy. The adult world of work is a world of structures and social relations, 
children’s world of work about everyday experience and personal relations. Yet, what role do social 
and economic structures play in understanding children’s paid and unpaid work, and children’s 
experience of such work, given that children, like adults are social actors and their activities are 
socially constituted even if individually experienced?  
 
The central argument of this thesis is that social and economic structures are important in 
determining how work is experienced, what activities count as work, and the social allocation of 
different types of work. These social and economic structures have significantly transformed over 
the past two centuries evidenced in profound changes in the world of work. The fundamental 
transformations in the world of work also create different opportunities for social integration 
according to social group membership, including according to gender, class, cultural identity and age, 
Furthermore these structures define the different ‘economies’ that children work in: the formal, 
informal and family based economies. This argument is a response to two prevailing themes in the 
child work literature. First is that age based development has been the overarching ‘structure’ that 
determines experiences of work. Second is that children’s agency and ‘free will’ is stymied by the 
effect of structural position and the institutions of ‘work’. While the argument presented in this 
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thesis does not necessarily oppose these two premises, it shows that structural factors are important 
in determining specific experiences of work and that these structures do not reflect a strict age-based 
developmentalism but instead reflect the specific nature of social relations within each economy; and 
that experiences of work can only be made sense of when other social categories are considered, 
such as class and gender, as well as age. These structural factors not only delimit children’s capacity 
to assert their agency, but enable action by providing the social environment that make possible 
certain types of activities, and through interactions with other social actors in these specific social 
environments make these activities meaningful as work. This thesis establishes these arguments 
through an empirical analysis and reconceptualisation of children’s economic activities.  
 
The aims of the thesis are to: 
 
a) Provide a detailed analysis of the characteristics of children’s work in modern capitalist 
economies, using children’s work in New South Wales as a representative case study of a 
modern capitalist economy. This includes examining the quality and conditions of work 
and the social distribution of work across the economies children work in. 
b) Assess how the social relations that children work within shape the conditions, meaning 
and experience of work for the individual actor, in this case the child. This includes how 
socio-structural factors determine and allocate work conditions and experiences within 
each economy.  
c) Contribute to understanding whether the different economies children work in are 
associated with different logics of social action, and if so examine the relationship 
between these different logics, the types of work activities children are engaged in, and 
the conditions young people obtain from that work. 
d) Contribute to understanding children’s economic agency through an analysis of children’s 
work, and consequently children as economic agents. 
 
The analytic tools used are drawn from three separate literatures or areas of research, child labour 
and child work research; aspects of economic sociology; and the sociology of adult work. Critical 
evaluation of the child labour/work research provides some specific theoretical and methodological 
insights that shape the analysis in the remainder of this thesis. This critical evaluation is developed in 
the second part of this chapter, but includes the problem of children’s economic agency; the 
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conceptual objectification of children, the opposition between quantitative and qualitative 
approaches and the importance of a systematic analysis and comparison of young people’s work 
conditions. Insights from economic sociology and the sociology of work are utilised to respond to 
these issues.   
 
Economic sociology emphasises the embeddedness of social action and institutions within systems 
of social relations, social structures that enable certain activities to be understood as work, and with 
the developments in the child work literature, the need to recognise the different ‘fields’ of work or 
economies of children’s work (i.e. the formal, informal and family based economies). We also draw 
upon this work for a theory of economic agency that does not oppose structure to economic action, 
but shows that the actions of individual agents occur within economic structures, which in turn 
enable the possibilities for action. This analytic framework is developed in Chapter Two, which 
outlines the conceptual approach used in this thesis. Insights from recent analysis of the adult world 
of work aid our understanding of children’s economies, especially by identifying the structural 
transformations that have had a marked impact on the nature of social interactions within each 
specific economy. From this analysis specific hypotheses are derived in which the insights drawn 
from the child work and economic sociology literatures are applied. For the formal economy, we 
show how the application of skill, as a result of the evolution of dual labour markets and the rise of 
the service economy, are relevant to understanding children’s work. For the informal economy we 
show how the specific type of relationship between employee and employer are relevant in 
prescribing rules of conduct given the absence of formal regulations. For the family economy, we 
examine how the extent to which work is oriented to either use by households or exchange on the 
formal economy affects the distribution of conditions on the family economy. These specific 
hypotheses are introduced at the beginning of the relevant empirical chapters. However the work 
literature also provides a set of measures of decent work standards, extrinsic and intrinsic 
orientations that are applied empirically across the three economies.  
 
The empirical data used was obtained from a questionnaire-based survey of approximately 11,000 
young people aged 12 to 16 years in New South Wales, Australia, undertaken in 2005. This survey 
obtained data on the prevalence of young people’s work, whether paid or unpaid and their work 
conditions. The data provides a statistical outline of the fields of children’s work and an assessment 
of aspects of work satisfaction, determined by children’s assessments of the quality of work they 
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perform. The thesis uses this specific dataset to draw more general conclusions about children’s 
work and what this means for the concept of children’s economic agency, drawing upon theoretical 
framework developed in Chapter Two.  
 
Empirically the capacity to generalise is also possible because in several respects New South Wales is 
similar to other developed capitalist economies. New South Wales has recorded sustained but small 
economic growth over the last decade. In 2008–09 NSW recorded economic growth of 1.1% in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), part of only a shallow decline in economic growth nationally as a 
result of the 2009 financial crisis. Yet, transitions evident across developed economies are also 
evident in New South Wales. Like other economies NSW has been characterized by disproportionate 
increases in service sector employment and a large increase in female labour force participation. The 
number of people in paid employment in NSW has grown steadily over the last decade, the biggest 
quantum of which (one-third; 137,00) being among females working part-time, reflecting growth in 
the service economy. The labour force participation rate increased from 62.1% in 2001–02 to 63.3% 
in 2009–10. These factors also reflect an increase in precarious forms of employment and a decline 
in the standard full-time employment arrangement.  Between 2001-02 and 2009-10, the proportion 
of employed persons who worked full-time decreased from 73.5% to 70.5%. The service economy 
constitutes a significant portion of economic activity in New South Wales. Of the 3.5 million people 
employed in NSW in 2010, the Health Care and Social Assistance and Retail industries were the two 
largest in terms of persons employed, together employing approximately 750,000 people, or 21.5 
percent of the NSW labour force. The shift from manufacturing to a service economy has also 
driven changes in education levels. Relatively New South Wales shares a similar education profile 
with many other post-industrial societies. In 2009 there were 1.1 million full-time school students in 
NSW, with relatively high retention rates to the end of secondary school (71%). Beyond secondary 
education, in 2009 over half of all persons in NSW aged 15-64 years (57%) held a non-school 
qualification with approximately 1.1 million people (25% of 15-64 year olds) holding a Bachelor's 
degree or higher qualification and a further 700,000 (15%of 15-64 year olds) holding a Certificate III 
or IV qualification, which are trade-based qualifications (ABS, 2011). Further details regarding the 
representativeness of the sample are outlined in Chapter Three. 
 
Chapters Four, Five and Six provide a detailed analysis of the formal, informal and family based 
economies respectively. Each chapter begins by examining structural features of each economy of 
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importance to young people’s work. In so doing specific hypotheses for each economy are identified. 
For example, in Chapter Four we hypothesise whether skills polarisation in the formal economy 
leads to a correlating skills polarisation in work conditions for young people who work in the formal 
economy; in Chapter Five we hypothesise whether, because the informal economy occurs outside of 
formal regulations, the particularity of the relationship between ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’ normatively 
regulates conditions and orientations towards work; in Chapter Six we examine how changes in the 
family mode of production have resulted in family work being oriented to use-value within the 
household or exchange value on external economies, and consequently hypothesise whether these 
orientations result in different work experiences for young people who work in the family economy. 
Each chapter proceeds by profiling the range of work undertaken within the economy being 
investigated, the social distribution of work within each economy and whether work arrangements 
differ for different groups of workers. We therefore analyse whether social group membership, such 
as class background, gender, age or cultural background, has any relationship with the extent of 
participation and the performance of work tasks within each economy. Each chapter then examines 
work conditions within each economy adapting the International Labor Organisation’s decent work 
standards to analyse conditions. This is then complemented by an assessment of intrinsic 
orientations that provide us with a sense of how economic action is experienced by children within 
each economy. While each chapter uses identical data items and statistical techniques, the analysis for 
each is specific to each economy, addressing the hypotheses generated from examining the structural 
changes in each economy. The final chapter returns to the key questions and aims identified in this 
chapter and draws linkages across the labour markets, to identify the structural factors that delimit 
and enable economic agency across each economy, including what structures work experiences 
across children’s economies; the social distribution of different forms of work, the meanings given to 
productive activities and what this tells us about the nature of economic agency across the three 
economies. 
 
The remainder of this chapter explores gaps and developments within some of the main approaches 
within child labour research that assist in delineating the approach taken in the thesis and the 
implications of these problems and developments for this thesis. The next section therefore assesses 
the literature for the express purpose of developing the framework for the remainder of the thesis. 
Four key approaches are identified, the welfare economics approach; sociological and 
anthropological studies of child labour; enumeration studies of children’s labour market activities in 
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developed economies; and studies of children’s work in developed economies informed by the ‘new 
sociology of childhood’. Chapter Two outlines how this thesis attempts to conceptually address 
some of the problems identified in the existing literature, by outlining the analytical approach used to 
identify and examine children’s economies. Chapter Three outlines how we operationalise this 
theoretical framework methodologically in a way that takes seriously children’s own perspectives on 
their work but also systematically compares work conditions across the economies children work in.  
 
1.2. Rethinking Children’s Work: Developments in Child Work Research 
 
1.2.1. Explaining global child labour: The ILO, welfare economics and children’s work in the 
majority world 
In the political economies of the South, children’s economic activities are largely viewed as ‘child 
labour’, understood not only as a form of exploitation of children, but also as a sign of social and 
economic underdevelopment. This view drives the agenda of powerful international organisations, 
including the International Labor Organisation (ILO), which is mandated to eliminate child labour, 
ILO Convention No. 182 commits countries to take immediate action to prohibit and eliminate the 
worst forms of child labour. ILO Convention No. 138 sets forth a larger framework for the longer-
term objective of the effective abolition of child labour. In pursuing this mandate the ILO has in 
significant part driven the child labour research agenda. Since 1979 the ILO has had its own program 
of child labour research and a significant amount, if not most, research on children’s work in 
developing economies has been published or sponsored by the ILO. However two streams can be 
discerned within the work of the ILO and studies sponsored by the ILO, the welfare economics and 
the child development approaches. These approaches have not only characterised the work of the 
ILO, but also influenced the research agenda more generally. These approaches are discussed in turn.  
 
The welfare economics analysis of child labour 
Welfare economists consider child labour as the consequence of a rational family strategy to 
maximise family income, where the marginal benefit of child labour (measured in earnings and saved 
costs of schooling) is higher than the marginal cost of foregone returns to human capital investment 
from schooling (Majumdar 2001, 282). The more advanced models point out the existence of two 
points of equilibrium in the child labour market - ‘good equilibrium’ where adult wages are high and 
there is no child labour and ‘bad equilibrium’ where adult wages are low and there is a large amount 
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of child labour. This model is based on two axioms or more precisely assumptions - the ‘luxury’ 
axiom (children work only when required because of poverty) and the ‘substitution’ axiom (children 
only work where adult work does not meet subsistence levels, child and adult labour being 
substitutable)  (Basu and Tzannatos 2003; Boockmann 2010; Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2006). Welfare 
economic models have had a significant impact on policy making at the international and national 
level, with the aim to shift the child labour market from ‘bad’ to ‘good’ equilibrium, including trade 
sanctions and bans on goods involving the use of child labour. These policies have achieved mixed 
results, however, for example product bans on imports have had the perverse effect of forcing 
children into more hazardous situations and encouraged governments to underplay the level of child 
labour in their own economies, pushing effective regulations further out of political reality 
(Bourdillon et al. 2009; ILO 2006; Bequele and Boyden 1988; Lopez-Calva, 2003; Lindbeck, Nyberg, 
Weibull, 1999, White 1996). 
 
While welfare economists provide an elegant model of the micro-level dynamics of child labour and 
the likely conditions under which children may be required to work, there is nothing within the 
model itself that suggests that one point of equilibrium is preferable to another. This leaves the 
model open to the immanent critiques of other economists who distance themselves from explicit 
normative criteria. Scoville (2002), for example, in his laissez-faire critique, takes advantage of this 
normative absence to justify a free market in children’s work. In so doing his conclusions serve as a 
justification for children to work in the lowest paid, least productive and most derogatory types of 
activities, because there is a market for children to provide that sort of labour. 
 
Welfare economists’ emphasis on individual utility appears to provide some scope for children’s 
autonomy, however vacuous that autonomy may be (as rationally calculative market players). 
However this approach does not prescribe the role of ‘rational strategist’ to children, but focuses on 
household decision-making, that is parental decision making, over children’s time. Because 
households are treated as firms in this analysis, households are not only the sites of consumption, as 
usually portrayed in general equilibrium theory, but also produce a marketable good, the labour of 
family members, including that of children. Whether a child sells their labour or not is therefore a 
function of the utility parents gain from selling their children’s labour. This is never attributed to any 
active behaviour on the part of children. Children themselves are not capable of making independent 
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decisions and parent-child relations are explained through strategies aimed at maximising utility at the 
household level (Becker 1981). 
 
Contextualising global child labour: Child labour studies in developing economies 
Early research efforts undertaken by international non-government organisations, such as the 
International Confederation of Trade Unions, Save the Children and Anti-Slavery International drew 
on the experiences of activists and the children they were working with, to document the conditions 
of working children and the adverse effects of working for children. These studies sometimes 
brought to the attention of governments and the international community the experiences of 
working children. However they were criticised for the methodology they employed, relying on 
journalistic reports indiscriminately or lacking transparency on the methods used. Because of these 
methodological problems, it was difficult to use these reports to develop a systematic response to the 
issues raised by the research. More than anything, these studies reinforced the prevailing view that 
there was a need for ‘hard statistics’ on the problem of child labour
1.  
 
Much of the work of the ILO focuses on understanding the causal mechanisms for child labour and 
developing statistical collections to inform and support national programs for its elimination. 
However the first studies conducted under the auspices of the ILO were more diverse in scope. In 
particular the collection edited by Rodgers and Standing in 1981, attempted to classify the broad 
range of economic activities undertaken by children and in so doing challenged the problem 
discourse associated with child labour promoted by non-government organisations and the ILO’s 
own program. Many of the contributions pointed out the benefits of work for children and their 
families and traced the adverse consequences of the socio-economic conditions under which children 
worked rather than the work itself.  
 
Liebel (unpublished) points out that the exploitation of children is almost always seen in connection 
to child labour. To this we could add the related point that exploitative child labour is often 
associated with children being forced to work because of their vulnerability to, for example, parental 
duress or poverty. However, children’s work involves a broader range of work experiences including 
slave-like forms of work (e.g. bondage through debt), wage labour and work that is self-determined. 
                                                          
1
 More recent studies commissioned by international agencies have been quite innovative, largely involving systematic field-based 
situation analyses and ethnographic studies involving working children and working children’s movements (eg.  Bessell 2009; 
Woodhead 2005, Liebel et al. 2001). 
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The ILO has been influential in this respect in differentiating exploitative ‘child labour’ from 
tolerable ‘child work’ on the basis of whether work meets certain standards, such as whether the 
work involves excessively long hours, is excessively hard, or involves the withholding of rest periods.  
 
While this makes it possible to define criteria for exploitation, Liebel argues that these criteria are 
arbitrary. Rather exploitation is a specific social relationship “in which one person profits from 
another or gains advantages at his (sic) expense, and which clearly presupposes and helps to 
reproduce certain social structures and power relations.” (Liebel, unpublished, p2). Within this view 
of exploitation, we can locate children’s work within broader socio-economic processes (for 
example, within capitalist societies all labour is exploited, and therefore children’s labour is also 
exploited). However this general treatment is not enough to differentiate between levels of 
exploitation. For Liebel, the most exploitative work is that which “reduce(s) their scope for action 
almost completely – which is the case above all in conditions of exploitation that are based on 
immediate personal dependence and in which the working subjects are socially isolated.” (Liebel, 
unpublished, p8).  Here the emphasis is not so much on this or that scenario, but how systems of 
social relations create forms of absolute dependence through restricting agency and creating social 
isolation. 
 
The ILO soon realised that the program to eliminate all forms of child labour could only be a long 
term goal. The mounting weight of empirical evidence presented in the Rodgers and Standing 
collection resulted in a shift towards research that has been described as ‘differentiated analyses of 
work’ (Liebel 2004). Reflecting developments in the ILO’s own policy, this research increasingly 
focussed on differentiating between work that was harmful to children and work that could benefit 
or improve children’s living conditions or even be beneficial to their development. In the 1990’s the 
ILO took up the distinction between ‘child labour’ and ‘child work’, and this distinction gradually 
evolved to the adoption of ‘continuum’ and ‘balance’ models of work (Hobbs and McKechnie 2007). 
Key debates revolved around what is the best way to differentiate between positive and negative 
forms of work and the balance of beneficial and harmful aspects of work in a given situation. This 
has had some effect in shifting the emphasis away from calls for prohibition, but has underscored a 
focus on child development as an arbiter of what is harmful and what is beneficial (Bourdillon 2006, 
2005, 2000; Chakraborty and Lieten 2004; Gamlin and Pastor 2009; Guarcello et al. 2005; Hanson 
and Vandaele 2003; Hazarika and Bedi 2003; Kabeer 2003; Ravallion and Wodon 2000).  
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This reliance on child development as the core of assessment has not been without its critics. The 
models have been criticised for adopting a modern western European concept of childhood, and 
more pertinently a yardstick of culturally specific adulthood. Vocal in these criticisms were working 
children’s movements such as Bhima Sangha in Karnataka, India and MANTHOC in Peru, which 
have argued for a subject-oriented understanding of working children. Representatives of these 
groups argued that by failing to take into account specific cultural contexts and the importance of 
work for children and their families, much research fails to consider how work can provide 
opportunities for social engagement, which has productive outcomes for children and their families 
(see also World Movement of Working Children 2004).  
 
Liebel (forthcoming) also distinguishes between decent work adopted by the ILO and ‘work in 
dignity’ or ‘dignified work’ adopted by working children’s movements. The idea of ‘dignified work’ is 
used by working children’s movements, as a platform to advocate for improved work conditions in 
both capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production. Liebel argues that the claim for ‘dignified 
work’ by working children’s movements is a common point of reference to challenge the position 
that children should be limited to ‘child-friendly’ activities. Rather, working conditions should be 
improved and sustainable employment created. Furthermore, the right to work is seen as a 
prerequisite to be able to exercise other rights, including rights to protection and participation at 
work. For example, the declarations of working children’s movements emphasise that work must be 
‘adequate according to capabilities’. Liebel argues that from the context in which the demands are 
made, human dignity and not age is the criterion for adequacy. This is contrasted with the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and ILO Conventions for the eradication of child labour. 
According to Liebel, legislation and policy devised to protect children who work rarely improves 
conditions of exploitation. Moreover where such Conventions have been implemented through 
concrete measures, the situation has often been made more complicated for children who work. 
These criticisms have prompted important shifts in the research. 
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1.2.2. Putting Child Work on the Research Map – Efforts in Developed Economies 
The last two decades has also seen a renewed interest in research on children’s work in developed 
economies. The view that child employment has been abolished in developed economies has been 
challenged by social scientists who, attempting to question how marginal children’s work is, have 
focused on the extent of children’s paid employment on the formal economy. Large-scale survey 
studies of children’s work in Europe and the United Kingdom, especially those undertaken by the 
Paisley Group, have not only enumerated the extent of children’s participation on the formal 
economy but shown that large proportions of children are in paid employment (Hobbs, Anderson 
and McKechnie, 2009; Hobbs et al. 2007; Lavalette, Hobbs, Lindsay, and McKechnie 1995, Hobbs, 
Lindsay, and McKechnie, 1996; Hobbs and McKechnie, 1997. See also Pond and Searle, 1991). 
These studies have tended, however, to replicate the ‘children’s work as problem’ motif, by 
highlighting children’s exploitation on the formal economy. According to Liebel (2004) the problem 
has been that this research has uncritically adopted a particular view of gainful employment, 
associated historically with the exploitation of children in capitalist production. Furthermore, the 
restriction of work to paid employment on the formal economy, in the interest of easy enumeration, 
has meant that the level of children’s involvement in work beyond paid employment is not well 
known. 
 
While European studies were preoccupied with rediscovering the extent of children’s work, research 
in the United States has long started from the premise that paid work is a common aspect of 
‘adolescence’. The main theme in these studies has been instead to examine the developmental 
consequences of paid work, either positive or negative, for children (Cunnien et al. 2009; Mortimer 
2003; United States Department of Labor, 2000; Balding, 1997; Schoenhals, Tienda and Schneider, 
1998). In the 1980’s this research was oriented towards whether early work experiences were 
associated with negative educational or behavioural outcomes (Greenberger and Steinberg 1986; 
Steinberg, Greenberger, Garduque and McAuliffe 1982). In the 1990’s the negative evaluations were 
increasingly called into question, and a focus on job conditions occurred. However the focus was not 
on the quality of work conditions themselves, but how work conditions were associated with 
behavioural outcomes  or transition into adult employment, for young people, or impeded the 
effective transition into adult employment (Mortimer and Finch, 1996; Schoenhals, Tienda and 
Schneider 1998).   
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While the United States tradition differs from many of the European studies by viewing work as a 
normal part of youth experience, a number of criticisms can be levelled against both bodies of 
research. Despite the increasing sophistication of these studies, including a shift from evaluating 
whether work is positive or negative to whether conditions are beneficial, harmful or 
inconsequential, these studies remained wedded to a developmental and psychologistic framework 
which held children up to a yardstick of apparently normal development and adulthood (Woodhead 
2009). This focus, on what Hansen, Mortimer and Krüger (2001) call ‘anticipatory socialisation’, has 
diverted attention from the quality of the work children do, focusing on a narrow range of outcomes, 
rather than the meaning and experience of work for children themselves. Children’s experience of 
work is therefore of limited importance. The definition of work used reinforces a marked boundary 
between economic and non-economic activities, which in turn reinforces that modern childhood is 
in part defined by the exclusion of children from direct economic activity. Because adult economic 
activity is defined as the norm, children’s economic activity undertaken outside of the dominant 
definitions of adult competence is trivialised, and the work undertaken by children that falls within 
that dominant definition is understood as outside the proper realms of what is appropriate for 
children (Qvortrup 1994). Hence, while using more sophisticated standards of evaluation, the 
underlying reliance on developmental models objectifies children as passive recipients of economic 
socialisation. Another criticism of these studies is that they rely on a restrictive definition of labour 
for the purpose of conceptual and operational clarity. This provides a single estimate of how many 
children work which is misleading for several reasons. The definition of labour used fails to take 
account of other work that is, for example not paid or outside the formal labour market. 
Furthermore it also combines work that may be quite different in terms of the work tasks involved, 
job design and employment arrangements, for example whether work is full-time and part-time or 
seasonal and sporadic. 
 
1.2.3. Child Workers as Social Subjects – New Childhood Studies and the multiple contexts of 
children’s work  
Studies focussing on child development have increasingly been challenged, with research in both 
developed and developing economies applying a child-centred approach to the work children 
undertake, prioritising how children experience their work and how children understand their work 
as a social contribution. These studies include renewed ethnographic studies of children’s work 
(Bessell, 2009a, 2009b; Bøås and Hatløy, 2008; Bourdillon 2006, 2005, 2000; Leibel 2004; Levine, 
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2011, 1999; Mayblin, 2010; Morrow 2010; Woodhead 2004; Zelizer 2002). This shift towards a child-
centred scholarship is part of a broader disciplinary approach referred to as the ‘new childhood 
studies’ or the ‘new sociology of childhood’. The view that emerges is one where children are 
articulate, competent to make sense of their situation and the world around them. One of the main 
aims of this approach is to highlight the gaps in existing knowledge because of its ‘adultist’ 
epistemological biases and distortions (Alanen 2005, Qvortrup, Corsaro and Honig 2009, Thorne 
1987).  Methodologically children are treated as agents and co-constructors of knowledge. Obtaining 
children’s standpoint is a critical feature of the methodological and epistemological stance in these 
approaches. Inspired by the feminist critique of ‘malestream’ scientific knowledge, this scholarship 
also highlights the very real political implications of taking certain methodological positions. One of 
the key political contestations about methodological choice centres on how work is conceptualized2. 
In practice this has meant a proliferation of studies involving qualitative methods. 
 
Several interrelated consequences of this scholarship are evident in research on children’s work.  This 
research has challenged developmental views of childhood by emphasizing children’s subjectivity and 
competence and questions whether working is in fact detrimental to children. Greater emphasis is 
given to children’s perspectives and assessments about their work. For instance Levine (1999) found 
that child vineyard workers in South Africa claimed the right to work with their parents, not the 
simple economic right to work. In Norway, Solberg acquired a sense of the various kinds of work 
children do and discovered forms of work that were far removed from the usual perception of 
children’s work as exploitation (Solberg 1997, 2001). Similar studies have been undertaken by for 
example by Leonard (1999, 2004) of children’s paid and unpaid work in Northern Ireland, Song 
(1999) of young people’s work in family businesses in the United States, Abebe and Kjørholt (2009) 
of domestic, entrepreneurial and mobility work in Ethiopia, Morrow (1994) of children’s work 
outside of school in the United Kingdom, Faulstich Orellana (2001) and Valenzuela (1999) of 
Mexican and Central American immigrant children’s work as ‘family brokers’ in the United States, 
                                                          
2 In developing economies, a sizeable literature reports on the conceptual and practical difficulties of measuring work traditionally 
done by young women (Anker, Khan and Gupta 1988). Because much of the work undertaken by women is outside the formal 
economy, the literature emphasizes the under-reporting of women’s labour force activities and the failure to appreciate women’s 
economic contributions. Anker, Khan and Gupta suggests that similar difficulties in measurement are likely to exist in the 
measurement of children’s work activities, especially where children predominate in family based unpaid work. For example 
household work and childcare are not considered labour force activities according to the international definition adopted by the ILO, 
and are thus not included in counts of child labour. This is despite the significant amounts of time many children, particularly girls, 
are required to spend undertaking these activities, which may compromise their participation in other activities. 
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Nieuwenhuys (2000) of the interface between the household economy and the commercialisation of 
children’s labour in Kerala and Frederiksen (1999) of young people’s perspectives of work on the 
formal economy in Denmark. These studies less often adopt adult definitions of economic activity, 
and more often observe social interaction as it occurs. A range of non-market and non-school 
activities are considered productive. By ‘conceptually stretching’ work (Alanen, 2005) these studies 
emphasise the multiple sites that children work in, including the private sphere (such as domestic 
labour) and other informal economies (for example Green, 1990; Levey 2009; Leonard 2003, 1999; 
Liebel, 2004, 2003; Morrow, 1994; Solberg, 2001; Song, 1999; Haavind 2005; Zelizer, 2002).  These 
approaches therefore recognise that the work children are involved in represents a broad spectrum 
of experiences and that children’s engagement in productive activities is widespread, but hidden or 
not socially recognised.  
 
The new childhood studies has driven some important developments in the study of children’s work. 
However, within the new childhood studies, the translation, epistemologically, of standpoint theory 
into, methodologically, a preference for certain methods and an underlying disavowal of other 
methods, particularly quantitative methods, has left some unfortunate gaps in our knowledge. Four 
issues are of particularly importance for this study - the absence of systematic categorisation of 
children’s work; the lack of comparison across work contexts; promotion of a false opposition 
between agency and structure and the capacity of research to facilitate children’s expression of free 
will. 
 
While emphasising the multiple contexts in which children work, this research provides only limited 
knowledge of the prevalence and social distribution of different sorts of work, beyond the formal 
economy, although we are told that children’s work in the informal economy, for example, appears 
widespread. For example Solberg states that she sees children work everywhere, now that she has 
broadened her conception of work. Such casual observations are not uncommon amongst social 
scientists who otherwise undertake careful analysis and these assessments seem inadequate given that 
the wide variety of work is used as the basis by which such authors argue that children are commonly 
engaged in production. A related issue is that children’s work is not examined across contexts using 
some common standard of evaluation, such as the presence of particular conditions like 
remuneration or hours worked.  One could argue that to do so would be insensitive to diversity of 
context.  But by systematically comparing different contexts of work we can assess the quality of 
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conditions across work contexts. By not doing so, differences between types of work, work 
experiences and conditions are obscured.  
 
The agency-structure opposition relates to the question of the effects of social and economic 
structures on individual autonomy and expression of free will. One of the key features of sociological 
enquiry is the investigation of how social outcomes are shaped by social context, institutions, and 
social actions. Central to new childhood studies approaches are how certain structural factors effect 
work conditions, especially how ‘cultures of childhood’ generated through complex interactions 
between factors such as gender, class, race, ethnicity, age and so on. Reacting to the objectification of 
children in dominant approaches to child labour research, new childhood scholars have emphasised 
the individual as social subject. This is a particular adoption of standpoint concepts that highlight 
how individualised experiences are a function of social position. However it is not the failure to 
consider structural factors, but the voluntaristic conceptualisation of structures as applied to working 
children, which is problematic.  
 
Manfred Liebel (2004) has been particularly strident in this respect in his analysis of working children 
as social subjects. At the core of this position is a view of working children as individual rights 
bearers who make claims for social recognition. What is critical Liebel argues, is to what extent and 
under what conditions work can become a ‘free expression of life’ (9), such that children can take 
part in work as a freely chosen activity and are able to influence their living conditions. Children’s 
agency or subjectivity, is therefore situated in broader structural factors which are more or less 
limitations to children’s agency that need to be confronted. The subject, with a will of her own, is 
constructed in opposition to social, economic and political constraints that need to be overcome. 
The limitations Liebel lists include the inability of children to decide what work they wish to do, and 
that children work under conditions that offer little scope for personal development. These 
limitations may be caused by economic factors, like extreme poverty, or cultural factors, like 
hierarchies of age or gender. These issues are critically important and Liebel reminds us that as 
researchers we have a responsibility to enquire into the sources of oppression experienced by 
children who work. However, by viewing structure as something that undermines the capacity of 
working children to express their free will confuses forms of domination, which Liebel rightly 
opposes, with structural factors that constitute the very conditions and possibilities for work to 
occur. To understand how individual children come to identify as social subjects, and why other 
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children do not, methodologically we must locate the concept of the social subject (as conceptualised 
by Liebel) into the realm of sociological relations. From this view cultural, social, economic and 
political factors are instead constitutive of, as well as limit, agency. Using Liebel’s terms a strong 
sense of subjectivity (individuals as rights bearer deserving recognition and respect), which is a 
precondition for the types of identity-formation which Liebel advocates, is in fact socially constituted 
through the operation of social structures.  
 
Proponents of subject-oriented approaches might argue that to understand structural factors in this 
way inevitably risks objectifying children and denies the claims of many children to be able to act 
independently. However this assumes that structural factors are not concrete social realities. The 
operation of and constitution of these factors, may be outside the view of individual actors 
(Bourdieu 1998). At the level of cognitive dispositions, norms and attitudes towards work, the issue 
of work as a ‘free expression of life’ may never explicitly be brought into question because work is 
experienced as a type of embodied knowledge and perception, competence and mastery over the 
world (Merleau-Ponty 1945/1962).3 
 
When a fuller conception of sociological subjectivity is applied to the practice of research, other 
limits in the social subject approach become evident. At a pragmatic and definitional level, children’s 
own perceptions about what counts as work are likely to reflect dominant discourses about what 
counts as work.  Children may not count their activities as work because children may also believe 
that childhood is a time of non-work. Hence the limits of self-definition are evident here, and indeed 
many children considered as working children, using an expansive definition of work, may not define 
their activities as such. All research designs impose particular and partial constructions for 
participants and those undertaking the research. That is research is an intersubjective process 
influenced by the respective social position and background of the researcher and participant; the 
transformative effects of participation in research; and the personal relationship between the 
researcher and participant. All of these factors mediate the apparently uninhibited and independent 
                                                          
3 Or in Bourdieu’s own terms: “In order to capture the gist of social action, we must recognize the ontological complicity, … between 
the agent (who is neither a subject or a consciousness, nor the mere executant of a role or the Trager of a function) and the social 
world (which is never a mere ‘thing’ even if it must be constructed as such in the objectivist phase of research). Social reality exists, 
so to speak, twice, in things and in minds, in fields and in habitus, outside and inside of agents. And when habitus encounters a 
social world of which it is the product, it finds itself ‘as fish in water,’ it does not feel the weight of the water and takes the world 
about itself for granted. 
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expression of children’s will. What perhaps is better taken from the new childhood studies tradition 
is the need for a conceptual openness and a reflexive research practice. It is thus more important that 
we pay heed to how concepts are translated into particular methods, than argue about the choice of 
method itself. Both qualitative and quantitative methods can be used in research to either objectify or 
promote a subject-oriented view of children and childhood, and which more or less promotes 
children’s participation.  
 
1.3. Applying Developments in the Field: Implications for this study 
The gaps and developments in this literature sensitise us to some of the salient conceptual and 
methodological strengths and weaknesses in the child work literature that can inform the rationale 
and guide the approach taken in this study.  The insights and gaps in each approach are summarised 
in Table 1.2. How these developments and gaps contribute to the approach taken in this thesis, 
including the broad purpose of each chapter, are also summarised.  
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Table 1.1: Implications of existing approaches to the study of children’s work 
Research Approach4 Developments and Insights Gaps in Approach Thesis Contribution 
ILO - Welfare Economics Sensitises analysis to the importance of 
relational and socio-economic structures as 
partly determining whether children work or 
not. 
 
Lacks theory of child agency. 
 
Can be used to support exploitative labour 
practices. 
Chapter Two proposes a concept of 
economic agency that takes children as 
agents seriously, respects their capacity to 
act, but theorises agential capacity in the 
context of relational and socio-economic 
structures.   
 
ILO - Child Labour Studies 
 
Highlight the importance of analysing 
children’s work systematically, and in so 
doing differentiating work that meets certain 
standards from work that does not. 
Remain based in problem and normative 
child development discourses. Hence 
objectification occurs at two levels, in 
understanding work as being disruptive of 
proper socialization and objectifying 
children within the research process. 
 
Chapter Two draws attention to broader 
economic processes that are relevant to 
children’s economies without theorising 
socialisation in a deterministic way. 
Chapter Three outlines a methodology for 
analysing children’s work systematically 
without objectifying children in the research 
process. 
US/UK Enumeration studies 
 
Highlight the importance of assessing 
conditions and also the importance of 
sophisticated enumeration. 
Limited to paid employment on the formal 
labour market. Subjugates children’s 
experience of work to processes of 
economic socialisation and therefore 
promotes a productivist view of early work 
experiences. 
Chapter Two outlines the variety of fields in 
which economic activity is undertaken. 
Chapter Three outlines measures of decent 
work standards and intrinsic orientations / 
motivations, broadening assessment of 
children’s work to include a range of 
‘objective’ conditions and ‘subjective’ 
experiences. These form the foundation of 
the empirical case studies presented in 
Chapters Four to Six.  
New childhood studies  
 
 
Emphasises the multiple contexts and 
diversity of children’s work, challenges the 
assumption that children are unproductive 
and focuses on the standpoint of children 
who work. In so doing provides an avenue 
through which children’s own assessments 
of work are prioritised.   
 
Do not systematically assess types of work 
across multiple contexts. Constructs agency 
and structure in opposition. 
 
Chapter Two applies insights from the new 
childhood studies and economic sociology 
that identifies the multiple economies of 
children’s work. Chapter Three outlines the 
measures that allow identification of the 
presence or absence of certain conditions 
across work contexts. Chapter Four to Six 
empirically assess children’s economies in a 
systematic way to assess the prevalence and 
social distribution of children’s work across 
different economies. 
                                                          
4
 These assessments are based on the review undertaken in Sections 1.1 and 1.2. Please refer to these sections for  reference to specific studies. 
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In summary, from the welfare economic approach we find models that can help explain the causes of 
child labour. However an emphasis on elimination means these approaches rely on criteria generated 
unreflexively from external ‘taken-for-granted’ norms, such as that prima facie, work is harmful to 
children. This also opens these approaches to contradictory interpretations, such as that households 
should be able to dispose of children’s labour according to their own preferences. Undoubtedly 
where children work to ameliorate poverty, they are likely to have fewer opportunities to engage in 
work that is of interest or advantage to them, or to limit their work time to engage in other activities. 
However, children who work to ameliorate their poverty are not necessarily working in exploitative 
conditions, even in poor societies that are dependent on children’s work. Often, great value is placed 
on the work that children do and children receive significant esteem from their work contributions. 
The work, moreover, may have other significant benefits to the children or young people involved. 
However it is too simple to suggest that because children work out of economic necessity they are 
either exploited or in contrast their work forms part of a ‘natural’ system of family support. Instead, 
careful analysis of the nature of appropriation is required to determine whether work relations are 
exploitative or not. This thesis contributes to the analysis of this appropriation by obtaining a 
population based sample robust enough to make confident conclusions regarding the distribution of 
work participation and opportunities across the socio-economic structure. 
 
This leads to another problem in this research, that it denies agential capacity to children. The focus 
on households as agents means that children are constructed as deployable resources that can be sold 
onto the labour market. Children’s own capacity to contribute to and influence family decisions 
including whether they work or not, is rarely considered. Yet at the same time these approaches 
foreground the role of structures, both relational (for instance, internal family dynamics) and broader 
structures (such as national economic development, and poverty) in influencing whether children 
work or not.  
 
Child labour studies highlight the importance of analysing children’s work systematically and in so 
doing differentiate between work that meets certain standards from work that does not. However, 
these approaches remain rooted in a problem discourse about work more generally, which betrays a 
more fundamental issue of relevance to this study. The reliance on child socialization as the basis for 
differentiating between good and bad forms of work treats children as the objects of socialisation 
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processes that are disrupted by their involvement in work. Methodologically children are objectified 
in the research process, rather than being participants in subject centred research.  
 
Survey based research in the United Kingdom and the United States have provided evidence that 
many children remain engaged in productive economic activities in developed economies, even 
though these productive activities are not as central to children’s own identities, household coping 
strategies and broader economic processes, as they once were. In particular the United States studies 
indicate the importance of systematically assessing conditions of work, rather than whether work per 
se is good or bad and therefore expand on the knowledge provided by studies that employ more 
generic assessments of work. However these studies, in attempting to show that children’s work is 
not marginal, focus on a narrow range of work activities and have ignored economic activities 
undertaken by children outside the formal economy. This reliance on orthodox categories of labour 
also suggests a broader normative position about what are the appropriate boundaries of childhood. 
This also promotes an overly productivist view of labour – where the primary concern is whether 
and how early work experiences are related to labour market outcomes in adulthood. Children’s own 
experiences are subjugated to these concerns and has diverted attention from the quality of the work 
children do.  
 
Studies based in new childhood scholarship provide a basis for a child-centred theory of work. By 
emphasising children’s subjectivity and competence, this research argues that children are subjects in 
economic processes and consequently do not start from a position that work is harmful. This body 
of work also challenges orthodox definitions of work as paid employment on the formal economy to 
include a broader range of activities that children may be engaged in. However, although these 
studies identify that children work across multiple contexts, they do not systematically assess types of 
work across those multiple contexts. Furthermore there may be a different distribution of different 
types of work among different sub-populations of children. By not systematically assessing 
conditions across children’s economies, new childhood studies approaches provide little context 
specific knowledge about whether children experience different labour markets in different ways and 
whether different social rewards associated with work, such as pay, work security and social esteem, 
are available across different economies. Furthermore, the agential subject is constructed in 
opposition to social, economic and political constraints that need to be overcome. 
 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
Chapter One: Introduction - 21 
Having identified some of the developments and gaps in the research, the implications for this thesis 
are several. The thesis empirically assesses children’s economies in a systematic manner to assess the 
prevalence and social distribution of children’s work across different economies, the formal, informal 
and family based economies. We identify these economies through an assessment and application of 
the economic sociology literature relating to labour markets. This is undertaken in Chapter Two, 
which outlines the theoretical and conceptual framework adopted in this thesis. In assessing these 
economies, the thesis applies consistent standards of evaluation, adapting the ILO’s decent work 
standards, or work securities, to examine work conditions across these different children’s 
economies. Chapter Three outlines measures of decent work standards and intrinsic orientations that 
form the foundation of the empirical case studies presented in Chapters Four to Six. 
 
An important theoretical problem addressed is that structural factors constitute the possibilities for 
work to occur. Claims to acting independently neither negate the existence of such structural factors 
nor assist understanding of how these factors create the condition for independent action and self-
understanding. Chapter Two, which specifies the theoretical framework and conceptual tools used in 
this thesis, draws upon the sociology of work and economic sociology literature to reconceptualise 
the problems arising from the subject oriented approach.  Rather than opposing agency and 
structure, social structures enable the possibilities through which work processes and activities are 
enacted by individuals. These issues, in light of the findings are returned to in the conclusion.
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 Chapter 2: Developing a Framework for Analysis –  
Forms of Economic Action and the Limits of Agency as Autonomy  
 
Chapter One has sensitised us to several issues. Children’s work occurs within a larger social 
context constituted historically, economically and politically. Furthermore, children work across 
multiple contexts, including the formal economy, at home, at school and in the informal 
economy.  Despite these insights no systematic assessment of children’s work across these 
multiple economies has been undertaken and identifying these fields clearly remains an important 
endeavour. Chapter One also discussed the need for a systematic comparison of fields of work 
using a common standard of evaluation, such as the presence of particular conditions such as 
remuneration or hours involved. In terms of understanding children’s agency, children have been 
objectified in many existing analyses of children’s work, or in contrast assessments of children’s 
subjectivity through work have emphasised agency in opposition to structure. Both positions, 
either objectifying children or promoting an overly voluntaristic concept of agency are 
problematic. 
 
The analytical framework adopted in this thesis takes account of the specific contexts of 
children’s work, but assesses work across these contexts in a systematic way. This includes how 
economic and social structures influence work experiences and work conditions; and whether 
different forms of economic agency are specific to economic contexts. This chapter moves from 
the general to the specific by first outlining the broad concepts of ‘relational’ and ‘structural 
embeddedness’ and how relational and structural embeddedness influence economic agency.  We 
finally examine how forms of relational embeddedness, structural embeddedness and consequent 
forms of economic agency can be conceptualised as specific fields of action, in this case specific 
’economies’, that are empirically examined in Chapters Four through Six.  
 
The next two sections show that ‘fields of work’ are characterised by individual interactions (or 
forms of relational embeddedness) that occur within broader economic and social factors 
(structural embeddedness). Drawing upon the work of Karl Polanyi, in particular, we show that 
relational and structural embeddedness have a conceptual relationship, and that forms of 
structural embeddedness in part set the parameters for the type of interactions between 
individuals. This sensitises us to the importance of broader economic and social processes at one 
level, but also to the importance of how work is experienced by individuals in terms of 
motivation and orientations. Drawing upon the work of Mark Granovetter and Pierre Bourdieu, 
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we show that structural and relational embeddedness simultaneously constitute, enable and limit 
expressions of action that can be understood as forms of agency, and furthermore enable 
activities to be understood by social actors as work in the first instance. Hence a conception of 
economic agency is proposed - as action constituted intersubjectively, that occurs within the 
parameters set by and enabled through structures of social space.  
 
The insights gained from these sections and from Chapter One, are conceptually applied in the 
section ‘Identifying the multiple contexts of children’s work’, which outlines some of the defining 
characteristics of specific economic fields, and therefore the multiple contexts of children’s work 
(i.e. the formal, informal and family based economies). These analytic tools also assist in 
identifying the structural transformations that have had a marked impact on the nature of social 
interactions within each specific economy and the relevant structural and relational factors in 
each field, factors that are empirically examined in Chapters Four to Six. The chapter concludes 
by outlining how the framework is applied in these chapters.  
 
2.1. Systems of social relations and the motivations to work 
Economic sociology emphasises that economic contexts reflect and are embedded in social and 
cultural contexts; and actor preferences and actions are less intact, calculated and about 
maximising utility, than socially derived cognitive strategies, substantive rationality, feelings, roles, 
norms, myths and expectations (Guillen et al. 2002). The work of Karl Polanyi is a classical 
reference in this study of economic embeddedness. Polanyi illustrates the reliance of markets 
upon social relations and that the formal market is only one institution in which economic 
exchange can occur. According to Polanyi (1944) rational self-interest is too unstable a 
foundation for the functioning of economic life. Economic life is integrated with social life 
through other organising principles, which stabilise the economy and allow for sustained 
relationships between economy and society.  
 
Polanyi (1957) identifies three ways which the economy is organised; reciprocity, occurring within 
symmetrical groups such as families, neighbourhoods and kinship groups; redistribution 
involving the allocation of goods from a centre in the community, for example the state; and 
exchange involving the distribution of goods via markets. In each economy there is a mix of 
these three forms and their corresponding institutions, the family, the state and the market. This 
is illustrated in Figure 2.1: 
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Figure 2.1: Three Forms of Economic Organisation 
 
 
 
Individual level:  
 
 
Institutional level: 
 
 
 
 
 
As a form of economic action, work is not only motivated by instrumental rationality, including 
the attainment of money, goods or services, but also for less tangible motivations such as respect, 
obligation, duty or moral obligation. Various extensions and alternative framings of this central 
argument have been elaborated, all of which in some respect build upon the work of Polanyi (for 
example Korczynski, Hodson and Edwards 2006, Boltanski and Thévenot 1999 and Folbre 1995.  
What all these typologies have in common is that multiple logics of motivation exist and are 
associated with specific fields of action, whether that be the existence or non-existence of one or 
other coordinating base, or whether in any particular field, different forms of justification co-
exist. Therefore modes of motivation for social action and the meaning of that social action will 
depend upon the specific field involved. 
 
 
2.2. Levels of embeddedness: relating the relational and the structural in 
determining economic agency 
Economic action is motivated by a range of orientations instituted through different forms of 
economic organisation. However different types of social relations are evident: those that form 
the immediate interpersonal and organisational context of work, and the socio-structural context, 
which shapes the dispositions and choices of individual actors. Drawing upon the work of 
Polanyi, Mark Granovetter (1985) specifically addresses this issue through his concepts of 
relational and structural embeddedness. 
 
Granovetter describes relational embeddedness as the immediate interpersonal and organisational 
context of work, which can be analysed in terms of forms of motivation, justification and 
understandings/meanings of action. These form the ‘rules’ or characteristics of the ‘field’ in 
which work occurs. Questions around how actors define their interests (constitutive effects) and 
regulate their behaviour (regulatory effects) are also relevant here (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990). 
The particular modes of social action, such as instrumentality, altruism, reciprocity and 
Reciprocity Redistribution Exchange 
eg. family eg. state eg. market 
Habitus, , relational 
embeddedness 
Level of social relations 
Socio-structural context, 
structural embeddedness 
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obligation, are an expression of economic agency as it is enacted through interpersonal 
interactions with others in their work environment. However Granovetter argues that the 
possibilities for action are coordinated by the second level, the socio-structural context that 
shapes the dispositions and choices of individual actors. He describes this as structural 
embeddedness. What these factors include is specific to political and economic contexts, but 
include structural transformations in the world of work; the social distribution of different forms 
of work according to organising structures of class and gender (which in turn reflect significant 
cultural and political transformations that have been described under the rubric of the ‘politics of 
recognition’ and the ‘politics of redistribution’ – (see Fraser and Honneth (2003), Outhwaite and 
Honneth (2009); and welfare state configurations (Esping-Andersen 1990; 2009). To this we can 
add the historical and cultural transformation of childhood, from a period productivity to one of 
non-productivity subsumed within the family and school (Zelizer 1985). Feminist scholars of 
children’s work also point to the important role of patriarchal structures in defining work roles, 
conditions and the broader organisation and access to work for children (Nieuwenhuys 1996, 
Levison 2000). In all fields of work it is likely that gender norms, obligations and constraints 
provide a substantive basis for different experiences of work between young men and women. 
 
While Granovetter develops the concepts of structural and relational embeddedness, his work 
has been criticised for not developing how structural and relational embeddedness are related in 
his framework. Pierre Bourdieu’s work (1990; 2005) relates individual action and social structure 
in ways complementary to the embeddedness thesis, through his concepts of field, capital and 
habitus. While Granovetter emphasises the interactions, networks and norms required for choice 
to take effect, Bourdieu emphasises the structure of the field, or relations of power, as orienting 
action. According to Bourdieu, the economy or specific economic phenomena, can be 
conceptualised as a field, defined as a structure of actual and potential relations with its own logic. 
The structure of a field can be understood in terms of the distribution of different forms of 
capital, particularly social, cultural and symbolic capital (to which Bourdieu adds, specifically with 
reference to the economic field, financial capital, technological capital, and commercial capital 
and juridical/ organisational capital (2005). Depending on the specific nature of the field, certain 
forms of capital are more highly valued than others.  
 
The structure of the field, or as Bourdieu puts it, ‘the structure of relations of force’ determine 
the conditions of action. The individual acts of agents are meaningful within the structure of 
relations that comprise the field (2005, p. 77). The structural delimits the space of possible 
actions and these actions are oriented towards and in turn reconstitute the ‘rules’ of the field. 
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However habitus, understood as a structure of the mind characterized by a set of acquired 
dispositions, (such as those orientations described in the previous section), is “an intelligent 
response to an actively selected aspect of the real” which takes into account history and likely 
trajectory into the future, and hence is “both determined and spontaneous” (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 
85)
5
. The issue of choice, constituted as free action in liberal theories of agency, does not account 
for the sociality of action. Rather, the actor is always an individual and social actor and individual 
acts are both an expression of individual and social action. 
 
Bourdieu’s work points to the operation of different modes of rationality in different spheres, 
constrained by conventions and social relations. While the thesis does not specifically apply these 
concepts to analyse children’s work, on the basis of these concepts we can potentially hypothesise 
that the various fields of action in which children work are constituted by different rules and 
logics of action that form the environment in which interactions take place. Furthermore the 
rewards obtained through these interactions reflect what forms of capital are most highly valued 
within each field Applying the work of Granovetter and Polanyi, at an ideal-typical level each 
field is constituted through forms of structural embeddedness that in turn establish the 
parameters of the work habitus of child workers in each field and those they interact with in the 
performance of the productive activities which constitute work. However, determining the 
precise nature of the actors in a field and their influence over the logic of action (what Bourdieu 
calls the prevailing relation of force) is a matter of empirical investigation. The work of Polanyi 
(reciprocity/exchange), Korczynski et al (power/ norm/ exchange) or Boltanski and Thevenot 
(passion /trust /solidarity/ recognition/ exchange/ function), provide pointers to the possible 
logics of action that exist across fields. For example work may be regulated through obligation in 
the family, reciprocity on the informal economy and exchange on the formal economy. A fuller 
exploration of the possible fields are examined in the next section. 
 
2.3. Identifying the multiple contexts of children’s work 
The framework thus far draws on the insights from existing literature on children’s work and, 
using ideas drawn from economic sociology, suggests the existence of multiple fields of work 
with associated logics of action. These are however general concepts that frame analysis. Which 
fields, or specific work contexts, children work in remains an open question.  Part of the answer 
                                                          
5 This is in some ways similar to, and accommodates the insights of, cultural approaches to economic 
sociology that emphasise how different ‘cultures’ are associated with and predict different modes of 
exchange and market logics. 
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comes from studies of children’s labour, which has examined the work children undertake across 
various social contexts, including, but not limited to the formal economy. However, this research 
has made little use of the more general concepts provided by the sociology of work. Studies on 
precarious work on the formal economy, non-standard work, and work on the informal economy 
are relevant to making sense of children’s work in a systematic way. At the same time these 
literatures have rarely, if ever, considered children. By synthesising the embedded agency 
framework discussed so far with insights drawn from the sociology of work, we can attempt to 
identify the fields, or economies, that children work in.  
 
Beamish and Biggart identify a limited number of systems of exchange that influence how work 
is arranged –what they refer to as the ‘worlds of work’. Only some of these systems of exchange 
have been fully ‘marketised’ (Beamish and Biggart 2006, pp 242-243)
6
. They identify four ideal-
type systems of exchange, which provide a useful set of categories to map children’s work – 
market systems, associative systems, communal systems and moral systems. The main features of 
each system are summarised in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1. The ‘Worlds of Work’ 
 Market Systems Associative Communal  Moral 
Structure Market Network Collective Substantive 
Alignment Instrumental-
universalistic 
Instrumental-particularistic Substantive-
particularistic 
Substantive-
universalistic 
Meaning ‘You pay and I’ll 
work’ 
‘I’ll work for your benefit, if you’ll 
work for my benefit’ 
‘I work out of obligation 
to the group’ 
‘I work for a higher 
purpose’ 
Remuneration Wages Payment Privilege Honor 
Differentiation Individualistic Relational In/out group Ethical 
Relation Contractual Extended/partnership Obligatory Normative 
Exit Final Breach Elder status None 
(Source: Beamish and Biggart 2006, p. 243) 
 
                                                          
6 As discussed in Section 2.1, a range of conceptual schema have been elaborated that typify forms of economic 
exchange and associated economic logics of action. For example Korczynski, Hodson and Edwards (2006) identify 
three fundamental bases of social action across the economy - power (including hierarchy and claims for social 
recognition), market (particularly exchange) and social norms (operating within groups of association, such as trust 
and loyalty). Each form of social action, at an ideal-typical level, tends towards different forms of social integration 
and consensus, or potentials for conflict. Another example is provided by Boltanski and Thévenot (1999), whose 
‘worlds of justification’ can be interpreted as forms of motivation, largely determined by the context in which the 
work is performed. A person working for a firm can justify their behaviour (or be motivated to act or understand 
their actions) on the basis of instrumental efficiency (the market) or loyalty (the domestic world), for example. These 
modes of justification in turn can become conventions of social action and lead to very different expectations and 
outcomes. Another example is provided by Nancy Folbre’s (1995) identification of the three motives for ‘caring 
labor’: altruism, long-run reciprocity, and fulfilment of obligation or responsibility, to which Levison adds, 
specifically for children, coercion – the ability of adult’s to dictate children’s behaviour (2000, 130). However the 
work of Beamish and Biggart’s typology is possibly the most systemic in discussing various characteristics of each 
system of exchange that are amenable to operationalising empirically, which are summarised in Table 2.1. 
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This schema provides a bridge between work fields or economies (market, network, collective 
and moral) and work motivations or logics of action associated with each field.  At this ideal 
typical level two major continuums differentiate the logic of each system of exchange- whether it 
is aligned according to instrumental or substantive-rational modes of action; and whether the 
social relations are universalistic or particularistic, which in turn give work ‘field specific’ social 
meaning. Specific structures and logics of alignment are associated with particular conditions, 
conceptualised by Beamish and Biggart as remuneration, differentiation, relation and exit. The 
‘Market world of work’ refers to the formal economy (Chapter Four); the ‘Systems-Associative’ 
most closely aligns with the informal economy (Chapter Five), with aspects of the ‘Moral world 
of work’ also evident (see associative forms of work – Chapter Five); and the ‘Communal world 
of work’ most closely aligns with the family economy (Chapter Six). The links between these 
elements for each system of exchange are more fully described below. Each section briefly 
describes the characteristics of each economic field derived from the work of Beamish and 
Biggart (2006) and a synthesis of the theoretical material presented in this chapter thus far. They 
therefore provide ideal-type descriptions for the empirical analyses presented in Chapters Four, 
Five and Six. Specific hypotheses generated from the theoretical synthesis are foreshadowed in 
the Conclusion to this Chapter and, with the examination of structural transformations within 
each economy, are detailed within the empirical chapters.  
 
2.3.1. The formal economy: exchange and self-interest logic 
Work on the formal economy is the prevailing system of work in developed economies.  The 
formal economy is prescribed and legitimated through law, including laws that constitute the 
industrial relations system, including arbitration and wage setting, laws that constitute 
corporations, and the law of employment (including common law employment contracts, awards 
and agreements). These systems underpin the main organising structure of the formal economy, 
the employment contract. These systems vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Orthodox 
economic theory assumes that transactions between employers and employees on the formal 
economy involve utilitarian reasoning as the basis of action. This ultimately conditions the 
expectations and motivations of workers, especially around modes of remuneration. Accordingly 
the perfect market for labour involves the free exchange of actors buying and selling their labour, 
who strategise their actions based on price signals (reflecting supply and demand) within the 
market (Becker 1976). Therefore exchange is characterised by strict forms of instrumental 
rationality geared towards obtaining tangible benefits such as money and skills from selling one’s 
labour. Given this, children are likely to occupy only a marginal position in the formal labour 
market, in low-skill and low-pay jobs. 
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Sociological accounts of markets complicate these assumptions by showing that market systems 
of exchange are neither universal nor free from other logics of action. As social and cultural 
constructions, formal markets are constituted through forms of social action other than those 
ascribed to market actors by orthodox economic theory – instrumental behaviour is modified by 
other social norms within a social and relational context (Abolafia 1996, Polanyi 1957, Lie 1997 
1996)
7
. These accounts also emphasise how monetary exchange can also be a means of 
conferring other less tangible but socially recognised rewards, such as status, power and social 
esteem. Behaviour on the formal market is characterised by affiliations, culture and institutions, 
as well as instrumental rationality (Beamish and Biggart 2006).  
 
2.3.2. Associative systems of work: alliance logic 
Associative systems of work are based upon strong and weak ties between co-exchangers. Work 
is arranged through networks of relations and exchange, and rather than being formal and 
universal is particular and preferential. Studies of associative systems of work indicate that 
preference for exchange is given to those who are members of the network of relations over 
those who are not (Castells and Portes 1989; Leonard 1998; Portes, 1994; Slack 2007; Williams 
and Windebank, 1998 Williams and Windebank 2001). Work is, nonetheless, instrumental in 
character, organised around achieving a particular end, such as completing a specific work task 
for money. The successful conduct of work is reliant upon, in an organisational context, the 
success of the association, and in more informal terms, the ongoing success of the relationship, 
with successful relations between economic actors characterised by ongoing cooperation, mutual 
support and reciprocity achieving mutual gain for the parties involved (Beamish and Biggart 
2006, p. 255). Put differently, the main logic of action is based around alliance and partnership. 
Informal economies operate on the absence of legal means to enforce contractual obligations. 
The success of transactions relies instead on ‘socially monitored transactions’ between networks 
of actors (Portes and Haller 2005: 407). Examples of associative systems of work include work 
guilds, cottage industries and professional associations (Van Maanen and Barley, 1984; Wenger 
and Snyder, 2000). This also includes what has been called the informal economy (Portes and 
Haller 2005), which encompasses productive activities that are not regulated by the state (Fiege 
1990).  
 
                                                          
7 Several studies have found that the proper functioning of formal markets require some elements configured 
along associative (Granovetter 1973, Child and Faulkner 1998) or communal (Dore 1973, Kondo 1990) modes of 
organisation. Especially for communal modes, the metaphor of the ‘family’ is sometimes used to enforce 
compliance and obligation among workers. 
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For children, examples most likely correspond to work on the informal open market, semi-
entrepreneurial activities (where children offer their services through known networks), work 
undertaken for friends or known persons outside of kinship groups and work organised through 
associative organisations, including schools, religious groups, sport and community groups 
(Gullestad 1992). One of the important insights from studies of the informal economy for our 
understanding of associative systems of work, is a focus on the characteristics of the relationships 
and process of exchange, rather than what is produced. The same sorts of commodities or 
services could be produced and sold either on the formal or informal market. This ‘process’ 
orientation is extended through a functional classification of activities according to their goals – 
of survival (of the individual or household through direct subsistence); or dependant exploitation 
(increased flexibility and reduced labour costs for employers through off-the book arrangements); 
or growth.  
 
2.3.3. Communal Systems of Work: obligation logic 
Communal systems of work are based on logics of collectivity and obligation. This work is 
undertaken between actors linked through highly particular relationships, such as family and kin, 
ethnic identity or communal order. The nature of the relationship takes priority over other 
factors and thus determines the nature of the work, the conditions of work and the 
understanding of the activity as part of the life of the group. It is the substantive nature of the 
binding relationships that makes this form of work different to associative systems of work. 
Work and the benefits from working may be organised through rules operating within the group, 
rather than external systems of regulation (for instance the law) or ethics (for instance rights) 
(Beamish and Biggart 2006, 256-257). This system of work is often associated with pre-modern 
social systems or highly closed groups, such as organised crime circles (Gambetta 1993). 
However household production, including caring and domestic labour are also examples of work 
organised along lines of obligation (Folbre 1995, Himmelweit 1995, 2002; Meagher 2003).  Pahl 
(1984) also includes the self-provisioning of goods and services by households. Activities like 
home repair and gardening are types of direct subsistence production that represent an attempt 
to maximise household resources by limiting reliance on the market. Another example are family 
businesses, which potentially blur the line between family based obligation and formal labour 
market instrumentality.  
 
Family-based work can also be the site of coercive practices involving family members. Several 
scholars have highlighted how family based work can be characterised by duress against, in 
particular, women and children. In addressing the involvement of children in family based work, 
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they point out that the prohibition of formal child labour has made licit work in the informal and 
family-based economy. However this has had a ‘paradox’ effect (Nieuwenhuys 1996) of 
promoting children’s involvement in unregulated work –domestic and informal work - and 
discouraging their involvement in work most likely to be regulated – paid work on the formal 
economy. The hidden nature of exploitation in informal and family based work, may mean that it 
is difficult to assign value to labour, especially monetary remuneration (White and Wyn 2004). 
Group membership determines who is able to do the work, and for this reason children are likely 
to be involved in a wide variety of family based work, depending on the needs of the family. 
Because work is organised around obligation, personal benefit may not be emphasised in these 
work environments. However whether family based work is harmful to children because it is 
unregulated remains an open question (Boyden, Ling and Myers 1998).
8
  
 
2.3.4. Moral systems of work: higher purpose logic 
Moral work is organised around substantive beliefs and principles – such as an ethical system or 
purpose. Hence, moral systems of work are oriented towards substantive rather than instrumental 
ends, and work conditions and tasks are organised around this ethical or moral system. For 
example recognition and the articulation of one’s beliefs through the work may be the form of 
compensation (Beamish and Biggart 2006, 258-259). Examples of this work include religious 
work (Sibler 1993), domestic work as moral commitment to family (Devault 1991, Ahlander and 
Bahr 1995), work in communes (Simons and Ingram 1997) and political activism. Beamish and 
Biggart cite Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism as the most prominent example 
of this logic of action.  
 
For children, moral systems of work are likely to involve volunteer work for community groups, 
schools or religious groups (such as teaching at Sunday school). Here children’s agency is 
expressed in terms of social responsibility and moral obligation. While not a specific chapter in 
this thesis, because the number of young people performing this work is too small to analyse 
separately, this work is examined in Chapter Five: The Informal Economy, as a sub-category of 
associative work. 
 
2.4. Conclusion to Chapter Two 
Our discussion highlights that economic agency as expressed through children’s work can be 
understood through the concepts of structural and relational embeddedness. These concepts 
                                                          
8
 Himmelweit’s (1995) thesis about the treatment of care work is relevant, except here the model of formal paid 
work is used to denigrate other forms of work on an a priori basis.  
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provide a framework for analysing children’s work. Polanyi, and those that build on his insights, 
allow us to see that children’s work is embedded in concrete systems of social relations. 
Economic agency is therefore an expression of relational embeddedness, which in turn, is in part 
determined by forms of structural embeddedness. The work of Bourdieu provides a conceptual 
bridge between structural and relational embeddedness by showing that individual dispositions 
(habitus) and interpersonal interactions are reflected in rules of behaviour (the ‘field’) that are 
constituted through broader relations of power and social transformations. What these 
theoretical insights also alert us to is that economic transactions, in this case work, do not merely 
evidence exchange rationales. Different orientations or modes of motivation are also present and 
include obligation, altruism and reciprocity. These orientations represent types of economic 
agency embedded in different social environments, and thus agency is the expression of a mix of 
these socially embedded orientations, rather than merely the expression of free will.  
 
In the proceeding chapters we show that the specific nature of these social relations are 
associated with the conditions, meaning and experience of work for children. Children undertake 
their work within (or embedded in) various institutions which shape the nature and exercise of 
agency, the definition of their activity as productive or not, and the immediate conditions 
(including rewards) of these activities. The concepts of exchange instituted in markets, reciprocity 
instituted in symmetrical groups and obligation instituted in groups of identity correspond with 
the formal (Chapter Four), informal (Chapter Five) and family based (Chapter Six) economies 
respectively.  
 
These empirical chapters, proceed initially by examining forms of ‘structural embeddedness’ 
relevant to each field of work. By examining the broader social and economic characteristics and 
transitions within each economy, we identify key hypotheses that guide analysis of the social 
distribution and conditions within each economy. Each chapter then proceeds to examine 
relational embeddedness within each economy. While examining the same measures in each 
chapter, the discussion of relational embeddedness follows on from the hypotheses identified in 
the discussions of structural embeddedness. This allows an examination of the links between 
forms of structural and relational embeddedness. The analysis therefore moves from broader 
economic and social processes to how work is experienced by individuals in terms of motivation 
and orientations. The implicit argument in this method is that structural and relational 
embeddedness simultaneously constitute, enable and limit agency, which is expressed through 
interactions with others. 
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For the formal economy we focus on the development of primary and secondary labour markets 
and service economy with a consequent skills polarization in labour market. The hypotheses 
examined are whether this skills polarization is associated with labour market segmentation 
according to class and other social position characteristics, such as age and gender; and whether 
skill level is associated with differences in conditions for young people, consistent with dual 
labour market theory. While participation in the formal economy for young people has 
increasingly involved low pay, employment insecurity and working-time insecurity (Mills 2004, 
Campbell 1997), for children who combine school and work, the impacts are unclear, with the 
trend both increasing flexibility but also undermining reliability of work. We assess the role of 
instrumental orientations in conferring rewards, hypothesise if young people primarily identify as 
consumers rather than producers, whether consumption is a primary rationale for young people 
to work, and whether the act of monetary exchange is also associated with intrinsic orientations.  
 
For the informal economy, we discuss how contention around whether the informal economy is 
marginal to economic development, or is an alternative source of economic development has 
been framed as a debate about whether workers on the informal economy are ‘disguised workers’ 
or ‘informal entrepreneurs’. We explore the implications of this debate for children’s involvement 
in the informal economy, by hypothesising that more marginal groups of children and young 
people are more likely to participate in the informal economy. As discussed in the previous 
section, the absence of formal laws and regulations means that work conditions are determined 
through the strength and nature of the ties between the actors. This raises two issues. The lack of 
formal regulation may mean that conditions on the informal economy are poor. Secondly, given 
that conditions are mediated through the strength of associative relationships, the quality of 
conditions may also be reliant upon the strength and particularity of the relationship between the 
worker and the purchaser of the goods or services. We develop a set of hypotheses to examine 
these issues including whether the strength and specificity of the association between worker and 
purchaser affects work conditions. Furthermore, because individuals are motivated to engage in 
economic activities by a variety of goals, including communal and reciprocal goals, the nature of 
the relationship between worker and purchaser may influence the sorts of orientations associated 
with the work. We therefore also test the hypothesis that work predicated upon strong 
particularistic ties is more likely to associated with intrinsic orientations; and conversely work 
predicated upon weak universal ties associated with higher levels of instrumental orientations.  
 
For the family based economy we show that household productive activities can be understood 
in terms of a continuum from use-value (products consumed by the household) to exchange-
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
Chapter Two: Developing a Framework for Analysis    34 
value (products sold on informal or formal market). We also discuss how children’s contributions 
to family life raise issues of the balance between obligation and responsibility within the domestic 
sphere. Given that some of this work may be consumed by the household (e.g. domestic labour) 
and other family based work may be sold onto the informal or formal market (e.g. family 
businesses) it remains an empirical question whether work oriented to the market obtains more 
formal conditions. Greater demarcation between ‘work-life’ and ‘family-life’ may also be more 
evident for production for the formal market and less where work is for use within the 
household. We analyse whether the use-value/exchange-value continuum can explain the social 
distribution of types of work within the family economy, and hypothesis that the more work is 
oriented to the market, the more formal the conditions. We also test the hypothesis that 
instrumental orientations are more likely for work geared to exchange value; and therefore 
whether greater levels of intrinsic and altruistic orientations are evident for work that involves 
production of goods for use-value. This shifts analysis away from assessments about whether 
obligation rationales consolidate intimate relations or whether work represents a 
commodification of intimate relations, by differentiating between types of work that occur within 
the family.  
 
Having developed the analytical framework, Chapter Three outlines the methodology employed, 
including how the concepts outlined in this chapter have been operationalised, as well as the 
details of the fieldwork, methods used and profile of the participants in the study.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter Two has outlined the analytical tools used to understand children’s work. This chapter 
outlines the methodology employed to obtain data on children’s work, and how the concepts 
outlined in Chapter Two are operationalised to obtain children’s perspectives on their work and to 
compare work conditions across economies. A questionnaire based survey of approximately 11,000 
young people aged 12 to 16 years was undertaken that obtained data on the prevalence and type of 
young people’s work, their work conditions, job satisfaction and the quality of the work they 
perform. This methodology provides a statistical outline of the fields or economies of children’s 
work, an assessment of the social distribution of work across these fields, an examination of the 
quality of conditions and an analysis of the extrinsic and intrinsic orientations from working. The 
data is analysed in what can be described as a multiple case study approach (Yin, 2009), in that the 
same data items are analysed identically for mutually exclusive subsets of data utilising the analytical 
framework identified in Chapter Two. Each subset is specific to an economy; namely, the formal 
(Chapter Four), informal (Chapter Five) and family-based economies (Chapter Six). The remainder 
of the chapter provides a rationale for the methodology employed, and outlines some technical 
aspects of the conduct of the research. This includes details of the instrument and measures used, 
and details of the fieldwork administration such as sampling method and strategy, piloting, fieldwork 
practice, data entry and data management. 
 
3.2. Rationale for the Research Design 
Chapter One traced how prevailing approaches in the child work literature have inadvertently 
promoted oppositions in the research on children’s work, such as structure and action and objective 
and subjective modes of knowledge, operationalised as an incompatibility between quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Despite an increasing recognition within the social sciences of the value of 
mixed-methods or multi-methodology research (Creswell 2004, Brannen 2005, Flyvbjerg 2001, 
Tashakkori and Teddlie 2010), dominant methodological approaches in the child work area seem to 
have left us with a difficult choice between ethnographic, small scale studies that document the 
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diverse forms of work children undertake and large scale, quantitative studies that provide robust and 
externally generalisable findings but are limited by a commonsense concept of work.  
 
Reflecting post-positivist developments in epistemology, it is with reference to qualitative approaches 
that commentators discuss the shift to subject-oriented studies of children’s work that unsettle the 
dominant discourse about child labour. For example, Liebel identifies “two contrary paradigms” – 
one where “research is oriented towards a picture of childhood that arose with bourgeois society in 
Europe and sees the work of children as a relic of past times, and therefore hostile to children.  This 
research is above all interested in data and documentation that underline the harmful and negative 
consequences for children”. The counter trend involves research that considers childhood and work 
“as an open relationship that needs to be examined … above all taking into account the viewpoint of 
children” (2004, p50). However opposing paradigms in this way confuses form with substance. 
Liebel’s real concern with quantitative approaches is their positivist, Eurocentric and 
developmentalist tendencies, rather than the method itself. Yet for those professing a subject 
oriented philosophy, a general mistrust of quantitative research abounds. The opposition of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches has confused the method with the epistemological approach 
used in applying these methods. In consequence the research suffers from not utilising the full range 
of tools that the social sciences offer.  What is more important is that techniques are mobilised which 
are relevant and practically useful for the problem being investigated. 
 
The research design used in this study attempts to bring together the interpretive insights of new 
childhood studies approaches with an empirical base that allows systematic analysis of work across 
the formal, informal and family based economies. It does this by obtaining children’s descriptions of 
the work they undertake guided by a broad definition of work. By documenting children’s 
perspectives, orthodox definitions of work as paid employment on the formal labour market are 
broadened to include other activities that children may be engaged in. Children’s own assessments of 
work conditions and rewards from work are also obtained, including extrinsic and intrinsic 
orientations.  However, by systematically obtaining data from a large number of participants on the 
prevalence of different types of work and conditions across economies, we can also assess whether 
inequality in work prevalence, type and conditions is linked to the social position of children. While 
complementary qualitative methods would be ideal to explore in greater depth some of the issues 
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raised in this thesis, especially findings related to the interaction of extrinsic and intrinsic 
orientations, use of such methods was beyond the time and financial resources of this study.  
 
3.3. Instrumentation 
 
3.3.1. Defining the Field: Questions about jobs and work 
The methodological opposition between qualitative and quantitative approaches has, as outlined in 
Chapter One, also involved contestation over the definition of work. In most studies of children’s 
work a ‘common sense’ concept of work has been uncritically adopted into the ‘scientific language’ 
used. However reliance upon this definition reflects, adopts and reproduces a common social 
understanding of work, legitimated by social science, which has come to dominate other possible 
understandings. In order to adequately evaluate children’s work, a more wide-ranging and rigorous 
consideration of the possible forms of work that children undertake is required.  
 
New childhood studies scholarship has challenged the common sense concept of work by 
documenting how children perform a variety of work activities that cannot strictly be defined as 
wage labour, but possess some kind of economic value. However in broadening the range of 
activities that potentially constitute work, conceptual clarity is compromised. For instance Kirchhofer 
(1998: 67) provides a useful definition of work as an activity aimed at the alteration of objective 
states of affairs and with which the individual satisfies his own needs or those of others, and thus 
creates usefulness (Kirchhofer 1998: 67). Kirchhofer’s definition emphasises how work can be multi-
faceted, having elements of what are conventionally considered ‘work’ and ‘play’. However what 
Kirchhofer does not specify is how the setting in which the activity is undertaken defines an activity 
as work. For example juggling (an example Kirchhofer uses) takes on meaning as work or 
amusement depending on the specific environment in which it is performed.  This definition thus 
broadens out the concept of work to the point that work and leisure become indistinguishable. 
Other exponents of new childhood studies approaches suggest that the concepts should be built up 
from participants’ own experiences. Morrow, for example, argues that in the case of direct questions 
about working, children might not relate their informal activity to the question because the concept 
‘work’ tends to be constructed as formal wage labour (Morrow 1994: 129). Morrow is right to point 
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out these concerns, but what appears to be at issue is whether using a standard question limits or 
excludes a proper conceptualisation of work, which confuses how work is conceptualised with the 
method employed. A balance is therefore needed between obtaining children’s perspectives on work 
using a definition that is sensitive to the multiple contexts of work and being able to differentiate 
between work and non-work activities. 
 
As specified in Chapter Two, work is not defined purely in relation to the activities of individuals, 
but is defined through social relations. At a concrete level, the social relations of work can be 
operationalised by determining who appropriates the labour of the young person, and in so doing 
work can be distinguished from other activities that children perform. Furthermore, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, embedding work as an activity that occurs in specific economic spheres avoids the 
conceptual error of including any kind of activity as work, such as play or schoolwork, an error to 
which Kirchhofer falls prey.  
 
Taking account of these considerations, in this study participants were asked to provide details of 
work they had most recently done and who they worked for. They were asked to state the work or 
work-type activity and describe the tasks they would normally undertake as part of that work. 
Participants were asked to include any job or work, as they understood that to mean, with the 
exception of basic self-care and schoolwork. Open-ended questions were used to allow for diversity 
of responses. However guidelines were included in the instrument about the parameters of the 
question and examples provided to stimulate reflection on the young person’s own experience. 
Additional guidance was provided by the fieldworker where required. Where there was any doubt, 
the young person was asked to include their experience as work. Jobs or work could include: 
 
 activities that are paid, unpaid or rewarded some other way,  
 regular work (approximating formal part-time work), casual work (activities that are undertaken 
as needed or on a sporadic basis) and one-off jobs (activities that are done once and that’s all).  
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No restrictions were placed on the setting in which the activities were undertaken. Work could 
therefore include: 
 
 work undertaken for family (with the exception of routine self-care) including helping out in a 
family business or family farm or helping parents do their work from home; 
 looking after a sibling while parents are at work;  
 work undertaken for neighbours or ‘community based’ work. This covers work that may be part 
of informal markets, including unpaid or ‘volunteer’ activities; 
 ‘conventional’ paid employment.  
 
The questionnaire instrument was therefore designed to capture the diversity of work activities 
children undertake, ranging from paid employment on the formal labour market, to work at home 
and for family business, work undertaken for cash or other reward for extended family, friends and 
neighbours and work that may be sporadic, seasonal or one-off.  
 
Other studies have started from the premise that there are special classes of children’s jobs, such as 
baby-sitting and delivery work. The assumption behind this is that there are specific types of work 
children are suited to perform because they do not require high levels of skill. This premise creates a 
conceptual barrier to identifying the full range of work children may be involved in, including work 
involving technical skills or knowledge of a particular content area. The open-ended responses were 
coded using the Australian Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO) (ABS 1997), a skill-based 
classification of occupations that distinguishes jobs by occupation and competency level. The ASCO 
system defines a job as the set of tasks performed by an individual. An occupation is a set of jobs 
with similar sets of tasks. Occupations are classified according to two criteria — skill level (the range 
and complexity of the tasks involved) and skill specialisation (the field of knowledge required, 
equipment used, materials worked on, and goods or services produced). Responses were coded 
according to ASCO classifications using a combination of the description of the work, the activities 
involved, whether tools and equipment were used in the work and the goods and services produced 
from the work. Generally from this information the level of skill required in the work, the work 
sector of and the variety of tasks involved could be identified. This information was sufficient to 
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code responses to the most specific coding level (the occupation level). Where the information was 
insufficient to code the response to the most specific level it was coded to the second most specific 
level (the unit group level).  
 
Information provided by participants was also used to code the type of work performed and the 
nature of appropriation that characterised the work, that is the relationship between the employee 
(the participant) and who they undertook the work for. For the formal economy skill level in 
combination with the description of the enterprise was sufficient to identify work undertaken by 
young people on the formal economy. For the informal and family based economies an empirical 
typology was also developed from the responses provided firstly to identify the economy that the 
work was undertaken within, and secondly to classify the relationship between ‘employer’ and 
‘employee’. These classification systems, which describe relations of appropriation in the informal 
and family based economies, are more fully described in Chapter Five, for the informal economy and 
Chapter Six for the family based economy. 
 
This study did not explicitly obtain data on the worst forms of child labour. Under International 
Labor Organisation Convention 182 the worst forms of child labour include all forms of slavery, 
such as the sale and trafficking of children, forced or compulsory labour, the use of children in 
armed conflict, child prostitution and pornography, and the use of children in illicit activities, 
particularly drug trafficking (International Labor Organisation, 1999). Undoubtedly some of these 
activities occur in the Australian context. However it would be expected that the incidence of this 
type of labour would be relatively small compared to the other work children do. Furthermore it is 
unlikely that children involved in such activities would openly admit to their involvement and it 
would be impossible to verify these situations through a questionnaire. This is not to suggest that 
such activities do not require careful consideration or response, and in fact considerable efforts are 
made by the Australian Federal Police to police child trafficking and prostitution in Australia. Indeed 
it is extremely important that children are protected from these forms of exploitation. A different 
type of study would be required to sensitively examine the worst forms of child labour in the 
Australian context.  
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3.3.2. Measuring the social distribution of work  
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, one consequence of different forms of structural 
embeddedness may be that specific economies are characterised by social inequalities. For example 
the destandardisation of the labour contract on the formal economy may lead to ‘winners’ and 
‘losers’, with the rewards of good jobs being unevenly distributed, or young people from less wealthy 
backgrounds may be more likely to work on the informal economy as an alternate form of 
subsistence, or there may be a highly gendered division of labour evident in the family economy. To 
explore these issues each chapter analyses whether social group membership, such as class 
background, gender, age or cultural background, has any relationship with the extent of participation 
in the relevant economy and whether, gendered, classed and age-based ideologies, expectations and 
practices influence the conditions obtained and attitudes towards work within each economy. To 
measure social group membership, participants were asked to provide information on their 
demographic characteristics.  
 
Two measures were used to determine participants’ cultural background: country of birth and 
languages spoken at home. These measures were obtained using the short version of the standard 
Australian Bureau of Statistics questions for obtaining data on cultural and linguistic diversity (ABS 
1999). If a young person was born overseas or spoke a language other than English at home a young 
person was classified as belonging to a minority cultural and linguistic group. Children and young 
people of ‘Anglo-Australian’ origin were those born in Australia and who speak only English at 
home. This indicator is limited in two ways. First, it does not account for children and young people 
born in what are classified as ‘English Proficiency Group One countries’ (Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 1999), namely the United Kingdom, New Zealand, South 
Africa, Ireland, United States of America and Canada. Children and young people born in these 
countries would be included as belonging to a cultural and linguistic minority group. Second, the 
questionnaire did not obtain information on parental country of birth or language use, both of which 
are reliable measures of cultural and linguistic background. Children and young people who were 
born in Australia and only speak English but whose parents were born overseas and speak English at 
home, even if their language of origin is not English, would be counted as being ‘Anglo-Australian’. 
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Socio-economic status was measured by matching the postcode of the young person’s residence with 
an Australian Bureau of Statistics index that measures relative disadvantage (ABS 2004). The measure 
used, the Index of Relative Socio-economic Disadvantage (IRSD), is calculated from aggregate 
household attributes within a postcode such as low income, low educational attainment, high 
unemployment and proportion of the labour force employed in unskilled occupations. High scores 
on the Index of Relative Socio-Economic Disadvantage occur when the area has few families of low 
income and few people with little training and in unskilled occupations. The lower the score, the 
greater the proportion of families with low household incomes, people with little training and people 
in unskilled occupations and is thus a measure of relative disadvantage rather than advantage. While 
these scores are generated from an aggregation of individual household characteristics within a postal 
area, using this index in this analysis involves generalising postal area level characteristics onto 
individual households. The measure is more accurately a measure of local area level, rather than 
household level, disadvantage. However this was seen as a more robust measure than relying on 
participant’s approximating household income. 
 
3.3.3. Work conditions 
As discussed in Chapter One, child labour studies evaluation of work standards focuses on whether 
work conditions are hazardous to children, more particularly whether working impedes or promotes 
positive child development. Conceptualising work conditions in this way treats children as objects of 
developmental processes and does little to explore the quality of conditions, such as wage adequacy 
or working time flexibility and predictability. This has diverted attention from the quality of the 
material conditions of work, such as pay and work hours; and experiential assessments of the quality 
of work, such as whether work provides feelings of control and autonomy, whether the people 
children work with provide a supportive and friendly environment and whether the workplace allows 
children to have a say. 
 
Work conditions in this study are operationalised through an adaptation of the ILO’s (2002) decent 
work standards or work securities, developed as part of its program for promoting decent work 
standards globally
9
. While we do not have data on all securities, or facets of securities, four labour 
                                                          
9 The ILO characterises decent work in terms of seven essential securities: Labour market security (adequate 
employment opportunities through high levels of employment); employment security (protection against arbitrary 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
Chapter Three: Methodology   - 43 - 
market securities are analysed in this study that are particularly relevant for young workers - ‘income 
security’, ‘work security’, ‘representation security’ and ‘skill reproduction security’. By applying these 
standards to evaluate work conditions across different economies, a systematic comparison of 
different work contexts is possible. Furthermore, by considering the quality of work in this way, this 
more closely resembles research on work undertaken by adults, which is primarily concerned with 
the conditions and qualities of work10. The concepts and measures used for each work security are 
presented in Table 3.1.  
 
 
Table 3.1: Work Securities- Concepts and Measures 
Work Security Condition Data Item 
Income Security 
 
Likelihood of pay Paid; Non-monetary reward; Not paid 
Level of Pay Weekly pay (dollars) 
Work-time Security Work hours Hours worked per week 
Work regularity Regular; Casual/as-needed; One-off 
Representation Security Workplace Participation ‘I have a fair say about things at work’ – SA to SD* 
Task autonomy ‘I can do things my own way in my work’ – SA to SD 
Control over work time ‘I can take a break when I want to’ – SA to SD 
‘I am free to decide when I take days off’– SA to SD 
‘If I need to do something important the person I 
work for let’s me change my work hours’– SA to SD 
Skill Reproduction Security Task instruction ‘The tasks I have to do are clearly explained to me’ 
and I get the training I need to do my job’– SA to SD 
Supervision/feedback ‘When I do a good job, I get told I do a good job’– SA 
to SD 
‘The person I work for takes an interest in the work I 
do’– SA to SD 
Workplace support ‘I can get help from the people I work with if I ask for 
it’– SA to SD 
‘I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my 
work’– SA to SD 
Skill development ‘I am gaining skills from the work I do’– SA to SD 
‘The experience I get working will give me advantages 
in the future’– SA to SD 
 
Income security is measured through the likelihood of being paid, rewarded or not paid at all, and for 
those who are paid, the level of remuneration. This information was used to calculate approximate 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
dismissal, regulation on hiring and firing, employment stability); job security (the opportunity to develop a sense of 
occupation through enhancing competencies); work security (protection against accidents and illness at work, 
through safety and health regulations, limits on working time and so on); skill reproduction security (opportunities to 
gain and retain skills); income security (provision of adequate income); and representation security (protection of 
collective voice in the labour market through independent trade unions and employers’ organizations).  
10 Use of decent work standards by the ILO is applied explicitly  and only by the ILO to those aged 15 years and older. 
The application of decent work standards to workers aged 16 years and under in this study is inconsistent with the 
ILO’s official position. 
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hourly rate of pay. Average pay per week was divided by the mid-point of the approximate hours 
worked per week for each job, deriving an approximate hourly rate for each job. If the work they had 
undertaken was one-off they were asked to provide the total amount they were paid and this was 
divided by the total number of hours worked unless the work occurred for more than a week, as 
might be the case for one-off holiday jobs. For these jobs, participants were asked to provide an 
average approximation for hours and pay for one week. Work security is measured through number 
of hours worked and also work regularity - the degree work is one-off, casual (as-needed) or regular. 
Representation security is measured by the ability of young workers to have a fair say in their 
workplace, exercise task autonomy and assert some control over breaks and when they work. Several 
measures are used to examine skill reproduction security; the level of task instruction and training, 
levels of ongoing support and measures of skill development. 
 
3.3.4. Relational Embeddedness: Measuring intrinsic orientations and motivations 
The assessment of intrinsic orientations provides a sense of how economic action is experienced by 
children within each economy. As discussed in Chapter Two, work not only involves obtaining 
extrinsic rewards but also intrinsic orientations, such as obligation, duty or moral obligation. 
Individuals work on the formal economy, for example, not only for money, but often to contribute 
to broader social goals and for a sense of self-worth. Work on the informal economy may be for 
money, but can also assist in developing and consolidating a sense of community. Work within the 
household may not only be based on shared reciprocity and obligation, but also for personal gain, 
whether that is through concrete exchanges of money or longer term expectations of returned care. 
As noted in the previous chapters, therefore, while the same measures of relational embeddedness 
are used in each chapter, they may take on a different significance because of the specific context in 
which the work is undertaken and we may expect that the specific economy that the work activity is 
embedded within will influence the orientations towards work. Instrumental, altruistic and other 
intrinsic non-instrumental orientations are measured, with specific items taken and modified from 
the Job Satisfaction Survey (JSS) (Spector, 1997) and the Job Descriptive Index (JDI) Smith, Kendall, 
& Hulin, 1969). These are summarised in Table 3.2: 
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Table 3.2: Intrinsic and Extrinsic Orientations: Concepts and Measures 
Orientation Aspect Data Item (5-point scale SA – SD) 
Instrumental  Income control ‘Working means I have control over my own income’ 
Income adequacy- self expenses ‘Working means I can cover my own expenses’ 
Personal use of income ‘Working means I can buy what I want’ 
Altruistic  ‘Working means I can help at home financially’ 
Non-instrumental  Responsibility ‘Work gives me a sense of responsibility’ 
Connectedness ‘Work gives me opportunities to build relationships’ 
Social Utility ‘Working makes me feel I am doing something useful’ 
Self-reliance ‘Working means I can rely on myself more’ 
Enjoyment ‘I like the things I do at work’  
 
Three variables are used to measure ‘instrumental’, ‘exchange-use’ or ‘materialistic’ orientations. 
These are whether working provides control over income, allows the young person to cover their 
expenses or allows them to buy what they want. All three variables measure the extrinsic orientations 
associated with individual payment and conform to a utilitarian economic perspective that income 
generates well-being (Frey, 2002). The variable ‘Working means I can help out at home financially’ is 
used as a measure of altruistic use of income. This is distinct from the utilitarian uses of income 
because it measures contribution to household, rather than personal, income. In this sense it is a 
measure of altruism because, although a young person may expect specific modes of reciprocity from 
other household members in return for their work, financial contributions to the household are likely 
to contribute to generalized modes of reciprocity, with no expectation of immediate benefits from 
work. Instead work is part of a sequence of exchanges that are ongoing and ambiguous. Five other 
measures are used to operationalise non-instrumental orientations. These variables include whether 
work provides a sense of responsibility, opportunity to build social connections, sense of social utility 
(which is also a potential measure of altruistic orientations), self-reliance and enjoyment. These five 
aspects are measures of intrinsic orientations towards work (Frey, 2002).   
 
All these measures are, strictly speaking, measures of rewards that may be epiphenomenal to the 
concept of an ‘orientation’. However, if structural relations partly determine personal dispositions 
towards work, (as discussed in Chapter Two) then disentangling the benefits of working from the 
reasons for working, which more closely resemble an orientation towards work, is not how work is 
experienced. The personal gains from working and the reasons to work are integrated experiences 
rather than disparate phenomenon that individuals can differentiate at different stages of the labour 
experience. Frey (2002) also argues in support of a non- linear relationship between rewards and 
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orientations. Drawing upon diverse sources as game theory and the work of T.H. Marshall, Frey 
argues that subjective orientations or intrinsic motivations are the subjective counterpart of objective 
rewards. For example, whether a young person feels their work provides them with a sense of 
responsibility not only indicates that work affords opportunities to exercise responsibility (the 
intrinsic orientation obtained from working), but that the inter-subjective basis of the work 
experience is indicative of a relationship of obligation  (what we can call the ‘orientation’ aspect of 
the relationship) - that is, it is a structural characteristic of the field expressed through a particular 
type of expectation played out through the relationship of economic exchange. 
 
 
3.4. Main Study: Fieldwork Administration 
The questionnaire was distributed to students in years 7 to 10 in selected secondary schools, between 
May and July, 2005. Years 7 to 10 are the years of compulsory secondary schooling in New South 
Wales. Students are generally aged between 12 and 15 years in these years and at the end of Year 10 
students can decide not to continue onto Year 12. The age of 15 years is also the age from which the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, the organisation tasked to collect official statistics for Australia, 
includes persons in the collection of labour force statistics. The combination of there being no 
formal routine statistical collection of children and young people’s employment under the age of 15 
years, and that from the end of Year 10 young people are not obliged by law to attend school, were 
pivotal in the decision to include only children and young people in compulsory secondary school in 
this study.  
 
The procedure for administering the questionnaire varied according to school preference. Generally 
the questionnaire was administered with a year group at a time but other methods included schools 
allowing students to break off into small friendship groups or administering the questionnaire in 
class groups. At all research sites process notes were used to guide students through the 
questionnaire. A number of strategies were employed so that the research process and instrument 
were accessible to students with learning difficulties or physical disabilities. This included the 
questionnaire being administered by a specialist teacher with students, students completing the 
questionnaire as a group activity over a prolonged period of time and technical adjustments being 
made for students with vision and hearing impairments.  
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Passive consent was required from parents and carers for participation in the study. Information 
regarding the study was communicated to parents and carers through letters sent home to parents 
and through short articles about the study included in several newsletters. This information outlined 
parent/carer’s and students ethical rights, including the right not to participate in the study, and 
encouraged parents-carers to discuss participation with their children. Parents and carers were also 
encouraged to discuss the study with the school Principal and/or the researcher. Parents and carers 
could indicate whether they did not want their child to participate in the study. Passive consent was 
adopted for several reasons. Firstly, this allowed a representative sample to be obtained efficiently. 
Secondly, in view of the potentially sensitive nature of some of the questions, active consent may 
have skewed the sample by excluding groups of children of particular interest to the study, such as 
children performing out-work. A number of measures were used to compensate for this process and 
minimize the possibility of coercion:  
 
 anonymity and privacy of participants was guaranteed; 
 assurance was provided to primary caregivers that participation was voluntary and that non-
participation would not negatively prejudice their child or their family; 
 schools informed students of the study either in class or in assembly several weeks in 
advance of the fieldwork; 
 an information sheet was provided to all primary caregivers and children explaining in detail 
all aspects of the research including the right to not participate – this was translated into 
school community languages;  
 information about the study was circulated in school newsletters; and 
 the fieldwork was administered by the researcher, not school staff.  
 
Participation in the survey was deemed as consent from students, however under certain conditions. 
To achieve informed consent from students additional measures were used to ensure students were 
informed about the study.  In the lead up to the study, teachers were provided resource sheets about 
the study to discuss with students. This included discussion points regarding the purpose of the 
study, who was undertaking the study, what would be required of students, the content of the survey 
and their ethical rights. The latter included that the survey responses were entirely anonymous and 
confidential, that students could choose not to participate and that they could withdraw from 
participating at any point. In terms of consent processes, this included deciding not to participate and 
withdrawing from participating in the study even where parents or carers had provided passive 
consent. A small number of students chose not to participate on the day of the survey even though 
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their parents or carers had passively consented. Additionally a small number of students, having 
completed the survey, withdrew their consent at the end of the survey by informing the researcher 
that they did not want to be included in the study. These questionnaires were destroyed. 
Approximately forty students either withdrew on the day of administration or withdrew consent 
having completed the survey. Information about students’ ethical rights and information about the 
study were again communicated to students, by the researcher, at the time of administration. The 
process of administration varied considerably depending on the method most convenient for the 
school. This included whole year groups undertaking the survey assembled in the school hall, the 
survey being administered in small class groups and students breaking into friendship groups to 
complete the survey. In three schools the survey was completed as part of a lesson plan about 
practical economics. 
 
Approximately 90 percent of participants approached to participate in the study did so. No data was 
collected about those students who chose not to participate.  
 
3.4.1. Sampling method and strategy 
A stratified random cluster sample of children and young people in Years 7 to 10 across New South 
Wales was obtained. The major strata consisted of children and young people in school grades years 
7 through 10 and the sampling frame was all co-educational, comprehensive schools in New South 
Wales. The primary sampling unit was the school
11
. In addition, four additional sampling criteria 
were employed in designing the sampling strategy.  
 
i. Socio-economic status: The sample aimed to be representative of socio-economic characteristics of 
the broader population of New South Wales. Schools were allocated to low, mid-range and 
high socio-economic bandings and the catchment postcodes of schools, where possible, 
matched against IRSD quantile bands. (Respondents were also asked to provide the postcode 
of their residence and this was used to analyse socio-economic status.)  
                                                          
11 The sampling strategy and selection of schools was undertaken with the cooperation and assistance of the Strategic 
Research Directorate of the NSW Department of Education and Training.  
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ii. Rurality: The sample aimed to include an appropriate ratio of metropolitan, rural and remote 
communities. Rurality was allocated according to school district. Schools were then selected in 
similar proportions on the basis of whether the school was located in Sydney (the capital and 
most populous city of NSW), other large metropolitan areas, rural/regional coastal areas and 
rural/regional inland areas. Measures of remoteness (for instance the Accessibility and 
Remoteness Index of Australia, ARIA12) were of limited use for sampling because the main 
sampling unit was schools. In many rural areas children and young people from vast 
geographical regions attend a particular school, making it difficult to code for the rurality of the 
young person’s place of residence.  
iii. Cultural and linguistic background: the sample had to include representative proportions of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people and children and young people 
from culturally and linguistically diverse communities. Department of Education and Training 
data was used to allocate schools according to the proportion of students of Aboriginal and 
diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds at the school.  
iv. School sector: In New South Wales three sectors comprise the primary and secondary education 
systems, the government, catholic and independent sectors. Each sector represents 
approximately 70 percent, 20 percent and 10 percent of school students in NSW respectively 
and schools were selected to reflect this overall proportion of the sample. The representative 
authorities for each sector, the Department of Education and Training, Catholic Education 
Commission and Association of Independent Schools agreed for the schools within their ambit 
of responsibility to participate in the study.  
 
These criteria were used to select schools for sampling. It was estimated that between 200 and 600 
children and young people from each school would participate in the study. On the basis of this 
estimation a short-list of 22 schools were randomly selected according to the sampling criteria giving 
an approximate sample size of between 4400 and 13200 students. This range of participants would 
provide a robust number of participants to examine the extent of children and young people’s work. 
Principals were then contacted to seek permission for their school to participate in the study. Only 
                                                          
12
 ARIA calculates remoteness as accessibility to service centres, such as medical facilities and centres of commerce based 
on road distances. The index ranges from Highly Accessible characterized as relatively unrestricted access to a wide range 
of goods and services and opportunities for social interaction, to Very Remote characterized as very little accessibility to 
goods, services and opportunities for social interaction. (Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care, 2001). 
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one school declined to participate in the study and a replacement school was recruited into the study. 
All students in Years 7 to 10, excluding those not wishing to participate or absent from school on the 
day the survey was administered, took part in the survey. The final sample included 22 schools and 
10, 999 participants.13 
 
3.4.2. Sample and population characteristics 
The comparison between the sample and population characteristics is presented in the tables and 
figures below. 
 
Table 3.3: Sample and population characteristics: age and gender 
Age Male Female Total 
 Popn (%) Sample (%) Popn (%) Sample (%) Popn (%) Sample (%) 
Twelve 20.2 17.0 20.3 18.7 20.3 17.7 
Thirteen 19.8 25.6 19.9 25.2 19.8 25.4 
Fourteen 19.7 25.8 19.8 26.1 19.7 25.9 
Fifteen 20.2 24.6 20.0 23.9 20.1 24.3 
Sixteen 20.2 6.3 20.1 5.2 20.1 5.8 
All aged 12-16  51.3 55.7 48.7 44.3   
Source ABS census 2001 NSW Basic community profile 
 
The sample age distribution approximates the overall population distribution with some differences. 
The sample over-represents young people aged 13-15 years, slightly under represents young people 
twelve-years of age and significantly under represents participants aged sixteen-years. This is a result 
of the sampling strategy being designed around year at school rather than age of participant and 
reflects that a sizeable number of sixteen-year-olds are not in Year 10. While this does not affect the 
overall research aims, as the sixteen year olds in the sample were in compulsory schooling at the time 
of the study, caution needs to be used when generalising the results of this study to the population of 
sixteen year olds in New South Wales. There was also a slight over representation of males in the 
study. The effect of this is that the percentage difference between males and females in the sample 
(11.4%) is exaggerated when compared to the percentage difference between males and females in 
the population (2.6%).  
 
 
 
                                                          
13 This figure excludes respondents who were eliminated from the study on criteria of validity. See section 3.4.4: 
Measures employed to avoid error. 
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Table 3.4: Sample and population characteristics: cultural and linguistic background 
 Population (%)a Sample (%) 
ATSI 3.3 3.0 
Language other than English 16.8 28.6 
Born overseas 10.7 13.7 
Source: 2001 census of population and housing ABS 
a Percentage of children, NSW, 10-17 years. 
 
The proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people and children and 
young people born overseas is similar to the proportion of children and young people from these 
groups in the population. There is an overrepresentation of children and young people who speak a 
language other than English in the sample compared to the proportion of children and young people 
who speak a language other than English in the population. This is due to the different 
operationalisation of ‘main language spoken at home’ between the ABS collection method and the 
instrument employed in this study, which asked if any language other than English was spoken at 
home, to capture children and young people who are bi-lingual and speak English and another 
language relatively equally. This is often the case in multi-generation CALD households. 
 
Figure 3.1: Sample and population characteristics: relative social disadvantage 
Source: SEIFA 2001 
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Socio-economic status was measured using the Index of Relative Socio-economic Disadvantage 
(IRSD) (ABS 2001)14. The respondent postcode was matched with the corresponding IRSD score 
and then allocated to the equivalent quantile according to the population distribution of scores.  
Figure 3.1 illustrates that the sample distribution is very similar to the population distribution of 
scores, with a slight overrepresentation of participants who fall within the 51-75th quantile, a middle-
class quantile. This indicates that the socio-economic distribution of the sample is representative of 
the population.   
 
Taken together the characteristics of the sample are generally representative of the population of 
children and young people in New South Wales in compulsory secondary school. However certain 
disparities are evident which need to be taken into account when interpreting the findings, even 
though the size of the sample assists in accommodating for these discrepancies. In particular the 
over-representation of children and young people who speak a language other than English and the 
under-representation of sixteen-year-olds and females represent the greatest disparities between the 
sample and population characteristics.  Specific explanations have already been provided to account 
for these differences. While being administratively necessary, this sampling strategy reduced the level 
of researcher control over the characteristics of the sample. Nonetheless with these minor 
precautions in mind the sample size and characteristics provide external reliability to the results. 
However most of the analysis involves between group comparisons using regression models, which 
does not rely on saying something about the sample as a whole and its relation to the broader 
population. These factors reduce the problems of sample bias.  
 
3.4.3. Pilot study and pre-test 
To test the suitability of the research method and instrument a pilot study was undertaken with three 
co-educational secondary schools. Of particular concern was how children and young people would 
respond to the instrument, what processes would be required to administer the instrument and how 
long the instrument would take to complete. The pilot schools were chosen according to school 
sector, size and rurality. One government, one Catholic and one independent school was involved in 
the study. Two of the schools were located in metropolitan areas and one in a moderately remote 
rural area. The characteristics of the three schools are presented in Table 3.5. 
                                                          
14 See section 3.3.2 for further discussion of the Index of Relative Disadvantage. 
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Table 3.5: Selected characteristics of pilot schools 
School Participating students Sector Rurality 
School One 401 Independent Sydney  
School Two 657 Catholic Moderately remote rural 
School Three 881 Government Sydney 
Total 1939   
 
All students in Years 7 through 10 attending school on the day of the survey participated in the pilot, 
with the exception of students whose parent/carer indicated they did not wish their child or children 
to participate. In total 1939 students participated in the pilot study. Observations were made during 
the fieldwork and notes made of questions asked throughout to determine whether particular 
questions or aspects of the instrument created difficulties for the participants. In addition focus 
group discussions were held with approximately 6-8 students from each year group from each 
school. Participants were asked to comment on the following areas: 
 
 Difficulties encountered in understanding and answering questions. 
 The clarity of the instructions provided to complete the questionnaire. 
 Whether the purpose of the questionnaire was clear. 
 Whether the length of the questionnaire was suitable. 
 Whether the questionnaire was presented and composed in a way that was easy to follow.  
 Any other modifications required to the questionnaire. 
 
Responses were further analysed to determine content validity and sequence logic of the instrument. 
As a result of this analysis, observations during the pilot and focus group discussions with 
respondents, a small number of modifications were made to the questionnaire regarding question 
wording, inclusion of additional categories for some concepts and amendments to the process for 
administering the questionnaire.  
 
3.4.4. Measures employed to reduce error 
A number of measures were used to identify and eliminate error at the data entry and data 
management stages. 
 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
Chapter Three: Methodology   - 54 - 
Data entry: All data entry was verified via a random audit of questionnaires carried out using a second 
keying method, to identify the existence of any patterns of data entry error. 
 
Data editing: A number of strategies were also used to identify and filter out invalid data: 
 Suspect, discordant and outlier values were identified using a combination of scatter plots, 
histograms and frequency tables. This included identifying high variances in responses on 
income. Using these validation checks, responses  outside the permissible range for closed 
questions were identified. Extreme income outliers on open questions were removed unless 
they could be logically explained by the pattern of other responses. 
 Where a participant provided a sequence of missing, suspect or discordant values the paper 
questionnaire was reviewed and a decision made as to whether to remove the case from 
analysis. Cases were removed where the response lacked critical information or the sequence 
of suspect and discordant values was such to make the pattern of responses invalid. 
 Sequence checks were used to identify illogical sequences of responses to questions. In 
particular this was used to determine if a participant answered questions on work if they had 
not worked and on pay and reward if they had not received pay or reward.  
 
Open-ended answers were also reviewed to identify fraudulent responses. An initial screen was 
undertaken at data-entry to identify responses that were offensive or fraudulent in character. Any 
responses that were suspected of being fraudulent at data entry were also marked and reviewed. For 
the entire sample just over one-percent of all responses were removed from analysis after review. In 
ten schools less than 0.5 percent of responses were removed, including three schools where no 
responses were removed. In total 150 of 11,149 responses were removed after editing creating a final 
data set of 10,999 responses. In eight of the twenty-two schools one-percent or more of the 
responses were removed from final analysis. The highest removal was just over six percent.  
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3.5. Systems of work among Children: A brief reflection on our sample 
characteristics 
What evidence do we have of different systems of work discussed in Chapter Two, within our study 
sample? This is elaborated in detail in Chapters Four through Six, however Appendix A outlines the 
sample characteristics of the study sample overall. The intention of this study is to examine distinct 
economies, rather than examine the population of child workers in aggregate form. It is also not the 
purpose of this thesis to examine in any detail the characteristics of children who work compared to 
those who do not. In large part the purpose of this thesis is to indicate that forms of work manifest 
in quite differentiated social spaces. However Table A1 in Appendix A indicates the following 
characteristics of our sample, which provides the context for the analysis in Chapters Four through 
Six: 
 Approximately 55 percent (54.9%, n=6040) of all children and young people undertake some 
form of work.  
 Three distinct economies of work are evident. Just under one-quarter of children and young 
people (24.4%, n=2686) work within the formal economy (examined in Chapter Four); 
approximately 13 percent (12.8%, n=1412) of participants work within the informal 
economy (Chapter Five) and approximately one-fifth (17.7%, n=1951) of children and young 
people work within the family economy (Chapter 6). The social and demographic 
characteristics of these groups of workers are assessed in detail in those respective chapters. 
 
When we examine the differences between children and young people who work compared to those 
who do not work we find: 
 
 An almost linear and positive relationship exists between working and age, with an increase 
in working from 42.2 percent (n=838) amongst 12 year olds compared to 71.2 percent (n-
467) amongst 16 year olds. The proportion of children and young people who do not work 
declines as children and young people get older. 
 Importantly, more children and young people from the most disadvantaged communities do 
not work. Furthermore, greater proportions of children work in wealthier communities than 
those who do not.  
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 Fewer children from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds work (44.6%, n=1547) 
compared to those of Anglo-Australian background (60.1%, n=4500).  
 Similar proportions of females and males work (57.2%, n=2756 and 53.6%, n=3247 
respectively) but, reflecting the overall distribution, more children and young people of both 
genders work than not. In later chapters we find however that significant gender differences 
exist in the types of work children perform 
 Approximately two-thirds of children and young people in rural areas work, while 
approximately half the children and young people in metropolitan areas work. Again this 
distribution is assessed in greater detail in later chapters and we find this distribution is also 
differentiated across different economies. 
 
These findings indicate that child work is a widespread social phenomenon. In developed economies 
in particular this social category is relatively unacknowledged by the community and is not well 
reflected in policy or law, kept invisible behind a conception of childhood that sees children as non-
productive dependants maintained by the family unit. This social distribution also suggests that 
vulnerability and necessity are not sufficient explanations for why children work, as more children 
work in the least disadvantaged communities rather than the most disadvantaged. Children’s 
participation in work may be more similar to the way that adult labour markets also function, where 
being in a paid job is a significant predictor of social status. This is explored in greater depth in the 
following chapters. Furthermore, while developmental and age-reductionist analyses of work have 
been critiqued, age remains an explanatory factor in determining whether children work or not. 
Starting work is a powerful symbol marking a young person’s entry into ‘adult life’ and social activity. 
Analytically age remains an important social category.  
 
 
3.6. Conclusion to Chapter Three 
In detailing the methodological design and methods used in this thesis, this chapter has outlined how 
the questions raised in Chapter One are empirically addressed and the conceptual framework 
outlined in Chapter Two operationalised. Some advantages of the methodology employed is that it 
sensitive to contextual relations but allows systemic comparison and enumeration of the social 
distribution and conditions of work. Furthermore it is also designed around a conceptual openness 
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around what constitutes work, and in so doing takes children’s own perspectives on their work 
seriously, without being overly voluntaristic, thus avoiding the concept of work from becoming 
indistinct from other activities such as play. The operationalisation of social characteristics, measures 
of decent work standards and intrinsic motivations form the foundation of the empirical analysis 
presented in the next three chapters. These chapters empirically delineate children’s economies to 
assess the prevalence and social distribution of children’s work across different economies. It is to 
this we now turn.  
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Chapter Four: Flexible, Precarious or Both?  
Work on the Formal Economy 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines young people’s work on the formal labour market. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the formal economy is the prevailing system of economic exchange in most nation 
states and globally prescribed through law and legally constituted institutions. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, formal labour markets have tended towards fragmentation in terms of work 
content and job quality (Callus and Lansbury, 2002; Standing 2011; Watson et al., 2003). The 
fragmented nature of modern labour markets raises important questions for the study of the 
youth labour market, particularly whether there is a fair distribution of good jobs for different 
groups of young people and whether the work young people perform is characterised by deep 
inequalities and fragmented in terms of skill and quality. 
 
The following sections examine specific aspects of this issue. Section Two outlines some of the 
structural changes to the standard employment relationship in post-industrial economies, and 
specifies key hypotheses that guide the analysis for this Chapter. Section Three details the sorts 
of jobs young people do. Using skill level as an indicator of primary and secondary labour 
markets, Section Three measures the extent of labour market segmentation in the youth labour 
market and also examines whether there are typically ‘young people’s’ jobs. Section Four 
examines whether markers of social division, such as class and gender, have any relationship with 
the prevalence and types of jobs young people perform. Two competing hypotheses, each 
making particular claims about the relationship between social position and work, are assessed. 
The first is that endemic insecurities that characterise post-industrial societies determine the 
distribution of employment and unemployment. The second is that markers of social position 
remain important explanatory categories – especially whether the likelihood of working in a good 
job varies by class background.  Sections Five and Six examine the relationship between skill and 
job quality for young workers and the level and social distribution of decent work. Section Six 
examines young people’s attitudes towards work on the formal economy, and the strength of 
extrinsic, altruistic and intrinsic attitudes towards work. In particular we examine the relationship 
between skill and attitudes towards work, for instance whether young people in low skill jobs are 
more likely to express utilitarian attitudes towards work – that is, it is ‘just a job’, and whether 
young people in higher skill jobs are more likely to be motivated by the interest they have in their 
work, or put another way are they less alienated from their work?  
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4.2. Structural embeddedness: Changes in Industry and the rise of dual 
labour markets  
Labour markets within and across nations have been undergoing a sustained transformation. Of 
particular significance is the long-term increase in non-manual employment associated with the 
rise of the service economy. Analysis of industry composition of the Australian economy over 
the last 100 years shows the decline of agriculture and manufacturing, upon which the Australian 
economy was highly reliant at the beginning of the 20th century, with a massive rise in the 
service economy and most recently reliance upon commodities exports. From between 20% to 
30% of GDP in the first half of the 20th century, the relative contribution of agriculture to GDP 
declined fairly consistently to between 4% and 5% of GDP from the 1980s onward (ABS, 2011). 
Similarly, the contribution of manufacturing to GDP peaked at just under 30% of GDP in the 
late-1950s and early-1960s, before a long period of decline to approximately 8% of GDP in 2011 
(ABS, 2011). The output of other industries has grown more consistently since the early-1960s. 
Service industries15, contributed around 30% to GDP from 1900-01 to the early-1960s. Since 
then, its contribution has steadily increased to over 50% of GDP in 2011 (ABS, 2011)16. Of 
specific interest are more recent trends regarding employment by industry, presented in Figure 
4.1. 
 
  
                                                          
15 Service industries include wholesale trade; retail trade; accommodation, cafes and restaurants; communication 
services; finance and insurance; property and business services; education; health and community services; cultural 
and recreational services; and personal and other services. 
16 Changes in the combined contribution of other industries to GDP since the mid-1980s were chiefly driven by 
changes in communication services that increased from 2.4% of GDP in 1985-86, increasing to 3.3% in 1997-98 and 
1998-99, before falling away slightly to 2.9% in 2002-03. Transport and storage services contributed 6.8% in 1985-
86, falling to 5.3% in 2002-03. Electricity, water and gas increased its share from 1.9% in 1949-50 to 3.9% in the 
late-1980s, before falling to 2.5% of GDP in 2002-03. The value of Australia's mining output in 1900-01 (10% of 
GDP) was dominated by gold production. By 1930-31 the mining industry contributed only 2% of GDP but began 
to increase again in the late-1960s as the scale of iron ore and coal production increased. Production of iron ore and 
coal continued to grow through the 1980s, principally driven by export demand. Mining's contribution to GDP has 
generally been around 5% since the mid-1980s.  
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Figure 4.1: Percentage employed persons by Industry Sector, Seasonally adjusted: 1984-2011  
 
Source: ABS (2011) Labour Force Australia, Detailed Cat. No 6291.0.55.003 
 
Using proportion of persons employed by Industry as a measure
17
, Figure 5.1 indicates the 
continued decline of manufacturing and the continued rise of service industries. Together, 
service industries have increased from employing approximately 57 percent of the labour force in 
1984 to approximately 65 percent of the labour force in 2010. This has largely been driven by an 
increase in human and consumer services. During the last 30 years we also see a dramatic decline 
in the proportion of manufacturing workers and also in agriculture. Between 1984 and 2010 the 
proportion of people employed in manufacturing almost halved (from 16.8 to 8.6 percent), with 
a similar decline occurring in agriculture (6.2 to 3.0 percent).  
 
Changes in industry composition have had major consequences for the nature of work. 
Throughout the twentieth century the standard employment relationship, defined as a stable, 
socially protected, full-time job, whose basic conditions are regulated by collective agreement or 
law (Bosch, 2004), was secured through national and international efforts to regulate work 
(Standing, 1999; Vosko et al., 2009). The standard employment relationship achieved a partial 
                                                          
17
 The proportions cited are calculated from the proportion of the industries included in the analysis, not the total 
labour force. Excluded from the analysis are transport, postal and warehousing services; professional, scientific and 
technical services; administrative and support services and other services. To include these in the analysis would 
underscore the trend away from primary to tertiary sector industries, and with the exception of transport, postal and 
warehousing services, these industries employ only relatively small proportions of the labour force. 
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decommodification of labour for workers, encapsulated in full-time, permanent jobs that paid a 
family wage. In many countries, welfare provision, employment law and collective bargaining 
provisions centred around and shaped this standard employment relationship (Vosko et al., 
2009). In Australia this was most famously proclaimed in the Harvester judgement of 1907 and 
legislated in various forms of industrial law at the State and Commonwealth levels. However 
employment relationships have fundamentally altered, partly as a result of structural changes to 
the economy and industry composition, leading to labour market fragmentation between 
standard and precarious work and an associated development of dual labour markets (Watson et 
al. 2003). Figure 4.2 illustrates trends in standard and non-standard forms of employment
18
 
between 1992 and 2008.  
 
Figure 4.2: Growth in non-standard forms of employment, 1992-2008 (base Index=100) 
 
Source:  Rafferty and Yu  (2010) 
 
Figure 4.2 illustrates that the growth in non-standard forms of employment has outstripped that 
of standard full time employment. The greatest growth has been experienced in full time casual 
and part time employment. While this underpins a level of labour flexibility allowing workers to 
move between work and non-work commitments, the growth in non-standard forms of work is 
a significant indicator of risk being borne by employees. Part-time and casual employment are 
                                                          
18 Part-time work is defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics as those working less than 35 hours per week, and 
casuals are employees on temporary contracts who work on a shift to shift basis who are paid a casual rate with no 
other entitlements. 
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strategies used by employers to manage changes in labour demand. The use of part-time and 
casual employment is most marked during economic downturns, where the rate of part-time 
employment rises as the labour market adjusts to slower economic growth. For example, the 
prevalent use of part-time employment was evident in response to the global financial crisis in 
Australia, with unemployment levels kept in check in part through a reduction in hours worked.  
 
Changes in industry composition and their effects on occupational structures and employment 
standards have been described as a shift from an industrial to a post-industrial or service 
economy (Clark, 2010; Edwards and Wajcman 2005; Taylor-Gooby, 2004; van der Waal and 
Burgers 2011). Dual labour markets develop as a result of employer strategies that involve 
dividing the workforce into core and periphery sectors with very different work conditions in 
order to handle the greater volatility of market conditions (Piore, 1970). These strategies include 
outsourcing or subcontracting arrangements and/or the use of flexible and individual 
employment contracts. This is coupled with the threat that capital is increasingly mobile and that 
firms and national economies must continuously adjust to become internationally competitive 
(Silver, 2003). The consequence is the labour market being divided into primary and secondary 
markets (Beck 2000). Jobs in the primary market are characterized by high wages, better working 
conditions, stability and upward mobility; whereas jobs in the secondary market are considerably 
more heterogeneous, yet still share certain common characteristics such as low pay, higher 
turnover rates, less stability, and little or no upward career mobility (Gaillie 2007).  
 
The massive growth of services has been central to the emergence of the secondary labour 
market, however the breadth and diversity of the service economy means that a patchwork of 
high and low quality jobs are evident across the service economy. Generic skills involved in 
information processing and problem solving have come to the fore in high skill service jobs. 
However many unskilled jobs have been created as part of the growth of the service economy, 
especially non-routine jobs that are difficult to automate (Tilly 1996; Kalleberg et al. 2000; Lowe 
& Krahn 2000). This suggests that there is a polarization of skill taking place that Edwards and 
Wajcman describe as a polarization between ‘MacJobs’ (good service jobs for core workers that 
require advanced skills, provide higher wages, better hours and employer benefits, for example 
professional work) and ‘McJobs’ (poorer quality service jobs for periphery workers that have 
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lower skill demands and low wages, hours, prestige, benefits and future prospects, such as fast 
food preparation, retail and personal services)
19
.   
 
The regulatory framework is another critical structure influencing children’s employment, 
especially in the formal labour market. In Australia, the employment of children and young 
people is subject to general labour laws. Young workers derive entitlements or protection similar 
to adult workers from a range of industrial instruments that regulate employment. These include:  
 industrial awards, workplace agreements and registered individual contracts;   
 unfair dismissal laws;  
 occupational health and safety laws;  
 workers compensation laws; and  
 anti-discrimination legislation.  

In some instances instruments contain provisions that are of particular relevance to young 
workers. For example, most awards set ‘junior’ rates of pay, generally on a gradated scale that 
increases with age. Certain awards also regulate the age at which children can perform certain 
types of work.  
 
At the Commonwealth level at the time the research was conducted, employment was regulated 
by the Workplace Relations Act 1996. Child specific provisions are almost entirely absent from 
this Act, whose jurisdiction covered employees not covered by a State Award, or those under 
individual workplace agreements. The few provisions in the Act that relate to child employment 
include that a parent or guardian must sign an individual workplace agreements for employees 
under 18, that minimum wage instruments in Awards can set junior pay scales and a provision 
making arrangements for school based apprenticeships.  
 
Every State and Territory jurisdiction does, however, have more extensive sets of laws dealing 
with the employment of children. The only provision consistent across States and Territories is a 
restriction on employing school-age children during school hours.  However this provision varies 
between states and territories.  
 
In New South Wales, the jurisdiction in which the study was undertaken, child employment is 
regulated by the Industrial Relations (Child Employment) Act 2006, Children and Young 
Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 and the Children and Young Persons (Care and 
                                                          
19 Some theorists, such as Beck and Giddens, argue that these shifts in employment structures are a key feature of 
late modernity, reflecting an individualisation of risk, creating new insecurities and inequalities to the extent that we 
are experiencing the transition from a class society to a risk society.  
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Protection Child Employment) Regulations 2005. These provisions are not systematic or 
comprehensive.  The Industrial Relations (Child Employment) Act 2006 provides only very 
generic guidelines for the regulation of child employment generally. The Children and Young 
Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 and the 2005 Regulations provide more specific 
regulations for a narrow range of jobs. This means that legal regulation of the majority of 
children’s employment, fall within the provisions of general industrial instruments, [i.e. Industrial 
Relations (Child Employment) Act 2006]. This is with the exception of a few occupations, 
described below.  
 
The Industrial Relations (Child Employment) Act 2006, applies where a child (defined in s 3(1) 
to mean anyone under the age of 18) is engaged to perform work under a relationship that would 
be regarded as one of employment under the terms of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW). 
The key provision is Section 4 of Part 2 of the Act that specifies that children’s conditions of 
employment are in accordance with any New South Wales award or industrial laws that are 
applicable to that work. In so doing the Act confirms the application of provisions within 
industrial instruments to children.  
 
Chapter 13 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 provides a 
general statutory provision for the protection of children who are employed (s222). The 
Regulations require a person to hold an employer’s authority for employees aged 15 years of age 
or under in the entertainment industry, exhibitions, still photography or door to door sales. The 
authority requires employers to meet a code of practice covering matters such as record keeping, 
hours of work, breaks, occupational health and safety coverage, payment of award rates and 
notification of parents in the case of injury or illness. This system is monitored by the Children’s 
Guardian.  
 
What are the implications of these structural changes for young people? Attempts to explore 
these relationships have produced an overly deterministic argument, in which young people’s 
jobs are held to be unchanged for nearly one hundred years. These accounts emphasise how 
profound socio-economic changes during the 19th and 20th centuries have marginalised children 
from a central role in production, through a combination of technological change, compulsory 
education and the maturing of a liberal capitalist welfare regime (Mizen, Bolton and Pole 1999). 
Taken together, these developments are viewed as culminating in a particular pattern of young 
people’s employment, that young people work in a limited range of jobs and primarily do so to 
support high levels of personal consumption. This narrative also suggests a profound shift in the 
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social role of childhood (and self-identification of children), from economically productive 
workers to students and consumers. While dual labour market theory pertains to economic 
structure more generally, the emphasis on labour market segmentation associated with skill at the 
core of dual labour market theory provides a useful framework for analysing young people’s 
work. There may be considerable variety in the quality of jobs young people perform, beyond 
whether work is good or bad for child development, or a presumption that all young people’s 
work is of poor quality.  Furthermore if such variety exists, which young people get the good 
jobs and which young people jobs of poor quality?  
 
The application of dual labour market theory to young people’s work opens up several lines of 
enquiry. The first is whether labour market segmentation in young people’s work exists. Is there 
some distribution in the quality of jobs according to skill, or are young people overwhelmingly 
concentrated in elementary skill jobs? If young people are largely in the secondary labour market, 
this would support an ‘alternative role thesis’, which suggests that young people tend to be found 
in the secondary labour market because an alternative role outside the labour market is available 
to them, that is as students. This is examined in Section Three, which examines the categories of 
young people’s work in the formal economy.  
 
Secondly whether the gains from growth in the knowledge economy are equitably shared across 
society is open to question. Is there a direct correlation between class position and skill level of 
work and are age and gender, also relevant? Two competing hypotheses will be assessed, the first 
suggesting that we have entered a ‘post-class society’, and in consequence that good and bad 
work is relatively evenly distributed across socio-economic strata. The second is that markers of 
social position remain important explanatory categories. These issues are examined in Section 
Four, which assesses the social distribution of categories of work identified in Section Three.  
 
Thirdly, if a social distribution of skill is evident, do young people working in jobs with different 
skill levels also experience different working conditions, as dual labour market theory suggests? 
While the post-industrial society argument fits well with aggregate skill trends, it provides less 
satisfactory account of other aspects of work experience. The assumption that skill trends 
condition other aspects of work quality has not been entirely correct (Gaillie 2007). Assuming 
that young people will be concentrated in elementary skill jobs, to what extent do conditions vary 
within the secondary labour market for young people? Therefore we examine how skill levels in 
work map onto other measures of job quality in the youth labour market in Section Five, 
operationalising certain decent work standards to do this. These arguments are extended to 
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examine the association between skill, social position and orientations towards in Section Six. In 
particular if working is an alternative role to support central roles of being a student and 
dependant, we would expect that consumption motives are particularly evident for young 
workers.  
 
4.3. Classifying young people’s work on the Formal Economy  
The previous section explored how changes in industry composition over the last 100 years have 
given rise to a dual labour market segmented into distinct sectors of good and bad jobs, between 
a primary sector of relatively skilled, highly paid and secure jobs, and a secondary sector of low-
skill poorly paid, insecure and dead end jobs. It is perhaps unsurprising then that many theories 
of job quality have skill level as central. For Marxist scholars’ the skill content of work is itself a 
major determinant of employee experience of, and capacity for, self-realisation through work
20. 
Research within a human resource management framework empirically identifies skill utilisation 
as a strong predictor of job satisfaction. Regardless of which theory, the exercise of skill is not 
only to how work is experienced, but also serves as a proxy for the structural location of 
occupations within the broader economy. Skill level of the work undertaken by young people 
was identified through coding job and task description using the Australian Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ASCO). Associate professionals and advanced clerical and service 
workers were categorised together as high skill workers. Tradespersons, intermediate clerical and 
service workers and intermediate production and transport workers were categorised together as 
intermediate skill workers.  Elementary clerical, sales and service workers and labourers and 
related workers were categorised together as elementary skill workers. Data for the adult labour 
force were taken from the 2006 Census of Population and Housing. These results are presented 
in Table 4.1.  
 
  
                                                          
20 For both Marx and Weber the extent workers can influence their work duties, requirements and organization is 
central to experiences of alienation or instrumentally rationalised social relations. Braverman’s Labour and Monopoly 
Capital was influential in this respect, applying a Marxist theory of alienation to job quality. Human self-realisation is 
reliant upon the capacity to both design and produce work, processes that are separated under capitalist economic 
systems, and modern forms of managerial practices that control labour processes more specifically. Psychological 
studies came to similar conclusions in a depoliticized sense. Job satisfaction and effective performance followed 
from the intrinsic qualities of the job, emphasizing both discretion and variety. Worker satisfaction could be 
enhanced by jobs that had a combination of responsibility and autonomy (Davis 1966). Influential in this respect 
was the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations. Blauner (1964) argued that an alternative strategy of responsible 
autonomy responds to the contradictions of extreme direct control. This entailed giving workers leeway and 
coopting them to work in the interests of the firm, but in so doing satisfy their need for doing interesting and 
creative work.  
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Table 4.1: Occupation type by skill level – formal labour market. 
Skill Level  ASCO 1 digit ASCO 6 digit modified Study Sample Adult Labour 
Force a,b 
  n % n % 
High Skill                      Professionals Other work 30 1.1   
 Entertainment and Performance 24 0.9   
 Sub-total 54 2.0 591,466 20.7 
Associate Professionals Sports related work 6 0.2   
 Other service work 2 0.1   
 Sub-total 8 0.3 345,197 12.1 
Adv. clerical and service workers Administrative & clerical work 5 0.2   
 Sub-total 5 0.2 100,084 3.5 
Managers and Administrators  0 0.0 274,184 9.6 
 Sub-total High skill level 67 2.5 1,310,931 45.9 
Intermediate Skill      
Tradespersons and related workers Labour, construction & labour trades 35 1.3   
 Food preparation 15 0.6   
 Non-labour trades 19 0.7   
 Agricultural & horticultural work 4 0.2   
 Entertainment & performance 1 0.0   
 Sub-total 74 2.8 333,023 11.7 
Intermediate clerical and service work Teaching & tutoring 51 1.9   
 Agricultural & horticultural work 28 1.1   
 Administrative & clerical work 26 1.0   
 Other food service 25 0.9   
 Care work 20 0.7   
 Other service work 15 0.6   
 Sub-total 165 6.2 492,653 17.3 
Production and Transport workers  0 0.0 225,881 7.9 
 Sub-total Intermediate skill level 239 9.0 1,051,557 36.8 
Elementary Skill      
Elementary clerical, sales and service  Sales work 1242 46.7   
 Delivery work 378 14.2   
 Other service work 162 6.1   
 Administrative & clerical work 37 1.4   
 Entertainment & performance 3 0.1   
 Sub-total 1822 68.5 269,942 9.5 
Labourers and related workers Food preparation 219 8.2   
 Agricultural & horticultural work 108 4.1   
 Labour, construction & labour trades 104 3.9   
 Cleaning work 101 3.8   
 Sub-total 532 20.0 221,530 7.8 
 Sub-total Elementary skill level 2354 88.5 491,472 17.2 
 TOTAL 2660 100.0 2853,960c 100 
a) Source: ABS (2011) 2006 Census of Population and Housing Tables Cat. No. 2068.0. Figures for NSW. 
b) Data presented only at ASCO 1-digit level 
c) Excludes responses inadequately described and not stated 
  
Most young people employed in the formal economy (almost 90 percent) are concentrated in 
elementary skill work, with a minority undertaking more highly skilled jobs. Hence while there is 
evidence of labour market segmentation, most young people are employed in jobs at the lower 
end of the labour market. Reflecting broader shifts in the economy, most elementary skill work, 
and most work on the formal labour market is in the service economy. Approximately 70 
percent of all young people in the formal labour market are employed in elementary clerical, sales 
and service work, with just under half of all young workers working in sales work, across a 
variety of service areas. The quintessential ‘children’s job’, delivery work, also comprises a large 
minority of jobs (n=378 14.2%), but is a much smaller category than other forms of retail service 
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work, which according to these results are more typical young people’s jobs. Labourers and 
related workers also form a sizeable elementary skill occupation category (20%). Food 
preparation (such as fast food cooks and kitchen hands) is the single largest job-type within this 
category (n=219; 8.2%). Other jobs include agricultural and horticultural workers (n=108; 4.1%) 
such as general farm hands, fruit, vegetable and nut farm hands, stable hands and nursery 
assistants; and labourers (n=104; 3.9%), such as construction assistants, mechanics assistants, 
hand packers, plumbers assistants; and commercial cleaners (n=101; 3.8%). Some typical 
descriptions provided by participants doing this kind of work include: 
 
‘I work at a newsagency – retail cashier’ (Female, 14 years) 
‘Working in Macdonalds cleaning dining hall and service’ (Female, 16 years) 
‘I make the burgers, nuggets, chips, clean, sweep, mop and get ice’ (Male, 15 years) 
‘Video shop attendant’ (Male, 16 years) 
‘Work in a factory and build draws’ (Male, 14 years) 
 
Work involving more advanced skills form relatively small percentages of the work young people 
perform. Approximately nine percent of jobs involve intermediate levels of skill. The majority of 
these are in intermediate clerical and service work (n=165; 6.2%).  A broad range of jobs are 
represented in this group, including teachers aides, animal attendants, administrative and clerical 
workers such as receptionists, library assistants and data entry operators. Intermediate food 
service positions include waiters and bar attendants. Care work is also represented in this 
classification level and includes a small number of young people who work as carers in child care 
centres and aged care facilities. The other occupation category represented in the intermediate 
skill category is a relatively small number of tradespersons. These include young people working 
as painter-decorators, cabinetmakers, panel beaters, and sign writers. Many, but not all, of these 
young people are involved in traineeships or apprenticeships. The handful of intermediate skill 
food preparation workers also includes apprentice chefs, butchers and bakers. Young people 
involved in non-labour trades, that is those trades that do not involve construction and 
manufacturing, include hairdressers, dressmakers, jewellers, florists, and performing arts support 
workers. Across the intermediate skill category classification we can observe that while only a 
small number of these young people have obtained or are working towards formal qualifications 
(technically possible through school-based traineeships and in evidence for our apprentices), 
most of these jobs are differentiated from elementary skill jobs in that they involve the 
application of a developed skill set, such as certain forms of vocational or technical knowledge. 
Some typical descriptions of this work include: 
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‘Finishing tops of tables for fine arts and antiques’ (Male, 16 years) 
‘Educating horses for people’ (Female, 13years) 
‘Digital photographer/ enhancing photos’ (Female, 16 years) 
‘Wildlife park assistant’ (Female, 16 years) 
Receptionist at a sports shop (Female, 15 years) 
Waitressing and kitchen hand at a local restaurant (Female, 14 years) 
Part host at a bowling alley (Male, 15 years) 
I work at a tutoring centre for school students (Male, 16 years) 
 
Only 2.5 percent of young people in the formal economy work in jobs that could be considered 
as involving the application of high skill levels. Here we find a miscellany of specialist jobs. 
Significant proportions these young people work as professional actors, musicians, dancers and 
performers, computer technicians and programmers, but there is also a small numbers of 
photographers, professional sportspeople and umpires and desktop publishers. Much of this 
work has the characteristic of a vocation or a form of skilled hobby, in some ways similar to 
Florida’s class of ‘creative workers’ (2002), involving the manipulation of and trade in symbols, 
ideas and other modes of complex communication. Some typical descriptions of this work 
include: 
‘Modelling’ (Female, 16 years) 
‘Singing and acting in chorus of Opera Australia’ (Male, 16 years) 
‘Architectural work, mostly using Autocad – smart architect’ (Male, 16 years) 
‘Website designer, I make websites and programs. Includes setting up a website for an accounting form 
and maintaining the site’ (Male, 15 years) 
‘Physio assistant’ (Female, 14 years) 
‘Youth consultant at Royal North Shore Hospital’ (Female, 15 years) 
 
In contrast, the distribution of work in the adult labour force is more evenly distributed across 
skill levels. While less than three percent of young people work in high skill jobs, just under half 
of adults (45.9 percent) are in high skill jobs While less than 10 percent of young people work in 
intermediate skill jobs, just over one-third (36.8 percent)  of adults are in jobs involving 
intermediate skill levels.  The contrast is especially evident for elementary skill jobs, with less 
than one-fifth of adults (17.2 percent) working in these jobs compared to approximately 90 
percent of young people. This illustrates that young people, largely because of their alternative 
role as students, occupy jobs at the lower end of the labour market, which are a product of 
labour market segmentation, while adults, not surprisingly, are more evenly distributed across the 
skills spectrum of occupations. However while there are work categories that we found no 
evidence of young people working in (Managers and Intermediate Production and Transport 
workers), what is also apparent is that young people are engaged in jobs that adults also perform.  
Much has been made of the diversity of young people’s work, largely as an argument to counter 
stereotypes of there being typical children’s jobs. These results suggest that the reality of young 
people’s work falls somewhere between these two extremes. Authors who have sought to give 
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recognition to the diversity of children’s work are correct in pointing out that young people can 
be found performing a variety of jobs, some of which involve high levels of skill. Furthermore, 
the majority work in jobs not traditionally associated with children’s work, namely baby-sitting 
and delivery work. However occupational differences between young people and adults highlight 
the overrepresentation of young people in elementary skill jobs compared to intermediate and 
advanced skill occupations. It is this skill distribution, and the tertiarisation of work, rather than 
the concentration of young people in specific jobs, which lies behind the distribution of work for 
young people.  
 
4.4. The Social Distribution of Work within the Formal Economy 
The previous section has shown that young people are concentrated in low skill jobs. However 
we also found that there are a small number of high and intermediate skill jobs undertaken by 
young people. Within the adult labour market debates have flourished as to whether and why 
certain social groups are disproportionately represented in secondary labour markets. In the 
previous section we saw a more even dispersion of adults across the labour market; however 
young people, by virtue of their age, are concentrated in low-end elementary skill jobs. Offe and 
Hinrichs (1985) offer the ‘alternative role thesis’ that can help explain this age based distribution 
of work. They suggest that migrants, youth, women and older people tend to be found in the 
secondary labour market because an alternative role of subsistence outside the labour market is 
supposed to be available to these groups. Because of the drive for continued accumulation and 
control of the labour market, employers will seek to balkanise the labour market, creating 
stratified clusters of jobs separated from each other. Such segmentation of jobs according to 
cultural background, age and sex are a means of increasing productivity by employing different 
types of workers at lower rates. For young people, the provision of low-end jobs are justified by 
employers and potentially accepted by young people because of their alternative roles as 
dependants within the family and as students, and contribute to their low level of identification 
with the job.  
 
While this explains the overall position of young people in the labour market, it does not explain 
social differentiation within the labour market among groups of young workers, for instance by 
class, gender, age or cultural background. Therefore there are two issues, the first regarding the 
general occupational position of young workers (as we have seen, in elementary skill jobs), and 
the second, internal segmentation of occupations amongst young people. In relation to this 
second issue, Beck (2000) is informative in identifying hypotheses that can guide analysis. Beck 
has argued that we have entered a ‘post-class society’. Most people, including the relatively 
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prosperous middle class, experience ‘endemic insecurity’. If this is so, then we would expect that 
good and bad work is differentiated not by class background, but by other social characteristics, 
such as gender and cultural background, or that good and bad work is relatively evenly 
distributed across socio-economic strata. Another possibility is that the polarization of work 
reflects class differences and we would also expect to observe class-related inequalities among 
young workers. In this case rather than job disparity being a cause of social class position, we 
would anticipate that social class determines which young people get what jobs. This hypothesis 
would therefore anticipate class based labour market segmentation within the youth labour 
market both in terms of overall participation in the formal labour market and the quality of jobs 
available to young people from different class backgrounds.  
 
Two analytical strategies are used to examine these hypotheses. The first examines the likelihood 
of working on the formal economy overall, compared to working in either the family or informal 
economy (examined in Chapters Six and Seven).  To do this, a dummy variable was created 
(Formal economy = 1; Other economies = 0). The second analytic strategy examines the 
likelihood of undertaking high, intermediate and elementary skill work, by a range of social and 
demographic characteristics. To compare and contrast each category of work, three dummy 
variables were created, each coding a respective category as 1, and all other formal work as 0 (e.g. 
High skill work= 1, Other work =0 as one variable, Intermediate skill work=1, Other work=0 as 
another variable and so on). Each dummy variable was then treated as a dependent variable in 
logistic regression models with socio-economic background
21
, age, sex, cultural background and 
rurality included as independent factors for analysis
22. The parameter estimates and model 
summary statistics for the likelihood of working in the formal economy are presented in Table 
4.2.  
 
  
                                                          
21
 Measured using the Index of Relative Social disadvantage. See section 3.3.2: Measuring the Social distribution of 
work, in Chapter Three, for details of this measure. 
22 This method clearly delineates interrelationships that may be difficult to discern when using one category as a 
reference category in multinomial logistic models. For example, if associative work is used as a reference category, 
the odds between the other types of work and associative work are clear, but not between the non-reference 
categories. 
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Table 4.2: Likelihood of working on the formal economy and skill category by socio-demographic 
characteristics 
 
Model I 
Formal 
Economy a 
Model II 
High Skill 
Model III 
Interm. 
Skill 
Model IV 
Elementary 
Skill 
Socio-economic status  11-25th quantile 1.06 (0.14) 1.36 (0.78) 0.78 (0.33) 1.16 (0.31) 
  26-50th quantile 1.24 (0.13 2.30 (0.72) 0.84 (0.32) 0.97 (0.30) 
 51-75th quantile 1.22 (0.13) 2.20 (0.68) 0.71 (0.30) 1.12 (0.27) 
  76-90th quantile 1.03 (0.14) 4.58 (0.64)* 1.23 (0.29) 0.59 (0.26)* 
  91-100th quantile (least disadvantaged) 1.26 (0.14) 2.09 (0.69) 1.03 (0.31) 0.86 (0.29) 
 0-10th quantile (most disadvantaged)=ref     
Age (years)  2.02 (0.03)*** 0.84 (0.11) 1.05 (0.07) 1.01 (0.06) 
CALD Non-Anglo Australian 0.73 (0.08)*** 1.15 (0.31) 1.35 (0.18) 0.77 (0.16) 
 Anglo-Australian=ref     
Rurality Metropolitan 0.73 (0.10)** 0.44 (0.48) 1.23 (0.23) 1.03 (0.21) 
  Rural coastal 0.66 (0.11)*** 1.24 (0.47) 0.82 (0.30) 1.09 (0.25) 
  Rural inland 
0.50 (0.10)*** 0.31 (0.66) 
1.65 
(0.25)* 
0.80 (0.23) 
  Sydney=ref     
Gender Female 
0.67 (0.06)*** 0.70 (0.28) 
1.51 
(0.14)** 
0.78 (0.13)* 
 Male=ref     
  Constant (0.42)***  (1.11)** (0.97)*** 
Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
a  The reference category is: working in other economies. 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
 
Cultural background, gender, age and rurality have a significant relationship with the likelihood 
that a young person will work in the formal economy as opposed to other economies. Notably 
there is no significant class difference in whether young people work in the formal economy as 
opposed to other economies. The relationship between age and work is quite strong, with older 
young people more likely to participate in formal work than younger children. The likelihood of 
working in the formal economy more than doubles for a one unit increase in age. Although not 
shown in Table 4.2, when age is modelled as a categorical variable, using 12 year olds as the 
reference category, there is no significant difference between 12 and 13 year olds, but 14 year 
olds are 1.99 times as likely, 15 year olds, 6.38 times as likely and 16 year olds 9.16 times as likely 
to work in the formal economy as opposed to other economies. Rural location, cultural 
background and gender also have a differentiating effect. The likelihood of working in the 
formal economy is highest in city and other metropolitan areas, indicating both more formal 
labour market opportunities in urbanised areas and potentially more work in other economies, 
such as family based agricultural work, in non-urban areas (possibilities explored in Chapters 
Five and Six). Young people in rural inland areas are approximately half as likely as young people 
in the city to work in the formal economy, and children in rural coastal areas 0.66 times as likely. 
Young people from non-English speaking backgrounds are 0.78 times as likely as Anglo-
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Australian young people to work in the formal economy. Females are also significantly less likely 
to work in the formal economy (0.67) compared to males. 
 
There are some patterns of social distribution of skilled jobs also evident. For the majority of 
jobs performed by young people, that is elementary skill jobs, gender and socio-economic status 
have overall predictive effects in explaining who undertakes elementary skill jobs. Young people 
from upper middle-class backgrounds (i.e. young people from the second most advantaged 
neighbourhoods) are 0.59 times as likely to undertake elementary skill jobs, as young people 
from the poorest areas.  Compared to all other areas, where between 88.1 percent and 90.5 
percent of workers are in elementary skill jobs, 82.9% of young workers from upper middle-class 
areas work in elementary skill jobs. Young people from upper middle class neighbourhoods are 
also more than 4.5 times as likely as young people from the poorest neighbourhoods to work in 
high skill jobs. Females are slightly less likely (0.8 times) than males to work in elementary skill 
jobs. Females are 1.5 times as likely as males to undertake intermediate-skill work. This reflects 
the gendered nature of jobs in this skill tier, particularly administrative, clerical and care work 
positions. Young people from rural-inland areas are 1.7 times as likely as young workers from 
Sydney to undertake intermediate skill level work also. Apart from these differences, the 
parameter estimates are largely similar and non-significant. 
 
In general the relatively undifferentiated distribution of elementary and intermediate skill jobs 
suggests the dominance of these jobs as a feature of the youth labour market, regardless of social 
position. Young people in general have access only to low-end jobs as their entrée into the 
formal labour market. These results also indicate that involvement in the formal economy is 
considerably more likely to be a ‘teenage’ experience, with the youngest participants in this study 
being less likely to work in the formal economy than older teenagers. The findings relating to 
geographical location suggest opportunities for young people to work are associated with 
regional differences in economic development, rather than a straightforward link between the 
relative poverty of an area and work opportunities. Formal economic development and 
opportunities to work have historically grown out of cities (Tönnies 1957), and economic 
development between city, regional and rural areas is uneven. Economic opportunities in large 
cities are sufficiently developed to provide work for young people across the class spectrum. 
Social exclusion reflected in forms of youth joblessness, clustered around pockets of inner city or 
urban poverty, such as is evident in some major cities in the United States, the United Kingdom 
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and France, are therefore not evident here. The more important differentiation is regional, 
between young people living in cities and those living in rural areas.  
 
There are also some important divergences within the formal economy indicating class based 
labour market segmentation, especially involving high skill jobs, which are far more likely to be 
undertaken by young people from upper-middle class backgrounds. The small number of high 
skill jobs evident and the broad distribution of elementary skill jobs suggest there are limits to the 
degree that formal labour market segmentation is tightly associated with social class, in part 
because there are a limited number of young people in high and intermediate skill jobs. These 
findings tell us little, however, about the relative importance of work for young people from 
different social backgrounds. The pressure to look for alternative sources of revenue has become 
a more pervasive experience for young people, not just something confined to the very poor 
(Mizen, Bolton and Pole 1999).  Most young people in elementary skill jobs are unlikely to be 
working in these jobs to pursue a hobby, or out of interest, which appears to characterise young 
people’s involvement in high skill jobs. For young people from upper middle class backgrounds, 
it may be precisely those creative aspects they are able to pursue through their work, because 
relative to elementary skill work, high-skill jobs involve some degree of autonomy and are the 
types of jobs that can be undertaken for leisure.  
 
 
4.5. Young people’s Work Conditions in the Formal Economy  
Assessments of young people’s work conditions are normally drawn from more general sector 
based analyses of the adult labour market. In these studies, the model of the full-time career 
worker, and of the standard employment contract, is central to assessments of whether children’s 
work is decent or not (Cunnien et al 2009, Frederiksen 1999, Green 1990, Hobbs and 
McKechnie 2007, White and Wyn 2004). Compared to this standard young people’s position in 
the secondary labour market means they are likely to occupy jobs that are likely to be poorly 
paid, insecure and with few prospects for career progression. This section examines provides a 
detailed analysis of work conditions. Two hypotheses guide the analysis.  The alternative role 
hypothesis holds that young people hold marginal jobs characterised by insecurity, low pay and 
lack of discretion. However, within the Australian context, employment law is supposed to 
guarantee certain employment standards, including award based minimum youth wages and 
some protections from unfair dismissal. Therefore legal institutions combined with young 
people’s general status in the labour market would mean that fewer differences in work 
conditions should be evident. Alternatively labour market segmentation may be apparent on two 
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fronts. Differences in work conditions may be associated with skill level. As dual labour market 
theory suggests, skill level should be associated with differences in conditions. We consider 
whether a similar relationship between skill and work conditions is evident in the youth labour 
market. Further, building on the post-class hypothesis introduced in section four, this section 
examines whether work quality is fragmented by social position and whether labour market 
segmentation reflects underlying social fragmentation between different groups of young people.  
 
Work conditions are operationalised using the ILO (2002) typology of decent work. The 
concepts and measures are presented in Section 3.3.3 in Chapter Three. In summary we examine 
work security through number of hours worked and work regularity - the degree work is one-off, 
casual (as-needed) or regular.   We examine income security through measuring the likelihood of 
being paid, rewarded or not paid at all, and for those who are paid, pay rates. Representation 
security is examined by the ability of young workers to have a fair say in their workplace, exercise 
task autonomy and assert some control over breaks and when they work. Several measures are 
used to examine skill reproduction security; the level of task instruction and training, levels of 
ongoing support and measures of skill development.  
 
Table 4.3 provides an overview of the analysis of work conditions in the formal economy. It 
indicates how the concepts developed from the discussion of structural transformations in the 
formal economy inform our hypotheses around work conditions, and how the work security 
measures map to these hypotheses. These conditions are assessed in the next sections.  
 
 
  
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
Chapter Four: The Formal Economy  - 76 - 
 
 
Table 4.3: Concepts, hypotheses and measures: Analysing work conditions on the formal economy 
 
 
 
4.5.1. Work Security in the Formal Economy  
A wide range of research has shown that job security is a major aspect of decent work (Gaillie, 
2007; Green, 2006). The use of non-standard contracts is a way employers can enhance ‘labour 
flexibility’ and reduce costs by shifting the risks of economic volatility onto employees. By 
making greater use of employees on a variety of non-standard contracts, employers seek to 
increase their own competitive advantage by being able to reduce their labour force in response 
to changes in market conditions. The use of precarious labour contracts has had an especially 
marked effect on the ‘young adult’ labour market, generally considered to be employees aged 
between 15 and 24 years of age (Presser 1998). Several studies have indicated that young workers 
are engaged on flexible labour contracts where employers adjust not only the amount of hours 
individuals work in accordance to cyclical or seasonal demands, but when labour is required 
Concept Hypothesis 
Fragmentation of standard employment contract. 
 
Development of primary and secondary labour markets and service 
economy lead to skills polarization in labour market 
 
Gains from growth in the knowledge economy have paradoxically 
also involved skills polarization, correlated with ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ 
in the labour market according class and other social position 
characteristics, such as age and gender. 
 
Labour market segmentation in young people’s work exists 
according to skill level.  Alternative role hypothesis: young 
people work in the secondary labour market because an 
alternative role of subsistence outside the labour market is 
available to them. 
 
‘Post-class society’ hypothesis good and bad work is relatively 
evenly distributed across socio-economic strata (Alternatively 
markers of social position, remain important explanatory 
categories). 
 
Decent Work Security 
Work security:  
 number of hours 
worked;  
 work regularity  
 
Skill level associated with 
differences in conditions 
for young people, 
consistent with dual labour 
market theory. High skill 
jobs associated with more 
regular work. 
 
Young people from more 
advantaged backgrounds 
more likely to have regular 
work. 
 
Income security:  
 likelihood of being paid;  
 level of remuneration 
 
Skill level associated with differences 
in conditions for young people, 
consistent with dual labour market 
theory. High skill jobs associated with 
higher pay. 
 
Young people from more advantaged 
backgrounds more likely to be paid 
and paid more. 
 
Representation security: 
 fair say at workplace;  
 task autonomy;  
 control over breaks;  
 control over when worked  
 
Skill level associated with differences 
in conditions for young people, 
consistent with dual labour market 
theory. High skill jobs associated with 
greater control and autonomy. 
 
Young people from more advantaged 
backgrounds more likely to have 
greater control and autonomy. 
Skill reproduction 
security:  
 task instruction;  
 training;  
 workplace 
support;  
 skill 
development 
 
Skill level associated 
with differences in 
conditions for young 
people, consistent 
with dual labour 
market theory. High 
skill jobs associated 
with increased 
supervision and 
training. 
 
Young people from 
more advantaged 
backgrounds more 
likely to have better 
supervision and 
training 
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(Mills 2004, Regini 2000, White and Wyn 2004). While this temporal flexibility may allow young 
people to accommodate work with other non-work commitments, it is just as likely that 
temporal labour flexibility makes it difficult for young people to plan regular commitments. 
Whether this is the case for younger workers, is less well established. 
 
Two variables are used to measure ‘work security’ - the number of hours worked per week and 
the regularity of work (whether the work was one-off, casual ‘as-needed’ or regular – involving 
set times). Some young people may be employed as permanent part-time employees, others as 
casuals with set shifts. For others, work times may be unpredictable, with no set times or shifts. 
This sort of irregularity may share some characteristics with sporadic work on the informal 
economy, in that aspects of the work evade normal regulation. To examine whether socio-
demographic characteristics function as latent explanatory variables for work security, a logistic 
regression model was run for the likelihood of working long hours (relative to low hours) and a 
multinomial logistic regression model run to determine the likelihood of working casual or 
regular compared to one-off work. These models are presented in table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Hours worked (two category) and Regularity by skill category and demographic 
characteristics 
   Work 11 hours + a Casualb Regular b 
Skill level High  1.53 (0.30) 0.26*** (0.35) 0.14*** (0.33) 
  Intermediate  1.03 (0.17) 0.36*** (0.22) 0.27*** (0.20) 
  Elementary = ref.     
Age  Twelve 0.14*** (0.30) 0.89 (0.33) 0.68 (0.31) 
 Thirteen 0.24*** (0.20) 1.28 (0.30) 1.18 (0.28) 
 Fourteen 0.41*** (0.16) 1.21 (0.26) 1.13 (0.25) 
 Fifteen 0.86 (0.14) 1.18 (0.24) 1.58* (0.23) 
 Sixteen =ref    
Socio-economic status  11-25th quantile  0.83 (0.21) 1.12 (0.33) 1.72 (0.32) 
  26-50th quantile  0.98 (0.21) 1.25 (0.34) 2.06* (0.33) 
  51-75th quantile  0.99 (0.19) 1.33 (0.31) 2.31** (0.29) 
  76-90th quantile  0.52** (0.20) 0.76 (0.30) 1.79* (0.28) 
  91-100th quantile  0.48** (0.22) 0.80 (0.31) 1.48 (0.29) 
  0-10th quantile (most 
disadvantaged)=ref 
 
  
CALD Non-Anglo Australian  1.17 (0.12) 0.74 (0.19) 0.51*** (0.18) 
  Anglo-Australian=ref    
Gender Female 0.96 (0.10) 0.97 (0.17) 1.29 (0.16) 
 Male=ref.    
Rurality Metropolitan  0.76 (0.16) 1.00 (0.27) 0.85 (0.25) 
 Rural coastal 0.60** (0.18) 1.64 (0.34) 1.34 (0.32) 
 Rrural inland 0.86 (0.17) 1.47 (0.32) 1.20 (0.31) 
 Sydney=ref    
Intercept  (0.21) (0.33) (0.32) 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000; a) Reference category is: 1-10 hrs; b) Reference category is: one-off. 
 
The casual and part-time nature of the work available and required by students is reflected in 
work regularity and work hours. Just under two-thirds (61.3%, n=1586) of young workers on the 
formal labour market work regular shifts, with a sizeable minority working casual/as-needed 
(29.4%, n=761). Most jobs do not involve long work hours. Just over 70 percent of jobs involve 
less than 10 hours per week (70.7%, n=1798), with 36.4 percent (n=926) involving work hours 
of 5 hours or less per week. Of these jobs, most are regular jobs, with just under two-thirds of 0-
5 hour (59.2%, n=536) and 6-10 hour a week jobs (61.7%, n=526) involving regular shifts and 
just under one-third being undertaken as-needed (0-5 hours: 29.8%, n=270; 6-10 hours: 30.4%. 
n=259). Regular work is therefore the modal work arrangement for young workers, regardless of 
the number of hours they work per week, which suggests that work schedules may reflect 
employer demands but young people are limiting their work hours in accordance with their non-
work priorities.  
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Young workers from middle class neighbourhoods are twice as likely as young workers from the 
poorest neighbourhoods to work regularly. Furthermore young workers from the most 
advantaged neighbourhoods are significantly less likely to work longer hours, being 
approximately half as likely as young people from the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods to 
work more than ten (as compared to less than 10) hours per week. Young people from non-
English speaking backgrounds are approximately half as likely to work regularly as compared to 
Anglo-Australian young workers, but there is no observed difference in terms of work time. 
Gender has no effect on either indicator of work security. Age has a significant impact on work 
time, with the likelihood of working more than 10 hours increasing by 1.65 times for each one-
year increase in age. When treated as a categorical variable, no significant difference is found 
between 15 and 16 year olds, but 16 year olds are 7 times more likely than 12 year olds, 4 times 
more likely than 13 year olds and 2.3 times more likely than 14 year olds to work longer hours. 
 
Within the adult labour market employers are reluctant to casually hire and fire employees with 
higher-level skills because of the costs of developing advanced and often firm specific skill sets 
(Gaillie, 2007).  As the peripheral work force was designed to bear the brunt of adjustment, the 
labour force is segmented into a protected core of skilled workers complemented by a vulnerable 
periphery of the lower skilled. However within the youth labour market we see different 
underlying structures evident. Both high and intermediate skill jobs are less likely to involve 
regular work compared to elementary skill jobs, being approximately one-fifth and one-third as 
likely to involve regular shifts as elementary skill jobs. Elementary skill jobs are highly regulated, 
the modal category involving regular shift work comprising less than 10 hours per week (85.2%, 
n=1857 of elementary skill jobs). A similar pattern is evident for intermediate skill workers, 
however these arrangements are not as encompassing as they are for elementary skill workers - 
these work-time arrangements comprising 57.5% (n=126) of intermediate skill jobs. For high 
skill jobs, the proportion involving precarious work-time arrangements, relative to elementary 
and intermediate skill jobs is much larger. Like elementary and intermediate skill jobs, the modal 
category is regular shift work comprising less than 10 hours per week. However just over 40 
percent of high-skill jobs are one-off or casual/as-needed jobs (43.6%, n=27). These results 
suggest that as skill levels increase, the formality of work arrangements decreases.  
 
4.5.2. Income security: Likelihood and level of remuneration  
The likelihood of whether young workers are paid or rewarded by skill level and socio-
demographic characteristics is presented in Table 4.5. Model I indicates the likelihood of being 
paid and rewarded by socio-demographic characteristics, whereas Model II introduces skill level 
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to determine the independent effects skill level may have on the likelihood of being paid or 
rewarded.  
 
Table 4.5: Likelihood of pay by skill level and Socio-demographic characteristics – Formal 
Economy 
   Monetary Reward Only 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Skill level High   0.64 (0.62)  2.84 (0.70) 
  Intermediate   0.15*** (0.23)  0.63 (0.31) 
  Elementary = ref.      
Age (years)  0.70*** (0.10) 0.74** (0.10) 0.57*** (0.12)  0.60*** (0.12) 
Socio-economic status 11-25th quantile  0.84 (0.32) 0.97 (0.34) 0.54 (0.53)  0.67 (0.55) 
  26-50th quantile  1.73 (0.40) 1.95 (0.41) 1.42 (0.56) 1.57 (0.57) 
  51-75th quantile  2.39* (0.36) 2.38* (0.37) 1.69 (0.542) 1.75 (0.53) 
  76-90th quantile  1.05 (0.32) 1.16 (0.34) 0.88 (0.49) 0.83 (0.51) 
  91-100th quantile  0.84 (0.33) 0.99 (0.34) 0.88 (0.50) 1.06 (0.51) 
  0-10th quantile (most 
disadvantaged)=ref 
 
 
 
 
CALD Non-Anglo Australian 0.30*** (0.22) 0.30*** (0.23) 0.51* (0.31) 0.50* (0.32) 
  Anglo-Australian=ref     
Gender Female 0.56** (0.19) 0.62* (0.20) 0.67 (0.27) 0.68 (0.27) 
 Male=ref.      
Rurality Metropolitan  2.91* (0.46) 3.24* (0.47) 3.15 (0.56) 3.53* (0.57) 
 Rural coastal 1.76 (0.45) 1.55 (0.46) 2.29 (0.57) 2.08 (0.57) 
 Rural inland 0.84 (0.39) 0.85 (0.40) 1.18 (0.51) 1.11 (0.52) 
 Sydney=ref     
Intercept  (1.84) (1.47) (1.84) (1.84) 
a The reference category is: Neither pay nor reward. 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
 
The majority of jobs on the formal labour market are paid (90%, n=2369). We would expect that 
all of these jobs should be paid, but just under 5 percent of jobs (4.9%, n=130) are rewarded 
non-monetarily (a gift in lieu of money), and a further 5 percent (5.0% n= 132) are done for no 
pay or reward
23
. Elementary skill jobs are paid with the greatest frequency. Almost 93 percent 
(n=2137) of elementary skill jobs are paid, compared to 82 percent (n=54) of high-skill jobs and 
just under 70 percent (n=162) of intermediate-skill jobs. Almost 20 percent  (n=44) of 
intermediate skill jobs are neither paid nor rewarded compared to fewer than 5 percent and 4 
percent of high and elementary skill jobs respectively. The frequency of obtaining non-monetary 
reward is similar for high and intermediate skill jobs but much lower for elementary skill jobs. 
                                                          
23 While it is unclear why this is the case, many may be undertaking voluntary work in the formal economy, the 
reasons for thus explored later in the chapter. In some instances this may also be a result of unpaid work trials. 
Within NSW it is legal to engage workers for trial periods, but it is illegal for an employer to make employees or 
prospective employees undertake an unpaid work trial, even if it is just for a few hours.  
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This is confirmed when likelihood of remuneration is modelled (Model II in Table 5.4). 
Intermediate skill jobs are 0.15 times as likely to be paid compared to elementary skill jobs.  
 
There is an evident social distribution of pay and reward independent of skill level. Young 
workers from upper-middle class neighbourhoods (51-75th SEIFA quantile) are more than twice 
as likely as young people from the poorest neighbourhoods to be paid. Young workers from 
non-English speaking backgrounds are significantly less likely to receive monetary and non-
monetary remuneration compared to young workers of Anglo-Australian background regardless 
of skill level, indicating a gift economy for some young workers from non-English speaking 
backgrounds in the formal economy. Young people from metropolitan areas are also more likely 
to be paid monetarily compared to young people from rural and regional areas. The prevailing 
parameter estimates associated with these socio-demographic characteristics are largely 
unaffected by the introduction of skill level, but skill level maintains its own independent effect 
despite the introduction of other terms into the model. Females are almost half as likely to be 
paid as males. This also holds when skill level is included, but the parameter is reduced from 0.56 
to 0.61, indicating that skill has a slight moderating impact.  
 
These results do not confirm a typical segmented labour market narrative, of high skill jobs 
securing income protections and elementary skill jobs being on the fringe of the labour market. 
Rather elementary skill jobs are more likely to be regulated and paid. This is perhaps unsurprising 
given the nature of skills exercised in high and intermediate as opposed to elementary skill jobs 
within the youth labour market. The high and intermediate skill jobs comprise a small segment 
of what we could describe as ‘fringe specialists’ (actors, musicians, IT programmers, 
photographers etc.). The exercise of specialised and unusual skills, especially for young workers, 
means that they may elude regulation, working in unusual and unexpected segments of the 
labour market. This can potentially result in working for non-monetary forms of remuneration 
or for experience, even though the work is located in the formal economy. This also points to a 
different self-identity, which these young people have as workers, and in consequence a different 
expectation of conditions- it is the exercise of particular competencies that may be the rewarding 
aspect of the work
24
. Elementary skill jobs represent youth-intensive segments of the labour 
market (retail sales, fast food service, labouring) and routine and regulated conditions of 
employment are a matter of course in these sectors. Because they form the bulk of labour market 
participation for young people formal modes of payment are institutionalised through law and in 
                                                          
24
 Whether, for these fringe specialists, this manifests as a different self-understanding about the role and benefits of 
work, compared to their colleagues in more mainstream jobs, will be examined in section six 
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the expectations of economic actors – the employers and employees.  Furthermore the use of 
skill does not act as a compensating differential for elementary skill jobs, as it does for high and 
intermediate skill jobs.  
 
The level and distribution of pay rates is presented in Table 4.6. Hourly pay rate is used as the 
dependent variable. By controlling for hours and forms of work (i.e. whether work is one-off, 
casual or regular) this also controls for the relationship between labour market security (how 
many hours young people work) and income security.   
 
Table 4.6: Approximate hourly pay by skill level – Formal Economy 
Statistic High Skill Intermediate Skill Elementary Skill Formal Economy 
Mean (S.E. mean) 48.00 (25.84) 15.36 (1.72) 11.21 (0.23) 12.32 (0.60) 
95% CI mean (L-U) 4.05-100.05 11.96-18.76 10.75-11.67 11.15-13.49 
5% Trimmed Mean 20.77 12.41 10.00 10.33 
Median 13.94 10.00 8.40 8.57 
 
Pay rates in the formal economy for young people are skewed towards the low end and are quite 
dispersed, indicating that most young people are paid relatively poorly and that wage rates in the 
youth labour market are marked by inequality. The mean pay rate is $12.32 per hour (only 
including those who are paid), however just under one-fifth of workers (n= 405, 18.5%) are paid 
less than $5.00 per hour, and approximately two-thirds of young workers are paid $10.00 per 
hour or less (n=1400, 64.1%). At the high end of pay rates, the top 10% of workers are paid 
$24.00 per hour or more, and the top 5%, $30.00 or more. This means that young people at the 
95th percentile of wages are paid $7.50 for every $1.00 received by young people at the 10th 
percentile of wages. While the likelihood of being paid is greater for elementary skill work, high 
skill workers, when paid, obtain higher levels of pay compared to workers in intermediate and 
elementary skilled jobs. We see a general tendency for pay rates to be less dispersed and decrease 
in amount as skill level decreases. The small number of high skill jobs, plus the likelihood that 
these jobs are not covered by legal employment awards or covered by collective or enterprise 
agreements, mean that pay rates for high skill jobs are highly dispersed (S.E.=25.84). In contrast 
the dispersion of pay rates is comparatively small for intermediate skill jobs (S.E= 1.72) and pay 
rates for elementary skill jobs relatively concentrated around the mean rate (S.E=0.23). Using 
measures that control for this variance, the 5% trimmed mean and median, we also observe that 
skill level and hourly pay is positively correlated. While intermediate and elementary skill jobs are 
paid at similar rates, (a $2.40 per hour trimmed mean and $1.60 per hour median difference 
between intermediate and elementary skill jobs) the difference between high skill and other jobs 
is larger. Using the trimmed mean, high skill jobs are paid more than twice the hourly rate of 
elementary skill jobs and $8.36 per hour more than intermediate skill jobs. Similarly the median 
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pay rate for high skill jobs is approximately $5.50 per hour more than elementary skill jobs and 
almost $4.00 per hour more than intermediate skill jobs.   
 
At the time the data was collected, there was no single junior or minimum pay rate against which 
the pay rates presented here could be benchmarked25. Instead industry and occupation specific 
youth or junior pay rates are specified in industrial Awards. In New South Wales, the New South 
Wales Industrial Relations Commission supervises the operation of these Awards, setting wages 
based on the industry standards, skills, qualifications, training and experience required for the 
job. In most agreements, youth wage rates are determined as a percentage of the adult wage 
applying to workers aged between 15 and 21 years, the percentage increasing with age.  However, 
there is no uniformity across awards between a child’s age and the relevant percentage of the 
adult wage that applies. For example young people aged 16 years and under receive 50 percent, 
and sometimes 40 percent, of the full wage rate. Furthermore, different Awards, depending on 
the industry that the work is undertaken in, may cover the same type of work. This is further 
complicated by whether the work falls within the Commonwealth or State (i.e. in this case New 
South Wales) jurisdiction.  
 
Given that the best comparator is the aggregate mean weekly earnings for 15 to 19 year olds in 
full-time employment26. At the time of writing this was approximately $388.00, which is 
approximately $10.21 per hour for a 38-hour week (ABS, 2003). This is slightly less than the 
mean pay rate found here overall, indicating the influence of the high mean pay rate for high skill 
workers. However it is similar to the mean rate for elementary skill workers in this study who 
appear to be paid around Award rates and at similar levels to young adult workers. 
 
To determine whether different sub-populations of young workers are more likely to receive 
different levels of pay, the inter-quartile range of hourly pay rates was calculated and bracketed 
into four categories, from the lowest quartile of pay ($1.00 - $6.00 per hour) to the highest 
quartile ($13.67 or more). Using the lowest quartile of hourly pay rates as the reference group, 
multinomial logistic regression analysis was undertaken to determine whether the likelihood of 
                                                          
25 This system has been rationalised by the introduction of the Fair Work Act, which commenced on July 1, 2009. 
One of the effects of the Act is the rationalisation of the thousands of federal and state-based awards by less than 
200 modern Awards. The Fair Work Act also sets a national minimum wages for trainees, apprentices and juniors 
who are not covered by any other award or agreement. These are not the prevailing rate but act as a floor, or 
safety net, below which it is illegal to pay workers. As of 1 July 2012, this rate for employees under 16 years of 
age is $5.87 per hour. 
26 Given the age-specific youth rates, this aggregation is not particularly helpful. However this is the most 
specific disaggregation provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Therefore this figures masks what are 
likely to be considerable differences in weekly earnings between 15 and 19 year olds.  
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
Chapter Four: The Formal Economy  - 84 - 
 
receiving moderate and high pay rates were associated with skill level and socio-demographic 
characteristics of young workers. The results are presented in Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7: Pay rates (inter-quartile range) by formal economy category and demographic 
characteristics 
   
26-50th percentile 
($6.01-8.57) 
51-75th percentile 
($8.58-13.66) 
76-100th ($13.67-
highest) 
Skill Level High  1.28 (0.48) 1.03 (0.50) 3.12** (0.39) 
  Intermediate  0.37*** (0.27) 0.59* (0.21) 0.86 (0.20) 
  Elementary. = ref.     
Age Twelve 0.65 (0.27) 0.42 ** (0.29) 0.86 (0.27) 
 Thirteen 0.76 (0.23) 0.50** (0.24) 1.38 (0.16) 
 Fourteen 0.87 (0.21) 0.75 (0.20) 1.26 (0.21) 
 Fifteen 0.91 (0.20) 0.75 (0.18) 0.85 (0.20) 
 Sixteen =ref    
Socio-economic status  11-25th quantile  1.23 (0.29) 1.23 (0.32) 1.00 (0.26) 
  26-50th quantile  1.11 (0.28) 0.75 (0.31) 0.53* (0.26) 
  51-75th quantile  1.49 (0.27) 1.01 (0.29)  0.66 (0.24) 
  76-90th quantile  1.82* (0.26) 1.09 (0.26) 0.97 (0.24) 
  91-100th quantile  1.34 (0.27) 0.78 (0.28) 0.74 (0.25) 
  0-10th quantile (most 
disadvantaged)=ref 
   
CALD Non-Anglo Australian  0.73 (0.17) 0.60** (0.16) 0.91 (0.15) 
  Anglo-Australian=ref    
Gender Female 1.15 (0.30) 1.08 (0.13) 0.72** (0.12) 
 Male=ref.    
Rurality Metropolitan  0.75 (0.19) 0.74 (0.21) 0.87 (0.20) 
 Rural coastal 1.06 (0.22) 0.99 (0.23) 0.92 (0.23) 
 Rural inland 0.74 (0.21) 1.02 (0.22) 0.88 (0.22) 
 Sydney=ref    
Intercept  (0.32) (0.28) (0.27) 
 
The results indicate that high skill jobs are differentiated from other work, in being able to obtain 
the highest quartile of pay rates, but are similar to elementary skill jobs in obtaining middle 
percentile pay rates. Intermediate skill jobs are less likely than elementary skill jobs to obtain 
middle tier pay rates. This indicates a clustering of pay for the majority of jobs within the middle 
of the distribution with pay differentiation at the high end, associated with skill. In terms of 
labour market segmentation, a small group of high skill workers are paid extremely well, with the 
majority of other workers paid at lower rates. Age is another important determinant of wage 
stratification in the youth labour market. Twelve and thirteen year olds share a similar pay 
profile, but are differentiated from older workers by being less likely to obtain pay in the 
moderately high level of pay rates. However the absence of extensive age-based stratification of 
pay rates indicates that the formal system of youth wages within the award system is working to 
level out some pay differences. A gendered division in pay is also evident at the high-end scale of 
pay rates, with females being less likely to earn the highest rates (0.72) as males. Apart from the 
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skill, age and gender determinants of pay, pay rates are largely undifferentiated. Young people 
from lower middle class backgrounds are approximately half as likely to obtain the highest wage 
rates compared to other young people and those from upper middle class backgrounds almost 
twice as likely to obtain moderate pay rates. Young people from minority cultural and linguistic 
backgrounds are 0.6 times as likely to obtain pay rates in the 51-75th quartile, but no other 
differences are apparent.  
 
The age-based determination of income indicates the importance of alternative role ideologies in 
suppressing young people’s pay. Ideologically low pay rates are defended through appeals to 
notions of specific and lesser youth needs, the presumed economic roles of parents in 
supporting young people and the idea that teenagers, possessing relatively low skills and having 
little formal training, are worth less than other workers (White and Wyn 2004). Institutionally, 
this is reflected in award specified pay rates for young people. However among young workers 
we see the importance of skill in influencing pay rates.  If the exercise of skill is understood as a 
compensating differential (Green, 2006), then jobs that afford more opportunities for the 
exercise of skill, should, all else being equal, be able to attract workers at lower wage rates. This 
certainly holds in terms of the likelihood of pay, with young people in high skill jobs more likely 
to volunteer their time. However skill utilisation does not act as a compensating differential for 
pay rates, but rather young people who can exercise those skills demand higher wages because 
they offer niche or specialised skills. Beyond that, institutional factors are also important in 
determining wages. Jobs in ‘youth intensive’ (i.e. elementary skill jobs) sectors attract average pay 
rates. Wage dispersion is limited across elementary and intermediate skill jobs, labour market 
regulation of these jobs providing some degree of wage equity. In contrast high skill jobs appear 
to be subject to less stringent forms of regulation. The results here suggest that pay for high skill 
jobs may be negotiated between individual employers and employees. As a result skill 
deployment is tempered by the prevailing award determined wage rates in youth intensive sectors 
of the labour market and the labour market is segmented into non-competing groups, between 
different grades of workers. The relationship between skill and income is therefore not 
straightforward. While those who provide niche or technical services are paid well, the effect of 
broader labour market regulations around pay also appears to have an effect. 
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4.5.3. Representation Security: Participation and Task Autonomy 
Workplace participation and job autonomy have a central place in discussions of job quality. 
Thinkers from a broad range of perspectives have argued for the importance of worker 
autonomy as a measure of job quality, dignified work and also broader conceptions of citizenship 
(Honneth 1996, Marshall 1964, Green 2006). Furthermore, task autonomy is usually seen as 
linked to skill; the more skilled the work, the greater the knowledge of the work process held by 
the employee rather than by management (Gaillie 2007).  Blauner (1964) for example highlighted 
the importance of unifying the conception and execution of work, and neo-Marxists have argued 
that individual control over work tasks is an essential condition for self-realisation (Braverman 
1974). Hence job autonomy and workplace participation are contested areas between employers 
and employees. Taylorist systems of work premised on the separation of the design and 
performance of work have also been extended to non-manual work. This is particularly 
significant to young workers because of their overrepresentation in the service economy. 
Because service workers are brought into contact with the product at the point of consumption, 
employees need to be controlled in their relations with customers (Braverman 1974, Edwards 
and Wajcman 2005). Therefore the corresponding requirement is for workers to attend to 
consumer generated demands, and rules for display of feeling are routinised through training and 
surveillance (Green, 2006, Hochschild 1983, Frederiksen 1999). However engaging with 
customers may also be a source of satisfaction and service workers may find standardised scripts 
useful to manage customer expectations and maintain some control about their degree of 
engagement.  The question then becomes whether we can identify under what social conditions 
autonomy and control at work is promoted.  
 
This section examines the capacity young workers have to determine their work conditions and 
to represent their views at work. Three facets of control and autonomy were measured– 
workplace participation (‘I have a fair say about things at work’); task autonomy (‘I can do things 
my own way in my work’); and control over work-time (‘I can take a break when I want to’; ‘I am 
free to decide when I take days off’; and ‘If I need to do something important the person I work 
for let’s me change my work hours’). Logistic regression models were run using these measures 
as dependent variables, with skill level, socio-demographic characteristics and work 
characteristics as the independent variables. The significant results are presented in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8: Workplace participation, task autonomy and control, by skill level, socio-demographic 
and selected work characteristics 
 
Model I 
Fair Say 
Model II 
Do things on 
way 
Model III 
Take break 
Model IV 
Take days off 
Model V 
Change work 
hours 
Skill level      
High 2.34 (0.39)* 2.55 (0.31)** 2.42 (0.39)* 1.44 (0.29) 1.00 (0.40) 
Intermediate 2.28 (0.20)** 1.61 (0.16)** 1.63 (0.20)* 0.88 (0.16) 0.90 (0.23) 
Elementary = ref      
Work regularity      
Casual 0.84 (0.19) 0.96 (0.17) 0.89 (0.22) 1.87 (0.17)*** 1.45 (0.25) 
Regular 0.70 (0.18)* 1.06 (0.16) 0.69 (0.21) 1.58 (0.16)** 1.35 (0.24) 
One-off=ref      
Hours worked      
6-10 hours a week 0.81 (0.11)* 0.67 (0.10)** 0.47 (0.13)*** 0.79 (0.10)* 1.12 (0.16) 
11-15 hours a week 0.64 (0.17)* 0.50 (0.13)** 0.33 (0.18)*** 0.83 (0.13) 0.84 (0.19) 
16 hours plus a week 0.81 (0.18) 0.69 (0.13)*** 0.52 (0.17)*** 0.91 (0.13) 1.03 (0.20) 
1-5 hours a week=ref      
Age (years)  0.82 (0.05)** 0.89 (0.05)* 0.75 (0.06)***   
Socio-economic status      
11-25th quantile  0.64 (0.24) 1.11 (0.22)    
26-50th quantile 0.62 (0.24)* 1.55 (0.22)*    
51-75th quantile 0.68 (0.22) 1.46 (0.20)    
76-90th quantile 0.51 (0.22)** 1.24 (0.20)    
91-100th quantile  0.45 (0.24)** 1.43 (0.22)    
0-10th quantile (most disadvantaged)=ref      
Gender      
Female 0.72 (0.10)** 0.69 (0.10)*** 0.64 (0.10)*** 0.79 (0.10)*  
Male=ref      
CALD      
Non-Anglo Australian 1.31 (0.13)*     
Anglo-Australian=ref      
Rurality      
Metropolitan     0.83 (0.23) 
Rural coastal     1.08 (0.26) 
Rural inland     2.01 (0.28)* 
Sydney=ref      
Pay rate      
26-50th ($6.01-8.57) 1.00 (0.14)  0.84 (0.13) 0.84 (0.13)   
51-75th ($8.58-13.66) 1.10 (0.16) 0.97(0.12) 0.99 (0.12)   
76-100th ($13.67-highest) 1.56 (0.17)** 1.49 (0.12)** 1.56(0.12)**   
0-25th (lowest-$6.00) =ref      
Intercept 0.78*** 0.73** 0.75*** 0.71 1.10 
Disagree=ref 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
Model 1 - I have a fair say about things that happen at work 
Model II - I can do things my own way in my job 
Model III - I can take a break when I want to in my job 
Model IV - I am free to decide when I can take days off work 
Model V - Need to do something important, person I work for lets me change work hours 
Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
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We found in the previous section that within the secondary labour market, most young people 
have relatively predictable work times. However being able to exert control over work time is a 
minority experience. Just over 50 percent (51.2%, n=1241) of young workers are not able to take 
a break when they want to, just under half are unable to determine when they work, with 46.3 
percent (n=1080) not free to decide when they can take days off. However greater latitude is 
evident in terms of being able to change work hours in response to important non-work needs, 
with just over 85 percent (85.3%, n=1766) of young workers being able to change their work 
hours if they need to do something important. The supposed benefits of casualisation, of being 
able to work when you want, are not evident for young workers, suggesting that flexible 
employment arrangements benefit employers rather than young workers.  
 
Compared to elementary skill workers, high skill workers are 2.4 times and intermediate skill 
workers 1.6 times more likely to be able to take breaks when they want to, indicating greater 
flexibility and control over work-day practices and the pace of work. As far as control over work 
hours, when young people work and whether they can change their shifts, no difference is 
associated with skill level. We would anticipate that regular jobs may involve less flexibility in the 
form of control over work hours, however compared to one-off jobs, casual and regular workers 
are 1.9 and 1.6 times as likely to be able to take days off than one-off workers. As it is hard to 
take days off for one-off jobs, the more meaningful difference is between casual and regular 
workers, with casual workers being slightly more likely (1.21 times) to take days off than regular 
workers. However no significant difference is observed for control over time at work (‘take 
break when I want to’), or young worker’s ability to alter their work in response to non-work 
needs. However the number of hours worked does have a significant relationship with control 
over work time. Compared to short hour workers, those who work moderate or long hours are 
less able to take a break when they want to, indicating that either break times are scheduled into 
long work shifts or not at all. These young workers are approximately one-third (for 11-15 hours 
workers) or one-half (for 6-10 hours and 16 plus hours workers) as likely to take a break when 
they want to. Again, in terms of flexibility over work schedules, the differences become less 
marked. Young people who work 6-10 hours a week are less likely to be able to take days off, but 
no differences are apparent for young workers’ ability to change their work hours in response to 
an important non-work event. Perhaps reflecting skill differences, workers obtaining the highest 
pay rates are also 1.6 times more likely take breaks when they want to. 
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Like control over work-time, there is a relatively even split between young workers who are able 
and those who cannot exercise task autonomy in their work. Just over 46 percent (46.6%, 
n=1075) of young workers are able to exercise autonomy in their work. In part this split is 
associated with skill. Workers in high and intermediate skill jobs are able to set the daily pace of 
their work to exercise task autonomy (‘I can do things my own way in my job’). Compared to 
elementary skill workers, high skill workers are 2.6 times and intermediate skill workers 1.6 times 
more likely to be able exert task autonomy in their work. Again skill differences may be 
implicated in pay rate differences associated with task autonomy, with those who receive the 
highest pay rates being 1.5 times more likely to exercise task autonomy than workers receiving 
lower pay rates. Compared to low hour workers, other workers are approximately one-half (11-
15 hours) and two-thirds as likely to be able to exercise task autonomy, indicating that the greater 
the work security and the lower the skill level, the more likely work processes are dictated by the 
employer. Work regularity does not appear to have an effect. 
 
Slightly more young workers are able to participate in workplace decision-making, with just 
under two-thirds of young workers contributing to workplace decisions. Just over 60 percent 
(62.2%, n=1482) of young workers either agree or strongly agree with the statement that they are 
able to have a fair say about things that happen at work. Workers in high and intermediate skill 
jobs also have greater opportunities to participate in workplace decisions compared to 
elementary skill workers. Not only are higher skill workers able to control the pace of their work 
and how they do their work, high skill workers are 2.6 times and intermediate skill workers are 
2.1 times more likely to be able to have a fair say about things at work. Again high skill and high 
pay rates have a positive correlation with workplace participation, with workers receiving the 
highest pay rates being 1.6 times as likely than other workers to contribute to workplace 
decisions. 
 
Task discretion, capacity to influence workplace decisions and control work time, decreases with 
age, with younger workers able to exercise greater autonomy than older workers. For example, 
when age is treated as a categorical variable, compared to sixteen year olds, twelve year olds are 
2.6 times more likely to have a fair say about things that happen at work and twelve to fourteen 
year olds are between 1.9 and 3.3 times more likely to be able to take breaks when they want to. 
Older workers are therefore more likely to be in jobs that allow less control over task 
performance, for example most sales and food preparation jobs. These aspects of control and 
autonomy are also gendered. Females are less likely to be able to exercise task autonomy, less 
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likely to be able to participate in workplace decisions and less likely to exercise control over work 
time both in terms of taking a break and taking days off.  
 
These findings indicate that a sizeable minority of young people have little control over their 
work and feel they have no opportunity to participate in day-to-day decisions. Most work is likely 
to be closely supervised and participation limited
27
. The picture that emerges is of regulated 
elementary skill work for the majority and a much smaller group of creative specialists who 
obtain benefits and some disadvantages from working outside more regulated work 
environments. Young people in higher skill jobs and those paid at higher rates disproportionately 
obtain the benefits of task autonomy and work-time control. This is because the exercise of 
more complex skills favours the devolution of decision-making to employees. Skilled employees 
work in ways that are costly for managers to monitor and difficult to explicate contractually. Skill 
and autonomy are likely to be closely related, as more complex tasks are less likely to be able to 
be automated and reliant on the discretion of the worker for their effective performance (Gaillie, 
2003). Therefore control over workplace decisions is more equally shared between employers 
and employees and unilateral control over decisions is less efficient than consensus based 
approaches to decision making (Gaillie, 2007). Furthermore young people who are in higher skill 
jobs are able to exercise greater control over scheduling of work and the ability to vary work 
hours.  Therefore we would anticipate that one of the benefits of high skilled work for young 
people is greater ability to cope with competing demands, as a high level of discretion over work 
time reduces the negative effects of work hours on work-life balance. Less skilled jobs are more 
closely controlled by rules or close supervision. Tasks are made routine and shifts are set. It is in 
the interests of management to limit discretion, capacity to influence workplace decisions, how 
work is done and the pace at which work is done. Most young workers in the formal economy 
are in such jobs.   
 
4.5.4. Skill Reproduction Security: Support and Skill Development at Work 
Employee supervision and support are important aspects of job quality generally and job based 
training and skill development more specifically (Misko, 2008; Noelker et al. 2009). For young 
people early work experiences can provide an important foundation for ongoing skill 
                                                          
27 For those with an optimistic view, there is a steady increase in skills in a more complex and technologically 
sophisticated economy, leading to improvements in job quality and greater say for individual employees over the 
work process (Blauner 1964; Zuboff 1988). This makes young people’s work discontinuous with the adult labour 
market, where changes in task discretion are thought to reflect trends in the development of skills. Neo-Marxists 
envisage a long term decline in job control, especially for those in lower skilled jobs, leading to polarisation between 
classes in job quality (Friedmann 1955; Braverman 1974; Wright and Singelmann 1982). 
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development and can enhance future employability (Lunt and Furnham 1996). Hungerland et al. 
(2007) argue that the knowledge gained from holding a job can have a higher value for young 
people than the extrinsic rewards of work, such as income. According to Hungerland et al. 
(2007) parents and young people associate work principally with the possibility of learning and 
see in this an investment for the future. This would suggest that the link between skill used and 
developed in work and the ongoing benefit gained from work may be related. However support 
at work is important not only because it results in better trained workers. Work quality is also 
influenced by the extent meaningful interaction is possible in a job. Congenial peer relations and 
solidarity are essential elements of a positive work experience that indicate a culture of support 
(Hodson and Sullivan 2002; Vogl 2009).  
 
Six questions were used to measure levels of support. ‘The tasks I have to do are clearly 
explained to me’ and ‘I get the training I need to do my job’ measure task instruction and 
training; ‘When I do a good job, I get told I do a good job’ and ‘The person I work for takes an 
interest in the work I do’ measure feedback and supervision; and ‘I can get help from the people 
I work with if I ask for it’ and ‘I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my work’ measure 
levels of ongoing support provided to young workers in doing their work. These variables 
provide some measure of the level of formal support and collegial relationships at work.  In 
addition two variables are used to measure skill gained from work and whether work contributes 
to future career prospects - ‘I am gaining skills from the work I do’ and ‘The experience I get 
working will give me advantages in the future’. These aspects of skill reproduction security were 
modelled against skill development, other work characteristics and socio-demographic 
characteristics of the young workers. The results are presented in Table 4.9. Only statistically 
significant results are reported.  
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Table 4.9: Support at work by skill level, socio-demographic and selected work characteristics 
 
Model I: 
Tasks 
Explained 
Model II: 
Training to 
do job 
Model III: 
Get told do 
good job 
Model IV: 
Employer 
Interest 
Model V: 
Get help if 
ask 
Model VI: 
Advice 
good/bad 
Model VII 
Gaining 
Skills 
Model 
VIII: 
Future 
advantage 
Socio-economic 
status  
  
 
     
   
11-25th quantile   0.57* (0.29) 0.56 (0.32) 0.73 (0.28) 0.91 (0.42) 0.83 (0.28) 0.68 (0.48) 0.62 (0.48) 
26-50th quantile  0.59 (0.29) 0.38 *(0.31) 0.53* (0.27) 0.67 (0.40) 0.74 (0.27) 0.37* (0.44) 0.35* (0.45) 
51-75th quantile  0.71 (0.27) 0.50* (0.30) 0.52* (0.25) 0.82 (0.38) 1.01 (0.26) 0.52 (0.43) 0.51 (0.43) 
76-90th quantile  0.44* (0.26) 0.42* (0.30) 0.43* (0.25 1.07 (0.39) 0.73 (0.25) 0.32* (0.41) 0.29* (0.42) 
91-100th quantile   0.37*(0.27) 0.34**(0.30) 0.38*(0.27) 0.40* (0.37) 0.55* (0.26) 0.02*(0.41) 0.21**(0.42) 
0-10th quantile (most 
disadvantaged)=ref 
 
 
   
   
Gender         
Female 0.72* (0.14) 1.35* (0.12)   1.87*(0.19)  1.94*(0.17) 1.85* (0.18) 
Male=ref         
Rurality*         
 Metropolitan 0.72 (0.23)    0.63 (0.28)    
 Rural coastal 0.58* (0.26)    0.82 (0.32)    
 Rural inland 1.25 (0.28)    1.70 (0.37)    
Sydney=ref         
Age 0.76* (0.78) 1.14* (0.05) 0.88* (0.06) 0.85* (0.05)    0.82* (0.08) 
CALD         
Non-Anglo      0.64* (0.21)    
Anglo-Australian=ref         
Skill level         
 High  2.33 (0.43) 3.69* (0.61) 3.64* (0.48)  4.56* (0.61) 2.09 (0.55) 2.08 (0.56) 
Intermediate  2.25 (0.25) 1.98* (0.25) 2.21* (0.23)  1.66* (0.24) 5.56*(0.52) 2.48* (0.41) 
Elementary=ref         
Remuneration type         
 Monetary    1.70 (0.31)     
Reward only    3.81* (0.67)     
No pay or 
reward=ref 
 
 
   
   
Hours         
 6-10 hours a week 0.65* (0.20) 1.45* (0.14)   2.10* (0.23) 1.31 (0.14) 1.56* (0.19) 1.93* (0.20) 
 11-15 hours a week 0.49*(0.24) 2.19* (0.22)   1.42 (0.30) 1.76* (0.21) 1.59 (0.28) 2.17* (0.31) 
15 hours plus a week 0.63 (0.27) 1.45 (0.21)   1.47 (0.30) 1.84* (0.22) 1.38 (0.29) 1.78 (0.31) 
1-5 hours =ref         
Regularity         
Casual  1.73* (0.22)     1.96* (0.27) 1.85* (0.29) 
Regular  1.62 (0.21)*     2.32* (0.27) 2.13* (0.28) 
One-off=ref         
Constant 7.56 (1.22)  0.32 (0.84) 9.43* (0.92) 4.31*(0.84) 1.50* (1.29)  6.34* (0.87) 9.76* (1.16) 5.83* (1.30) 
Model I: The tasks I have to do are clearly explained to me; Model II: I get the training I need to do my job 
Model III: When I do a good job, I get told I do a good job; Model IV: The person I work for takes an interest in 
the work I do; Model V: I can get help from the people I work with if I ask for it 
Model VI: I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my work; Model VII: I am gaining skills from the work I 
do; Model VIII: The experience I get working will give me advantages in the future 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 The reference category is: Disagree  
Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
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These results indicate that jobs involving greater levels of skill afford greater opportunities for 
formal training, informal support and feedback and ultimately an emphasis on obtaining skill for 
the future. Intermediate skill workers are more than five times and high skill workers more than 
twice as likely as elementary skill workers to work in jobs that afford opportunities for skill 
development (‘I am gaining skills from the work I do’); and more than twice as likely to obtain 
the training they need. Despite being able to exercise greater discretion as to how the task should 
be done, young people in high skill jobs are also more likely to receive instruction and 
supervision as to how to perform the work. For these young people decision latitude is 
supported, rather than negated, through forms of employer supervision and training. High skill 
jobs are 4.5 times more likely to obtain informal feedback about work progress than elementary 
skill jobs and intermediate skill jobs are 1.7 times as likely to obtain this sort of advice. Workers 
in both high and intermediate skill jobs are more than twice as likely to perceive their work as 
providing future advantages than young workers in elementary skill jobs. The results in terms of 
future advantage indicate that career development opportunities are skewed towards high skill 
jobs. Workers in high and intermediate skill jobs identify that the skills they are using will 
potentially provide them with future occupational advantage above and beyond the skills 
obtained from ‘just having a job’. The sorts of content skills developed and deployed on the job 
therefore matter to young people. This is also buttressed through the distribution of forms of 
positive recognition and support obtained by young workers. Young workers in high and 
intermediate skill jobs are approximately 3.7 and 2.0 times, respectively, as likely as elementary 
skill workers to receive positive recognition from work (‘When I do a good job, I get told I do a 
good job’), 3.6 times and 2.2 times respectively for their employer to take an interest in the work 
they do.  
 
Work regularity and hours also have some association with skill development. Workers in regular 
jobs and those who work moderate hours are most likely to also be in jobs that provide 
opportunities for skill development, formal and informal training and informal feedback about 
task performance. Young people in casual and regular jobs are also approximately twice as likely 
to perceive that their work will provide them with future advantage. These results suggest that 
employers are most likely to have institutionalised systems for training and supervision for jobs 
involving ongoing commitment, and are also more likely to invest some resources in jobs that 
involve regular commitment. This may be associated with occupation specific practices. Work in 
the service economy structured around routine shifts, such as retail service and food preparation, 
all involve some level of training and for many large food service franchises significant resources 
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are invested in training to regulate task discretion. Here we see how training diminishes control 
through quality control measures, a finding discussed in our previous section.  
 
Skill development is associated with gender, class background and to a certain extent age. 
Females and those from less wealthy backgrounds are more likely to emphasise that their work 
provides opportunities for skill development, obtain the training they need to do their work and, 
for young workers from the least wealthy neighbourhoods, obtain advice as to task performance. 
Females and those from the least wealthy neighbourhoods are also most likely to emphasise 
future benefits from their current work. Given that females and young people from working 
class neighbourhoods are less likely to work in jobs that offer greater skill development 
opportunities, these young people appear to place greater relative value on the opportunities that 
work provides, compared to males and young people from wealthier backgrounds.  Differences 
in future aspiration may be relevant here. Young workers from wealthier backgrounds may see 
their current work experience as discontinuous with their future work experience. For example 
working in retail has benefit in earning money now, but is less relevant for their future career that 
is more likely to involve work in professional jobs that require tertiary level qualifications. Hence 
current work experiences have less importance than educational qualifications.  For working 
class young people, the value of current work may be highly valued for both its current and 
future advantage. Potentially having fewer occupational career prospects, they may see their 
current work as providing advantage in a tight labour market. For these working class young 
people their work careers have already started, for wealthier young people, the job is just a stop 
gap way to earn some money.  
 
4.6. Relational embeddedness in the formal economy 
As discussed in the previous chapters, assessment of intrinsic and extrinsic attitudes towards 
work provides a sense of how economic action is experienced by children within each economy. 
For the formal economy, it is the exchange of labour for money that is central to work based 
attitudes, so much so that employees can withdraw their labour if they are not paid and it is the 
free exchange of labour for pay that is central to the capitalist production process and defines the 
capitalist economic system (Kolakowski 1978). Money wages are both incentive and reward – 
they are an incentive to supply labour and the reward for productivity. Extrinsic rewards include 
pay, fringe benefits and job security (Hodson and Sullivan 2002). However pay is also a basis for 
conferring intrinsic orientations because pay acts as a ranking device and therefore a form of 
valuation of individual and occupational status. Intrinsic orientations are realised on the job and 
include things like the freedom to plan one’s own work, chance to use and enhance abilities, 
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absence of close supervision and positive relations with co-workers. Getting a job not only 
provides income, but also is important in terms of social status, self-esteem, personal 
development and existential security. Therefore the market, through the medium of money, has 
some role in designating value and status (Towse, 2001). Hungerland et al. (2007) also found that 
a similar process applies to children who work. They found that the principal attraction of work 
for young people lies in payment, yet young people’s judgement of the adequacy of their pay 
centres on the concept of whether the pay was ‘appropriate’, in the respect that the level of pay 
matches the task being performed.  In this sense, it is also understood as social recognition of 
their own performance.  
 
Most studies emphasise that that consumption motivations are a primary rationale for young 
people to work (Green 1990, Hobbs and McKechnie 1997, Lavalette 1994). Mizen, Bolton and 
Pole (1999) suggest that these studies emphasise how young people’s motivations to work are 
most appropriately conceptualised around creating and supporting particular ‘styles of life’. If 
this is the case then we should find that these instrumental, or exchange-use attitudes prevail 
among young people working in the formal economy.  Green’s work on secondary school 
students and part-time work highlights that rather than working purely for the money, work 
involves a complexity of motives and intrinsic orientations (Green 1990). Drawing upon young 
workers reflections about the value of work, Green (1990) concludes that employment may serve 
one or more of three major roles for school aged young people facilitating the transition from 
school to work – (i) employment being part of a highly structured adolescence, where work 
offers a source of discipline and responsibility; (ii) work being a basis for social exploration 
beyond the boundaries of home and school; and (iii) work providing social skills opportunities 
and material benefits. For Green, none of these ‘roles’ represents a pure-type of motivation or 
rationality, but a mix of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards and instrumental and altruistic motives 
(Green 1990). In a study of young worker motivation, Hobbs et al. (2007) found that many 
young people discuss the human capital developing elements of their work. ‘Dealing with 
customers’, ‘handling money’, ‘time management’ were cited as the main benefits. These motives 
do not rely on affective relationships, but are endogenous to the formal employer-employee 
relationship, reflecting the exchange relationship on the market.  However motivations may also 
include the desire for self-actualising outcomes that are both non-instrumental and particular. 
Frey (1997) develops a general theory of economic motivation that includes extrinsic rewards 
(defined as response to pecuniary incentives) and the satisfaction of inner intrinsic motivations. 
Frey suggests that inappropriate rewards can displace incentives, for example monetary payment, 
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an extrinsic reward, may crowd out intrinsic motivations and become a disincentive for acts that 
are intrinsically motivated. Table 4.10 maps out the concepts and hypotheses around 
instrumental and intrinsic attitudes that guide the analysis in the following sections, and how the 
variables that are used to measure these attitudes map to the hypotheses. 
 
Table 4.10: Concepts, hypotheses and measures: Analysing instrumental and intrinsic attitudes on 
the formal economy 
Concept Hypothesis 
Formal economy is associated with instrumental behaviour. 
Money wages act as both incentive and reward. 
 
Act of monetary exchange also related to intrinsic orientations.  
Instrumental, or exchange-use attitudes prevail within the 
work that young people do on the formal labour market. 
 
Given young people’s primary identification as consumers 
rather than producers, consumption motivations are a primary 
rationale for young people to work. 
 
Work Orientation 
Instrumental Attitudes:  
 control over income;  
 cover expenses;  
 covers discretionary wants  
 
Instrumental attitudes more evident in elementary skill work, 
for those who are paid the highest. Instrumental attitudes 
highest among the most disadvantaged young people, as 
reliance upon personal income is more important for these 
groups of young people. 
 
Intrinsic Attitudes:  
 altruism;  
 responsibility;  
 build relationships;  
 social utility;  
 self-reliance;  
 enjoyment 
 
Intrinsic attitudes higher for more skilled work, as these types 
of jobs create more ‘self-actualising’ opportunities. 
 
The following sections assess whether non-instrumental as well as instrumental attitudes are 
evident among young workers on the formal labour market, and the extent to which they have 
mixed attitudes. We first examine instrumental attitudes, then intrinsic and altruistic attitudes. 
The measures used are detailed in Chapter Three, Section 3.3.4. 
  
4.6.1. Instrumental Orientations –Pay 
Three variables are used to measure ‘instrumental’ or, ‘exchange-use’ orientations. These are 
whether working provides control over income, allows the young worker to cover their expenses 
and allows them to buy what they want. All three variables measure the extrinsic orientations 
from work associated with being paid (Frey, 1997). For each variable responses were aggregated 
into those who agreed or strongly agreed and those who disagreed or strongly disagreed with 
each statement to form a dummy variable of disagree=0 and agree=1, for each extrinsic attitude. 
These were used in logistic regression models to examine the likelihood of instrumental 
orientations across skill category, socio-demographic characteristics and other work 
characteristics. These are reported in Table 4.11. Again, only significant or select results are 
reported. 
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Table 4.11: Instrumental orientations by Formal economy, socio-demographic and selected work 
characteristics 
 
Model I: 
Control income 
Model II: 
Cover expenses 
Model III: 
Buy what I want 
Skill level High 0.51 (0.47) 2.03 (0.75) 0.49* (0.35) 
  Intermediate 1.18 (0.32) 0.96 (0.30) 0.92 (0.22) 
  Elementary = ref    
Socio-economic status  11-25th quantile  
1.02 (0.39) 1.88 (0.36) 1.11 (0.29) 
 26-50th quantile  
0.99 (0.38) 2.14* (0.377) 1.38 (0.29) 
  51-75th quantile  
1.17 (0.37) 2.54* (0.34) 1.20 (0.27) 
  76-90th quantile  
1.49 (0.38) 1.87 (0.33) 0.89 (0.26) 
  91-100th quantile  
0.92 (0.37) 1.76 (0.34) 0.70 (0.27) 
 0-10th quantile (most 
disadvantaged)=ref 
 
  
Age (years)  1.14 (0.07) 1.09 (0.08) 0.96 (0.06) 
     
Rurality Other metropolitan 1.01 (0.30) 0.68 (0.28) 1.05 (0.21) 
  Rural coastal 1.27 (0.32) 0.76 (0.32) 0.89 (0.24) 
  Rural inland 0.87 (0.30) 0.96 (0.33) 0.79 (0.23) 
 Sydney = ref    
CALD Non-Anglo Australian  1.13 (0.23) 1.22  (0.23) 0.89 (0.16) 
 Anglo-Australian=ref    
Gender Female 1.03 (0.17) 1.65** (0.18) 1.09 (0.13) 
 Male = ref    
 Remuneration type Monetary 3.68*** (0.32) 3.79*** (0.31) 2.07* (0.26) 
  Reward only 1.22 (1.23) 0.89 (1.22) 0.98 (1.29) 
 Neither pay or reward = ref    
Pay rate     
 26-50th ($6.01-8.57) 1.77* (0.25) 1.59* (0.23) 1.40* (0.17) 
 51-75th ($8.58-13.66) 1.66* (0.22) 2.01** (0.23) 1.47* (0.17) 
 76-100th ($13.67-highest) 1.34 (0.21) 1.41 (0.21) 1.32 (0.16) 
 0-25th (lowest - $6.00)=ref    
Intercept  (1.19) (1.17) (0.91) 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
Model I - Working means I have some control over my own income. 
Model II - Working means I can cover some of my own expenses 
Model III - Working means I can buy what I want 
The reference category is: Disagree  
Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
 
High levels of exchange or instrumental orientations are evident amongst young workers in the 
formal economy. Less than four percent indicate either disagreement or strong disagreement 
with all three items (n=87, 3.8% indicating non-instrumental orientations or uses for income) 
and less than 18 percent indicated disagreement or strong disagreement with at least one item 
(n=403, 17.6%). Just under 80 percent of young people indicated either agreement or strong 
agreement with the single items (n=1892, 82.4%) and over one-quarter of workers indicated the 
highest possible level of instrumental orientation (n=599, 26.1%). 
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In earlier sections we found that skill level has an important relationship with various work 
conditions. However work conditions are fore-grounded in the results for instrumental 
motivations. Exchange orientations map, perhaps unsurprisingly, onto objective conditions. The 
most marked difference is evident for pay, with young people who are paid being between two 
and four times more likely to indicate exchange-use orientations compared to young people who 
are remunerated some other way or who are unpaid. Furthermore, differences are evident for 
pay rate. Compared to workers who are paid the lowest rates, instrumental orientations are more 
likely as pay rates increase, with the exception of the highest pay rates. Workers who receive the 
highest pay rates are moderately more likely to exhibit instrumental orientations, but this result is 
not statistically significant. Taken together, the close relationship between pay and instrumental 
orientations confirms theories of extrinsic orientations that emphasise how instrumental 
orientations are a response to pecuniary incentives. Young workers view pay as a pragmatic 
resource – those who are paid more have a greater capacity to purchase goods for themselves 
than those who don’t. Skill level has only a minor bearing on instrumental orientations, with 
young people in high skill jobs half as likely as other young people to indicate that working 
means they can buy what they want.  Young people from lower middle-class and middle class 
backgrounds are approximately twice as likely for their work to cover expenses as other young 
people. Females are 1.65 times more likely to indicate similar orientations. Notably age has no 
association with exchange use orientations.  
 
The income available to any young person depends upon household circumstances and therefore 
for many young people the opportunity to engage in recreation and leisure activities, amongst 
other things, often requires that they seek an income beyond that available from their family. In 
this respect it is unsurprising that extrinsic motivations are more apparent for young workers 
from lower socio-economic backgrounds. The social distribution of motivations therefore 
complicates explanations that focus on work being motivated by self-centred consumer 
aspirations, as discussed in Section Two. This is because patterns of consumption and leisure are 
not merely expressions of choice, but are situated in tensions around ‘freedom and constraints, 
opportunities and costs’ that define childhood in developed economies (Mizen, Bolton and Pole 
1999). Leisure has been reconstituted into increasingly commodified forms constituted according 
to the dictates of the market. On the one hand, because few households rely on children’s 
income, young people are freed from the necessity of having to work, which in part defines 
adulthood (Blatterer 2009). Instead working, including working to support consumption is an 
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explicit expression of autonomy. Therefore working is not only a vehicle for consumption but 
also a necessary act on the part of many young people to participate in the ‘normal’ routines of 
being a young person (Mizen, Bolton and Pole 1999).  
 
4.6.2. Intrinsic Work Orientations  
Six variables were used to assess intrinsic orientations to work. The variable, “Working means I 
can help out at home financially’ is used as a measure of altruistic use of income. This is distinct 
from the utilitarian uses of income examined in the previous section because it measures 
contribution to household, rather than personal, income. The five other variables measure 
whether work provides a sense of responsibility (‘Working gives me a sense of responsibility’), 
opportunity to build social connections (‘Work gives me opportunities to build relationships’)’ 
sense of social utility (‘Working makes me feel I am doing something useful’), self-reliance 
(‘Working means I can rely on myself more’) and enjoyment (‘I like the things I do at work’). As 
for previous sections, logistic regression modelling was undertaken by aggregating for each 
variable those who agreed or strongly agreed and those who disagreed or strongly disagreed to 
form a dummy variable of disagree=0 and agree=1. These intrinsic motivations were assessed 
against skill development, other work characteristics and socio-demographic characteristics of 
the young workers. Statistically significant results are presented in Table 4.12 below. 
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Table 4.12: Intrinsic work motivations and altruistic orientation by skill level, socio-demographic 
and selected work characteristics 
 
Model I: Help 
at home 
(altruism) 
Model II: 
Responsibility 
Model III: 
Build 
relationships 
Model IV: 
Something 
Useful 
Model V: 
Self-reliance 
Model VI: 
Like work 
Socio-economic background         
11-25th quantile  0.54* (0.23)  0.88 (0.40)  0.30* (0.43)  
26-50th quantile 0.47** (0.23)  0.55 (0.38)  0.43 (0.45)  
51-75th quantile 0.52** (0.21)  0.80 (0.36)  0.41* (0.42)  
76-90th quantile 0.31*** (0.22)  0.49* (0.35)  0.32* (0.42)  
91-100th quantile  0.32**(0.23)  0.36** (0.35)  0.25** (0.43)  
0-10th quantile (most 
disadvantaged)=ref 
    
  
Age (years) 0.90* (0.05)  1.18* (0.07) 0.79** (0.08) 0.73* (0.16) 0.85** (0.05) 
Gender       
Female 0.94 (0.10)  2.06** (0.17)    
Male = ref       
CALD       
Non-Anglo Australian  1.49** (0.13)      
Anglo-Australian=ref       
Skill level       
High 0.95 (0.31) 1.13 (0.98) 1.24 (0.46)  2.26 (0.61) 6.86** (0.72) 
Intermediate 1.59* (0.18) 3.71* (0.62) 3.64** (0.44)  2.87* (0.39) 2.57**(0.25) 
Elementary = ref       
Remuneration type       
Monetary 1.50 (0.28) 2.57*     
Reward only 2.08 (0.46) 1.04 (0.87)     
Neither pay or reward = ref       
Pay rate       
26-50th ($6.01-8.57) 0.82 (0.13) 1.69 (0.31) 1.16 (0.20) 1.19 (0.20) 0.79 (0.20) 0.80 (0.14) 
51-75th ($8.58-13.66) 0.96 (0.12) 1.58 (0.28) 1.57* (0.20) 1.53* (0.20) 1.15 (0.20) 0.85 (0.14) 
76-100th ($13.67-highest) 1.03 (0.12) 1.37 (0.26) 0.82 (0.17) 1.25 (0.19) 1.03 (0.20) 1.18 (0.14) 
0-25th (lowest - $6.00)=ref       
Hours       
6-10 hours a week 1.20 (0.12)  1.60* (0.18)    
11-15 hours a week 1.27 (0.17)  2.13* (0.30)    
15 hours plus a week 1.49* (0.18)  2.45* (0.32)    
0-5 hours a week = ref       
Regularity       
Casual 0.82 (0.20) 1.46 (0.40) 0.77 (0.29)    
Regular 0.87 (0.19) 2.27* (0.39) 1.132    
one-off = ref       
Constant 5.25* (0.74) 14.66 0.36 (1.08) 22.04*(1.23) 18.18* (1.19)  
       
Model I: Working means I can help out at home financially 
Model II: Work gives me a sense of responsibility 
Model III: Work gives me opportunities to build relationships 
Model IV: Work makes me feel I am doing something useful 
Model V: Working means I can rely on myself more 
Model VI: I like the things I do at work 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
The reference category is: Disagree  Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
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While extrinsic orientations are primarily a response to pecuniary incentives, intrinsic 
orientations are associated with other factors, especially class background, age and job skill level. 
The largest parameter estimates relate to socio-economic background. Compared to young 
people from the poorest neighbourhoods, other young people are between one-third and one-
half as likely for the income they earn from work to contribute to household income. 
Furthermore the necessity to contribute to household income also appears to buttress other 
orientations. Compared to young people from the poorest backgrounds, other young people are 
between one-third and one-quarter as likely to feel that working provides them with a sense of 
self-reliance. We can surmise that the income contribution that young people make in 
economically disadvantaged households also valorises a sense of larger purpose, expressed as 
self-reliance here. This finding is important because much literature on young people’s work in 
developed economies suggest that young people, if they contribute at all, only contribute 
indirectly to the overall household economy (Morrow 1996). While it is unlikely that most 
children work out of necessity, this does appear more likely for young people from the most 
disadvantaged backgrounds. Young workers from non-English speaking backgrounds are also 
1.5 times as likely to contribute to family income.  
 
In general intrinsic orientations decrease with age. Older workers are less likely to see their work 
as contributing something useful compared to younger workers. However opportunities for 
sociability are emphasised by older workers more than younger workers. The intrinsic enjoyment 
that work provides also decreases with age. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that older 
workers are less likely than younger workers to be in jobs where they can exercise initiative and 
autonomy over how they do their work (See Section 5.3). For the youngest workers it may be the 
first time that they are undertaking an activity that is not supervised by parents. According to 
Hungerland (2007) young workers are likely to take pride in their work, since they are aware that 
they are carrying a level of responsibility that is not normally expected of them. Through 
working, they experience themselves as ‘older’ and more ‘adult-like’. However, for older workers, 
the novelty of the work wears off, but the independent availability of money means young 
people will stick with the work until they find a better position. The findings here suggest 
another dimension to this explanation by showing that the value of responsibility and autonomy 
is mitigated by a reduction in control at work. The majority of older workers, especially those in 
elementary skill jobs, are in jobs characterised by low autonomy. Younger workers appear 
therefore to emphasise work as an avenue for the expression of autonomy.  Older workers are 
more likely to view work sceptically. 
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Skill level is also associated with almost all intrinsic work orientations. Higher skilled jobs 
provide a greater sense of responsibility, greater opportunities for sociability, emphasise self-
reliance and provide far greater enjoyment compared to elementary skill jobs. Young people in 
high and intermediate skill jobs are approximately seven and three times respectively more likely 
to enjoy their work compared to young people in elementary skill jobs.  For young people in 
intermediate skill jobs similar differences are evident for work providing a sense of self-reliance, 
responsibility and opportunities to build relationships. Therefore while elementary skill jobs 
provide some degree of regularity in conditions, less precariousness and some semblance of 
regular income, it is higher skill jobs associated with intrinsic orientations.  
 
Whereas pay maps onto utilitarian uses of income, neither the likelihood nor amount of pay 
relates to altruistic use of income. We could expect that the more a young worker earns the 
greater their capacity to contribute to household income. However we do not find this. Instead 
young people who are paid are more likely to feel responsible and those who are paid reasonably 
high pay rates more likely to build relationships and feel though they are doing something useful 
at work. The strong relationship between application of skill and intrinsic orientations and the 
weak relationship between pay and intrinsic orientations suggests that, for young workers, 
incentives to work, such as the exercise of creativity, aptitude and technical capacity, diverge 
from extrinsic orientations, that is income. Incentives to work cannot entirely be replaced by 
money; high and intermediate skill workers are in part motivated by an intrinsic drive which is 
not necessarily substitutable by extrinsic financial payment
28
.  
 
Females are twice as likely to emphasise the importance of work providing opportunities to build 
relationships with other people. However females are less likely than males to indicate that work 
means they can be more self-reliant. Gender differences are therefore apparent-females 
emphasising and valuing work qualities that promote social connection. Furthermore the longer 
the work hours the more likely work will provide opportunities to build relationships. The 
discipline of a regular job is also associated with an increased sense of responsibility.  
 
  
                                                          
28
 Towse (2001) in critiquing the neo-classical model of wages also found a similar pattern of incentive structures for 
artists. Within the artistic community the capacity to exercise creativity freely could not be entirely substituted by 
money wages. 
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4.7. Conclusion to Chapter Four 
This chapter has shown that young people are typically engaged in work that is part of the 
broader but secondary labour market. Most of the work young people perform are elementary 
skill jobs in the secondary labour market, such as retail, food preparation and labouring jobs. 
These jobs are characterised by low-wages, casual, part-time and insecure work with few chances 
of advancement.  The debates in the children’s work literature that centre on whether there are 
structurally speaking ‘children’s jobs’, that is jobs which are more or less the exclusive preserve 
of children, or whether young people are involved in work more generally available on the labour 
market, overlooks the issue of where young people are structurally located in the labour market. 
While some young people are performing work that has traditionally been associated with 
children’s jobs, such as baby-sitting and delivery work, young people are in fact engaged in a far 
more diverse range of work. More importantly the common characteristic of most of the jobs 
young people are employed in is that they are elementary skill jobs on the secondary labour 
market.  
 
There are structural reasons for this deriving from transformations to the economy as a whole, 
which have had fundamental affects on the standard labour contract. The need to tie skilled 
workers into firms and reduce labour turnover among groups of workers with scarce skills (i.e. 
the primary labour market) is reliant upon the presence of a group of workers who are prepared 
to accept inferior pay, job insecurity and lower status, largely because they have an alternative 
role beyond that of being an employee. While the alternative role thesis has been applied to 
women, young people, who are primarily students and in most cases rely on their parents to have 
their basic needs met, are also considered ‘suited’ to provide labour to the secondary labour 
market. Young people’s work-time arrangements are an example of this.  However the degree 
that flexible work-time arrangements suit young people is contested (Willis 1998). For most 
young people in NSW, labour market regulations provide some protection in terms of work-time 
regulation and, unlike the adult labour market, exposure to contingent and precarious work 
arrangements is more likely for high skill workers, again emphasising the significance of this 
work as a type of alternative role. Yet when we consider the overall conditions experienced by 
young people in the formal economy, work time arrangements provide a general advantage to 
employers. Productivity is maximised by having young workers available when it suits the 
business, such as peak trading times, weekends and special events.  
 
The gradual shift of children and young people from being important sources of labour on the 
formal labour market, to work being an alternative role for children and young people, has had 
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major consequences economically and culturally on how young people are perceived in relation 
to dependency, responsibility and material needs, and continues to play a major role in how 
young workers are subsumed ideologically into age-specific rather than production specific 
categories. The system of youth wages, whereby, employees are paid a proportion of the adult 
wage, illustrates this, by officially sanctioning low wages. Young people remain a group who are 
paid on the basis of personal characteristics, that is age, and on this basis are also perceived as 
less productive than adult workers, and can also be paid less than adult workers. Low pay may be 
justified by reference to the productivity of the workers and skill requirements of the work. Yet 
we have shown that most young people work in elementary skill jobs in the service sector where 
the productivity of the employee is only loosely related to their age, if at all. Furthermore, age 
related factors, such as educational qualifications, have little relationship with productivity in 
these jobs. The emphasis, especially in retail work, is on the presentation of the self, general 
competence and basic social skills, rather than specific technical knowledge and skill. 
Furthermore, White and Wyn (2004) suggest that the quantity of goods and services produced is 
not age divided, but set by external factors such as training and adherence to standards of 
productivity. Therefore the productivity of young workers in these areas is likely to be similar to 
other workers.  
 
We have also found some degree of labour market segmentation within the youth labour market 
itself. The skills distribution is not as dispersed as in the adult labour market, where levels of 
education and increased specialisation produce a more evenly dispersed skill differentiation of 
occupations. While most young people’s work involves elementary skill level jobs, small numbers 
of young people are employed in intermediate and high skill work. Furthermore there is some 
association between skill level and work conditions and skill level and work orientations, some of 
which confirm traditional understandings of the role that skill plays in determining work 
conditions, and others that do not. In summary there is evidence of a minority of high skill 
workers whose conditions are less formal but whose work provides opportunities for existential 
fulfilment and some opportunity for social rewards, and a majority of young people in 
elementary skill jobs that provide fewer opportunities for autonomy and fulfilment but provides 
greater income security and work regularity.  
 
High skill workers are afforded discretion over how they do their work, greater opportunities to 
set the pace of their work and to actively participate in workplace decisions. Consequently they 
are more likely to enjoy their work. However the discretion and autonomy in work also acts to 
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structure the contract for labour and we see that work conditions are far less regulated in high 
skill jobs compared to elementary skill jobs. For young workers the freedom to control work 
tasks and work time (i.e. the labour process), is intertwined with an openness around 
employment conditions. The focus in many high skill jobs is the creation of some form of 
output, that is the work is task rather than time oriented and work processes reflect this. 
Therefore how much work and of what type can rarely be delineated in advance, resulting in a 
certain amount of latitude over planning and execution of work. For elementary skill jobs the 
performance of the work is far more controlled. Elementary skill workers work in jobs with less 
capacity to control work processes, whether that be how long to cook the burger or the 
appropriate manner in which to engage with customers, and less capacity to contribute to 
workplace decisions and consequently to do work that they are less likely to enjoy. The focus 
here is on doing the time rather than creating a certain output and therefore the performance of 
work can be specified in advance. Consequently work time is more controlled and work hours 
more regulated. 
 
Therefore, while the range of possible material rewards is relatively limited for young people, for 
a minority of young people in high skill jobs, the exercise of skill appears to compensate for 
limited income and lack of work regularity. Furthermore, the exercise of skill not only 
compensates for the lack of some rewards but reinforces others. As well as pay rates, labour 
market segmentation is also evident in terms of investment in human capital, with young people 
in higher skill jobs having greater opportunities to develop the sorts of skills that will potentially 
lead to ongoing careers. Towse’s (2001) discussion of creativity as a resource that can command 
scarcity rents is relevant here. Creativity, talent and skill are aspects of human capital in relatively 
short supply. These skills are most likely to be used (and in fact define) high-skill jobs. 
Consequently young people in higher skill jobs are more likely through their work, to experience 
themselves as competent and to be perceived as such by others. This suggests that the precarious 
nature of high skill jobs may be experienced as creative and autonomous opportunities to 
develop and exercise skill.  
 
The different capacity to exercise autonomy and control associated with skill level is also 
reflected in the different value orientations towards work. The mix of motivations identified 
within the formal economy indicates the multi-dimensional nature of young people’s economic 
activity. The importance of extrinsic motivations indicates the importance of consumption 
motives to young people. However our results suggest that the stereotype of the young 
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consumer is not justified. The consumption-centred position underestimates the extent that 
extrinsic motivations also indicate a need for exercising autonomy because children’s social 
position offers few opportunities to do so.  It also underestimates the capacity for altruistic 
behaviour, as evidenced by their work. Whereas objective work conditions, such as pay, are 
associated with instrumental orientations, the social characteristics of young workers are 
significantly associated with non-instrumental uses of income in the formal economy, indicating 
that latent characteristics of young people have some role to play. Furthermore skill level has an 
important relationship with several intrinsic work motivations. Work upholds a variety of 
interpretations for young people that not only centre on consumption, but also development of 
collegiality and self-reliance. Moreover for some young people, especially those from the least 
wealthy backgrounds, financial responsibility also involves contributing income to the household 
economy. Hence the purpose and meaning of this work varies according to class.  
 
Having examined the formal economy we now turn to the informal economy. The discussion 
now shifts from the importance of regulation and skill, to the proximity and specificity of social 
relations. 
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Chapter Five: Enterprise and Network - 
Work on the Informal Economy 
 
5.1. Introduction  
The informal economy involves the production of, or trade in, goods and services that 
occur outside the purview of the state but are otherwise legal (Commission for the 
European Communities, 1998; Feige, 1990; Portes, 1994; Thomas, 1992; Williams and 
Windebank, 1998 Williams and Windebank 2001)29. Occurring outside the formal, 
regulated economy, informal economic activities, whether remunerated directly or 
indirectly, cover a residual category of economic activities (Kesteloot and Meert 1999). 
This chapter examines young people’s involvement in the informal economy. It examines 
the extent of their participation in the informal economy, the types of work they 
perform, under what conditions they work and their work orientations.  
 
We initially examine the regulatory deficit definition the informal economy in Section 
Two and discuss some of the structural changes that have resulted in the development of 
the informal economy in developed economies. In so doing two key hypotheses are 
identified that inform the analysis for the remaining chapter, the ‘marginality’ and ‘worse 
conditions’ hypotheses. The first pertains to whether informal work is a coping strategy 
employed by marginal groups, the latter whether, because outside of regulation, informal 
work is characterised by poor conditions.  
 
Section Three profiles the range of work undertaken by young people within the 
informal economy. For the formal economy the use of existing coding frameworks 
assists in identifying similarities and differences with adult labour market. However for 
work undertaken on the informal economy an empirical typology from the ‘ground up’ is 
developed, guided by the International Labor Organisation’s (ILO) enterprise-worker 
matrix. Three categories of informal work performed by young people on the informal 
economy are identified, enterprise workers, informal employees and associative workers. 
Each category of work is embedded in different social relations between ‘worker’ and 
‘employer’ and form the analytical categories used to test the ‘marginality’ and ‘worse 
conditions’ hypotheses. 
                                                          
29 It is not my intention to contribute to debates about what constitutes the informal economy, but to draw 
from general consensus within the literature to provide a foundation for the analysis in the chapter.  
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Section Four examines the social distribution of work within the informal economy and 
whether work arrangements differ for different groups of workers. In so doing we test 
the ‘marginality’ hypothesis and thus the level and characteristics of work-based 
inequality on the informal economy. We examine whether the likelihood of working on 
the informal economy varies by class background, gender, cultural background and 
geographically. However because social ties are especially critical to facilitating 
participation in the informal economy, then differences in participation between social 
groups tell us not only about which groups work on the informal economy but may also 
the social distribution of these social ties.  
 
Section Five examines work conditions on the informal economy and assesses whether 
the lack of formal regulation translates into poor conditions for young workers on the 
informal economy. We examine whether work conditions are differentiated for informal 
workers depending on the social relations within which work is embedded. As in Chapter 
Four, several labour market conditions or ‘securities’ are analysed, income security, work 
security, representation and skill reproduction security.   
 
Section Six then examines some of the orientations evident in work on the informal 
economy. Because informal economic activities are based in community and 
neighborhood relations, they are part of a system of reciprocal exchange (Polanyi 1944). 
This implies that a social network with symmetric links between members exists that 
generates the rules upon which such a system of exchange relies upon. Economic 
exchange on the informal economy is therefore reliant upon trust between the members 
of the network. We assess whether network solidarity, and particularly reciprocity, are 
evident normative structures for the operation of the informal economy for young 
people. Replicating the analysis in Chapter Four, we examine the degree of 
instrumentality, altruism and reciprocity on the informal economy. 
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5.2. Structural Embeddedness: Trends Underlying Informalisation in 
Developed Economies  
 
5.2.1.  Defining the Informal Economy30 
The notion of the informal economy has its origins in Hart’s study of urban labour 
markets and informal entrepreneurs in Ghana (Hart 1973). In its original formulation, 
the distinction between the formal and informal economies was that between regulated 
wage employment and the unregulated work of self-employed micro-entrepreneurs. For 
Hart, the urban unemployed and underemployed were not a passive exploited majority 
but instead exercise strategies to obtain a livelihood. Hart’s work instigated debate 
between those who view the informal economy as marginal and peripheral to economic 
development and those who argue that activities within the informal economy are an 
alternative dynamic source of development.  This debate has resolved into a dialogue 
around whether workers on the informal economy are ‘informal entrepreneurs’ or 
‘disguised workers’ (Barrett, Jones and McEvoy 1996; Cichocki and Tyrowicz 2010; 
Cross 1997; Fernandez-Kelly and Garcia 1989; Kloosterman Van der Leun and Rath 
1998). While initially the informal economy was synonymous with capitalist 
underdevelopment in majority world countries, analysts began to recognize that the 
informal economy was an increasingly salient feature of developed economies (Castells 
and Portes 1989; Pahl 1984; Sassen 1991; Williams 2009). 
 
Work by Pahl (1984, 1988), Mingione (1983, 1985, 1991) and Gershuny (1979, 1983) was 
pivotal in demonstrating that Hart’s analysis had wider application. Pahl (1984), in his 
study of informal economic activities on the Isle of Sheppey, argued for the need to 
conceptualise work beyond formal employment, showing that individuals combine a 
broader range of activities to generate income (see also Castells and Portes 1989; 
Leonard 1998; Slack 2007a; Williams and Windebank 2005; Williams 2011). These 
scholars pointed out that informal work coexists alongside formal employment in 
societies with highly commoditized labour and consumption markets (Pahl 1984; Slavnic 
                                                          
30 Contributing family workers, including self-provisioning for family, which are often included in the 
informal economy, will be examined in Chapter Six: The Family Economy.  This is because work for 
family, which overlaps with both the formal as well as informal economy are mediated through kinship 
relationships rather than through relationships with other known persons. Within the framework of this 
thesis this introduces a distinct social dynamic into the meaning of work and the conditions that might be 
expected from work. In this thesis the informal and family economies are differentiated as associative and 
communal systems of work respectively. See Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework.   
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2010). While formal labour market participation is the principal means by which most 
people support themselves economically in industrial and post-industrial societies, a great 
deal of work is undertaken outside the regulatory confines of the formal labour market 
including through kinship, friendship and community ties such as household self-
provisioning and interhousehold exchange of goods and services (Leonard 1998; 2000; 
Pahl 1984, Pahl and Wallace 1985; Slack 2007a).  
 
The distinction between the formal and informal economy hinges on the presence or 
absence of state regulation, (Kus, 2010; Slack 2007b). We can refer to this as the 
‘regulatory deficit’ definition of the informal economy. Sassen (1991) points out that we 
can only specify an informal economy because there is an institutional framework for 
economic activity largely determined by the state, which explicitly regulates the process 
and outcomes of income-generating activities through enforceable legal rules. Since state 
intervention is socially defined and varies across time and space, the boundaries of the 
informal economy also vary substantially according to the same dynamics (Castells and 
Portes 1989). The activity may be entirely licit, but because of the context in which it is 
done (for instance at home) is part of the informal economy. Similarly an activity may be 
in breach of existing codes of practice (for example occupational health or zoning) or 
licensing requirements (for example unlicensed ‘gypsy’ cabs), and also constitute the 
informal economy (Sassen 1991). The informal economy therefore encompasses 
activities such as tax evasion, welfare evasion, voluntary work, self-provisioning, some 
forms of self-employment, domestic labour and criminal activity (Leonard 1998). It is not 
therefore, the intrinsic characteristics of activities that determine informalization, but 
rather the boundaries of state regulation.  
 
5.2.2.  Structural Trends in the Informal Economy  
Within a framework of postwar economic development, studies of the relation between 
the formal and informal economies have revealed an increase in informal activity, not 
necessarily accompanied by a compensating decline in formal activities (ILO 2002; 
Kesteloot and Meert 1999).
31
 Processes of globalization, economic restructuring, and 
market deregulation have served to increase the prevalence of informal work in advanced 
capitalist nations (Castells and Portes 1989; Cornea and Danziger 1997; Portes and 
                                                          
31 See also Williams and Windebank (2002). According to these authors, more time is spent on the 
informal economy than in formal employment. Citing figures from the United Kingdom, United States and 
various European states, informal work activities take up approximately 60 percent of total work time.  
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Sassen-Koob 1987). Strategies aimed at increasing competitiveness, cutting production 
costs, maximising flexibility in labour use and spatial destandardisation (home working), 
have facilitated informalisation of labour markets
32
. This trend has run counter to more 
conventional readings of capitalist development that markets for labour, goods, and 
services would be increasingly absorbed within the formal economy and that the 
informal economy would diminish (Slack 2007b).  
 
Several theorists have explicitly conceptualized the interrelationship between the formal 
and informal economies from which we can take several leads for analysis. Gershuny 
(1979, 1983), reflecting on patterns of economic development in the late 1970’s, argued 
that the consequence of capital-intensive “jobless growth” was an increase in the 
proportion of the population required to work on the informal economy, augmenting 
their low incomes through household self-provisioning or providing services on the 
informal economy. Gershuny argued that most people enter the informal economy 
because of unemployment or underemployment, and the low incomes that such jobs 
yield create a vicious cycle of poverty. Sassen has argued that informalisation processes 
support, rather than replace, formal economic activities. Sassen identifies two sets of 
mediating processes that promote the informalization of work. These are firstly, 
increased earnings inequality and associated restructuring of consumption patterns of 
those with high and low incomes; and secondly the inability of some providers of goods 
and services to compete for the necessary resources in urban contexts where leading 
sectors have sharply bid up the prices of commercial space, labour, auxiliary services, and 
other basic business costs (Sassen, 1989, 1991, 2010). 
 
The first process is linked to polarization in the labour market; where consumption 
patterns among high and low income groups have a feedback effect on the organisation 
of work. Sassen argues that high income gentrification in inner cities requires a supply of 
low-wage workers. High income gentrification is labour intensive (hired cleaners, carers 
and drivers) and generates a demand for customised goods and services produced 
                                                          
32 Shifting production to the informal economy is one way of accomplishing cost cutting and flexibility 
aims because informal production is less costly (no taxes, lower wages, less compliance costs with 
workplace and environmental standards), particularly through the use of de-unionised labour. 
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through small runs and sold through small outlets
33
. Subcontracting part of this 
production to low-cost operators, including sweatshops or households, is common, thus 
increasing informalisation. In another set of informal market establishments and labour 
markets, this time within low-income populations, consumption needs are met by 
manufacturing and retail establishments that can compete with cheap imports, those that 
are small, rely on family labour, and often fall below minimum labour and product 
standards. Low-income groups are therefore performing the work for their own 
communities and also for wealthy communities either through producing cheap 
customised goods or by travelling to wealthy neighbourhoods and providing services. 
Furthermore, the informal economy caters both to high and low income groups possibly 
involving distinct groups of workers and manufacturers. 
 
The second mediating process Sassen describes involves inequality in the bidding power 
of firms for space (resulting from the dominance of high-profit industries, such as 
finance and specialized services in major urban economies, raising the price of 
commercial space). This creates inducements for informalization in a broad range of 
activities and spheres of the economy. Small low-profit firms can hardly afford to 
compete for space. The existence of an informal economy in turn emerges as a 
mechanism for reducing costs, because one way of solving the problem of high rents is 
to use spaces not zoned for commercial or manufacturing uses, such as basements in 
residential areas, or to use a space that does not meet safety standards.  
 
Two hypotheses arise out of these discussions. Firstly, interpretations of the informal 
economy that emphasise unemployment or the informal economy as comprising niche 
labour would suggest that poorer and jobless households are more likely participants in 
the informal economy. We will refer to this as the marginality, or coping strategy, 
hypothesis. If this hypothesis is true, then more marginal groups, either economically or 
socially will be more likely to participate in the informal economy. We would therefore 
expect higher proportions of young people from low socio-economic backgrounds to 
participate in the informal economy. We will investigate this in Section Four.  
 
                                                          
33 Middle class gentrification relies on capital-intensive development such as shopping malls, private 
vehicles, household appliances and equipment. 
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The second hypothesis arises out of the important defining characteristic of the informal 
economy, as occurring outside of legal and regulatory frameworks. The lack of formal 
regulation and structural trends towards destandardisation of labour suggest that 
conditions on the informal economy are poor such as low wages, arduous conditions, 
unpredictable hours and work in dangerous environments.  We will refer to this as the 
‘worse conditions hypothesis’,
34
 examined in Section Five. The more nuanced 
hypothesis, however, is that work conditions are differentiated for informal workers 
depending on the type of work performed, drawing from Hart’s research on whether 
those who engage in informal economic activities are ‘informal entrepreneurs’ or 
‘disguised workers’.  The range of work on the informal economy is varied, and includes 
informal entrepreneurs, sweatshop production and casual industrial outworkers. 
Consequently conditions may also vary. We now turn to developing an empirical 
typology to guide the analysis.  
 
5.3. Classifying Young people’s work on the Informal Economy 
Typologies of work that constitute the informal economy are prevalent perhaps because 
of the broad nature of regulatory deficit definitions. Generally these typologies 
conceptualise activities along a continuum. At one end are more ‘organized’ forms of 
informal work, often low-paid and undertaken by employees for a business that conducts 
some or all of its activity informally. At the other end are more ‘individual’ types of 
informality, covering work conducted by the self-employed concealing a proportion, or 
all, of their earnings, as well as casual one-off jobs. Many of these activities take place 
between friends, neighbours and relatives and may be legal, quasi-legal or illegal; involve 
cash or in-kind exchange (Gershuny 1979; Jordan, 1998; Jordan and Redley, 1994; 
Leonard, 1994; 1998; MacDonald, 1994; Williams and Windebank, 1999).  
 
Perhaps the most comprehensive is that developed by the ILO (2002) that takes account 
of both the enterprise (type of production unit) and employment characteristics (type of 
job) to form an ‘enterprise-worker’ matrix of work on the informal economy.  
                                                          
34 For child labour in developing economies, these hypotheses have been forcefully advanced by the ILO 
(2002). They argue that children work on the informal economy as a survival or coping strategy to meet the 
subsistence needs of their families. The most visible licit forms include washing cars, shoe shining, 
hawking, goods delivery and other ‘street jobs’.  Other forms of children’s work on the informal economy 
include family or home based work (domestic work, subcontracted piecework); manufacturing; brick-
making, stone carving, weaving; scavenging, construction and commercial agriculture. Rural children, 
particularly girls, tend to begin economic activity at an early age, some as young as five years. 
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Enterprises or ‘production units’ are distinguished between formal sector enterprises, 
informal sector enterprises and households. Jobs are distinguished according to their 
employment status and include own-account workers, employers, employees, 
contributing family workers, and members of productive cooperatives.  
 
Through this process the ILO identifies several categories of informal employment, 
‘employees who have informal jobs’; ‘own-account workers’; ‘employers who have their 
own informal enterprises’ and ‘members of informal producers’ cooperatives’. 
‘Employees who have informal jobs’, whether employed by formal enterprises, informal 
enterprises or by households are considered to have informal jobs if their employment 
relationship is not subject to labour law, taxation, social protection or entitlement to 
certain employment benefits (such as paid annual or sick leave). ‘Own-account workers’, 
‘employers who have their own informal enterprises’ and ‘members of informal 
producers’ cooperatives’ form three other informal employment categories. The informal 
nature of their jobs follows directly from the characteristics of the enterprises that they 
own or the cooperative of which they are members
35
. While the correlation between 
conditions and categories of informal work remains an empirical question, the ILO 
typology is informed by the ‘entrepreneur-disguised worker’ continuum, with own-
account workers and informal enterprise workers most clearly fitting into the 
entrepreneur model, (owning small scale means of production; having some degree of 
autonomy over work conditions; potentially hiring other workers) and informal 
employees fitting the disguised worker model (employed by other informal operators and 
potentially less autonomy to determine work conditions). 
 
In this study, informal economy workers were identified where young people, in 
describing their work, stipulated that they worked for some form of informal employer 
(for example, family friend or neighbour), that they produced their own good or service 
or worked for some other organisation that was not a corporation or business, such as a 
community organisation.  The ILO matrix was used as a guide to code the responses 
                                                          
35 Households as production units include households producing goods for their own final use (e.g. 
subsistence farming, do-it-yourself construction of own dwellings), and those employing paid domestic 
workers. At the category level, the ILO also includes in their matrix  ‘contributing family workers’, who 
work either in formal or informal enterprises, and ‘own-account workers’ producing goods for their own 
final use by their household, (for example, subsistence farmers and households engaged in do-it-yourself 
construction of their own dwellings form another category). These categories are examined in the Family 
Economy chapter.  
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provided by young people into informal work categories. These responses were classified 
into informal employment categories including informal employees, enterprise workers, 
and employees of informal cooperatives
36
. The results are presented in Table 5.1, which 
presents occupation type (coded using the Australian Classification of Occupations) by 
informal employment category.   
 
Table 5.1: Occupation type by Informal employment type 
Occupation Type Enterprise Informal Employees Associative  Total 
 n % n % n % n % 
Child care/other care work 55 34.4% 543 68.8% 0 0.0% 598 48.8% 
Sports related work 2 1.3% 0 0.0% 224 87.8% 226 18.4% 
Agricultural & horticultural work 40 25.0% 155 19.2% 4 1.6% 199 16.2% 
Cleaning work 19 11.9% 64 7.9% 2 0.8% 85 6.9% 
Teaching & tutoring 19 11.9% 3 0.4% 6 2.3% 28 2.3% 
Labour, construction & labour trades 5 3.1% 22 2.7% 0 0.0% 27 2.2% 
Sales work 8 5.0% 1 0.1% 12 4.7% 21 1.7% 
Other service work 2 1.3% 12 1.5% 3 1.2% 17 1.4% 
Administrative & clerical work 0 0.0% 4 0.5% 3 1.2% 7 0.6% 
Entertainment & performance 4 2.5% 1 0.1% 2 0.8% 7 0.6% 
Food preparation 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.4% 1 0.1% 
Delivery work 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 
Other food service 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.4% 1 0.1% 
Non-labour trades 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 
Other work 6 3.8% 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 7 0.6% 
         
Total 160 13.1% 808 65.9% 258 21.0% 1226 100.0% 
         
 
Three informal work contexts are evident, informal work for known persons (herein 
referred to as informal employees), ‘own-account’ enterprise workers and work 
undertaken for associative organisations. Informal employee work involves the 
production of goods or services where the ‘employee’ and ‘employer’ are known to each 
other, for example a young person hired by friends or neighbours, to provide a good or 
service.  Enterprise work involves the production of goods and services by a young 
person running a small scale (mainly one-person) enterprise on the open informal 
market.  Associative work includes work for third sector organisations, such as non-
profit, community organisations and sports clubs, which fall between the formal 
                                                          
36 For some responses it was difficult to determine who the work was undertaken for, especially where 
short responses were provided. This is critical to differentiate whether workers are own-account 
entrepreneurs or obtain their work through known informal networks – the latter having more 
particularistic relationships with those to whom they provide their services. This was particularly the case 
for care work. Unless otherwise specified it is assumed that care work was undertaken for known persons. 
Where a respondent specified that they offer care services, then they were coded as an own-account 
enterprise worker. The same rule is applied for cleaning and gardening jobs. Unless otherwise specified, 
tutoring or teaching is coded as own-account/enterprise worker. Where tutoring is specified within an 
organisational context (‘School’, ‘Dad’s martial arts class’, ‘Tennis club’) then the response is coded as 
associative work.  
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economy and the household. Informal employees make up the largest category of 
informal employment for young people accounting for approximately two-thirds of work 
on the informal economy (n=808; 65.9%); work for associative organisations account for 
approximately one-fifth of work on the informal economy (n=258; 21.0%) and just over 
13 percent of is enterprise work (n=160; 13.1%).  
 
These categories emphasise the relationship between young worker and ‘employer’, 
rather than the type of work undertaken. If we consider these categories in the context of 
our broader theoretical framework, informal employee’ relations are predicated upon 
strong ties (‘particularistic’ social relations) with their employers because these 
interactions involve work between persons with pre-existing social ties. Enterprise work 
is predicated upon weak ties (closer to ‘universal’ relations similar to the formal 
economy) because such work involves offering services to anyone who is willing to 
purchase the service. Associative work is organised through more formalised rules, 
mediated through third sector organisations. These characteristics will be more closely 
examined in the following sections. 
 
Care work is the most prevalent type of work on the informal economy. Because care 
work is sporadic and reliant upon particularistic social relations it is an activity 
particularly likely to escape regulation. The second largest group of young people in the 
informal economy do sports-related work, as sports coaches or umpires. Almost all of 
this work takes place for associative organisations generally local sports organisations.  
Just over 16 percent of young people working on the informal economy do agricultural 
and horticultural work.  Outside these three main occupation types, a range of other 
work is evident. This includes labour work such as renovations, alterations, and small 
scale construction (often project based work for neighbours). Other jobs include cleaning 
(mainly washing neighbourhood cars and houses, but sometimes offering car washing 
services), teaching (informal music teaching and school-work tutoring), sales work 
(selling goods at markets or on-selling to other distributors), entertainment work (mainly 
busking), and administrative work (largely helping out friends businesses by performing 
routine administrative tasks).  
 
The diversity of work canvasses an unusual range of activities, which may be a result of 
the inadequate provision of goods and services by the formal sector and low-skill work 
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capitalising from lower end opportunity structures, such as those provided by friends and 
neighbours (Kesteloot and Meert 1999). The following examples are illustrative: 
 
‘Cutting fire wood for people in town.’ (Male, 11 years) 
‘Demolition with a friend. Unbolting beams and stacking them.’ (Male, 15 years) 
 ‘A person paid me to keep her house clean, payed weekly, washing cleaning vacuuming.’(Female, 
13 years) 
 ‘Tutoring primary school children (years 3 and 5). Checking homework, teaching how to tell the 
time, spelling, multiplication, sentence structure etc.’ (Female, 15 years) 
‘Teaching mums friend how to use a computer and the software. Teach how to use software, how 
to type and the features of a software/computer.’ (Female, 14 years) 
 ‘I go to the shop for my neighbour and get rewarded.’ (Female, 13 years) 
 
We now turn to a more detailed examination of the three categories.  
 
5.3.1.  Informal Employees  
Informal employee work is reliant on existing social networks, such as friendship and 
kinship ties, which are utilised to obtain and provide work. The work is carried out on an 
individual basis and the product is sold or provided to the user without intermediaries. 
According to Gershuny (1979) this means that the use value of goods and services is 
central, not their exchange value. Williams and Windebank suggest that this work 
involves non-market oriented production or exchange of goods and services between 
people who do not live in the same household (Williams and Windebank 2000. See also 
Burns and Taylor, 1998). Demand for informal activities is generated from within the 
communities where the activities are performed, that is the neighbourhood or 
community based economy provides the market. According to MacDonald (1994) some 
jobs would be no more than reciprocal friendship based activities: a form of localised, 
embryonic self-provisioning, such as doing handy work for a neighbour for a small 
amount or in return for a favour. Other jobs might involve longer term commitments 
which could last for months. These may be more lucrative but the work would more 
often be infrequent and irregular. 
 
Most care, agricultural, cleaning, labour, other service and administrative jobs on the 
informal economy are held by informal employees. Care work (accounting for 68.8% of 
jobs for informal employees) and agricultural and horticultural work (accounting for 
19.2% of jobs for informal employees) are the two largest occupational categories. Just 
over 90 percent (90.8%, n=543) of care work jobs take the form of informal 
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employment, largely because care work is reliant upon trust based relationships, such as 
for family friends and neighbours
37
.  
 
Most agricultural and horticultural jobs are organised through local and particular social 
networks also. In the urban context this involves work such as mowing and watering 
neighbour’s gardens and taking care of neighbour’s pets.   
 
‘Walking the neighbour’s dog and looking after it. Walking, feeding and playing with the dog.’ (Female, 
12 years) 
‘Cut lawn around the street and get paid.  The neighbours know me and I cut the lawn and they pay 
me.’ (Male, 13 years) 
'Helping an elderly person (my Grandmother's friend) around her garden i.e., garden work, digging, 
moving woodchips, dirt and mulch. And helping her with her computer.’ (Male, 14 years) 
 
In a rural context the tasks are more involved, that are more likely to contribute to 
reciprocal obligations within the local rural economy.  
  
‘Helping out on a friend’s property. Check out the cows, rug horses, feed dogs, horses, just helping 
out.’(Female, 13 years) 
‘Breaking in horses for mum's friend.’ (Female, 14 years) 
 
The work of informal employees covers the ground between domestic work (i.e. unpaid 
work conducted by household members for themselves or other members of their 
household) and more formal institutions such as private, public and ‘third sector’ 
organizations charged with delivering goods and services either on a paid, statutory or 
volunteer basis. Williams and Windebank (2000) describe this work as a type of micro-
level exchange that arises out of, and helps constitute, social networks and norms from 
which trust develops. Because the focus is on the provision of a good or service within a 
particularistic relationship, several interconnected hypotheses arise. We would expect that 
workers would not necessarily demand higher payment for their service, and may do 
work unpaid or as part of a pattern of gift exchange. We may also hypothesise that they 
would experience lesser levels of autonomy and control in their work and anticipate that 
the orientations of workers are more likely to emphasise reciprocity more so than 
instrumental attitudes. These will be examined in Sections Five and Six.  
 
 
 
                                                          
37 No care work is offered via associative organisations (institutions) indicating the importance of direct 
interaction in the provision of care work and the irregularity in which it is supplied. 
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5.3.2. Enterprise Workers 
Enterprise work involves the production of goods and services by a young person 
operating a small-scale enterprise on the open informal market.  They are informal 
because the enterprise workers are unregistered and receive little or no legal protection. 
Consequently, most provide goods and services to households rather than selling into the 
formal economy. The provision of the good or service is not reliant upon pre-existing 
relationships although it may be provided to neighbours relatives and friends. Similar to 
the overall occupational profile of the informal economy, care work and agricultural 
work comprise over half the jobs undertaken as enterprise work by young people in the 
informal economy. Enterprise care work involves young people offering care work as a 
service to an open informal market. While inevitably these are small scale and localised, 
potentially anyone can take up the service.  
 
‘I babysit children under 5 for anyone that asks. I put the children to bed, clean the dirty nappies 
and I feed them.’ (Female, 13 years) 
 
Enterprise agricultural and horticultural work is similar to enterprise care work. It 
involves young people offering gardening and landscaping work within localised but non-
particular markets.  Some work involves highly particular skills. For example: 
 
‘Training and raising greyhounds, building their kennels, walking, feeding, raking yards.’ (Male, 14 
years). 
‘Training horses for people and get paid money for riding horse every afternoon. I feed and wash 
them before they take it away to somewhere’ (Female, 13 years) 
 
Although care and agricultural work dominate, a diverse range of other types of 
enterprise activity is also apparent, including production of consumer goods such as 
clothes and food; and traders who operate market stalls or produce goods such as 
jewellery or art to on sell. Some young people produce goods (sometimes quite 
specialized) that feed into the formal economy but in this study’s sample, production of 
goods and services bought directly by consumers is typical. They produce and distribute 
goods and services generally within their community with very little capital or technology 
and generally at a low level of productivity.   
 
‘I sell jewellery. Making jewellery then selling it at markets.’ (Female, 14 years) 
‘Selling bait to shop.’ (Male, 14 years) 
‘Running a neighbourhood carwash business. We washed cars, inside, outside, dried etc. different 
prices for different tasks.’ (Male, 13 years) 
‘Teaching violin to young students. Preparing work like music for my students to learn, 
photocopy music for homework, order new music book etc…’(Female, 15 years) 
‘Busking. I juggle for roughly an hour to 2 hours.’ (Male, 13 years) 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
Chapter Five: The Informal Economy  - 120 - 
‘Artist, I sell works. I do works of art and sell them to galleries.’ (Male, 14 years) 
‘Collect golf balls and sell the golf balls.’ (Male, 13 years) 
 
This work exists in the interstices of the formal economy, consisting largely of economic 
activities also undertaken in the formal economy (Kawecka Nenga and Baccam 2010; 
Gershuny 1979). These jobs are therefore similar to MacDonald’s (1994)  ‘fiddly jobs’ 
obtained on the basis of reputation and facilitated by the falling cost of capital which 
makes it easier for individuals to own their own tools and therefore engage in enterprise 
work. Again, several hypotheses follow from the nature of the relationship between 
enterprise worker and consumer. Because the focus is on the delivery of the enterprise, 
relationships are expected to be more formal and universal and less particularistic. We 
would hypothesise then that they would demand higher payment for their service, 
experience greater levels of control over their work and that the orientations of workers 
would be income-oriented.  
 
5.3.3. Work for associative organisations. 
This category includes work for third sector organisations or associations such as non-
profit or community organisations and sports clubs. While informal employees are locally 
hired by known persons and enterprise workers offer goods or services for an open 
market, associative workers are hired informally by associative organisations. 
Organisational rules and affiliations structure this work, however even though the work 
takes place within an institutional environment it is informal in the sense that few or no 
regulations pertain as to employment conditions. Work-related practices and conditions 
are instead likely to be developed from agreed to and localized customs of practice. Such 
associations are on the verge of the formal production system because they operate on 
the basis of a quasi-money exchange, tokens or credits. For Gershuny (1979), this raises 
the possibility that relationships will break down if equal values are not exchanged within 
a relatively short period. Like informal employees, and in contrast to enterprise workers, 
the provision of the good or service relies upon existing relationships. However this does 
not arise out of neighbourhood or friendship based interpersonal relationships, but by 
virtue of engagement with the associative organisation.  
 
Almost all young people doing associative work are in sports related occupations (n=224, 
87.8%), but some undertake work for other organisations such as schools, religious 
groups and other community organisations. Sports-related associative organisations are 
not strictly formal labour market institutions, but nonetheless employ young people to 
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carry out important tasks that relate directly to the activities of the organisation, 
particularly coaching and refereeing.  
 
‘I teach karate in my karate club as an assistant teacher. Helping children with their uniforms, 
helping children with fitness & teaching the techniques.’ (Male, 13 years) 
‘Netball Umpiring. Umpiring 3-4 games of netball on a Saturday morning.’ (Female, 15 years) 
‘I coach a basketball team Teach them skills and drills. Explain tactics and formations.’ (Male, 15 
years) 
 
While no data was collected on the pathways into this work, because of the expertise 
required to umpire or coach, it is likely that young people become involved in this work 
through membership ties, becoming involved initially as a junior player and then over 
time progressing to umpiring or coaching. In this way the tasks are a mix of work and 
leisure, similar to volunteering in the moral economy. Therefore the forms of work 
carried on by actors are most likely to resemble volunteers, in the sense that the products 
are directed towards meeting the goals of the associative organisation and therefore 
related to use-value, rather than exchange value.  
 
Because the focus is on the provision of a good or service for the association, is network-
oriented and less particularistic, we would expect that work conditions are more formal 
for most conditions than work done by informal employees. However, because the 
reasons for involvement are for leisure or ethical commitment for instance, we can 
hypothesise that only a rudimentary system of exchange exists for this work and 
remuneration may even be in the form of symbolic rewards unpaid or as part of a pattern 
of gift exchange (Gershuny 1979; Taylor and Warburton 2011). We would hypothesise 
they would experience lesser levels of control in their work because work practices are 
regulated by organisational rules and procedures and that the orientations of workers 
would be altruistic.  
 
Having established the types and categories of work young people are involved in on the 
informal economy, including that different categories of work are embedded in different 
social relations, we now turn to examining the social distribution of work on the informal 
economy overall and different categories of informal work more specifically. 
 
5.4. The Social Distribution of Work within the Informal Economy  
As discussed in Section Two, expansion of the informal economy has in part been driven 
by the demand for specialist services from niche markets and by the internal needs of 
low-income communities incapable of buying goods and services in the mainstream 
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economy. Among young workers in the informal economy we see some evidence of a 
service orientation in work with high levels of care work, cleaning and a diversity of 
specialised, production of goods and services for local use (Section Three). However we 
have also found high levels of associative work which are more closely related to third 
sector activities than informalisation processes more generally.  
 
The implications of this analysis for the social distribution of work are whether informal 
work is primarily a strategy of the poor or an economic strategy of a broader segment of 
society. The ‘marginality’ or ‘coping strategy’ hypothesis holds that more marginal 
groups, either economically or socially will be more likely to participate in the informal 
economy, with the informal work providing goods and services to meet the needs of 
low-income households (Blair and Endres, 1994; Brown and Kulcar, 2001; Button, 1984; 
Castells and Portes, 1989; Elkin and McLaren, 1991; Gutmann, 1978; Kesteloot and 
Meert, 1999; Matthews, 1983; Mingione, 1983, 1991; Portes, 1994; Slack 2007b). If this 
hypothesis is correct, then informal economic activities will not only be more prevalent 
in poorer communities, but because such activities are a survival strategy, we would 
anticipate that these communities might also have more work organised through existing 
social networks, that is informal employees (Blair and Endres, 1994; Button, 1984; Elkin 
and McLaren, 1991; Haughton, Johnson, Murphy and Thomas, 1993; Robson, 1988; 
Williams and Windebank 2000). 
 
The counter argument is that young people from wealthier households are more likely to 
participate in the informal economy because these households have greater human 
capital and social network resources, which are required for successful conduct in the 
informal economy. Pahl (1988) for instance has shown informal activities demand not 
only time but also the means of production, specialized knowledge, systems of 
information and exchange and a location where production can take place. Activities, 
such as gardening and do-it-yourself renovation and repairs, require tools and knowledge. 
Therefore it is middle class and wealthier neighbourhoods where informal economic 
activities are most likely to occur, especially small-scale localized activities that young 
people are involved in. Informal work is also associated with the needs of these 
households to purchase this work, providing a willing market that informal entrepreneurs 
may be able to capitalizing on, using their skills. Therefore we would not only expect a 
higher rate of participation in the informal economy in middle class and wealthier 
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neighbourhoods, but also a higher rate of participation in enterprise work. We now 
examine the social distribution of work on the informal economy. 
 
As per the analysis of the formal labour market, two analytical strategies are used. The 
first examines the likelihood of working on the informal economy overall, compared to 
working in either the family or formal economy. The second examines the likelihood of 
undertaking enterprise work, being an informal employee or associative work, that is the 
social distribution of categories of work within the informal economy, using three 
dummy variables, each coding a respective category as 1, and all other informal work as 0 
(e.g. Enterprise work= 1, Other work =0 as one variable, Informal employees=1, Other 
work=0 as another variable and so on). Each dummy variable was then treated as a 
dependent variable in logistic regression models with socio-economic background, age, 
sex, cultural background and rurality included as independent factors for analysis. The 
parameter estimates and model summary statistics for the likelihood of working on the 
informal economy and different sectors of the informal economy are presented in Table 
5.2.  
 
Table 5.2: Likelihood of working on the informal economy and informal work category by 
socio-demographic characteristics 
 
Model I 
Informal 
Economya 
Model II 
Informal 
Employees 
Model III 
Enterprise 
work 
Model IV 
Associative 
work 
Socio-economic 
Status  
11-25th quantile 
1.10 (0.19) 0.66 (0.44) 
1.20 (0.65) 
1.45(0.53) 
  26-50th quantile 0.97 (0.19) 0.32**(0.40) 1.83 (0.59) 2.90*(0.47) 
 51-75th quantile 1.20 (0.18) 0.32**(0.39) 1.28 (0.59) 3.83**(0.46) 
  76-90th quantile 2.06***(0.17) 0.24***(0.38) 2.87 (0.57) 3.14*(0.45) 
  91-100th quantile (least disadvantaged) 2.48***(0.18) 0.64 (0.40) 3.04 (0.58) 0.87 (0.49) 
 0-10th quantile (most disadvantaged) = ref     
Age Twelve 3.32***(0.19) 1.55 (0.39) 0.41 (0.48) 1.16 (0.47) 
 Thirteen 3.67***(0.19) 1.19 (0.37) 0.66 (0.44) 1.19 (0.46) 
 Fourteen 3.44***(0.19) 1.50 (0.37) 0.45 (0.44) 1.14 (0.46) 
 Fifteen 1.61*(0.19) 0.90 (0.38) 0.84 (0.44) 1.44 (0.47) 
 Sixteen=ref     
CALD Non-Anglo Australian 0.63***(0.10) 1.43 (0.20) 1.29 (0.26) 0.51**(0.24) 
 Anglo-Australian=ref     
 Rurality Metropolitan 1.54***(0.12) 1.99**(0.21) 0.98 (0.31) 0.43***(0.23) 
  Rural coastal 1.89***(0.13) 1.81*(0.23) 2.00*(0.34) 0.29***(0.28) 
  Rural inland 1.82***(0.12) 2.52***(0.23) 1.37 (0.34) 0.26***(0.27) 
  Sydney=ref     
 Gender Female 1.67***(0.07) 2.15***(0.13) 0.69*(0.18) 0.46***(0.15) 
 Male=ref     
 Constant  5.81***(0.43) 11.93*(0.92) 0.01***(1.29) 0.18 (1.07) 
a) Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
The reference category is: Work in other economies  *Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
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Socio-economic status, cultural background, gender, age and rurality have a significant 
relationship with the likelihood that a young person will work on the informal economy 
as opposed to other economies. Younger workers, those from rural and regional areas, 
females, young people of Anglo-Australian background and young people from more 
advantaged communities are more likely to work on the informal economy.  
 
Compared to sixteen year olds (the oldest in this study), young people of all other ages 
are more likely to work on the informal economy. However the parameter estimates are 
particularly large for 12 to 14 year olds, who are more than three times as likely to work 
on the informal economy as other economies compared to 16 year olds. Taken with the 
findings presented in Chapters Four and Six, this suggests a pathway of youth 
participation in the economy, from participation in the family and informal economies, 
which have fewer barriers to participation and which are likely to be embedded in day to 
day practices, to working on the formal economy, which is a progression into more adult 
and formally institutionalised economic practices. Older workers, who in other spheres 
of life are seeking greater autonomy and independence, undertake work requiring greater 
autonomy, initiative and enterprise. This provides an interesting contrast to the formal 
economy, where older workers are more likely to be involved in less autonomous work. 
Younger workers are undertaking work that takes place as part of particularistic and 
therefore potentially protective work environments. Underlying these concrete economic 
conditions, therefore, are social dynamics relating to transitions from childhood to 
adulthood.  
 
Young people from non-English speaking backgrounds are approximately two-thirds as 
likely as other young people to work on the informal economy reflecting the greater 
likelihood of young people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds to work on 
the family economy (see Chapter Six). Females are almost twice as likely to work on the 
informal economy as males, reflecting the large amount of care work that is undertaken 
on the informal economy. Gender, a conventional predictor of formal labour market 
stratification, is also an important consideration in shaping the dynamics of informal 
work. One-quarter (n=686; 24.9%) of females work on the informal economy compared 
to 16.5 percent of males (n=535). Gender stereotyping effects modes of work 
undertaken by females, but is less evident for males.  More than 70 percent (n=492; 
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71.9%) of the work performed by young women in the informal economy is care work. 
In terms of relative proportion in different types of work across gender, females 
dominate sales work and care work on the informal economy. Males are involved in a 
more diverse range of informal activities. Agricultural and horticultural work is most 
dominant, accounting for less than one-third of the work males perform on the informal 
economy (n=161; 30.2%). Males dominate agricultural and horticultural work, labour 
work, administrative work, other service work, cleaning, entertainment work and other 
work not elsewhere classified. Work such as labour and labour trades have been found to 
be highly represented in ‘off the book’ enterprise work. The tradeable skills required for 
this sort of work have been traditionally associated with male dominated forms of labour 
(Hoyman 1987; MacDonald 1994).  
 
Young people from the most advantaged communities are most likely to work on the 
informal economy compared other young people. Compared to young people in the least 
wealthy neighbourhoods, those in the richest are almost 2.5 times as likely and young 
people from the second most advantaged communities are more than twice as likely to 
work on the informal economy. Working on the informal economy is also more likely in 
rural and regional areas than in urban areas, potentially indicating the vibrancy of local 
networks in these areas that underpin the ties necessary for the informal economy to 
exist.  Compared to young people in Sydney, young people in rural areas, both coastal 
and rural, are 1.8 times as likely to work on the informal economy, and young people in 
regional metropolitan areas are 1.5 times as likely to work on the informal economy.  
 
Socio-economic status, gender and rurality are significant factors predicting the 
likelihood of working as an informal employee. Similar to enterprise work, young 
workers from rural areas are approximately 2.0 to 2.5 times as likely to work as informal 
employees. A U-shaped distribution is evident, with poorer and wealthier young people 
being more likely than middle class young people to work for known persons. Compared 
to the most disadvantaged young people, middle class young people are between 0.24 
and 0.32 times as likely to be informal employees. While females are less likely to 
undertake enterprise work, they are approximately twice as likely to work as informal 
employees.  
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Socio-economic status, rurality and gender are also significant factors in predicting the 
likelihood of enterprise work on the informal economy. The largest parameter effects are 
for rurality, with enterprise work being more likely in rural areas than metropolitan and 
city areas.  In particular young people from rural coastal areas are twice as likely as young 
people in Sydney to be involved in enterprise work.  Individual parameter estimates for 
class are non-significant, however the parameter estimates indicate that, compared to 
young workers from the poorest neighbourhoods, those from the wealthiest 
neighbourhoods are approximately three times as likely to undertake enterprise work. 
Females are less likely than males to undertake enterprise work. The results for age are 
also non-significant but indicate that younger people (12 to 14 years) are approximately 
half as likely to undertake enterprise work compared to 15 and 16 year olds. 
 
Socio-economic status, gender, cultural and linguistic background and rurality are also 
significant factors predicting the likelihood of associative work. In terms of socio-
economic status, an A-shaped distribution of likelihood is evident, inverse to that of 
informal employees. The poorest and wealthiest young people are least likely to 
undertake associative work, with young people from middle class neighbourhoods being 
between 2.9 and 3.8 times as likely to undertake associative work. Whereas young people 
from metropolitan and rural areas are more likely to be involved in enterprise work and 
as informal employees, they are less likely to be associative workers. Workers outside of 
Sydney are between 0.25 and 0.43 times as likely to undertake associative work. The 
differences are particularly large for rural workers who are about one-quarter as likely to 
undertake associative work. Young people from non-English speaking backgrounds and 
females are approximately half as likely to undertake associative work.  
 
In sum, informal work, taken as a whole, appears to reinforce socioeconomic inequalities 
with informal work most likely to be undertaken within wealthier neighbourhoods. While 
informal work may be more important to the ability of low-income households to make 
ends meet, young people from the most advantaged communities are more likely to work 
on the informal economy compared to young people from middle-class and poor 
neighbourhoods. This result is therefore consistent with studies that find that informal 
work is more prevalent in higher than lower income areas (Jensen Cornwell and Findeis, 
1995; Laguerre, 1994; Pahl, 1984; Renooy, 1990; Waldinger and Lapp, 1993; Williams and 
Windebank, 1998). However the class distribution of different types of informal work 
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provides a more complex picture of the relationship between class and informal work. 
Young people from wealthier neighbourhoods are more likely to undertake enterprise 
work. This is consistent with the ‘informal entrepreneur’ hypothesis that suggests that 
informal entrepreneurial activities are reliant upon consumers with greater purchasing 
capacity to buy in services offered by enterprising young people. However, for informal 
employees, work most likely to be mediated by reciprocal relationships within existing 
social networks, poorer and wealthier young people are more likely than middle class 
young people to undertake this sort of work.  This suggests that within poor 
neighbourhoods, there is some evidence of mutual aid or work performed by young 
people as a ‘survival strategy’ in the face of limits of other alternative economic 
opportunities. Greater unemployment and greater challenges in finding formal 
employment provide strong incentives to participate in interhousehold exchange (Brown 
and Kulcar, 2001; Campbell, Spencer and Amonker, 1993; Duncan, 1992). If we extend 
this to comment on community characteristics, the findings suggest at least some level of 
solidaristic relations within lower income neighbourhoods to support informal 
employment among working class young people (Young and Wilmott 1975). This is 
counter to narratives that depict these areas as characterised by fear, lack of trust, urban 
decline and alienation (see Williams and Windebank 2002 for a discussion of these issues 
in relation to the informal economy).  
 
At the same time the hypothesis that informal economic activities are most likely to be 
undertaken by those who have the available resources is also evident in these results (see 
also Jensen Cornwell and Findeis, 1995; Hofferth and Iceland, 1998). Young people from 
wealthier neighbourhoods are more likely to be able to mobilise resources, such as tools 
and transport to undertake enterprise work (Pahl, 1984; Smith, 1986; Thomas, 1992). 
Poorer young people are more likely to trade in work involving low levels of capital, such 
as care work, which as we have noted, is also embedded in local social networks because 
it relies on high levels of trust. The smaller volume of money in poorer neighbourhoods 
potentially forces greater reliance upon friends and neighbours, on a voluntary, reward or 
nominal pay amount (Kesteloot and Meert 1999). This will be examined in Section Five. 
While social networks seem most pertinent in developing informal economic 
opportunities among the least and most wealthy young people, the inverse relationship is 
found with associative work. It is middle class young people who are most likely to 
engage in work opportunities provided by associative organisations. While poor and 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
Chapter Five: The Informal Economy  - 128 - 
wealthy young people appear to engage in work driven by instrumental or informal 
reciprocal orientations, middle class young people are engaged in work oriented towards 
leisure or value identities embodied in their participation in associations. This type of 
economic activity appears therefore to be related to middle-class leisure and lifestyle 
practices.  
 
Informal work is an important aspect of the livelihood strategies of rural communities 
and factors prominently as an economic activity among young people from rural areas. 
One of the characteristics of rural life is the ability to maintain economic self-sufficiency 
by engaging in a range of livelihood strategies, including participation in informal 
economic activities (Brown and Kulcar, 2001; Brown, Xu and Toth, 1998; Campbell, 
Spencer and Amonker, 1993; Duncan, 1992; Edgecomb and Thetford, 2004; Fitchen 
1981; Hofferth and Iceland, 1998; Jensen, Cornwell and Findeis, 1995; Levitan and 
Feldman 1991; Nelson, 1999a; Nelson and Smith, 1999; Pickering, 2000; Slack, 2007a; 
Tickamyer and Wood, 1998, 2003; Ziebarth and Tigges, 2003). A number of theoretically 
compelling reasons have been advanced to indicate why informal economic activities are 
an important economic strategy in rural areas. Low population density, the small size and 
geographical isolation of some rural communities can limit the size of the formal market, 
necessitating the development and reliance on informal alternatives (Levitan and 
Feldman 1991); the availability of natural resources in rural areas often forms the basic 
inputs for food, crafts and other goods produced for household self-provisioning and 
interhousehold exchange and allows opportunities for forms of informal work not 
available in urban areas (Brown and Kulcar 2001; Jensen, Cornwell and Findeis 1995, 
Nelson and Smith 1999). Furthermore because such activities depend on strong social 
networks, gemeinschaft relations thought to be more typical in rural communities might 
make rural life more conducive to participation in the informal economy (Levitan and 
Feldman 1991, Slack 2007a). Several of these reasons are plausible here. The 
development of informal alternatives to the formal market explains the increased 
likelihood of enterprise work which potentially is a low cost, low capital and local 
alternative that provides niche goods and products. Furthermore greater prevalence of 
associative work in large urban areas most likely reflects the greater number of third 
sector organisations in these areas. The availability of natural resources not only 
translates into small scale cottage industries that young people may be involved in with 
other members of their households, but is indicated in the moderately high proportion of 
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agricultural and horticultural work undertaken by young workers in the informal 
economy generally. The importance of strong social networks is directly indicated by the 
greater likelihood of working as an informal employee, but is also likely to increase word-
of-mouth opportunities for young rural enterprise workers.  
 
The increased likelihood of informal economic activities in rural areas, especially 
enterprise work and informal employee work, in combination with the findings on class, 
indicate that at least for young people, informal economic activities are not primarily a 
survival strategy utilized by the urban or inner-city poor, as suggested by Sassen. Sydney 
is characterized by large scale geographical suburban sprawl. Most young people, and 
especially the poorest young people live in the outer south-western suburbs of Sydney, 
and are consequently 30 or 40 kilometres away from wealthy neighbourhoods whose 
residents might utilize the sort of niche informal activities that Sassen discusses. 
Therefore the spatial proximity between poor and wealthy neighbourhoods that links 
inner-city gentrification with informal economic activities, which characterizes cities like 
New York, does not exist to any great extent in Sydney, at least for young people. This is 
further exacerbated by the limited access that young people from the poorer areas of 
Sydney have to independent modes of transport, limiting their capacity to seek out 
informal economic activities outside their local communities.  The social mix more 
evident in Sydney is between poor and middle-class localities. Sassen points out, middle 
class consumption patterns are reliant upon capital intensive rather than labour intensive 
infrastructure. This also decreases the informal economic opportunities for young 
workers from poor areas and also middle class areas. In this data this is shown in the 
lower likelihood of informal employee and enterprise work among middle class young 
people. Therefore the spatial patterns identified here interplay with the class dimensions 
discussed earlier.  
 
Sociological studies of the urban economy suggest that immigrant communities have 
provided much of the requisite labor, sites for the development of, and entrepreneurial 
drive to initiate informal economic activities (Kloosterman, Van der Leun and Rath, 
1998; Portes, 1995, 1998; Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987). However, young people from 
non-English speaking backgrounds are less likely than young people of Anglo-Australian 
background to work on the informal economy. However, within the informal economy, 
significant differences are only apparent for associative work, with young people from 
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non-English speaking backgrounds less likely to undertake associative work. This may 
reflect the specific patterns of migration evident in Australia, where ‘ethnic enclaves’ 
which provide informal market opportunities are not as concentrated amongst single 
cultural groups as they may be in other countries. For example Kloosterman, Van Der 
Leun and Rath (1998) show that immigrant entrepreneurship is heavily skewed towards 
economic activities with low barriers of entry in terms of capital outlays and education.  
 
5.5. Young People’s Work Conditions in the Informal Economy  
As discussed in Section Two, work conditions on the informal economy have generally 
been characterized as poor. Low wages, unpredictable hours, work in dangerous 
environments and the lack of effective representation, are seen as a consequence of being 
outside formal regulation and intrinsic to processes of informalisation - what we have 
referred to as the ‘worse conditions hypothesis’. However in the absence of formal 
regularity and institutional boundaries, other normative structures may operate to 
regulate conditions. Because much informal work is based upon relationships within 
social networks, enforceable trust and negotiation rooted in group membership may 
instead exert influence over conditions. Conditions may be determined by informal or 
group rules, arrangements, institutions and structures which serve to build consensus 
around remuneration, hours and regularity, autonomy over performance of work and 
support in performing work. Compliance with negotiated agreements about conditions 
can be backed by group norms of trust and reciprocity and the ability to apply informal 
penalties for malfeasance (Portes, 1994).  
 
From the previous sections we have also found segmentation of the informal labour 
market according to category of work. Building upon the ‘informal entrepreneur-
disguised worker’ thesis we can develop some hypotheses regarding whether work 
conditions are differentiated depending on the type of work performed.  For informal 
employees because work is organised through known social networks (and thereby 
potentially based in reciprocity), we would anticipate that informal employees are more 
likely to perform unremunerated work, more likely to receive lower levels of 
remuneration, less able to exercise control and autonomy in their work and potentially 
less able to determine when they work.  Because enterprise workers are more ‘market‘ 
and therefore income-oriented, we would expect that they are more likely to perform 
remunerated work, more likely to receive higher levels of remuneration and are able to 
exercise greater levels of control and autonomy in their work. For associative workers, 
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because the reasons for involvement are symbolic, for leisure, ethical or other intangible 
reasons, we would predict only be a rudimentary system of exchange and that returns for 
work might be largely in terms of symbolic rewards.  Because of the rule-based and 
regular nature of the work, we would anticipate associative workers would experience 
less autonomy and control in their work.  At the same time the quasi-organisational basis 
might offset poor pay and lack of autonomy through predictable and non-precarious 
work commitments, offer other conditions aimed at maintaining commitment or which 
reflect the ethical basis of the organisation, such as skill development opportunities. 
 
In examining whether work conditions are systematically associated with different work 
categories, premised as they are on different social relations, we can gain some insight as 
to whether normative, as opposed to legal, structures regulate young people’s work on 
the informal economy. Table 5.3 provides an overview of the analysis of work conditions 
in the informal economy. It indicates how the concepts developed from the discussion of 
structural transformations earlier in this chapter inform our hypotheses around work 
conditions, and how the work security measures map to these hypotheses. 
 
Table 5.3: Concepts, hypotheses and measures: Analysing work conditions on the informal 
economy 
Concept Hypothesis 
Globalization, economic restructuring, and market deregulation have increased the 
prevalence of informal work  
 
The distinction between formal and informal labour markets hinges on the presence 
or absence of state regulation - regulatory deficit’ definition of the informal labour 
market. 
 
Two arguments regarding the structural role of the informal economy. Informal 
economy as marginal and peripheral to economic development; and informal 
economy as an alternative dynamic source of economic development.  This debate 
has resolved into a dialogue around whether workers on the informal economy are 
‘informal entrepreneurs’ or ‘disguised workers. 
 
In the absence of formal regularity and institutional boundaries other normative 
structures operate, based upon weak or strong ties within social networks. 
Conditions are largely determined through enforceable trust and negotiation rooted 
in group membership. 
 
Worse conditions hypothesis: The lack of formal regulation and 
structural trends towards destandardisation of labour mean that 
conditions on the informal economy are poor, experienced as 
low wages, unpredictable hours, lack of support, control and 
effective representation. 
 
Work conditions differentiated for informal workers depending 
on the type of work performed. 
 
 
Decent Work Security 
Work security:  
 number of hours 
worked;  
 work regularity  
 
Informal employees less 
able to determine when 
they work. Enterprise 
workers less likely to 
determine when they work 
and have less regular work. 
Associative workers more 
regular hours of work. 
Income security:  
 likelihood of being paid;  
 level of remuneration 
 
Informal employees are more 
likely to perform unremunerated 
work, more likely to receive lower 
levels of remuneration. Enterprise 
workers more likely to perform 
remunerated work, more likely to 
demand higher levels of 
remuneration. Associative workers 
may be remunerated through 
symbolic rewards. 
Representation security: 
 fair say at workplace;  
 task autonomy;  
 control over breaks;  
 control over when worked  
 
Informal employees less able to 
exercise control and autonomy. 
Enterprise workers more likely to 
exercise greater levels of control 
and autonomy in their work. 
Associative workers have little 
control over how they do their 
work. 
Skill reproduction security:  
 task instruction;  
 training;  
 workplace support;  
 skill development 
 
Skill reproduction opportunities 
available for associative workers 
and to a lesser extent enterprise 
workers. Support evident for 
informal employees, but skill 
development not evident. 
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Following the analysis undertaken in Chapter Four: The Formal Economy, several types 
of work conditions are operationalised adapting the ILO (2002) measures of work 
securities. For details of these measures, see Chapter Three. 
 
5.5.1. Work Security and Commitment in the Informal Economy  
As discussed in Chapter Four, limits on working time are a fundamental condition of 
work. However for the informal economy, working hours are regulated through the 
expectations of the worker and employer/purchaser, rather than formal regulations that 
set work times. The time commitments on the informal economy are instead embedded 
in the nature of the social relationship between the parties to the economic transaction, 
and therefore are likely to be task rather than time-oriented. We hypothesised that 
informal employees, whose work is determined through needs arising within local social 
networks, are potentially less able to determine when they work. Similarly, enterprise 
workers, responding to demands for service, may be able to exert minimal amounts of 
control over when they work. For associative workers, we anticipate that because work 
performance is determined by agreed rules, much like the formal labour market, they will 
have predictable and non-precarious work commitments. 
 
Consistent with the analysis in Chapter Four, two variables are used to measure ‘work 
commitment’ - the number of hours worked per week and work regularity (whether the 
work was one-off, casual ‘as-needed’ or regular – involving set times). Informal work 
category and socio-demographic variables are included as independent variables, the 
latter to determine whether these factors function as latent explanatory variables for 
work commitment. These models are presented in table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4: Hours worked (two category) and regularity by informal economy category and 
demographic characteristics 
  Work 11 hours + a Casualb Regular b 
Informal Employment Enterprise  5.43**(0.54) 1.40 (0.49) 0.31*(0.48) 
  Informal Employees  3.99**(0.49) 0.98 (0.38) 0.10***(0.36) 
  Associative org. = ref.     
Age Twelve 0.39 (0.60) 0.67 (0.82) 0.39 (0.85) 
 Thirteen 0.53 (0.54) 0.46 (0.80) 0.44 (0.82) 
 Fourteen 0.42 (0.55) 0.79 (0.80) 0.50 (0.83) 
 Fifteen 0.48 (0.57) 0.43 (0.81) 0.33 (0.83) 
 Sixteen =ref    
Socio-economic Status  11-25th quantile  0.47 (0.71) 1.52 (0.63) 2.50 (0.70) 
  26-50th quantile  0.77 (0.62) 0.82 (0.56) 1.30 (0.63) 
  51-75th quantile  0.78 (0.59) 0.86 (0.53) 1.58 (0.60) 
  76-90th quantile  0.60 (0.61) 1.20 (0.55) 2.06 (0.61) 
  91-100th quantile   0.73 (0.63) 1.44 (0.57) 1.32 (0.65) 
  0-10th quantile (most 
disadvantaged) = ref 
 
  
CALD Yes  1.12 (0.36) 0.97 (0.33) 0.90 (0.35) 
  No=ref.    
Gender Female 0.90 (0.25) 2.14***(0.22) 1.67*(0.24) 
 Male=ref.    
Rurality Metropolitan  0.97 (0.42) 0.92 (0.37) 0.78 (0.39) 
 Rural coastal 0.83 (0.46) 1.28 (0.40) 1.07 (0.43) 
 Rural inland 1.51 (0.43) 1.04 (0.39) 0.90 (0.41) 
 Sydney=ref    
Intercept  0.84** 0.96  1.00  
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
a The reference category is: 1-10 hrs. 
b The reference category is: one-off. 
Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
 
The unregulated nature of work on the informal economy is borne out in the high levels 
of casual, as-needed work. Over half of the jobs performed (n=614, 54.1%) are casual 
and approximately one-third (n=410, 36.1%) are regular.  Fewer than 10 percent are one-
off (n=112, 9.9%) and fewer than 7 percent of workers on the informal economy work 
more than 11 hours per week (n=79; 7.0%). Work commitment for enterprise and 
informal employees is similar, the modal category for both being casual and involving 
low hours (1-10 hours) work, accounting for half of enterprise jobs and approximately 60 
percent of informal employee jobs. The work commitments of associative workers are 
different than enterprise workers and informal employees, with approximately three-
quarters (n=181, 73.0%) of associative workers working regular, low-hours work.  
 
When hours of work are modelled we find that enterprise workers and informal 
employees are 5.4 and 4.0 times respectively more likely to work longer hours than 
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associative workers. Despite the inclusion of socio-demographic characteristics, no other 
parameter estimates are significant, indicating the strong underlying relationship between 
the category of informal work, and thus the social relations that these different types of 
work are embedded in, and hours worked
38
. When work regularity is considered, the 
descriptive frequencies are confirmed. Enterprise workers and informal employees are 
less likely to work regularly than associative workers, with no difference in casual work.  
The differences in likelihood are quite stark. Enterprise workers are 0.3 times and 
informal employees 0.1 times as likely as associative workers to work regularly. Females 
are also more likely than males to work regularly (1.7 times) and as-needed (2.2 times).  
 
In terms of work commitment therefore, few differences can be observed between 
enterprise workers and informal employees, with the work commitment profiles for both 
groups of workers characterised by sporadic and irregular times. This pattern is 
characteristic of the informal economy experience of young workers regardless of socio-
demographic characteristics, indicating that contingent work commitments are a 
characteristic the informal economy generally. There are two exceptions to this. Females 
work more regularly, possibly related to ongoing care jobs they are involved in. However 
the more marked contrast is for associative work which is both regular and involves less 
hours compared to enterprise and informal employee work. Rather than being reliant 
upon the fluctuations of demand generated from social networks or the open informal 
market, associative work is generated through the operation of associative organisations 
whose schedules are generally fixed and regular, the times set often months in advance. 
In fact the existence of these associations is reliant upon the ongoing and regular labour 
of its members.  
 
  
                                                          
38 When hours of work are further disaggregated and modelled against informal work category, compared 
to associative workers, enterprise workers are 6.5 times more likely to work 16 hours or more, 4.9 times to 
work 11 to 15 hours and 2.3 times as likely to work 6-10 hours. Informal employees are 4.6 times to work 
16 hours or more, 4.1 times to work 11 to 15 hours a week and 2.3 times as likely to work 6-10 hours.  
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5.5.2. Income security: Likelihood and level of remuneration  
The likelihood of pay by informal employment category and socio-demographic 
characteristics of workers is presented in Table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.5: Likelihood of pay by informal employment category and Socio-demographic 
characteristics 
   Monetary Reward Only 
Informal Employment Enterprise  0.63 (0.78) 0.17*(0.91) 
  Informal employee  0.38 (0.60) 0.18*(0.65) 
  Associative = ref.    
Age (years)  1.30 (0.16) 0.95 (0.19) 
Socio-economic Status  11-25th quantile  1.20 (0.85) 1.66 (0.98) 
  26-50th quantile  0.55 (0.74) 0.55 (0.89) 
  51-75th quantile  0.54 (0.72) 0.59 (0.86) 
  76-90th quantile  1.84 (0.84) 0.40 (1.06) 
  91-100th quantile  3.68 (1.00) 1.23 (1.18) 
  0-10th quantile (most 
disadvantaged) = ref 
  
CALD Non-Anglo Australian  0.26**(0.43) 0.61 (0.52) 
  Anglo Australian =ref.   
Gender Female 0.71 (0.36) 0.73 (0.42) 
 Male=ref.   
Rurality Metropolitan  3.17 (0.69) 1.88 (0.82) 
 Rural coastal 1.94 (0.56) 2.30 (0.65) 
 Rural inland 0.91 (0.52) 0.73 (0.65) 
 Sydney=ref   
Intercept  (2.33)  (2.77)  
a The reference category is: Neither pay nor reward. 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
 
While modes of remuneration on the informal economy encompass a broad range of 
social relations, from cash for work, to barter exchanges and gift exchanges, almost 90 
percent (n=1052; 87.5%) of young people working on the informal economy are paid 
monetarily. Non-monetary remuneration (a gift in lieu of money) is less frequent, with 
only 8 percent of young people (n=94; 7.8% of remuneration type) remunerated this way 
on the informal economy. Less than five percent of work is done for no remuneration at 
all (n=56; 4.7%). The cash economy is most prevalent for enterprise workers (although 
this is the most common form of exchange for all categories) where transactions are 
embedded in the least particular relations between buyer and seller, with 92.3 percent of 
enterprise workers paid for their work compared to 87.1 percent of informal employees 
and 86.0 percent of associative workers. The barter or reward economy is most prevalent 
for associative workers. Almost 12 percent of associative workers are remunerated non-
monetarily, compared to 7.3 percent of informal employees and only 3.9 percent of 
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enterprise workers. The gift (unpaid) economy is most prevalent for informal employees, 
with exchanges occurring in highly particular social relations. Informal employees have 
the greatest proportion of non-remunerated work, with 5.6 percent of these workers 
being unpaid, compared to 3.9 percent of enterprise workers and 2.3 percent of 
associative workers. While no significant differences are associated with monetary reward 
and type of informal employment work, the likelihood of being rewarded is higher for 
associative work than enterprise workers or informal employees. Enterprise workers and 
informal employees are less than one-fifth as likely as those who work for associative 
organisations to be rewarded non-monetarily for their work.  
 
The extent and character of remuneration also differs demographically, spatially and 
socio-economically. Cultural and linguistic background has a significant relationship with 
likelihood of monetary remuneration. Significantly, young workers from non-English 
speaking backgrounds are approximately one-third as likely to be paid monetarily for 
their work as other young people. Socio-economic status also has an effect on the model 
overall, but no significant differences are apparent at the parameter estimate level. 
However young people from the most advantaged communities are more than 3.5 times 
as likely to be paid monetarily and those from metropolitan areas approximately 3 times 
more likely to be paid. The greater likelihood of being paid in wealthier neighbourhoods 
further suggests that households in wealthier neighbourhoods are more able to pay for 
informal work than households in less wealthy communities, which potentially translates 
into greater instrumentality in wealthier neighbourhoods and greater reciprocity in poorer 
neighbourhoods (Williams and Windebank, 2002).  
 
There is, therefore, some evidence that network characteristics have some effect on 
remuneration for particular demographic communities. Young people from non-English 
speaking backgrounds in particular are least likely to be paid and there are tentative 
results to suggest the barter and gift economies are more prevalent in the poorest 
communities and outer-metropolitan areas.  In terms of our hypotheses we find some 
indication of high levels of instrumentality in the informal economy indicated by the high 
level of cash payment, at rates similar to the formal economy. Furthermore, aspects of 
the enterprise-worker hypothesis appear to be confirmed – informal employees are most 
likely to perform unremunerated work (what Williams and Windebank (2002) refer to as 
‘unpaid mutual aid’), enterprise workers are most likely to be remunerated for their work 
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and associative workers most likely to be rewarded for their work relative to other 
categories of work. These findings are in line with the theoretical expectations regarding 
the nature of social relations that embed different categories of work.  
 
According to the hypotheses identified earlier in this chapter, we would anticipate that 
enterprise workers will receive the highest level of pay, informal employees the least, and 
associative workers, working in semi-regulated environments, have the least income 
dispersion. Isolating only young workers who are paid we can determine whether there 
are differences in pay rates that may compound the inequities in likelihood of pay. The 
level of pay across informal work types is presented in Table 5.6.  
 
Table 5.6: Hourly pay rate by informal work category 
Statistic Enterprise Informal employees Associative Informal Economy 
Mean (S.E. mean) $12.56 ($1.57) $8.78 ($1.16) $9.09 ($0.53) $9.37 ($0.32) 
95% CI mean (L-U) $9.44 - $15.67 $8.16 - $9.40 $8.05 - $10.14 $8.74 - $10.01 
5% Trimmed Mean $9.81 $7.96 $8.22 $8.21 
Median $8.00 $8.00 $8.00 $8.00 
 
Average incomes in the informal economy are much lower than in the formal economy. 
The median pay rate in the informal economy is $8.00, with the mean being $9.37, 
compared to a median of $8.57 and a mean of $12.32 in the formal economy. Not all 
jobs in the informal economy yield trivial incomes however. Many young workers in the 
informal economy, especially enterprise workers, are paid at similar or better rates than 
some young workers in the formal economy. At the low end of wages within the 
informal economy, one quarter of the distribution falls below $4.00 or less. The top 10 
percent of pay rates start at approximately $16.00 per hour. The middle 50 percent of 
scores range from $4.00 to $12.00. The ratio of the 90th to 10th percentile scores is10.00, 
indicating that those whose pay falls at the 90th percentile are paid ten times as much as 
those whose pay falls at the 10th percentile. This is larger than that found among young 
workers in the formal economy, indicating significant wage inequality within a 
compressed distribution of wages.  
 
While no significant differences are apparent in the likelihood of pay, large differences in 
level of pay are apparent between enterprise workers and other workers in the informal 
economy.  When comparing mean hourly pay rates, enterprise workers are paid $3.78 
more per hour on average than informal employees and $3.47 more per hour on average 
than associative workers. The dispersion of pay is also much greater for enterprise 
workers, with the standard deviation for enterprise workers being over $18.02, compared 
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to approximately $7.88 for informal employees and $7.46 for associative workers. 
Therefore some mechanism of ‘wage discipline’ is evident for associative workers and 
informal employees. As expected, wage dispersion is smallest for associative workers, but 
social norms based in neighbourhood relations also exercise some regulation for the 
range of pay received by informal employees. The influence of such norms is not as 
evident for enterprise workers, where pay rates are much more dispersed. 
 
To explore further the distribution of payment among different groups of informal 
economy workers and to determine whether different sub-populations of young workers 
are more likely to receive different levels of pay, the inter-quartile range of hourly pay 
rates was calculated and income levels bracketed into four categories, from the lowest 
quartile of pay ($4.00 per hour or less) to the highest quartile ($12.01 or more). Using the 
lowest quartile of hourly pay rates as the reference group, multinomial logistic regression 
analysis was undertaken to determine whether the likelihood of receiving moderate and 
high pay rates were determined by informal employment category and socio-
demographic characteristics of the young worker. The results are presented in Table 5.7. 
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Table 5.7: Pay rate by work category and demographic characteristics 
   
26-50th percentile 
($4.01-8.00) 
51-75th percentile 
($8.01-12.00) 
76-100th ($12.01-
highest) 
Informal Employment Enterprise  1.08 (0.33) 0.92 (0.40) 2.81** (0.35) 
  Informal employee  1.55 (0.23) 1.39 (0.34) 1.39 (0.26) 
  Associative = ref.     
Age Twelve 0.28* (0.56) 0.31* (0.56) 0.18* (0.58) 
 Thirteen 0.48 (0.54) 0.43 (0.71) 0.32 (0.54) 
 Fourteen 0.59 (0.54) 0.47 (0.71) 0.72 (0.53) 
 Fifteen 0.62 (0.55) 0.77 (0.72) 1.39 (0.55) 
 Sixteen =ref    
Socio-economic status 11-25th quantile  2.20 (0.49) 0.95 (0.55) 2.68 (0.67) 
  26-50th quantile  1.16 (0.45) 0.65 (0.49) 1.38 (0.63) 
  51-75th quantile  1.42 (0.44) 0.85 (0.47) 1.84 (0.61) 
  76-90th quantile  1.57 (0.43) 1.09 (0.47) 3.81* (0.59) 
  91-100th quantile  2.18 (0.46) 1.55 (0.50) 2.80 (0.62) 
  0-10th quantile (most 
disadvantaged) = ref 
   
CALD Non-Anglo Australian  0.60 (0.26) 0.52* (0.29) 0.99 (0.29) 
  Anglo Australian =ref.    
Gender Female 0.66* (0.17) 0.50*** (0.18) 0.28*** (0.22) 
 Male=ref.    
Rurality Metropolitan  1.12 (0.27) 1.49 (0.30) 0.71 (0.33) 
 Rural coastal 1.17 (0.30) 1.67 (0.34) 0.82 (0.39) 
 Rural inland 0.66 (0.30) 0.87 (0.33) 0.46* (0.38) 
 Sydney=ref    
Intercept  (0.67) (1.07) (0.69) 
a The reference category is: 0-25th percentile ($0-20.00). 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
 
The regression model, in general, confirms the descriptive analysis of rates.  Enterprise 
workers are almost three times more likely to be paid the highest rates than other 
workers on the informal economy. However apart from this difference at the highest end 
of pay rates no other significant differences are evident. Age and gender are also 
important determinant of pay rates in the informal economy, reflecting particular age and 
gender-based norms around what is appropriate to pay older workers compared to 
younger workers, and male workers compared female workers. We see a general 
tendency for older workers to be more likely to be paid higher rates, however the only 
significant difference is that 12 year olds are less likely to be paid medium or high pay 
rates, ranging from 0.31 times for rates falling in the 51-75th percentile of rates, to 0.18 
times as likely as 16 year olds to be paid rates falling in the highest quartile. A similar type 
of finding is evident for females, with females being less likely to be paid anything but 
the lowest pay rate compared to males. Furthermore, the higher the percentile of rates, 
the less likely females will be paid those rates – females working in the informal economy 
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are 0.66 times as likely to be paid rates falling in the 25-50th quartile, 0.50 times as likely 
to be paid rates falling in the 51-75th quartile, and only 0.28 times as likely to be paid the 
highest rates. Therefore, females are concentrated in the lower-income segments of the 
informal economy. We also find some differences associated with cultural and linguistic 
background (young people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds being half 
as likely to be paid rates within the 51-75th quartile) and rurality (young people from 
rural inland areas being half as likely to be paid the highest pay rates). The class effects 
on pay rates are moderate and like category of work only appear to be statistically 
significant at the highest pay rates, with young people from upper-middle class 
backgrounds being almost four times as likely as young people from the least wealthy 
neighbourhoods to be paid the highest rates. Apart from that patterns are varied, with 
some indication that young people from the least wealthy backgrounds are more likely to 
be paid the lowest rates. However this is only a suggestive finding as the results are not 
statistically significant. Therefore the results provide only tentative support for low levels 
of pay in the informal economy being a function of the work being undertaken by low-
income people for low-income communities (Leonard 2000). While the financial returns 
from informal economy work appear to be more modest than those young workers 
obtain in the informal economy, this appears to hold across the class spectrum, not just 
for the least wealthy young people. Other factors, such as the type of work involved, age 
and gender dynamics, rather than the purchasing power of local communities (which 
could potentially result in different pay levels across socio-economic brackets), explain 
variation in pay levels.  
 
5.5.3. Representation Security: Participation and Task Autonomy 
In section 5.1 we found that patterns of work commitment for informal employees and 
enterprise workers are characterised by a certain degree of ‘flexibility’ – work is irregular, 
although work hours across the informal economy are not particularly high. Associative 
workers, in contrast, are more likely to work regular and shorter hours.  The degree that 
these ‘objective’ conditions are experienced as flexibility or precariousness (an element of 
the ‘informal entrepreneur-disguised worker’ hypothesis) depends as much on the degree 
of control and autonomy young workers are able to exercise in their work as it does upon 
the predictability of their work time.  As in the formal economy, flexibility may be used 
by ‘employers’ for their own needs to shift risks onto young workers, or flexibility may 
allow young people to organise their work around other commitments. In general we 
would expect that the level of control would relate to the social relationship in which the 
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economic transaction is embedded. Specifically, because informal employees work for 
people they know, expectations of reciprocity may limit their ability to exert control over 
the relationship, whereas the opposite is likely to characterise enterprise work, which is 
organised through an open and impersonal market. Associative workers, who work in 
rule bound organisations, are likely to have the least autonomy and control over their 
work. Data testing these hypotheses is presented in Table 5.8. Only the significant results 
are presented.  
 
Table 5.8: Workplace participation, task autonomy and control, by informal economy, 
socio-demographic and selected work characteristics 
  
Model I 
Fair say 
Model II 
Do things 
own way 
Model III 
Take break 
Model IV 
Take days off 
Model V 
Change 
Work hours 
      
Informal 
Economy 
Enterprise 
2.08 (0.38) 2.11*(0.31) 6.11***(0.29) 
 2.58*(0.47) 
  Informal employees 1.95* (0.30) 1.84*(0.24) 4.85***(0.23)  2.17*(0.31) 
  Associative = ref      
Age Twelve 4.76** (0.52) 1.57 (0.46)  3.45**(0.46)  
 Thirteen 4.70** (0.47) 2.44*(0.43)  3.29**(0.43)  
 Fourteen 3.45* (0.46) 1.65 (0.43)  2.89*(0.43)  
 Fifteen 2.37 (0.47) 1.62 (0.44)  2.39*(0.44)  
 Sixteen = ref      
Rurality Other metropolitan     3.21*(0.45) 
  Rural coastal     1.27(0.43) 
  Rural inland     1.83(0.43) 
 Sydney=ref      
Gender  Female   0.42***(0.17)   
   Male=ref      
Hourly rate 26-50th ($4.01-8.00) 1.78* (0.27)     
 51-75th ($8.01-12.00) 3.19***(0.33)     
 76-100th ($12.01-highest) 2.01* (0.33)     
 0-25th percentile (lowest -
$4.00)=ref 
   
 
 
Hours 6-10 hours a week    1.08 (0.20)  
  11-15 hours a week    2.00 (0.45)  
  15 hours plus a week    5.41*(0.77)  
 0-5 hours a week =ref      
Constant  55.61*(1.49) 7.14(1.21) 23.37*(1.15) 11.70*(1.15) 13.38 (1.86) 
Model 1 - I have a fair say about things that happen at work 
Model II - I can do things my own way in my job 
Model III - I can take a break when I want to in my job 
Model IV - I am free to decide when I can take days off work 
Model V - Need to do something important, person I work for lets me change work hours 
Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
 
A majority of young people are able to exercise some degree of workplace control in the 
informal economy. Eighty-six percent (n=931) of young workers on the informal 
economy are able to contribute to workplace decisions (‘I have a fair say about things 
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that happen at work’) which, in the informal economy, is likely to mean something closer 
to setting the overall parameters of how work is done and the conditions of work. Fewer 
young workers are able to exercise task autonomy (‘I can do things my own way in my 
job’: n=869; 78.1%), exercise control over work-day time (‘I can take a break when I 
want to’: n=682; 62.8%) and control when worked (‘I am free to decide when I can take 
days off work’: n=709; 69.4%). Apart from associative work, which is structured around 
institutional requirements, this is quite a significant proportion given that the normative 
and institutional leverage that exists in the formal economy (contracts of employment) is 
not evident in the informal economy. However just over 90 percent (n=894; 90.6%) are 
able to alter their work hours with their employer if they need to do something 
important. 
 
Reflecting the rule-based functioning of their work environment, associative workers are 
least likely to be able to contribute to workplace decisions, exercise task autonomy and 
are less likely to be able to exercise control over work day time. Other workers are twice 
as likely as associative workers to be able to contribute to ‘have a fair say about things at 
work’, however this result is only statistically significant for informal employees. 
Enterprise workers and informal employees also are approximately twice as likely to be 
able to exercise task autonomy (especially enterprise workers, who are 2.11 times more 
likely to ‘do things their own way’). The institutional regularity of associative work also 
sets stricter parameters about when work can be done, with their particular tasks being 
highly structured. Enterprise workers and informal employees are respectively 6.11 and 
4.85 times more likely to take a break when they want to compared to associative 
workers. Notably enterprise workers are most able to exercise work-time control within 
the informal economy. Enterprise workers and informal employees are also more than 
twice as likely to be able to renegotiate their work times in response to non-work needs 
(i.e. change work hours in response to something important). 
 
Enterprise workers and informal employees appear to have some degree of autonomy 
and control over the work process. The majority have some degree of control over work-
time, are able to exert task autonomy and have some degree of workplace participation. 
However the degree of autonomy experienced at work is potentially undermined by the 
highly contingent nature of work commitments for these groups of workers, as found in 
section 5.1. Yet, given their status as secondary workers, there is nothing to suggest that 
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this contingency is experienced as precariousness. The experience of associative workers 
is somewhat different, who, because of the organisational basis of their work, are less 
likely to experience all facets of autonomy and control in their work. However, the 
potential pay-off for this lack of control is greater certainty over when work happens and 
higher levels of social integration or identification with the work tasks. 
 
As well as being embedded in different relational contexts, experiences of autonomy and 
control are also embedded in the experiences of different sub-populations of young 
people. Perhaps counter-intuitively, older workers have less autonomy and control in 
their work than younger workers. This is because we would expect that task autonomy 
should increase with age, for example because older workers are entrusted with greater 
responsibility over how they do their tasks than younger workers. Instead, the ability to 
contribute to workplace decisions, have task autonomy and exert control over work time 
decreases with age. This is similar to the pattern evident on the formal economy, where 
autonomy and control decreases with age. The parameter estimates are quite large for 
workplace participation (between 3.45 and 4.76 times) and ability to take days off 
(between 2.39 and 3.45 times) and generally increases the younger the worker. Young 
workers from outer metropolitan areas are also approximately three times as likely to be 
able to change their work hours for an important non-work commitment (‘If I need to 
do something important, the person I work for lets me change work hours’) and females 
are 0.42 times as likely to be able to take a break when they want as males. 
 
Generally other work conditions, such as hours, regularity, pay type and pay amount, are 
not significantly associated with workplace participation, control or task autonomy. 
However long hour workers are more than 5 times more likely to take days off than 
other workers. Pay rate also has a significant relationship with ability to have a fair say at 
work, with young people who are paid in the lowest quartile least able to influence 
workplace decisions, which as mentioned earlier is likely to mean that the lowest paid 
workers are least able to influence or bargain the conditions under which they work. In 
comparison to the lowest paid workers, other workers are between 1.78 (for workers 
paid in the 26-50th quartile of pay rates) and 3.19 times as likely (for those paid in the 51-
75th quartile of pay rates) to influence decisions regarding their work. 
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5.5.4. Skill reproduction Security: Support and Skill development at Work 
Within the formal economy workplace training and supervision are integrated into 
institutional practices through policy and procedure. In the informal economy, skill 
development and support is not generally institutionalised. Instead the degree of 
supervision, support, feedback and training is an indicator of the nature of social 
relations in which informal work is embedded – in addition to remuneration; it is the 
employer side of the reciprocal informal work relationship. Normative expectations that 
guide conduct on the informal economy can, therefore, result in job ‘training’, feedback 
on work performance, support and encouragement. If the social relations between the 
worker and employer influence level of skill reproduction security, then we can 
hypothesise that support patterns will vary by the particularity of the relationship in 
which the economic transaction is embedded. This leads to the hypothesis that informal 
employees receive the highest levels of support because their work is embedded in 
known social networks. Associative workers would instead obtain higher levels of task 
instruction and training in how to do their work, because these sorts of support are easily 
institutionalised, but other forms of support will not be related either positively or 
negatively with associative work.  Enterprise workers, however, would receive the least 
levels of training and support because the expectation in purchasing such services is that 
the provider can competently offer the service without needing any assistance, which is 
part of the premium for higher wages, greater flexibility and more control.  
 
Consistent with Chapter Four, six questions were used to measure support in the 
informal economy ‘The tasks I have to do are clearly explained to me’ and ‘I get the 
training I need to do my job’ measure task instruction; ‘When I do a good job, I get told 
I do a good job’ and ‘The person I work for takes an interest in the work I do’ measure 
levels of supervision and feedback; and ‘I can get help from the people I work with if I 
ask for it’ and ‘I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my work’ measure levels 
of support provided to young workers in doing their work. In addition two variables are 
used to measure skill development - ‘I am gaining skills from the work I do’ and ‘The 
experience I get working will give me advantages in the future’. These were modelled 
against the category of informal work, demographic characteristics and other work 
characteristics. The results are presented in Table 5.9. Only statistically significant results 
are reported.  
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Table 5.9: Support at work by informal economy, socio-demographic and selected work 
characteristics 
 
Model I: 
Get told do 
good job 
Model II: 
Employer 
Interest 
Model III: 
Get help if 
ask 
Model IV: 
Tasks 
explained 
Model V: 
Advice 
good/bad 
Model VI: 
Training to 
do job 
Model VII: 
Gaining 
Skills. 
Model VIII: 
Future 
advantage 
Informal Economy         
Enterprise   0.23**(0.49)  0.25**(0.38) 0.39**(0.33) 0.18*(0.70)  
Informal Employees   0.18**(0.44)  0.24**(0.34) 0.30**(0.28) 0.15**(0.65)  
Associative = ref         
Socio-economic status          
11-25th quantile     0.44 (0.57)    
26-50th quantile      0.52 (0.54)    
51-75th quantile      0.53 (0.52)    
76-90th quantile      0.74(0.53)    
91-100th quantile      0.27*(0.52)    
0-10th quantile (most 
disadv.) = ref 
  
 
 
 
 
  
Gender         
Female  1.82**(0.21)     2.41**(0.29)  
 Male=ref         
Rurality         
Other metropolitan  1.94*(0.31)     3.83*(0.52) 2.58*(0.39) 
Rural coastal  1.21 (0.34)     1.66(0.46) 2.99*(0.43) 
Rural inland  3.11**(0.38)     2.90*(0.47) 5.26**(0.45) 
Sydney=ref         
Age          
Twelve 6.67**(0.66)  2.12 (0.56) 3.64 (0.68) 2.88*(0.50)    
Thirteen 6.61**(0.58)  3.03*(0.53) 5.34**(0.63) 3.40*(0.47)    
Fourteen 4.56**(0.55)  2.05 (0.52) 3.52*(0.61) 2.07 (0.46)    
Fifteen 3.23*(0.56)  1.58 (0.53) 2.39 (0.62) 1.59 (0.47)    
Sixteen=ref         
Regularity         
Casual       2.27*(0.37)  
Regular       2.64*(0.44)  
One-off =ref         
Remuneration type         
Monetary  2.14*(0.37) 2.22* (0.37)    3.22**(0.48)  
Reward only  1.49 (0.46) 2.39 (0.50)    2.96 (0.56)  
No pay or reward=ref         
Constant 29.8**(2.16) 25.6*(1.39) 28.62*(1.61) 43.93*(2.42) 76.77*(1.40) 12.74*(1.17) 14.37 (1.97) 16.73 (1.71) 
Model I: When I do a good job, I get told I do a good job 
Model II: The person I work for takes an interest in the work I do 
Model III: I can get help from the people I work with if I ask for it 
Model IV: The tasks I have to do are clearly explained to me 
Model V: I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my work 
Model VI: I get the training I need to do my job 
Model VII: I am gaining skills from the work I do 
Model VIII: The experience I get working will give me advantages in the future 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
The reference category is: Disagree  
Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
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The large majority of young people work in relationships characterised by support, 
suggesting that the economic transactions within the informal economy are, in general, 
characterised by reciprocity and trust. Almost 95 percent of young workers receive 
positive feedback for good performance (‘When I do a good job, I get told I do a good 
job’; n=1057; 93.2%) and obtain clear task instruction (‘The tasks I have to do are clearly 
explained to me’; n=1080; 94.5%). A majority of young workers also obtain help with 
work when requested (‘I can get help from the people I work with if I ask for it’; n=964; 
88.0%), other support (‘The person I work for takes an interest in the work I do’; n=861; 
83.6%), advice as to the quality of work (‘I get advice about how good or bad I am doing 
my work’; n=877; 81.1%), and agree that work provides opportunities for skill 
development (n=1039; 92.6%) and future advantage (n=985; 90.3%). However almost 30 
percent indicate that they do not obtain the training they need to do the job (‘I get the 
training I need to do my job’ - in the case of the informal economy appropriate informal 
instruction).  
 
While the high level of support suggests skill reproduction security is relatively common 
across the informal economy, organisational context of work is also significantly 
associated with support, confirming the hypotheses. The semi-institutional nature of 
associative work manifests in greater likelihood of support and working relationships that 
reflect cooperative organisational environments. Associative workers are most likely to 
get help from the people they work with if they ask for it; most likely to obtain ongoing 
feedback about how good or bad they are doing their work and are most likely to obtain 
the training they need to do their job. Enterprise workers are 0.23 times and informal 
employees 0.18 times as likely to obtain help if they ask for it compared to associative 
workers; are 0.25 and 0.24 times to obtain ongoing feedback as to work performance; 
and are 0.39 times and 0.30 times as likely to obtain the training they need to do their 
job. Therefore it is also not surprising that associative workers are also most likely to 
obtain skills from the work they do. Compared to associative workers, enterprise workers 
are 0.18 and informal employees are 0.15 to obtain skills from the work they do.  
 
Age is also significant factors explaining support and skill development within the 
informal economy. Older workers are less likely to obtain support within the informal 
economy and the differences in levels of support received by younger workers are quite 
dramatic. In terms of positive feedback for the work they do; compared to sixteen year 
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olds, younger workers are between 3.23 and 6.67 times as likely to receive positive 
recognition for good work. This is a general tendency for most aspects of skill 
reproduction security. However for being able to obtain help, thirteen year olds are 
approximately three times more likely to get help if they ask for it, and for task 
instruction and advice, the level of support obtained appears to be quantitatively 
different for those aged thirteen and fourteen or younger compared to fifteen and sixteen 
year olds, the younger workers obtaining higher levels of advice and instruction. These 
differences do not translate into ongoing skill gains however, with no significant 
differences evident for skill gains and future development. Expectations of competence, 
as part of the transition from being a child at work to an adult at work, are reflected in 
these findings. 
 
There are also geographical differences in the experience of support. Being able to obtain 
help when requested is more likely in other metropolitan and rural inland areas 
suggesting the existence of denser social networks in these areas that potentially impact 
on the experience of work on the informal economy. Young workers in rural inland areas 
are more than three times as likely and those from other metropolitan areas 
approximately twice as likely to obtain informal supervision from those they work for 
and are 3.8 times and 2.9 times more likely to develop skills from their work. 
Furthermore workers outside of Sydney are also more likely to perceive that their work 
provides them with future advantages. Other metropolitan workers are 2.6 times, rural 
coastal workers 3.0 times and rural inland workers 5.3 times more likely to agree that the 
experience they get working to give them future advantages. In the rural context this is 
likely related to continuities in work careers provided through informal work. Given the 
prominence of the agricultural sector for rural economies, the skills developed through 
informal agricultural and horticultural work are directly related to running their own farm 
or finding other agricultural work on the formal labour market. Furthermore, given the 
importance of localised labour markets in rural settings, obtaining future work may be 
reliant upon developing good working relationships within particularistic and informal 
networks. With more limited employment prospects in these areas, young people may be 
building a reputation as diligent or skilled workers to obtain future work.  If this is the 
case it is therefore unsurprising that young people from these areas are more likely to 
view that their current work will provide then with future advantage.  
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Females are also 1.8 times as likely to obtain informal supervision and 2.4 times as likely 
as males to develop skills from their work. However, this does not extend to agreement 
that work is contributing to future advantage. Both findings may again be related to the 
high levels of care work performed by females on the informal economy. In the absence 
of formal regulation, care work is reliant on trust. Parents, for example, are likely to want 
to know how the care of their children went, and therefore express interest in the work, 
but are unlikely to provide little other support. Within this context and the devaluation of 
care work generally, it is difficult to see how informal care work might translate into 
future career prospects, even though doing similar work in a child care organisation 
might. We also find that workers from the least wealthy neighbourhoods are most likely 
to obtain ongoing feedback as to task performance; however the only statistically 
significant difference is between workers from the poorest and wealthiest areas, with the 
latter being 0.27 times as likely to obtain ongoing feedback. In the formal economy, 
females and young people from the least wealthy neighbourhoods were significantly 
more likely to view their work as providing future advantage, indicating that they were 
investing more in their current work for future aspiration than males or young people 
from wealthier backgrounds, who are more likely to see their work just as a job. However 
work undertaken on the informal economy for young women and young people who are 
disadvantaged does not provide the same advantages.  
 
Remuneration is significantly associated with support, with those who are paid 
monetarily 2.2 times as likely to be able to obtain help when they ask for it and 2.1 times 
more likely for their employer to take an interest in the work they do. Those who are 
remunerated monetarily are also approximately 3.2 times as likely to develop skills from 
working. Regular and casual workers are, unsurprisingly, also more likely to develop skills 
from their work than one-off workers (respectively 2.6 and 2.3 times as likely to develop 
skills from work. 
 
Aspects of the ‘worse conditions’ hypothesis are borne out in the findings on work 
securities. In terms of income security the cash economy prevails but the level of 
remuneration is generally quite low. The unregulated nature of work on the informal 
economy is also borne out in the high levels of contingent work arrangements on the 
informal economy. However, rather than poor conditions being endemic to the informal 
economy, they are systematically patterned by the social relations in which the work is 
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embedded, manifesting as trade-offs between different ‘work-securities’ depending on 
whether the work is enterprise work, undertaken as an informal employee or as an 
associative worker. This is especially highlighted in differences in skill reproduction 
security across the informal economy.  Norms of reciprocity and trust operate in 
different ways to regulate work conditions depending on the closeness of the social 
relationship involved. We now turn to examine whether the different social relations, that 
have a marked impact on conditions, also translate into different orientations towards 
work.  
 
5.6. Relational embeddedness in the informal economy 
We saw in the previous section how the operation of informal group rules and 
arrangements regulate the interaction between worker and employer, systematically 
patterning remuneration, work commitment, support and skill development 
opportunities, participation and task autonomy. This section examines how these 
informal rules pattern some of the motivations and orientations evident in work on the 
informal economy, assessing the extent of instrumental and intrinsic orientations towards 
work, and whether different orientations are patterned by the social relations that 
organise work (i.e. informal work categories) and the social position of young people.  
 
A well-established premise of economic sociology is that individuals may be motivated to 
engage in economic activities by a variety of goals, some utilitarian, others communal or 
reciprocal (Granovetter 1973, 1985; Granovetter and Swedberg 1992). Informal work 
may be motivated by a range of orientations, including reciprocity, self-help and more 
conventional modes of economic utility. In particular, because informal economic 
activity occurs outside of formal regulation, conventions associated with orthodox 
market relations are potentially more likely to be mixed with other motivations, (Cornuel 
and Duriez, 1985; Crewe and Gregson, 1998; Levitan and Feldman, 1991; Portes, Slack, 
2007a; Soiffer and Herrmann, 1987; 1994; Tickamyer and Bohon, 2000; Thiel 2010; 
White and Williams 2010; Williams and Windebank, 2005). Because informal employee 
relations are predicated upon strong particularistic ties we would anticipate that the 
orientations of these workers are more likely to emphasise intrinsic rather than 
instrumental attitudes. For enterprise workers whose work relations are predicated upon 
weak universal ties similar to the formal economy we would anticipate that the 
orientations of workers would emphasise instrumental attitudes. For associative workers 
we would anticipate an emphasis on symbolic rewards and thus non-instrumental 
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orientations. Furthermore, the marginality hypothesis suggests that because informal 
work is a survival strategy of poorer households, then participation for economically 
instrumental reasons is more likely in poorer households than wealthier ones. Wealthier 
households might participate in informal economic activities for other reasons; because 
they find the work fulfilling for example. Alternatively, solidaristic social relations might 
be more prevalent in poorer communities as a result of shared identity borne out of 
struggle or through necessity. Non-instrumental attitudes developed through ongoing 
mutual aid or reciprocal relationships, such as work providing a sense of responsibility, 
may therefore be more prevalent among young people from the least wealthy 
communities. Analysis of instrumental and intrinsic orientations on the informal 
economy is presented in the following sections. Table 5.10 maps out the concepts and 
hypotheses around instrumental and intrinsic attitudes that guide the analysis in the 
following sections, and how the variables that are used to measure these attitudes map to 
the hypotheses. 
 
Table 5.10: Concepts, hypotheses and measures: Analysing instrumental and intrinsic 
orientations on the informal economy 
Concept Hypothesis 
Individuals motivated to engage in economic activities by a 
variety of goals, including utilitarian, communal and reciprocal 
goals. Conventions associated with orthodox market relations 
are either suspended or mixed with other motivations, and 
exchange is socially, culturally and geographically embedded 
 
Marginality hypothesis - informal work is a survival strategy of 
poorer households, then participation for economic reasons is 
more likely in poorer households. Wealthier households 
participate in informal economic activities for other reasons; 
because they find the work fulfilling and enjoyable for 
example.  
 
Work Orientation 
Instrumental Orientations:  
 control over income;  
 cover expenses;  
 covers discretionary wants  
 
Instrumental attitudes more evident among most and least 
disadvantaged young people, but for different reasons. 
Instrumental orientations more evident for enterprise workers, 
because of the marketisation of this work. 
 
Intrinsic Orientations:  
 altruism;  
 responsibility;  
 build relationships;  
 social utility;  
 self-reliance;  
 enjoyment 
 
Because informal employee relations are predicated upon 
strong particularistic ties hypothesise higher level of intrinsic 
orientations. For associative workers emphasis is on symbolic 
rewards and therefore non-instrumental orientations. 
 
As per the previous chapter, we first examine instrumental orientations, then intrinsic and 
altruistic orientations. The measures used are detailed in Chapter Three, Section 3.3.4. 
 
5.6.1. Instrumental Orientations –Pay 
Three variables are used to measure ‘instrumental’, ‘exchange-use’ or ‘materialistic’ 
orientations in the informal economy. These are whether working provides control over 
income, allows the young worker to cover their expenses or allows them to buy what 
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they want. As discussed in previous chapters, these variables measure the extrinsic 
orientations associated with work and are the subjective counterpart to income-level as 
measures of extrinsic rewards from work (Frey, 1997). The likelihood of instrumental 
orientations across informal employee category, socio-demographic characteristics and 
other work characteristics are presented in Table 5.11. Again, only significant or select 
results are reported. 
 
Table 5.11: Instrumental orientations by informal economy, socio-demographic and 
selected work characteristics 
 
Model I: 
Control income 
Model II: 
Cover expenses 
Model III: 
Buy what I want 
Informal Economy Enterprise  2.64* (0.53)  
  Informal employees  0.95 (0.37)  
  Associative = ref    
Socio-economic status 11-25th quantile    0.75 (0.52) 
 26-50th quantile    0.79 (0.48) 
  51-75th quantile    0.95 (0.47) 
  76-90th quantile    0.39*(0.46) 
  91-100th quantile    0.73 (0.48) 
 0-10th quantile (most 
disadv.)= ref 
 
  
Age Twelve  6.13*(0.71)  
 Thirteen  4.11*(0.63)  
 Fourteen  2.56 (0.61)  
 Fifteen  1.92 (0.62)  
 Sixteen=ref    
Rurality Other metropolitan 2.56*(0.39) 3.51*(0.47)  
  Rural coastal 2.26*(0.39) 1.79 (0.42)  
  Rural inland 4.01**(0.42) 1.71 (0.42)  
 Sydney = ref    
CALD Non-Anglo Australian  0.53*(0.32) 0.59*(0.24) 
 Anglo Australian =ref    
Remuneration type Monetary 6.86*** (0.36) 3.39**(0.38) 5.07***(0.31) 
  Reward only 4.09**(0.47) 1.01 (0.45) 2.36*(0.38) 
 Neither = ref    
Hourly rate 26-50th ($4.01-8.00)  2.54*(0.36) 1.31 (0.24) 
 51-75th ($8.01-12.00)  1.60 (0.37) 1.63 (0.27) 
 76-100th ($12.01-
highest) 
 
1.44 (0.39) 1.84*(0.30) 
 0-25th (lowest to 
$4.00)=ref. 
 
  
Constant  21.25 (1.69) 29.45**(1.77) 5.66(1.26) 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
Model I - Working means I have some control over my own income. 
Model II - Working means I can cover some of my own expenses 
Model III - Working means I can buy what I want 
The reference category is: Disagree  
Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
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The way that work is configured relationally has some effect on instrumental orientations 
towards work. Enterprise workers are most likely to indicate that working allows them to 
cover their expenses, being 2.6 times as likely to be able to cover some of their own 
expenses. However the ability to ‘control income’ and ‘buy what I want’, are not 
associated with informal work category. Therefore there is some modest evidence to 
support the hypothesis that enterprise workers are more likely to exhibit relatively 
instrumental orientations. Class effects are also quite marginal, with the only statistically 
significant difference evident for young workers from the second wealthiest 
backgrounds, who are 0.39 times as likely for work to mean ‘they can buy what they 
want’. However although not statistically significant, the parameter estimates indicate that 
young people from wealthier neighbourhoods, compared to those from the least wealthy 
neighbourhoods, are less likely to exhibit instrumental attitudes. These results therefore 
do not entirely confirm the marginality thesis, that poorer workers are more likely to 
exhibit instrumental attitudes. Rather, economic motives are evident across the class 
spectrum, suggesting that instrumental orientations characterise informal economic 
exchange generally.  
 
Work on the informal economy provides greater control over income in rural and 
regional areas than in Sydney. Young people from rural inland areas are four times from 
rural coastal areas 2.3 times and from other metropolitan areas 2.6 times more likely to 
agree that their work provides control over income. Young people in other metropolitan 
areas are also more than three times as likely as young people from Sydney to agree that 
their work covers some of their expenses. Young people from non-English speaking 
backgrounds show less instrumental orientations than other young people, being 
approximately half as likely to agree that their work enables them to cover expenses and 
0.59 times as likely to use their income to ‘buy what they want’. Age is a factor also, with 
twelve and thirteen year olds being approximately six and four times more likely to agree 
that works covers their expenses than older workers. These orientations only loosely 
match actual differences in pay rates. Young people from non-English speaking 
backgrounds are least likely to be paid but older workers are also paid more highly than 
younger workers. A more general feature of the informal economy may underlie these 
findings, therefore: income earned from informal work is not particularly high, and 
exchange use orientations reflect differences in consumption patterns that may be 
spatially, culturally and age patterned. 
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Remuneration type and pay rates are also associated with instrumental orientations. The 
largest parameter estimates are associated with remuneration type indicating a 
straightforward link between being paid and showing instrumental attitudes towards 
income use. Those who are paid are almost seven times and those who are rewarded 
approximately four times more likely to indicate that working provides some control 
over their income; and 5.1 and 2.4 times more likely to be able to buy what they want. 
Young people who are paid are also 3.4 times as likely to be able to cover their own 
expenses. Furthermore, those who are paid the lowest quartile of rates are less likely to 
be able to cover their expenses and buy what they want. Monetization is therefore 
strongly linked with instrumental orientations. We see this not only in the direct 
relationship between pay and exchange orientations but also in the variation 
geographical, cultural and in terms of age discussed previously–sub-populations of young 
people who may have greater consumption demands are also the ones who are more 
instrumental in their orientations – older workers and those who live in the city for 
example. What these findings suggest is that, like the formal economy, the social 
patterning of consumption needs, rather than subsistence needs and marginalization, that 
has a latent relationship with instrumentality.  This is only mediated in a minor way by 
the type of relationship that economic exchanges on the informal economy are 
embedded in. Whether these dynamics are evident for intrinsic orientations we discuss in 
the next section.  
 
5.6.2. Intrinsic Work Orientations  
The high prevalence of money payment evident in the informal economy would suggest 
that exchanges on the informal economy are in large part ‘market-like’ similar to formal 
economic exchange in advanced economies, more generally, and from an anthropological 
perspective less ‘embedded’ than those in pre-industrial societies, and so thinner, having 
less social meaning and being less symbolic (Crewe and Gregson, 1998; Davies, 1992; 
Mauss, 1966).  However this market-based view of exchange may not capture the 
complexity of the exchange experience on the informal economy, including the desire to 
develop reciprocity and trust through paid informal exchange (Crewe and Gregson, 1998; 
Komter, 1996; Cornuel and Duriez, 1985; Deener 2009; Mingione, 1991; Pahl, 1984; 
Williams and Windebank, 1998). Given the importance of the type of relationship in 
which the work is embedded on work conditions and to some extent instrumental 
orientations, we would also expect that these relations would influence intrinsic 
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orientations. More specifically, that informal employee work, based on strong and 
particular ties between buyer and seller, would emphasise reciprocity and therefore 
intrinsic orientations; enterprise work predicated upon weak universal ties would not 
evidence high levels of intrinsic orientations; and associative work, being predicated on 
group membership, value solidarity and symbolic rewards would also emphasise intrinsic 
orientations. Intrinsic orientations might also be more prevalent in less wealthy 
communities if such orientations are developed through ongoing mutual aid or reciprocal 
relationships, which might arise out of a shared experience of economic adversity.  
 
As in Chapter Four, the variable “Working means I can help out at home financially’ is 
used as a measure of altruistic use of income. As discussed in previous chapters this 
variable measures contribution to household livelihood strategies, but also, within the 
context of the informal economy is also a measure of ongoing generalized reciprocity 
within the household. Five other measures are used to operationalise intrinsic 
orientations, which on the informal economy we would expect to result from exchange 
relationships that emphasise mutual aid and reciprocity.  These are whether work 
provides a sense of responsibility, opportunity to build social connections (‘Work gives 
me opportunities to build relationships’) sense of social utility (‘Working makes me feel I 
am doing something useful’), self-reliance (‘Working means I can rely on myself more’) 
and enjoyment (‘I like the things I do at work’). The results are presented in Table 5.12. 
Again, only statistically significant results are reported.  
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Table 5.12: Intrinsic work motivations and altruistic orientation by informal economy, socio-demographic and selected work characteristics 
  
Model I: Help at 
home (altruism) 
Model II: 
Responsibility 
Model III: Build 
relationships 
Model IV: 
Something Useful 
Model V: 
Self-reliance 
Model VI: 
Like work 
Informal Economy Enterprise  1.87*(0.77)   1.79*(0.45) 0.56 (0.50) 
  Informal Employees  0.86 (0.56)   1.15 (0.34) 0.24***(0.40) 
  Associative = ref       
Socio-economic status 11-25th quantile  0.62 (0.45)   0.33*(0.90)  0.76 (0.66) 
  26-50th quantile  0.58 (0.41)   0.41*(0.86)  0.73 (0.61) 
  51-75th quantile  0.58 (0.40)   0.58*(0.87)  0.80(0.59) 
  76-90th quantile  0.33*(0.40)   0.54*(0.86)  0.70*(0.59) 
  91-100th quantile  0.32*(0.43)   0.53*(0.87)  0.50*(0.60) 
 0-10th quantile (most 
disadv.)=ref 
 
   
 
 
Gender  Female  2.94*(0.41) 2.42***(0.24)   2.01**(0.24) 
   Male=ref       
CALD Non-Anglo Australian     0.44**(0.28)  
 Anglo-Australian=ref       
Rurality Other metropolitan  2.86 (0.71) 2.09 (0.39) 2.42**(0.55) 3.68**(0.39)  
  Rural coastal  1.15 (0.59) 1.82 (0.40) 1.17 (0.50) 1.62 (0.41)  
  Rural inland  7.32*(0.87) 2.23*(0.40) 3.00*(0.57) 1.70 (0.40)  
 Sydney=ref       
Remuneration type Monetary  3.25*(0.50)  2.44*(0.46)  3.06**(0.35) 
  Reward only  9.42*(1.11)  1.77 (0.61)  4.47*(0.54) 
 Neither = ref       
Hourly rate 26-50th ($4.01-8.00) 1.92**(0.21)      
 51-75th ($8.01-12.00) 1.51 (0.22)      
 76-100th ($12.01-high) 2.28**(0.26)      
 0-25th (lowest to $4.00)=ref       
Constant  11.35*(1.13) 9.69(2.56) 7.31(1.60) 67.97*(2.21) 15.54**(1.67) 64.39**(1.67)  
Model I: Working means I can help out at home financially; Model II: Work gives me a sense of responsibility; Model III: Work gives me opportunities to build relationships; Model IV: Work makes me feel I am doing 
something useful; Model V: Working means I can rely on myself more; Model VI: I like the things I do at work; *Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000; The reference category is: Disagree ; Figure in brackets is standard 
error for parameter estimate. 
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While significant majorities of young people show instrumental orientations on the 
informal economy, only a minority show altruistic orientations, with fewer than half 
(n=449; 44.5%) indicating that working means they help out at home financially. While 
altruistic tendencies are evident, the greater prevalence of instrumental attitudes indicates 
the importance of utilitarian exchange on the informal economy. Furthermore, while 
informal work category is related to utilitarian attitudes, with enterprise workers having 
the most utilitarian attitudes, there is no significant association between altruism 
orientations and informal work category. All workers, regardless of the work relationship, 
show similar levels of altruistic orientation. The hypothesise that altruistic orientations 
are more prevalent where work occurs as part of existing social relationship is not 
supported. Altruistic orientations are similar across informal work category, regardless of 
whether it takes place within known social networks, as part of anonymous transactions 
or as part of the activities of an associative organisation. 
 
This result suggests that monetary transactions are related to other social relations, 
especially socio-economic status does have a significant relationship with altruistic 
orientations. The previous section established that class has only a marginal relationship 
with instrumental orientations, challenging the marginality thesis that instrumental 
orientations are more evident in the least wealthy households, because informal work is 
an element in the coping strategies of households in lower income neighbourhoods 
(Hofferth and Iceland, 1998; Komter, 1996; Portes, 1998; Williams 2009, 2011; Young 
and Wilmott, 1975). However young people from the least wealthy neighbourhoods 
exhibit the greatest levels of altruistic orientations relative to young people from all other 
socio-economic backgrounds. In particular young people from the wealthiest 
neighbourhoods are 0.33 and 0.32 times as likely to exhibit altruistic orientations.  
 
Pay rate also has a relationship with altruistic use of income, with young people who earn 
higher rates of pay rates more likely to contribute income to household use. In particular 
workers who receive the highest pay rates are 2.3 times and those who receive rates in 
the 26-50th quartile of rates are 1.9 times as likely to contribute income to their 
households. While class effects have some influence over the social distribution of 
altruistic orientations, these results suggest that, like consumption patterns, altruistic 
orientations are also influenced by the degree that young people have access to money 
more generally. As discussed in Chapter Four, this has some relationship with class, but 
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is also an endemic condition of childhood. Young people will not only use their income 
to maintain consumption needs, but contribute to broader household needs where they 
have the money to do so. That is, being paid more does not necessarily crowd out 
altruism, but to some extent facilitates it, by enabling the possibility of providing income 
to household needs.  Furthermore, like instrumental orientations, this is only mediated in 
a minor way by the type of relationship that economic exchanges on the informal 
economy are embedded in, indicating that it is a general feature of exchange on the 
informal economy.  
 
Unlike altruism, other intrinsic orientations are prevalent on the informal economy. 
Almost all young workers, feel work develops a sense of responsibility (n=1079; 96.4%), 
utility and social contribution (‘Working makes me feel I am doing something useful’ 
(n=1049; 94.0%); self-reliance (n=965; 89.2%) and opportunities to build relationships 
(n=989; 89.3%). A similar proportion enjoy the work they do (n=1004; 89.2%). The 
incidence of these orientations across informal work categories suggest that reciprocal 
relationships are a general feature of the informal economy, ranging from close ties in the 
case of informal employees, and the ‘strength of weak ties’ for enterprise workers. In the 
absence of institutional rules, reciprocity involving mutual obligation to give and to 
receive expresses and cements social relationships between giver and receiver. These 
exchanges contribute to the establishment and maintenance of social networks through 
reciprocal and solidary relationships (Brown and Kulcar, 2001; Leonard, 2000, Mingione, 
1985; Thiel 2010). This is regardless of whether the work is performed through 
enterprise work arrangements, as an informal employee or for associations. This dynamic 
then translates into enhanced orientations of responsibility, social utility and enjoyment.  
 
Despite this we do find some differentiation based on the nature of the exchange. 
Enterprise workers are 1.8 times as likely as other workers to indicate their work 
provides them with responsibility and self-reliance, both attitudes synonymous with 
enterprise work (Hart 1973). Informal employees are approximately one-quarter as likely 
as association workers to enjoy their work, indicating how work involves leisure or other 
interest pursuits for association workers. The incidence and distribution of intrinsic 
orientations indicate that reciprocal exchange is a general feature of the informal 
economy, representing a normative basis that regulates economic exchange. However 
intrinsic orientations are also embedded in specific relationships of exchange, as 
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indicated in the relationship between responsibility and reliance with enterprise work, 
and enjoyment with associative work. 
 
Intrinsic orientations are also associated with demographic characteristics. Workers from 
the poorest neighbourhoods are most likely to feel useful and enjoy their work the most. 
Young workers from other socio-economic backgrounds are between 0.3 and 0.6 times 
as likely to feel useful because of their work and between 0.8 and 0.5 times to enjoy their 
work compared to young people from the most disadvantaged communities. For these 
young workers, reciprocity between neighbours, which provides much of their work, may 
be activated during times of social and economic uncertainty. The nature of the work 
takes on a different meaning because it is more likely to contribute to household coping 
strategies, not only for their own household, but for the household they are working for, 
translating into higher levels of social utility. This is also consistent with the findings on 
altruism. Females are between two and three times more likely for their work to provide 
a sense of responsibility, provide opportunities to build relationships and enjoy their 
work compared to males. A major difference is apparent between rural inland and 
Sydney, which indicate the persistence of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft dynamics within 
the informal economy. Workers from rural inland areas are 7.3 times as likely as young 
workers in Sydney for their work to provide a sense of responsibility, 2.2 times as likely 
to build relationships through work and 3.0 times more likely to feel useful because of 
their work. Workers from other metropolitan areas are also 2.4 times as likely to feel 
useful because of their work and 3.7 times as likely to feel work provides self-reliance. 
These findings suggest that the social networks that develop in rural communities not 
only create informal work opportunities because of local economic contexts (as discussed 
in section 5.4), but are reliant on relationships of reciprocity generated out of local 
community networks. 
 
The prevalence of monetized social relations on the informal economy, does not ‘crowd 
out’ other intrinsic orientations. Instead young people who are paid are 3.2 times as likely 
as other workers for their work to provide a sense of responsibility; 2.4 times as likely to 
feel as though they are doing something useful and 3.1 times as likely to enjoy their work 
compared to those who are unpaid. No other work characteristics are associated with 
these intrinsic orientations, including pay rate. Those who are rewarded however are 
more than nine times to feel their work also provides a sense of responsibility and 4.5 
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times as likely to enjoy their work as those who do not. The reasons why money does not 
crowd out other intrinsic qualities suggests that the exchange of cash can, especially in 
the informal economy, function as a medium or ‘social glue’ to consolidate social 
relationships, especially where trust is not high. Where ‘employers’ want to avoid 
ongoing obligation or reciprocity, unpaid mutual exchange is replaced by paid exchange 
(Williams and Windebank, 2001; 2002). This is because the exchange of cash for goods 
and services diminishes the possibility for ambiguity around what is owing, especially in 
long-standing relationships, whereas the exchange of non-equivalents can make it unclear 
whether a favour has been repaid or not (Gouldner, 1960). In this way, other intrinsic 
motivations consolidate social relationships and regulate the conditions involved in 
economic exchange. Rather than crowding out intrinsic orientations, payment can 
maintain or creates social relations through exchange. Reciprocity and trust are essential 
in regulating the exchange, helping avoid obligations arising from unpaid exchange.   
 
5.7. Conclusion to Chapter Five 
Young people are involved in a variety of economic transactions on the informal 
economy – those predicated upon strong and ‘particularistic’ ties; those predicated upon 
weak and universal ties; and those predicated upon quasi-formal rules.  The 
predominance of service work involving specialised activities suggests some informal 
work supplies niche product markets. However many young workers are also capitalising 
from low-end opportunity structures, such as those provided by friends and neighbours. 
Three informal work contexts are evident, informal work for known persons (‘informal 
employees’), ‘own-account’ enterprise workers, and work undertaken for associative 
organisations. These social relations that embed work transactions shape the nature of 
young people’s work experience on the informal economy, including work conditions 
and orientations.  
 
Two key hypotheses guided the analysis. The marginality/coping strategy hypothesis 
considered whether more marginal groups, either economically or socially were more 
likely to participate in the informal economy, or whether the resources required on the 
informal economy advantage young people from wealthier neighbourhoods. The other 
hypothesis, the ‘worse conditions’ hypothesis, considers whether the lack of formal 
regulations translate into poor conditions for young workers on the informal economy. 
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In terms of the marginality/coping strategy hypothesis, opportunity structures for work 
are in part determined by extant conditions found in different class neighbourhoods. 
Young people from poorer neighbourhoods are more likely to engage in work for people 
they know, sometimes unpaid and sometimes for a nominal fee or reward, as part of 
reciprocal exchanges within local social networks. Participation for exclusively economic 
reasons is to some extent more prevalent in the most economically disadvantaged areas, 
but is not dissimilar to other socio-economic areas, especially the wealthiest areas, where 
there is also some evidence that utilitarian attitudes, particularly around work providing 
control over income, are evident. Young people from relatively wealthy neighbourhoods 
are involved in relatively well-paid informal work, often undertaken on an enterprise 
basis, evidencing both instrumental and non-instrumental orientations. The prevalent 
nature of instrumental attitudes indicates that income is frequently used as to meet 
individual consumption needs.  
 
However, differences do exist in terms of whether work contributes to household 
livelihood strategies. For poorer households, young people’s work on the informal 
economy is more likely to contribute to household livelihood strategies. Work in the 
informal economy therefore provides an important resource for young people from the 
least wealthy neighbourhoods, especially work embedded within existing social networks. 
However to an even greater extent informal work is an opportunity for young people 
from wealthier neighbourhoods. This is particularly evident for enterprise work, reliant 
upon the self-mobilisation of skills to offer goods and services, but also applies for work 
embedded in existing social networks. Therefore within wealthier communities, we see a 
mix of work organised through known social networks and offered on an open market, 
whereas in less wealthy communities, particularistic organisation of work prevails.  
 
Young people from middle-class neighbourhoods are more likely to engage in associative 
work as part of an interweaving of economic activities with leisure or value identities. 
Involvement in associative work appears reliant upon a match between individual modes 
of human capital (values, skills, interest, and knowledge) and organisational values and 
goals. These human capital resources link the young person with a broader community of 
interest represented by the associative organisation. For the young person, the economic 
activity is therefore also an extension of identity. For example to obtain work as a martial 
arts instructor, football coach or netball referee, not only must the young person have 
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the initial interest, but develop their expertise to the point where they can work in a more 
official capacity. This is unlikely to occur unless there is an extended period of 
involvement with the association and the young person not only has an interest in the 
activity, but aligns or has loyalty with, organisational values.  
 
Other social distribution patterns are also evident. Gender segregation in types of work is 
evident, especially for females who are overrepresented in caring and service to others. 
Males appear to take advantage of the possibilities on the informal economy, being 
involved in more diverse range of work activities, some of which do not conform to 
orthodox masculinities, as well as work that more conventionally conforms to masculine 
stereotypes, such as manual labour. Informal work factors prominently as an economic 
activity among young people from rural areas indicating the importance of local networks 
in rural and regional areas that underpin the informal economy. Informal work 
opportunities evident in rural communities arise out of local economic contexts, and are 
also generated through strong social networks. For young people in rural and regional 
areas, their participation in the informal economy provides opportunities to develop 
skills that may be directly related to future career trajectories, and develop important 
networks that future economic activity may be reliant upon.   
 
A clear pathway of economic participation related to age is also evident. Within the 
‘youth labour market’ work on the informal economy appears to be a transition from 
work in the family economy, embedded as it is in close-knit kinship ties, and work on the 
formal economy, which is closest to the adult world of work. This is evident in a number 
of ways. Younger participants are more likely to work on the informal economy, but 
there is also internal age-related differentiation, with older participants being more likely 
to be enterprise workers and less likely to be informal employees.  Or put another way, 
types of work that are more ‘adult-oriented’ because they are less embedded in existing 
relationships, are more likely to be undertaken by older workers. Patterns of informal 
work therefore seem in part driven by age-related processes, specifically transitions from 
dependence to independence; from particular to universal and informal to formal social 
relations. While these findings do not support strict developmentalism, there is certainly 
evidence of age-related transitions within the informal economy that reflect age–related 
expectations of young people, and therefore broader opportunity structures for older and 
younger workers. 
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Does the lack of formal regulation translate into poor conditions for young workers on 
the informal economy, in line with the ‘worse conditions’ hypothesis? While informal 
exchange encompasses a broad range of social relations, paid work is more common 
than unpaid exchange. Paid work on the informal economy is not only transacted 
between anonymous buyers and sellers (i.e. enterprise work) but embedded in close 
social relations (i.e. informal employees). However the reward economy is more 
prevalent for associative work, indicating the importance of symbolic rewards for that 
type of work. There is little evidence of unpaid mutual aid undertaken by young people 
within the informal economy. Monetary exchange is closely linked with intrinsic 
orientations on the informal economy that may avoid obligation that arise from ongoing 
reciprocity, but nonetheless creates closer relations through exchange. In this way money 
avoids some uncomfortable dynamics that may arise through the ongoing trade in favour 
and debt, but facilitates some form of sociability between non-related people. While 
average incomes in the informal economy are lower than on the formal economy, wage 
mechanisms are embedded in relations and contexts that reflect norms about what are 
appropriate levels of exchange for informal work. Particular and associative social ties 
constrain the amount paid but also the dispersion of pay. The specificity of social 
relationships that underpin informal employee work appears to suppress pay rates. 
Enterprise workers fare the best in terms of income but because they provide services on 
an open market pay rate fluctuation is greater.  
 
In terms of work-time security, the worse conditions hypothesis is confirmed. Unlike the 
formal labour market, regularity of work cannot be guaranteed due to the absence of 
labour market institutions. The largely irregular nature of the work is a function of the 
sporadic generation of needs within social networks for informal employees, or the 
success or failure of obtaining work on an unpredictable informal market for enterprise 
workers. Despite, or perhaps because of the irregular nature of work on the informal 
economy, enterprise workers and informal employees have considerable autonomy and 
control over the work process. However associative work is generated through the 
operation of organisations whose schedules are fixed and regular, the times set often 
months in advance. Because of the organisational basis of their work, associative workers 
are less likely to experience all facets of autonomy and control in their work. However, 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
Chapter Five: The Informal Economy  - 163 - 
the potential pay-off for this lack of control is greater certainty over when work happens 
and higher levels of social integration, or identification, with the work tasks. 
 
Work orientations evident in the informal economy are neither strictly instrumental nor 
intrinsic, but a combination of both. While altruistic tendencies are evident, the 
prevalence of instrumental attitudes over altruistic ones indicates the importance of 
utilitarian exchange as part of the transactions that occur on the informal economy. Yet 
the high degree of monetization and instrumental orientations evident potentially 
reinforce, and certainly do not crowd out, ongoing cooperation, mutual support and 
reciprocity between the parties involved, cementing social relations in ways over and 
above the instrumental value of the exchange.  The high level of intrinsic work 
orientations developed through strong or weak ties (or a combination) evidence 
reciprocity as a general feature of the informal labour market. For young workers on the 
informal economy at least, monetary relations coexist or facilitate alternative logics that 
are beyond material gain, displaying that the relationship between monetary exchange 
and market relations is not hermetically sealed. 
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Chapter Six: It’s not just work – Variety in the Family Economy 
 
6.1.  Introduction 
This chapter examines the work undertaken by children with and for their families as part 
of a family mode of production. In Chapter Two, we described the family mode of 
production as a form of communally organised work. Communal systems of work are 
undertaken between actors linked through highly particular relationships, such as family, 
with the relationship strongly influencing what type of work is done and work 
conditions. Hence group generated rules, rather than external regulations, are important 
in regulating work activities. In terms of family activities the labour of family members is 
at the disposal of the family unit. Care work, domestic labour, household self-
provisioning and family-owned and run businesses are types of activities that are 
potentially organised through kinship based relationships within the family economy 
(Folbre 1995, Himmelweit 1995, 2002; Meagher 2003, Pahl 1984). This does not 
necessarily mean that the products of work are used or consumed by the family, but 
rather that children’s labour is available as part of a family mode of production. This 
chapter aims to assess empirically what the ‘family mode of production’ entails, and how 
young people’s labour is utilised. 
 
Section Two provides the broad context for the analysis by examining the transformation 
of the household from producing and consuming units in pre-industrial societies into 
consuming units in industrial and post-industrial societies. Consequently, cultural 
expectations around the economic value of children to family have also shifted, from 
children as economic contributors to children as economic dependants. Yet, we also 
highlight how family-based work encompasses a diverse range of productive activities, 
which can meaningfully be categorised by examining their relationship with the formal 
economy, from use-value within the household, to exchange-value on the formal market. 
Our analysis centres on an assessment of what we call the formality hypothesis, that calls 
attention to the relationship between formalised conditions and the degree work is 
oriented towards the formal market and whether a greater division between work and 
family spheres is evident the more work is oriented towards the formal market. 
 
Section Three profiles the range of work undertaken within the family economy. Unlike 
work on the informal economy, where systematic typologies of categories of informal 
work exist, categories of work in the family economy are identified by the degree that 
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work is oriented towards the needs of the family or exchange on the formal economy. 
Four categories are identified, care work, household self-provisioning, consort work and 
family owned production.  
 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds with a similar structure to the previous two. 
Section Four examines the social distribution of participation within the family economy. 
Section Five tests the formality hypothesis directly by examining work conditions on the 
family economy, especially whether more formal conditions are evident for certain types 
of work and groups of workers.  
 
Section Six examines some of the motivations and attitudes evident in work for family. 
We examine the degree of instrumental and intrinsic attitudes in the family economy and 
whether such attitudes have any relationship with the degree of formality of work. 
Specifically we examine whether work for family is dominated by obligation and altruism, 
or whether, instrumental values more commonly associated with cash exchange in the 
formal economy are also evident for the family as a working unit.  
 
6.2.  Structural Embeddedness: Transitions in the Function of the 
Family-based Economy 
 
6.2.1. The transformation of the productive role of households 
The family as a producing unit has undergone fundamental change as part of 
transformations in capitalist production.  Classical versions of economic development 
trace how modes of ‘family capitalism’ have been in decline as the range of spheres of life 
organised through the market has broadened. According to these accounts, pre-industrial 
households, that functioned as a basic economic unit for the production of goods and 
services, have been displaced through processes of industrialisation, the introduction of 
the factory system and its associated division of labour. These processes have 
necessitated the transfer of production to specialist sites away from the private efforts of 
individual families (Maynard, 1985; Silva and Thistle 2009).  
 
This separation of work and home was fundamental in the construction of what is now 
considered the standard form of work, sharply dividing public and private spheres 
(Davidoff, 1995; Edgell 2006; Edwards and Wajcman 2005; Hall, 1992; Pahl, 1984; 
Polanyi 1944; Nicholson, 1995). As work and family became temporally and spatially 
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separate, work came to mean paid employment and people who worked unpaid at home 
were no longer considered workers. Family life became associated with personal 
fulfilment where women had particular responsibility for domestic well-being.  
Consequently the public sphere was defined as the site of economically productive 
industrial labour and as a specifically male domain, whilst the private domestic sphere 
came to be seen as non-economic – the site of family activities assigned to women
39
. 
One legacy of this focus on male industrial labour is the notion that work and 
employment are synonymous (Beechey, 1987; Bradley, 1989; Davis, 1980; Glucksmann, 
1995, 2000; Hakim, 1996; Pahl, 1988; Tancred, 1995). 
 
The fundamental distinction between public and private spheres was, however, 
challenged by a revaluation of work undertaken within the home. Second wave feminists 
questioned assumptions that unpaid work in the private sphere was not work, 
recognising that domestic work was a form of work, thus countering the marginalization 
of women’s domestic labour in the home (Beechey, 1987; Oakley, 1974). This new focus 
allowed an analysis of the economic value of domestic and reproductive labour to family 
and society (Becker, 1981; Fernandez-Aceves and Blum 2011; Glucksmann, 1995; 
Hartman, 1981; Maher, Lindsay and Franzway 2008; Maynard 1985; Stohs 2007). 
Empirically, the argument that industrialisation sharply divided men into the public 
sphere and women into the private sphere, has also been questioned. Tilly and Scott 
(1978) illustrated how industrialisation had a diverse effect on women’s economic 
circumstances. Some women were unpaid domestic labourers; others produced 
commodities in the home, and some worked in the formal economy. Although 
industrialisation meant the productive capacity of households was reduced, the family 
structures continued to influence the economic roles members undertook.  
 
Households remained highly productive via the privatisation of production and 
consumption, manifested in forms of household self-provisioning and home working. 
Gershuny and Pahl (1980) argue that even within ‘post-industrial societies’, self-service 
economies exist that involve people producing goods and services from their own unpaid 
work, in what Gershuny and Pahl describe as household self-provisioning. Households 
                                                          
39 Maynard also points to a gradual unfolding of an ideology of domesticity that presented an ideal of 
family living based upon images of middle class living, which had become part of the dominant culture by 
the 1840’s (Maynard 1985, Davidoff, 1976; Hall 1979).  
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produce goods for their own consumption, the surplus of which they can sell onto 
others. Others have pointed to the growth of home-business enterprises and other 
home-working arrangements as evidence that the formal economy is utilising the private 
sphere as a location for production. Technological innovations, changes in managerial 
practices and shifts to sub-contracting have made possible the spatial destandardisation 
of certain types of work and have increased the possibility for home-based work (Edgell, 
2006; Wight and Raley 2009). These home working arrangements are in part a means by 
which employers can create more flexible production methods and employment 
relationships. Homework represents one way in which workers are often employed on an 
"as needed" basis (Finnegan, 1985; Hakim, 1988; Rovi, 1997).  
 
The implications of this are several-fold. While family based production has historically 
declined, households have remained economically productive. However the terrain is 
varied, from work consumed by family members, such as care work, to work consumed 
by the formal market, where the divide between the market and family life is blurred, as 
in home-based enterprises. This blurring raises questions about who benefits from these 
arrangements. Do such arrangements favour employers by increasing their capacity to 
lay-off and take-on labour as a way to manage economic cycles, through the creation of a 
peripheral workforce, or are households advantaged via greater flexibility, control and 
convenience in their work environments? And what of children’s involvement in these 
arrangements? We turn to the context of children’s productive capacities next. 
 
6.2.2. Transformations in cultural expectations of childhood 
Paralleling the decline of the family as a producing unit, cultural expectations around the 
economic value of children, at least in developed economies, have also shifted, from 
children as economic contributors to children as economic dependants (Zelizer 1985, 
2002). In the past, children were looked upon as a source of labour to the family, both 
inside and outside the home. Over the course of the 20th century, the position of 
children in the family economy has changed fundamentally. Adult males secured 
privileged access to the formal labour market, welfare state provision was expanded 
reducing the need for children to work, and compulsory education was legislated for, 
largely to develop the human capital necessary for a labour market requiring increasingly 
specialised knowledge. By the end of the 20th century, young people had lost much of 
their role as contributors to the family economy. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
employment came to be seen as an alternative role for young people (de Regt 2004). It is 
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now assumed that children’s main contribution to the family economy is to household 
chores (Gager, Sanchez and Demaris 2009).  Furthermore, this contribution is now 
primarily viewed as having a pedagogical function, rather than making a material 
contribution to the household. As Blair (1992) puts it, parental concerns about 
socialisation are the primary reason to use children in the home as a labour source, rather 
than to relieve parents. Corsaro (1997) further argues that whenever children figure in 
discussions on domestic labour they are seen as contributing to domestic labour burdens 
rather than sharing domestic labour responsibilities. Children’s more substantial 
contributions to domestic labour and other contributions to the family economy are lost 
in these constructions. The social construction of childhood as a period of dependency 
prevents proper acknowledgment of the productive labour children contribute to their 
families. 
 
Childhood sociologists have also questioned this depiction of childhood dependence 
(Mayall, 1996; Morrow 1992, 1996; Punch 2003; Solberg, 1997). These authors have 
argued that the construction of childhood dependency masks the extent children are 
capable, competent and have responsibility in their own lives. While children are 
dependent on their families, the few studies that have considered children’s contributions 
to domestic labour have shown that children are not merely care burdens but undertake a 
range of household tasks (Brannen, 1995; Kibria, 1993; Morrow, 1996; Solberg, 1990; 
Valenzuela 1999). Several authors have also pointed out the increased reliance on 
children’s domestic labour as a result of broader changes in the economy, especially 
longer work hours and increased female labour force participation (Berk, 1985; Blair and 
Lichter, 1990; Hedges and Barnett, 1972; Jensen, 2009; Propper, 1972; Rubin, 1983, 
Thrall, 1978, Wihstutz, 2007). The implication is that such changes have increased 
pressure on children to undertake care and domestic obligations in the home. However 
they also indicate that children and adults form interdependent relations rather than 
dependent ones (Faulstich Orellana, 2001; Morrow, 1996; Rogoff, 2003). At the heart of 
children’s contributions to family life is the question therefore of the balance between 
obligation and personal gain. If children contribute to family productivity, then are they 
obliged to undertake this work as part of normal family practices – that is, are there 
productive activities embedded in family life – or do they get something out of it, is their 
scope for instrumentality in the family economy? We examine these issues in later 
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sections. However prior to this we examine what work young people undertake as part of 
the family economy. 
6.3.  Classifying Young People’s work in the Family-based Economy 
The previous section briefly canvassed broader issues relating to the family and the 
economy to question the degree that the family is not a productive unit, and within that 
the degree children are defined as dependants. These sections drew attention to 
transformations of the private sphere as a productive unit, but that nonetheless a range 
of productive activities occur within families that can be understood through their 
relationship with the formal market. As well as family-owned businesses, family 
production also includes a range of activities such as care work, household self-
provisioning, children working in consort with other family members in their work, and 
home working.  
 
Unlike the informal economy, where systematic typologies of informal work exist, these 
various forms of family-based work have largely been treated in a disparate fashion. 
However, work can be placed along a continuum defined by whether the ‘products’ are 
consumed by the producing group (the family), or made and sold for an external market. 
Work can be oriented towards the needs of the family on one end (use value- internal 
family-based production) to exchange on external formal markets at the other (exchange 
value - external family-mode of production). Using this logic, care work and household 
self-provisioning, are oriented towards family-use value, because production and 
consumption is by household members. On the other end of the continuum we would 
place consort work, home-based enterprises and family businesses, because, while the 
labour of family members is utilised, the products of this work are for sale or exchange 
on the formal or informal economy. This continuum is not reliant on the type of work 
performed, but the social relations that characterise the production and consumption of 
goods and services. For example agricultural work may be found across categories, 
depending on the nature of the production relations – from small-scale self-provisioning, 
to farms that produce goods for the market (either on a large or small scale). This 
continuum also makes provision for the fact that relations of paid labour may also occur 
in the context of familial relations.  
 
Family economy workers were identified where young people, in describing their work, 
stated that they worked for immediate or extended family, including care work, 
household self-provisioning, working in consort with parents, home-working or whether 
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they worked in a family business (whether owned by immediate or extended family). 
These responses were classified into family work categories. Coding identified 1951 
young people working for their family. This group comprises the second largest economy 
of young workers, comprising 31.7 percent of all workers and 17.7 percent of the entire 
sample. Family work category by occupation is presented in Table 6.1: 
 
Table 6.1: Occupation by Family work category 
 Care work Self-provisioning Consort work Family-owned 
production 
Total 
 n % n % n % n % n % 
Child care/other care work 561 99.3   6 2.3 4 0.5 571 29.3 
Agricultural & horticultural work   208 59.8 14 5.3 169 21.8 391 20.0 
Sales work     29 11.0 319 41.2 348 17.8 
Labour, construction & labour trades   30 8.6 93 35.2 65 8.4 188 9.6 
Cleaning work   86 24.7 34 12.9 47 6.1 167 8.6 
Administrative & clerical work   1 0.3 42 15.9 65 8.4 108 5.5 
Other service work   4 1.1 14 5.3 34 4.4 52 2.7 
Food preparation   6 1.7 4 1.5 24 3.1 34 1.7 
Non-labour trades   1 0.3 2 0.8 9 1.2 12 0.6 
Delivery work     5 1.9 5 0.6 10 0.5 
Teaching & tutoring 4 0.7   3 1.1 1 0.1 8 0.4 
Other food service   1 0.3   5 0.6 6 0.3 
Other w     2 0.8 4 0.5 6 0.3 
Entertainment & performance     1 0.4 3 0.4 4 0.2 
Other not elsewhere classified   11 3.2 15 5.7 20 2.6 46 2.4 
Total 565 100.0 348 100.0 264 100.0 774 100.0 1951 100.0 
  (28.9)  (17.8)  (13.5)  (39.7)  (100.0) 
 
Four categories of work were identified: care work (n=565, 28.9%), household self-
provisioning (n=348, 17.8%), consort work (n=264, 13.5%) and family owned 
production (n=774, 39.7%)
40
. The work children perform includes work that children do 
within the private household, that enables parents to engage in the formal labour market, 
activities for which someone else would have to be paid, as well as activities undertaken 
for and with family members on the formal economy that directly generates income. In 
terms of ‘occupation types’ the variety of work undertaken on the family economy is not 
as varied as that performed in the formal and informal economies. Care work (n=571, 
29.3%) and agricultural and horticultural work (n=391, 20.0%) comprise half of all work 
undertaken within the family economy. Sales work also comprises a sizeable type of work 
within the family economy (n=348, 17.8%), the majority of which is undertaken in family 
                                                          
40 Only 16 children indicated working in a home-based enterprise (0.8%). On re-examination, these 
children were either involved in family-owned production (n=6) or were working in consort with parents 
(n=10).  Evidence of classic ‘sweatshop’ or outwork arrangements were not found in this study therefore. 
This does not mean that outwork arrangements do not exist, but they are more likely to take institutional 
forms associated with precarious employment or sub-contracting arrangements.  
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owned production. Only three other forms of work comprise more than 5 percent of 
work within the family economy – labour and construction work (n=188, 9.6%), most of 
which is undertaken in consort with adult family members; cleaning work (n=167, 8.6%), 
most of which is undertaken as part of household self-provisioning activities; and 
administrative work (n=108, 5.5%) undertaken in family owned production and in 
consort with other family members. Family-owned production and consort work 
evidence the greatest diversity of work, reflecting the variety of products and services 
within the formal market. Whereas household self-provisioning is limited to nine 
occupation types, fourteen occupation types are evident for consort work and fifteen 
types evident in family owned production. Care work by definition is limited to the care 
of others in the family. Using participant’s descriptions of what their work involves, these 
categories are examined in more detail below.  
 
6.3.1.  Care Work 
Folbre has defined caring labour as work involving services based on sustained personal 
(usually face-to-face) interaction, and is motivated (at least in part) by concern about the 
recipient’s welfare (Folbre 1995, Folbre & Weisskopf 1998). Children are generally not 
associated with being ‘carers’, but rather as the recipients of care41. Smyth and colleagues 
point out that that because intra-familial care giving often occurs in the context of 
intimate bonds of love and reciprocity, even high levels of care are often viewed as 
‘normal’ family relationships. The lack of self-identification of care is complicated even 
further for young people, because societal expectations around care-giving are that adults 
are expected to provide care and young people are not expected to be care-givers (Smyth, 
Blaxland and Cass 2011. See also Smyth, Cass and Hill 2011). Yet many children in this 
study provided a significant amount of help to parents (n=358; 63.5%) and other 
relatives (n=205; 36.5%) by caring for their younger siblings or relatives. More 
exceptionally several children mentioned they care for or help their grandparents, such as 
undertaking domestic tasks for them.  
 
                                                          
41 There are many examples of care work undertaken by children that are an expected and integral aspect 
of social life in ‘tribal’ societies. These include examples of self-autonomous spaces of children that were 
critical in the overall division of labour, allowing adults to undertake other tasks required for the 
functioning of community. In our sample, care work is a far more privatised experience because of the 
disembedding of the family unit from broader community and kinship networks, which also means that 
many young people are caring for siblings in isolation.  
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As mentioned in Section 2.1 an important concern of feminist theory and practice has 
been to claim the importance of care work socially, institutionally and interpersonally.  
Discussions of the value of care work highlight the considerable contributions that carers 
make (and thus the social benefits and savings), the broad range of skills that are involved 
in care work and the difficulties and rewards experienced by carers (England & Folbre 
2000; Folbre, 1994a, 2001). In addition to the devaluation of care work generally, care 
work undertaken by young people is also dismissed by virtue of it being undertaken by 
children.  Wihstutz (2007) argues that at best children’s care work is seen in terms of 
socialisation benefits for young people, especially preparation for the sexual division of 
labour in adulthood. Participant’s descriptions from this study are typical of care work 
generally, involving both physical and emotional care, but also involving the exercise of 
responsibility and authority. Some described caring for infants and small children 
overnight, looking after large groups of children at once, administering medicine, 
‘conflict resolution’ work, tutoring siblings and relatives and picking up and transporting 
children places. Many emphasised the job of keeping the children safe– making sure they 
don’t get into trouble. The following responses help provide a picture of the work 
involved.  
 
Putting two babies and a 7 year old to bed as well as changing diaper, getting them out of bed and 
feeding them breakfast (Female, 13 years) 
 
Baby-sitting and picking up my little brother once a week. Give him food, give him a bath and 
make him take an afternoon nap. Plus changing him (Female, 12 years) 
 
I cook meals (usually simple meals like noodles or pasta or party pies etc…), give them baths, play 
games, watch videos, read, help them with homework (Female, 15 years)  
 
Three overlapping and related contexts of care work were identified from the 
descriptions provided - ‘episodic/respite’, ‘collective’ and ‘social reproduction’ care work.  
Respite care involved young people providing care so that adult family members (those 
who were the primary carers of the children) can enjoy some leisure time, undertake 
some task or attend some event. Although infrequent, the care work provided by young 
people contributes to the ongoing organisation of family life relied upon by adult family 
members to free them from care responsibilities.  
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‘Collective’ care work42 extends this dynamic beyond care-specific work to collective 
domestic labour (Warren 2011). Care of siblings is undertaken with other routine family 
tasks such as washing up, vacuuming, washing clothes, ironing, running errands, making 
meals and household shopping. These tasks are not self-care tasks, but are critical to 
general household functioning. This sort of care contributes to the overall domestic 
labour burden that would otherwise have to be undertaken by adult family members or 
outsourced. A special case of ‘collective care work’ can be labelled ‘social reproduction 
care work’. This involves care work undertaken to allow parents or other relatives to 
work. Statements such as ‘I look after my siblings when my parents work’ are typical 
descriptions provided. This response was evident for just over one-fifth of participants in 
this category (n=128; 22.5%)43. This care work is a critical contribution made by young 
people to allow their parents to engage in the formal economy.  
 
What is evident is that many children provided a large amount of help to their families in 
the form of caretaking, and while it is unlikely that such work displaces women as the 
primary caregiver and organiser of care in most families, it is evident that children are 
also taking on responsibilities. Furthermore, as is the case with private care work more 
generally, the care provided by children significantly reduces the costs that parents would 
have to bear either in lost work-time or the expense of publicly provided care and is 
therefore a hidden component of the care economy. Adult family members benefit from 
the work young people provide to younger siblings and other relatives requiring care.  
 
  
                                                          
42
 Both collective care work and household self-provisioning include forms of domestic labour that 
overlap with care work despite being conceptually distinct. Collective care work is distinguished in this 
analysis from household self-provisioning by whether a component of the activity is directly related to 
another person, including feeding, playing and other forms of care. Otherwise it is included in household 
self-provisioning.  
43 Whilst the number of children performing this care work forms a sizeable minority, this figure is also 
likely to be an underestimate because it relies on specific reference to providing care so that adults can 
work. Many children provided only a general description like ‘I look after my brother’, without reference to 
the context for providing that care are not included in the figure. However it is likely that some of these 
children are providing care in exactly these circumstances.  
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6.3.2  Household Self-provisioning44 
Household self-provisioning involves households buying goods and services from the 
formal economy and using the purchased goods as capital, in combination with 
household labour, to produce other goods and services for their own consumption. 
Household self-provisioning involves the provision within the domestic context of goods 
and services that might otherwise have been bought through the formal economy 
(Finnegan, 1985; Mingione, 1988; Nelson, 2004; Nelson and Smith, 1999). Common self-
provisioning activities include house maintenance, gardening, car maintenance and 
clothes production. Two main forms of household self-provisioning are evident in the 
descriptions provided by participants: ‘routine self-provisioning’, largely involving 
domestic labour, and ‘substantial self-provisioning’ largely involving agricultural work 
and renovation and repair (see Nelson and Smith 1999). 
 
Routine self-provisioning (n=167, 48.4%) includes household chores involved in the 
general upkeep of the family household, tasks which Nelson and Smith (1999: 10) define 
as ‘‘helping to guarantee the daily life of the household’’. These are distinct from routine 
self-care activities performed by young people, such as cleaning their room, making their 
bed or putting away their clothes. Typical descriptions in this study included:  
 
Gardening and doing my aunt’s lawns. Mowing my aunt's lawn, planting and watering plants and 
cutting down overhanging tree branches. (Male 13 years) 
 
I wash my dad’s car, clean up the house, cut the grass and hang up the laundry. (Female 15 years) 
 
I do ironing for my family. Ironing all my dad's work shirts as well as any other clothes that need 
ironing. (Female 13 years) 
 
                                                          
44 For some responses there was difficulty differentiating between whether the activities described were 
household self-provisioning or family-owned production involving agricultural work. Surplus of goods 
produced from household self-provisioning may be sold onto the formal market. Conversely, surplus 
goods produced in the course of family-owned production may be used for household self-provisioning. 
However the primary aims of the production process are conceptually distinct in both cases. This was 
because there was insufficient detail provided in the responses to determine who the work was done for. 
These two categories of work are practically related. In these cases, postal area codes were matched against 
Industry of employment, to identify which industry was the predominant employer in the locality (see 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001 Basic Community Profile catalogue No. 2001.0. and the 2001 
Indigenous Profile catalogue No. 2002.0). Where the industry of employment was agriculture, then the 
work was coded as family-owned production; otherwise it was coded as household self-provisioning. The 
assumption used is that in localities where agriculture is the modal industry type, the participant is, on the 
balance of probabilities, working on a productive farm. If agriculture is not the modal industry type, then 
using the same logic, the work is not likely to be undertaken in the course business and therefore likely to 
involve household self-provisioning. Any productive output is likely to be secondary to participation in the 
non-agricultural labour market. 
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Pay the rent for my mum. Pay rent after school. (Female 12 years) 
 
I do most of the housework. Clean my whole house, cooking. (Male 14 years) 
 
All the tasks are oriented towards general upkeep of the immediate family home, or 
undertaken for extended family members. By providing their labour to collective 
household work young people substitute for either outsourced domestic labour, external 
provision of service (for example car washes) or parental domestic labour.  
 
Substantial self-provisioning involves activities that ‘‘help to improve the family’s living 
conditions’’ (Nelson and Smith 1999: 10). Examples of substantial self-provisioning 
include servicing or repair of vehicles, growing vegetables and work done by households 
on the maintenance and improvement of their dwellings, such as renovation and repair 
(Pahl, 1984). Approximately 40 percent of household self-provisioning involved 
agricultural or horticultural work (n=139, 39.3%).  
 
Helping my dad around the farm. Cleaning the horses, fixing the fence, clean the stables, wash all 
the animals. (Male 13 years) 
 
I helped in my parents lemon orchard. Help pick the lemons with mum and dad. (Female 13 
years) 
 
Working on my uncle’s farm and my Nan and pops farm (they are separate properties). Pull 
fences down, lay concrete, saw wood, drive tractor (ploughing) round up cattle put up fences. 
(Male 15 years) 
 
I help on my family property. Round up cattle, put out salt blocks, molasses and hay in cattle 
yard, help fix fences. (Female 14 years) 
 
In these cases the goods produced more directly substitute for other goods that could be 
directly purchased on the market. Children are not only replacing a service (for example 
substituting other purchasable labour) but also directly contributing to the production of 
subsistence goods.   
 
A smaller category of substantial self-provisioning involved renovation and repair work 
(n=39, 11.3%) involving construction labour or specialised repair work of houses and 
cars.  Much of the work involves complicated tasks aimed at enhancing family assets 
such as the home or car. The scope of the work described is often large, rather than just 
minor repair work. 
 
Floor sanding for mum and dad. Laying wood, sanding wood, varnish wood. (Female 15 years) 
 
Renovating with my dad. Making a kitchen and painting walls. Renovate two rooms by taking 
down the ceiling and replacing it, tiling, painting and decorating. (Male 12 years) 
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Working for parents building a house (i.e. tiling, painting etc). Tiling, waterproofing, demolishing 
old walls, nailing up new plasterboard, cleaning away rubbish. (Male 14 years) 
 
I helped my father sort of put a motor in a car. We built the motor from a half the old one. (Male 
13 years) 
 
Home mechanic helper to dad. Change oil, change tyres, build carburettor, change transmission 
oil and sand down paint. (Male 14 years) 
 
Here young people are directly substituting for labour and services that would normally 
be purchased on the market, some of which might be quite specialised or technical. For 
both types of substantial self-provisioning, young people’s work diminishes cash-outflow 
resulting in financial savings for the household. Hence young people’s work contributes 
to offsetting the need to buy in services; and saving adult time from doing the activities 
otherwise done by young people. 
 
6.3.3  Working in Consort with family 
Working in consort with family involves young people working as employees with 
another adult family member. Critical to consort work is that a non-family member owns 
the means of production. The related family member is an employee or a sub-contractor. 
The young person is often engaged by this family member to assist in their work. The 
work relationship therefore represents a chain of employees, the young person working 
by virtue of their relative’s employee status. Therefore the kinship relationship is an 
important mediating factor in obtaining the work and often in its organisation.   
 
I work at my mothers work in an office. Answering phones, data entry, working in the mailroom, 
general office work. (Female 15 years) 
 
I help out at where my mum works at a cosmetics factory. Pack up all the products in boxes. 
Working on the processing line (sometimes). (Male15 years) 
 
Putting vertical runners together for my mums work. Putting the runners together, packaging 
them. (Female 14 years) 
 
I help my dad at work installing marble and granite onto kitchen bench tops. Installing bench 
tops and sinks in new houses. (Male 15 years) 
 
As mentioned earlier the diversity of work reflects the myriad opportunities for work on 
the formal market. However labour jobs, cleaning and low-end administrative work are 
over-represented. These forms of engagement also reflect forms of contractual 
destandardisation in employment. Contractual arrangements in these situations may be 
vague, reflecting how many of these opportunities arise out of the casualisation of work 
surplus to the core functioning of the enterprise. Such ‘scrap work’ provides 
opportunities for young people to pick up a job and therefore to earn some income, but 
may not necessarily provide opportunities that are lasting. In this sense the work, 
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although done with and mediated by adult family members, is disembedded from family 
life both in the nature of the tasks done and the individualisation of the work 
arrangements, as the young person is an employee. The opportunistic nature of this work 
is also reliant upon the networks developed through adult employment– family members 
in employment identify opportunities for young people’s employment.  
 
6.3.4  Family-owned production 
Family-owned production involves young people working in family owned and run 
business. Like consort work family-owned production is oriented towards provision of 
goods or services for the market. However, unlike consort work, the young person’s 
immediate or extended family owns the means of production. Many of the descriptions 
indicated that the family business was a small enterprise, often involving service work, 
such as restaurants or corner stores. Here children embody a form of economic capital 
where family members’ labour is pooled as part of a ‘family strategy’ used as part of the 
operating practices of the enterprise (Katila 2010; Sanders and Nee, 1996; Song, 1997). 
For example: 
 
I help my mum & uncle at a shop, serving customers, cleaning, sweeping, mopping and other 
things if needed. (Female, 12 years) 
 
I work at my parent’s restaurant, Serving customers, cleaning restaurant when closed, cashier, set 
plates. (Male, 15 years) 
 
Some authors have argued that family labour is suited to small-scale enterprises that can 
be run by a single family rather than larger enterprises that require the employment of 
non-family labour. Family members may constitute the primary and sometimes sole 
labour source and their participation in family-owned production can be very stable over 
time (Light et al 1994). Being small scale and based on family units, these enterprises 
constitute relatively autonomous units of production. There may, therefore, be a great 
deal of pressure on family members, not only as an operational workforce, but also as a 
relatively self-sufficient social group (Faulstich Orellana et al., 2003; Light et al., 1994; 
Park 2000; Sanders and Nee, 1996; Song, 1999). The descriptions provided in this study 
also indicated other work arrangements and contexts. For some responses it was 
apparent that the ‘family business’ also employed non-family employees as well as family 
members. The responses varied for the pattern of employment also, young people being 
employed in flexible or stop-gap arrangements as well as in an ongoing way.  
 
Work for my parents company, Packaging, setting up systems to complete work, setting up 
computer systems, salesman. (Male 15 years) 
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I work at my Aunties shoe shop when she doesn't have enough workers, I do stock take. (Female 
12 years) 
 
As discussed earlier, within the family economy the greatest diversity of occupation types 
is evident for family owned production. The variety of work involved is indicated in the 
responses below- 
 
I worked for my dad’s business at home sending faxes, phone calls, bookwork, typing, bank work, 
going on job inspections with dad and recording down information. (Female, 15 years) 
 
Family business, DJ and Juke Box service, downloading Jukeboxes, DJ-ing, delivery, processing, 
loading jukeboxes, gathering music. (Male 15 years) 
 
My Grandfathers stamp business. I handle stamps and envelopes. (Female 13 years) 
 
I help my uncle get some lobsters pots back and pull up some as well, used diving equipment to 
retrieve lobster pots which were stuck. Also pull pots by hand out in the boat. (Male, 15 years) 
 
Many young workers described work that involved technical or skilled labour:  
 
Working at my dad’s local gym, serving customers, cleaning helping people train - if the 
customers have any questions about an exercise I answer it. (Female, 14 years) 
 
Editing my dad’s website every month. I do get paid. Use dream-weaver and I edit it. I use 
photoshop to design the voucher. (Male 13 years) 
 
Working at family business Saturday mornings (stonemason), polishing granite/marble, cutting 
and grinding granite/marble, installation of bench top. (Male 15 years) 
 
Engine reconditioner with my dad.  It’s a family business, talk to customers, build engines, 
advertising for the shop. (Male 14 years) 
 
The prevalence of young people’s involvement in family owned production, the diverse 
characteristics of the family enterprises young people are employed in, the variety of 
work arrangements and types of work contributions young people make within these 
enterprises, all indicate that young people’s contributions are part of complex relations of 
production rather than merely labour inputs whose commitment is simply taken for 
granted. But is there a social distribution of work in the family economy and do different 
groups of young people work in different types of family work arrangements. We now 
examine the social distribution of work on the family economy. 
 
6.4.  The Social Distribution of Work within the Family Economy 
The previous section described how, within the context of transformations of the family 
unit and cultures of childhood that are implicated in the division between the public and 
private spheres, we can make sense of young people’s work in the family economy by the 
degree work is oriented towards exchange-value on the formal market or use-value 
within the family. However, this public-private dichotomy of family work may also create 
different opportunities for different groups of young people. For example, the 
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feminisation of the private sphere is evident in women still taking primary responsibility 
for domestic labour and childcare. This section examines the overall distribution of 
family-based work across socio-economic groups and examines whether class position, 
gender, cultural background and other factors that define the social position of young 
people, influence participation in the family economy and in different forms of work 
within the family economy.  
 
Researchers have debated the relationship between socio-economic status and 
involvement in family based work.  These debates have developed in the context of the 
use of alternative household economic strategies to cope with economic decline, as 
discussed in Chapter Five. One thesis links household deprivation with greater reliance 
on family-based production (Boas and Hatloy, 2008; Mayblin 2010). Poorer households, 
unable to meet their consumption needs via the formal market are forced to reduce their 
demand for goods on the market and instead work for ‘self-consumption’. The 
alternative thesis holds that a polarisation between work-rich and work-poor households 
exists, and it is households who have family members in formal employment that are 
more likely to have recourse to the family economy (Pahl, 1984). These households have 
more extensive networks created through paid employment, greater ownership of tools 
necessary for production and greater capacity to purchase manufactured goods that 
enable households to produce more goods for themselves; features that are all essential 
for family based work.   
 
Although these debates centre on household self-provisioning, we can acquire more 
generally applicable insights for this study as to whether participation rates vary across 
category of work in the family economy.  Care work may be more common in poorer 
households because using older siblings to care reduces expenditure on formal childcare 
(Faulstich Orellana, 2001). Household self-provisioning may be a counter-cyclical 
strategy used by poorer households to cope with economic fluctuations. In periods of 
economic growth people use increased earnings to buy durable goods to shorten time 
spent on labour in the domestic economy. In periods of economic decline more time and 
incentive exists for individuals to produce goods and services in the domestic economy 
to substitute for goods otherwise purchased in the official economy. This cyclical 
interpretation has been questioned most fervently by Pahl (1984). For the unemployed, 
turning to the domestic economy may be of limited help if they have no cash to buy the 
necessary resources that are required for household self-provisioning (Pahl 1984). 
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As noted earlier consort work is reliant upon an adult family member being in formal 
employment. We would expect, then, that consort work is more likely in areas of greatest 
employment, in middle class and wealthier neighbourhoods. For family-owned 
production, the use of young people’s labour may reflect a survival strategy to reduce 
labour costs, especially for the ‘enterprising poor’. However the capital intensity of 
starting up and operating most businesses require resources not generally available to 
poorer households. We would therefore anticipate that family owned production is more 
likely in wealthier households.  Similar to the other chapters, two analytical strategies are 
used to analyse the social distribution of work in the family economy. The first examines 
the likelihood of working on the family economy overall, compared to working on either 
the informal or formal economies.  The second examines the likelihood of undertaking 
different types of work in the family economy, again using dummy variables to increase 
the capacity to compare and contrast each category of work. Each dummy variable was 
then treated as a dependant variable in logistic regression models with a range of social 
and demographic variables to provide a sense of whether underlying social factors 
explain the likelihood of undertaking certain types of work within the family economy. 
The parameter estimates are presented in Table 6.2.  
 
Table 6.2: Likelihood of working on the family economy and category by socio-
demographic characteristics 
 
Model I 
Family 
Economya 
Model II 
Care work 
Model III 
Self-
provisioning 
Model IV 
Consort work 
Model V 
Family-owned 
production 
Socio-economic  11-25th quantile 0.90 (0.13) 0.95 (0.23) 0.90 (0.27) 0.93 (0.26) 1.12 (0.20) 
 status 26-50th quantile 0.85 (0.13) 0.87 (0.24) 0.89 (0.28) 1.21 (0.28) 1.04 (0.21) 
 51-75th quantile 0.73 (0.12)* 1.28 (0.21) 0.60 (0.27) 0.92 (0.25) 1.10 (0.19) 
  76-90th quantile 0.52 (0.13)*** 1.05 (0.23) 0.55 (0.30)* 0.58 (0.29) 1.73 (0.21)** 
  91-100th quant (least disadv) 0.37 (0.15)*** 1.24 (0.28) 0.79 (0.34) 0.50 (0.35)* 1.41 (0.25) 
 0-10th quant (most disadv)=ref      
Age (years)  0.58 (0.03)*** 0.87 (0.05)** 0.81 (0.06)** 0.99 (0.06) 1.26 (0.04)*** 
CALD Non-Anglo Australian 1.88 (0.08)*** 0.62 (0.15)** 0.66 (0.19)* 0.83 (0.18) 2.03 (0.14)*** 
 Anglo-Australian=ref      
 Rurality Other metropolitan 1.07 (0.11) 0.90 (0.19) 1.13 (0.26) 0.91 (0.25) 1.06 (0.19) 
  Rural coastal 1.03 (0.11) 0.56 (0.21)** 1.86 (0.24)** 0.31 (0.28)*** 1.92 (0.19)** 
  Rural inland 1.39 (0.11)** 0.56 (0.20)** 1.41 (0.23) 0.30 (0.27)*** 2.35 (0.18)*** 
  Sydney=ref      
 Gender Female 0.99 (0.06) 4.57 (0.12)*** 0.31 (0.14)*** 0.36 (0.15)*** 0.87 (0.10) 
 Male=ref      
  Constant 31.40 (0.38) 1.79 (0.70) 5.80 (0.83)* 0.49 (0.88) 0.02 (0.62)*** 
a) The reference category is: Work in other economies; Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter 
estimate; *Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
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Socio-economic status, cultural background, age and rurality have a significant 
explanatory relationship with the likelihood that a young person will work on the family 
economy as opposed to other economies. The likelihood of working in the family 
economy decreases as socio-economic advantage increases. Compared to young people 
in the most disadvantaged areas, young people in middle class, upper middle class and 
wealthiest areas are between 0.37and 0.73 times as likely to work in the family economy, 
compared to young people in the most disadvantaged areas. Whereas 42.5 percent of 
young people in the most disadvantaged areas work in the family economy (n=232), this 
progressively decreases to less than one-fifth of young people in the least disadvantaged 
areas (n=107, 19.1%). This social gradient would suggest that household economic 
adversity may necessitate the use of children’s labour in the family.  
 
Despite hypothesising that care work may be more likely in poorer households, young 
people from wealthier and middle class areas are just as likely to undertake care work as 
young people from the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods. We do, however, find class-
related differences for household self-provisioning, consort work and family owned 
production. Young people from upper-middle class backgrounds are half as likely to 
undertake household self-provisioning and almost twice as likely to be involved in family 
owned production. Young people from the most advantaged areas are half as likely to be 
involves in consort work. 
 
Differences in specific economic contexts appear to be implicated in the distribution of 
family based work.  In terms of household self-provisioning the ability to acquire durable 
means of consumption, such as tools and freezers, has increased the capacity of 
households generally to engage in household self-provisioning. This is borne out here in 
the general distribution of this work across economic contexts, apart from upper middle-
class communities. However the reasons for undertaking such work are likely to differ by 
socio-economic background. Williams and Windebank (2002) provide one possible 
explanation in their work on preference/necessity ratios. They suggest that households in 
lower income areas undertake tasks perceived most necessary or routine, which is likely 
to translate into ongoing forms of household self-provisioning. For higher income 
households a greater proportion of household self-provisioning is performed out of 
choice on major home improvement work, reflecting a desire to individualise the end 
product or the pleasure of doing the work. These more involved, large-scale forms of 
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self-provisioning depend on having enough resources to invest in equipment and 
supplies, which higher income households are more likely to have. Furthermore the 
greater ability to outsource other domestic tasks, such as cleaning, potentially creates 
more opportunity for these households to participate in household self-provisioning in a 
more voluntary way than in lower income areas. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4, consort work is mediated by opportunities identified by adult 
family members who are in employment. This might suggest that middle class and 
wealthier young people are more likely to be involved in consort work, as levels of labour 
market participation are highest in these communities. Young people from the least 
disadvantaged areas are less likely to be involved in consort work compared to other 
young people. Consort work is instead most prevalent in middle class and working class 
neighbourhoods. This appears linked to adult labour market structures that generate 
opportunities for young people. Professional and semi-professional occupations may not 
generate consort work opportunities for young people. However lower and middle-class 
occupations, such as labour jobs, and administrative work, are more likely to as these 
sorts of jobs may be more amenable for young people to work in.  Many of the tasks 
involved, and skill demands required, involve elementary skill tasks and can be delegated 
with little training and supervision. The hypothesis linking the capital-intensity of family 
owned production with class effects is also supported. Family owned production is most 
likely in upper middle class areas that are more likely to have the necessary capital to 
invest in small business operations. These findings suggest a petit-bourgeois effect.  
 
Children are entrusted with tasks that are of importance to the family from a very early 
age. However an age-division of labour is evident, with younger children being given 
responsibility for work centring on the home and older children broadening these 
responsibilities to family based work that engages with the formal market. In general 
terms the more work is oriented towards use-value (and therefore embedded in family 
life) the more likely that younger workers will undertake this sort of work. As age 
increases the likelihood of working in the family economy decreases. For every year 
increase in age the likelihood of working in the family economy is halved. Using sixteen 
year olds as a reference, 14 year olds are 2.8 times as likely to work in the family 
economy. The differences become more pronounced for younger workers, with 13 year 
olds 4.3 times as likely and 12 year olds 5.2 times as likely to work in the family economy 
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compared to other economies. Age-related patterns are also evident across categories of 
work. Twelve and thirteen year olds are twice as likely as 16 year olds to undertake care 
work than other kinds of work. A similar pattern is evident for household self-
provisioning. Twelve year-olds are 1.8 and 13 year olds 1.4 times as likely as 16 year olds 
to undertake household self-provisioning. However families are more likely to rely on 
older children to work in family owned production with the likelihood of working in 
family-owned production increasing by 1.26 times with an increase in age. While no 
significant difference in likelihood is observable between 12 and 13 year olds, they are 
approximately half as likely as sixteen-year olds to work in family owned production. 
Fourteen year olds are 1.65 times, 15 year olds are 1.91 times and 16 year olds are 2.11 
times more likely to work in family-owned production than 12 year olds.  
 
This age-based division between public and private work appear to conform to parental 
understandings of age-related competence. The performance of tasks is adapted to the 
particular skills attributed to the child’s age and in turn reinforces age-based assumptions 
about children’s competence. Studies of children’s domestic work also clearly indicate 
that being assigned tasks around the house is age-related (Brannen, 1995; White and 
Brinkerhoff, 1981b). Song’s study of take-away businesses found a similar age-based 
progression of tasks within family-owned production. Young people started helping out 
in family take-away businesses from a relatively young age (under the age of ten), usually 
in the kitchen doing simple things, like washing dishes. The performance of these labour 
intensive tasks was productive for the business, but keeping children busy was also a 
means of managing childcare for parents. The availability and potential productivity of 
children’s labour tended to increase as the children grew older. The findings presented in 
this study suggest that as well as age-based task differences within types of family work, 
there also appear to be age-based differences across types of family work. 
 
Although males and females are equally as likely to work in the family economy, gender 
differentiates types of work undertaken within the family economy. The largest 
parameter estimates relate to care work and gender, with females being 4.6 times as likely 
as males to perform care work. Over 40 percent of females are involved in care work 
(n=403, 44.4%) compared to approximately 16 percent of males (n=164, 15.9%). 
Females are approximately one-third as likely as males to undertake household self-
provisioning (females: n=85, 9.4%; males: n=255, 24.7%) and to work in consort with 
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family (females: n=74, 8.2%; males: n=187, 18.1%). Gendered occupational differences 
are also evident, suggesting that gender expectations exert a normative influence over 
work roles within the family economy. Approximately 60 percent (61.1%, n=66) of 
administrative work is done by females. Males dominate agricultural and labour work, 
with 73.4 percent (n=287) of agricultural work in the family economy done by males; 
who also predominate in cleaning work (63.5%, n=106). Gender parity is evident in sales 
work, with roughly similar proportions of males and females undertaking this sort of 
work (females 52.6%, n=183; males 47.4%, n=165).  
 
Relying on family members as a source of labour appears to be critical for many 
businesses run by people from diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Young people 
from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds are approximately 1.8 times as likely to 
work in the family economy as Anglo-Australian young people. Approximately 40 
percent of children from minority linguistic and cultural backgrounds work in the family 
economy (n=633, 39.4%), compared to fewer than 30 percent of Anglo-Australian young 
people (n=1318, 28.9%). This finding is largely accounted for by the increased likelihood 
that young people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds are twice as likely as 
Anglo-Australian children to be involved in family-owned production (n=281, 44.4% for 
children from minority linguistic and cultural backgrounds; n=493, 37.4% for Anglo-
Australian children). Young people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds are 
also 0.6 times as likely to perform care work (n=168, 26.5% compared to Anglo-
Australian children n=400, 30.3%); and are approximately two-thirds as likely as Anglo-
Australian young people to be involved in household self-provisioning (n=81, 12.8%; 
n=264, 20.0% respectively). The literature on businesses set up by first and second wave 
immigrants has emphasised the importance of ‘ethnic resources and strategies’ for the 
success of ethnic business communities (Katila 2010; Sanders and Nee, 1996; Wilson and 
Portes, 1980; Zhou and Bankston, 1994). Song (1997; 1999) and Park (2000; 2002) 
elaborate on these strategies for children by showing that use of family labour is 
associated with aspects of the migration experience. Parents employ their children not 
only to reduce labour costs, especially during start-up or establishment phases of 
businesses, but also rely on their children to provide more intimate forms of labour, such 
as acting as mediators or translators with customers, clients and external agencies (see 
also Faulstich Orellana, 2003; Valenzuela, 1999). Song (1997) also suggests that for ethnic 
minorities, experiences of racism and discrimination intensify feelings of family solidarity. 
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Working within the family business and undertaking the more subtle forms of helping 
labour contributes to reinforcing a sense of family membership.  
 
Young people from rural-inland areas are 1.4 times as likely as young people in Sydney to 
work in the family economy. Approximately 37 percent of young people in rural-inland 
areas work in the family economy (n=397, 36.5%) compared to just over 30 percent for 
children in all other areas (n=1554, 30.6%). Within the family economy, the results 
suggest that different economic structures exist in different regions. Young people from 
rural areas are approximately twice as likely to be involved in family-owned production 
(rural coastal n=154, 42.1%; rural inland n=184, 46.3% compared to Sydney, n=343, 
38.2%) and young people from rural-coastal areas are 1.86 times as likely to be involved 
in household self-provisioning (n=96, 26.2% compared to n=128, 14.3%). This is likely 
to reflect both the relative lack of opportunities for formal economy work in these areas 
and the prevalence of family-based agricultural activities.  Given the smaller scale of 
formal economies in rural areas, the importance of family-owned agricultural enterprises 
or family owned businesses that service rural communities appear to also provide 
employment opportunities for young people. Some forms of household self-provisioning 
are intricately linked to the land and impossible to replicate in an urban area. The 
availability of natural resources in rural areas is therefore a crucial basic input for many 
forms of household self-provisioning.  However young people in Sydney are more likely 
to work in consort with adult family members (n=156, 17.4%) compared to children in 
both rural-coastal (n=30, 8.2%) and rural-inland areas (n=32, 8.1%) and are more likely 
to provide care work for their families (Exp (B) =0.6 for both rural coastal and rural 
inland). Consort work is reliant upon chains of employment through parents or other 
family members, and is more likely in the ‘denser’ urban local economies of Sydney. 
 
In summary then we find mixed support for our hypotheses. Care work and household 
self-provisioning occurs across the class spectrum, supporting neither the economic 
coping strategy or polarisation hypotheses. However consort work appears reliant upon 
employment based networks, often in blue collar and semi-skilled white collar jobs. 
Furthermore, family owned production is more evident among the upper middle class, 
suggesting a petit bourgeoisie effect. We now turn to examine work conditions across the 
formal economy.  
 
  
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
Chapter Six: The Family Economy  - 186 - 
6.5. Young people’s Work Conditions in the Family Economy  
As we noted earlier, the historical shift in the self-understanding of the family’s 
productive capacities have brought into relief the varied relationships between the 
household and the market. For some, this means that the family mode of production is 
reliant upon the loyalty of family members, which in terms of conditions translate into 
lower incomes, longer working hours and reduced labour turnover (Boissevain and 
Grotenberg, 1987; Taylor and Warburton 2011; Waldinger, 1986). To this may be added 
exploitation within the household, most significantly of men over women, who may 
control the pace and timing of work as an extension of patriarchal relations within the 
household (Tipple, 2006). However the effect of loyalty in diminishing conditions may be 
more evident for some family based work more than others, conceptualised here as the 
degree to which work is oriented to use-value or exchange value. Several related 
hypotheses flow from the family to formal market categorisation relevant to work 
conditions, that centre on whether different conditions are evident for family-based work 
oriented towards family use compared to family-based work oriented towards market 
exchange, what we can refer to as the extent of market formality. The extent of ‘market-
formality’ leads to some hypotheses to guide our analysis. 
 
What we can refer to as the formality hypothesis suggests that conditions will vary 
depending on the degree work is oriented towards satisfying the production of goods for 
the market or for the satisfaction of needs within the family. The more work is oriented 
to the formal market, the more formal the conditions in terms of regular work, level of 
pay and training received. Conversely the more work is oriented towards internal use by 
the family, the less formal the conditions, including less regular work, less likelihood of 
pay, lower levels of remuneration and less formal training.  On this basis we would 
expect more ‘formal’ conditions to be evident for family-owned production and consort 
workers, and less formal conditions to be evident for young people involved in 
household self-provisioning and care work. At the heart of this hypothesis is whether, 
because young people have fewer formal conditions in the family economy they become 
cheap and reliable sources of labour.  
 
Following the analysis used in Chapters Five and Six, decent work standards are 
operationalised using an adaptation of the ILO’s (2002) work securities. The following 
sections assess whether the formality of different types of family-based work is related to 
differences in conditions, either exploitative (less security and control, less pay, less 
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support) or beneficial, (greater security and control, more pay and more support). Table 
6.3 provides an overview of the analysis of work conditions in the family economy. It 
indicates how the concepts developed from the discussion of structural transformations 
in the family economy inform our hypotheses around work conditions, and how the 
work security measures map to these hypotheses.  
 
Table 6.3: Concepts, hypotheses and measures: Analysing work conditions on the family 
economy 
Concept Hypothesis 
Transformation of household from producing and consuming 
units in pre-industrial societies into consuming units in industrial 
and post-industrial societies. Household productive activities 
embedded in continuum from use-value (product consumed by 
household) to exchange-value (product sold on informal or 
formal market). 
 
Cultural expectations about economic value of children shifted, 
from children as economic contributors to children as economic 
dependants. Children’s contributions to family life raise issue of 
the balance between obligation and responsibility within the 
domestic sphere. 
Formality hypothesis: Young people have fewer formal conditions in the 
family economy compared to the formal economy, which translates into 
exploitation.  
 
The more work is oriented to the market the more formal the 
conditions. More ‘formal’ conditions for family-owned production and 
consort workers, less formal conditions for self-provisioning and care 
work. For work oriented to family-use, work time and family time 
seamless and pay via non- monetary goods. For production oriented 
externally family-based obligations tempered by pay and work-time 
distinct to family time.   
 
Relatedly, greater division between work and family is evident the more 
work is oriented towards the formal market. Greater demarcation 
between ‘work-life’ and ‘family-life’ evident for production for the 
formal market (family businesses and consort work), and less where 
work is for use-value for households (care work and household self-
provisioning). 
Decent Work Security 
Work security:  
 number of hours worked;  
 work regularity  
 
Longer working hours evident 
for work involving use-value by 
family because work-time and 
family-life more embedded.  
Time-based orientation of work 
for the market means regular 
work more likely for consort 
work and family-owned 
production. 
 
Income security:  
 likelihood of being 
paid;  
 level of remuneration 
 
Likelihood of being paid 
and level of remuneration 
highest in work oriented 
towards the formal market, 
replicating conditions on the 
formal market. 
 
Representation security: 
 fair say at workplace;  
 task autonomy;  
 control over breaks;  
 control over when worked  
 
Less control over work time 
(including control over breaks and 
when worked) for work oriented 
towards exchange–use. Greater 
task autonomy for work oriented 
towards internal needs of the 
family because timelines and 
routines dictated by the internal 
needs of the family, rather than 
the requirements of the external 
market.  
Skill reproduction security:  
 task instruction;  
 training;  
 workplace support;  
 skill development 
 
More formalised task instruction, 
training and skill development 
opportunities for work oriented to 
the market. However because 
work oriented towards family use 
is more closely embedded in 
family life, levels of support may 
arise out of everyday family 
interactions. 
 
6.5.1. Work Security and Commitment in the Family Economy 
Our discussion in the previous section has indicated the young people’s work in the 
family may be embedded in normal family activities, that work and family become 
blurred through the conduct of certain activities that we have marked out as having 
economic value to the household. Work may suffuse life so pervasively that children 
rarely have the time to get away from work, and young people may feel they may have to 
subordinate their own needs to collective family needs. Alternatively, family-based work 
may allow young people to set their own timeframes and control their own hours, 
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providing greater control and flexibility over hours worked (Appelbaum, 1984). For 
example, for household self-provisioning and care work, the time allocation of work 
revolves around the needs of family members rather than an external employer. 
Consequently, the focus may be on getting the task done, and breaking whenever needed, 
rather than doing the time or meeting externally set timetables. However we 
hypothesised that greater distinction between work-time and family time will be evident 
for work oriented towards exchange value.  Where goods are produced for the market 
working schedules may be out of the household’s control and work time determined by 
the volume of orders. Consistent with the analysis undertaken in Chapters Five and Six, 
two variables are examined to - the number of hours worked per week and the regularity 
of work (whether the work was one-off, as-needed or regular). The results are presented 
in Table 6.4.  
 
Table 6.4: Hours worked (two category) and regularity by family work category and 
demographic characteristics 
   
Work 11 hours + a 
Casualb Regular b 
Family Work Type Self-provisioning 0.58 (0.34) 0.51* (0.27) 0.94 (0.30) 
 Consort w parents 0.64 (0.33) 0.55* (0.28) 0.64 (0.32) 
 Family owned production 1.56**(0.16) 0.89 (0.24) 1.61* (0.27) 
 Care work=ref    
Age Twelve 0.71 (0.34) 2.28 (0.46) 1.46 (0.47) 
 Thirteen 0.76 (0.33) 2.04 (0.44) 1.41 (0.44) 
 Fourteen 0.92 (0.33) 2.36 (0.44) 1.52 (0.46) 
 Fifteen 1.34 (0.34) 1.68 (0.46) 1.21 (0.47) 
 Sixteen =ref    
Socio-economic status 11-25th quantile  0.79 (0.35) 2.09*(0.34) 2.03 (0.37) 
  26-50th quantile  1.23 (0.35) 1.85 (0.35) 1.70 (0.38) 
  51-75th quantile  0.58 (0.34) 2.27* (0.32) 1.95 (0.35) 
  76-90th quantile  0.38*(0.42) 1.56 (0.32) 1.48(0.36) 
  91-100th quantile  0.58 (0.48) 4.43** (0.52) 4.10* (0.55) 
  0-10th quantile (most 
disadvantaged) = ref 
 
  
CALD Non-Anglo Australian  1.11 (0.17) 1.27 (0.23) 1.33 (0.25) 
  Anglo-Australian=ref    
Gender Female 0.96 (0.14) 1.43 (0.19) 1.37 (0.20) 
 Male=ref    
Rurality Metropolitan  0.85 (0.25) 0.88 (0.30) 1.05 (0.33)  
 Rural coastal 0.69 (0.25) 2.14* (0.36) 2.20* (0.39) 
 Rural inland 1.07 (0.22) 1.54 (0.33 2.19* (0.35) 
 Sydney=ref    
Constant  0.43* (1.30) (6.96) (7.27) 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
a The reference category is: 1-10 hrs. 
b The reference category is: one-off. 
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Young people’s work commitments in the family economy are on-going, involve 
moderate hours but are relatively flexible. Overall approximately two-thirds of young 
people are involved in casual work (n=1096, 59.3%), one-third work regularly (n=583, 
31.5%) and just under ten percent of work is one-off (n=170, 9.2%). Demands in terms 
of hours worked are relatively moderate. Approximately 80 percent (n=1509, 82.0%) of 
respondents work 10 hours or less per week, with over half working 5 hours or less per 
week (n=1096, 59.3%). Approximately 10 per cent of respondents work 15 hours or 
more per week (n=181, 9.8%).  
 
Care work is most likely to involve casual, but relatively short hours commitment, with 
almost 80% working as needed or regularly and 10 hours or less per week (n=401, 
77.3%). Care work commitments are therefore ‘on-call’; the availability of young people 
is an essential feature that allows care work to be undertaken in response to a variety of 
family needs. Their time is flexibly available, normally for short to moderate periods of 
time.  
 
The time patterns for household self-provisioning and consort work suggest involvement 
in discrete tasks that can be differentiated from other household activities with both less 
likely to be casual than care work and less likely to be regular than family owned 
production. For consort workers this reflects time structured by standard workdays. 
Consort work is most strictly time-oriented in this sense, with clear start and finish times.  
For household self-provisioning the effect of substantive self-provisioning projects, 
involving discrete and distinctive projects from other aspects of domestic life, possibly 
explains these patterns. Yet neither are likely to involve regular working, suggesting they 
are opportunistic.  
 
Like care work and unlike household self-provisioning and consort work, family-owned 
production involve generalised obligations, with no evident time-horizon. Over one-fifth 
of young people who work in family-owned production are involved in regular or casual 
work involving 11 hours or more per week (n=309, 21.9%, including n=90, 12.3 % who 
work more than 10 hours per week on a regular basis). Family-owned production is 
therefore more likely to involve longer hours from young people, but in more predictable 
ways, similar to regular shifts on the formal market. For small scale retail enterprises this 
is likely to reflect extended operating hours to maximise opportunities for trade. Many 
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young workers may have restricted time for social lives and schoolwork, especially during 
weekends when business may be busiest (Song, 1997). However, as Tipple (2006) points 
out, the time spent minding a small shop may allow young people to combine their work 
with other tasks such as school work and may be engaged only at busy times or called on 
to ‘mind the shop’ if a parent or adult family member cannot (Frost, 2000; Tipple, 2006).   
 
Young people from wealthier backgrounds are less likely to work long hours, but more 
likely to work casually and regularly than other young people. Regular work 
commitments are also more likely in rural areas, independent of family work category, 
suggesting that work patterns may be linked to agricultural routines. 
 
6.5.2.  Income Security – likelihood and level of remuneration  
The likelihood of pay by family work category and socio-demographic characteristics of 
workers is presented in Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5: Likelihood of pay by family work category and Socio-demographic 
characteristics 
Compensation type (a)   Monetary Reward only 
Family Work Type Self-provisioning 1.66*(0.23) 1.30 (0.27) 
  Consort w parents 2.63***(0.27) 0.96 (0.33) 
 Family owned production 3.26***(0.19) 1.56*(0.22) 
  Care work=ref   
Age  1.03 (0.29) 0.89 (0.23) 
Socio-economic status  11-25th quantile  0.90 (0.31) 1.53 (0.36) 
  26-50th quantile  0.72 (0.31) 0.94 (0.38) 
  51-75th quantile  0.93 (0.29) 1.53 (0.35) 
  76-90th quantile  0.55*(0.30) 0.65 (0.37) 
  91-100th quantile  0.87 (0.38) 1.36 (0.45) 
  0-10th quantile (most disadvantaged) = ref . . 
CALD Non-Anglo Australian 0.58*(0.20) 1.24 (0.24) 
 Anglo-Australian=ref   
Gender Female 0.68*(0.16) 1.02 (0.20) 
  Male=ref .  
Rurality Metropolitan  1.87 (0.30) 1.35 (0.36) 
 Rural coastal 1.43 (0.30) 1.22 (0.36) 
 Rural inland 0.93 (0.27) 1.45 (0.32) 
 Sydney=ref .  
Intercept**  (0.17)** (0.19)  
a The reference category is: Neither pay or reward. 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
 
Overall the level of remunerated pay is far less than that observed in the informal and 
formal economies, suggesting some support for the formality hypothesis. Just over 70 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
Chapter Six: The Family Economy  - 191 - 
percent of young people in the family economy are paid for the work they do (n=1326; 
71.3%) and a further 16.8% (n=312) are provided non-monetary forms of remuneration. 
Approximately 12 percent (n=221; 11.9%) of young people are unpaid. The main 
differences within the family economy relate to likelihood of being paid monetarily. 
Young people working in self-provisioning are 1.7 times, consort workers 2.6 times and 
family owned production workers 3.3 times as likely to be paid as care workers. Males, 
young people from other metropolitan areas, young people from upper-middle class 
neighbourhoods and Anglo-Australian young people are more likely to be paid 
monetarily, but the effect is not as strong as for family work type.  In percentage terms, 
approximately 80 percent of consort workers and those involved in family owned 
production are paid for their work, compared to 58 percent (n=313) and 70.9 percent 
(n=224) of care workers and household self-provisioning workers respectively. 
Approximately 20 percent of care workers are unpaid for their work (19.3%; n=104), 
compared to 11.4 percent, 9.1 percent and 7.7 percent for household self-provisioning, 
consort work and family owned production respectively. The reward economy is least 
prevalent for consort workers (n=26; 10.3%), but again most prevalent among care 
workers (n=123; 22.8%).  
 
We find therefore that a significant number of young people work for no money or 
payment in kind. Monetisation of work is more likely to characterise work oriented 
towards production for the market rather than household use. This appears to explain 
the gendered pattern in these findings, as females are most likely to perform care work, 
which is also most likely to be unpaid,
45
 as are young people from minority cultural and 
linguistic backgrounds, who are more likely to be involved in family owned production.  
 
The prevalence of unpaid work among young people from minority cultural and 
linguistic backgrounds is consistent with Song’s research on ethnic family businesses. 
Few young people received a real wage for helping out, but most pointed to other forms 
of give and take between themselves and their parents. We also find some parallel in 
studies of children’s domestic labour. In Brannen’s (1995) study of children’s domestic 
work, parents from minority cultural backgrounds expressed opposition to monetary 
payment for household work. They drew upon collective household obligations and 
responsibilities to explain this opposition. In contrast parents of Anglo-Celtic 
                                                          
45
 Care work is also predominantly undertaken by females in the informal and formal 
economies, however it is generally paid in these economic contexts. 
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backgrounds offered payment as an incentive to do housework. According to authors 
such as Mehrotra and Calasanti (2010), Park (2000), Song (1999) Valenzuela (1999) and 
Faulstich Orellana (2001), these sorts of family-based obligations are more characteristic 
of minority cultural or immigrant households, who transfer cultural practices from their 
country of origin to their new homeland. However young people themselves may feel 
differently about the fairness and acceptability of such practices.  
 
As shown in the previous section likelihood of pay can be understood by the degree 
work is oriented towards the market and the gender and cultural background of young 
people. Isolating only those young workers who are paid we can also determine whether 
there are differences in hourly pay rates. From our hypotheses we would expect that 
work oriented towards the market is more likely to be more highly paid than work 
oriented towards use-value by the household. Pay rates by family work types is presented 
in Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6: Hourly pay rate by family work category 
Statistic Care Work Household Self-
provisioning 
Consort with 
family. 
Family owned 
production 
Family 
Economy  
Mean (S.E. mean) $6.65 ($0.49) $9.44 ($1.38) $13.02 ($1.00) $11.31 ($0.86) $10.14 ($0.48) 
95% CI mean (L-U) $5.68-$7.61 $6.72 - $12.16 $11.03 - $15.00 $9.63 - $13.00 $9.18-$11.10 
5% Trimmed Mean $5.71 $7.01 $11.82 $8.92 $8.11 
Median $4.00 $5.71 $8.00 $6.86 $6.67 
 
Mean pay rates in the family economy are approximately $10.00 per hour. Despite the 
lower likelihood of being paid in the first instance compared to the other economies, the 
hourly pay rate is comparable to pay levels in the informal economy, largely attributable 
to the high hourly rates for consort work and family owned production. This is less than 
the mean pay rates in the formal economy [family economy workers being paid 
approximately $2.00 per hour less on the mean and 5% trimmed mean (which minimises 
the influence of outlier and extreme values), than the formal economy]. Young people in 
family-owned production are also paid less compared to mean rates in the formal 
economy, although the differences are smaller (mean difference = $1.01; 5% trimmed 
mean difference = $1.41). Consort work, which in the family economy most closely 
resembles work on the formal labour market, is however, paid at comparable but slightly 
higher rates to young people who work in the formal economy (mean difference = $0.70; 
5% trimmed mean difference = $1.49). So while we find that pay rates are lower for work 
oriented towards use-value, confirming the hypothesis that obligation acts to suppress 
pay, this is not evident for all work across the family economy. 
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Within the family economy significant differences in pay rates are evident. As well as 
being least likely to be paid, care work is also the lowest paid. Comparing the 5% 
trimmed mean household self-provisioning and care work, are paid at similar rates ($1.30 
difference between the means for these types of work). However the differences between 
care work and household self-provisioning on one hand, and consort work and family 
owned production on the other are larger. These differences range from $1.91 (between 
household self-provisioning and family owned production) and $6.11 (between care work 
and consort work). The level of dispersion is also markedly different across categories of 
work, with work oriented to the formal economy more dispersed than work oriented 
towards family-use.  
 
As per the analysis presented in Chapters Four and Five, the inter-quartile range of 
hourly pay rates was calculated, from the lowest quartile of pay ($1.00 - $4.00 per hour) 
to the highest quartile ($12.01 or more). Using the lowest quartile of hourly pay rates as 
the reference group, multinomial logistic regression analysis was undertaken to determine 
whether the likelihood of receiving moderate and high pay rates were associated with 
family work category and socio-demographic characteristics of young workers. The 
results are presented in Table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7: Pay rates (inter-quartile range) by family work category and demographic 
characteristics 
   
26-50th percentile 
($4.01-6.67) 
51-75th percentile 
($6.68-12.00) 
76-100th ($12.01-
highest) 
Family work type Self-provisioning 1.24 (0.35) 1.27 (0.28) 1.93 (0.36) 
  Consort w parents 2.32*(0.36) 1.52 (0.32) 5.41***(0.34) 
 Family owned production  2.61**(0.28) 1.75*(0.23) 3.89***(0.29) 
  Care work = ref     
Age Twelve 0.97 (0.85) 0.24**(0.55) 0.09***(0.56) 
 Thirteen 0.94 (0.84) 0.47 (0.54) 0.16**(0.53) 
 Fourteen 1.65 (0.84) 0.50 (0.54) 0.34*(0.53) 
 Fifteen 2.33 (0.87) 0.82 (0.57) 0.54 (0.56) 
 Sixteen =ref    
Socio-economic status  11-25th quantile  0.84 (0.44) 0.62 (0.39) 0.77 (0.37) 
 26-50th quantile  1.04 (0.44) 1.10 (0.38) 0.51 (0.40) 
  51-75th quantile  0.81 (0.40) 0.76 (0.35)  0.55 (0.36) 
  76-90th quantile  0.39*(0.44) 0.49 (0.38) 0.26**(0.40) 
  91-100th quantile  0.46 (0.62) 1.13 (0.47) 0.68 (0.49) 
  0-10th quantile (most 
disadv.)=ref 
   
CALD Non-Anglo Australian  0.49*(0.29) 0.83 (0.25) 0.72 (0.26) 
  Anglo-Australian=ref    
Gender Female 0.53**(0.23) 1.08 (0.19) 0.78 (0.21) 
 Male=ref    
Rurality Metropolitan  0.97 (0.35) 0.89 (0.32) 0.80 (0.35) 
 Rural coastal 0.43*(0.39) 0.59 (0.34) 0.58 (0.37) 
 Rural inland 0.31**(0.38) 0.50*(0.32) 0.21***(0.39) 
 Sydney=ref    
Intercept  (0.93) (0.64) (0.65) 
0-25th percentile (lowest to $4.00) =ref 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
 
Across all pay rate quartiles, care work is least likely to be paid higher rates compared to 
family-owned production and consort work, with no significant differences between care 
work and household self-provisioning. These differences are, however, exaggerated at the 
high end of pay rates, with young people involved in consort work 5.41 and those 
involved in family owned production 3.89 times more likely than care workers to obtain 
the highest pay rates. The fact that young people involved in family owned production 
are paid at much higher rates indicates that the use of family labour to offset or reduce 
costs only partly explains differences in wage rates within the family economy. Rather the 
value of labour is set by the degree of embeddedness of work within the family. Work 
that more sharply differentiates between public and domestic spheres is paid more highly.  
 
We also see age-based differences in pay rates for the highest pay rates. While no 
differences are evident between 15 and 16 year olds, younger workers are between 0.09 
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times (for 12 year olds) and 0.34 times (for 14 year olds) to be paid the highest pay rates. 
This is likely to also reflect that the youngest workers are more likely to be involved in 
care work and household self-provisioning, which are paid at the lowest rates, and older 
workers engaged in consort work and family-owned production, which are paid at the 
highest rates. We also find a geographical distribution of pay rates. Compared to young 
people from Sydney, young people in rural inland areas are most likely to be paid the 
lowest rates, indicated in that they are less likely to be paid any of the higher pay rates. 
This is also the case for rural coastal areas for the second lowest pay-rate quartile. 
However, young people from rural areas are more likely to work in family owned 
production and less likely to be involved in consort work. This suggests that pay rates in 
family-owned production, that normally attracts relatively high pay rates, are suppressed 
in rural areas. This further supports that different economic structures create 
substantively different opportunity structures for family based work between rural and 
urban areas.  
 
6.5.3.  Representation Security: Participation and Task Autonomy 
Within the family economy, young people’s ability to contribute to decisions about work, 
exert control over when they do the work, the pace at which they perform work and how 
they perform the work depends on the conditions which their parents (or adult family 
member) set them. Additionally, for consort workers and for family owned production 
external clients or employers also determine conditions. We suggested in previous 
sections, therefore, that work oriented towards internal needs of the family might provide 
greater levels of control because family members, rather than the requirements of the 
external market dictate timelines and routines.  For work oriented towards the formal 
market the performance of work is likely to be dictated by the requirements of external 
timeframes, quality controls and outputs, which in turn may dictate how work is done 
and the timeframes in which the work is required to be performed.  
 
As per Chapters Four and Five, three facets of control and autonomy are analysed – 
control over work-time (‘I can take a break when I want to’; ‘I am free to decide when I 
take days off’; and ‘If I need to do something important the person I work for lets me 
change my work hours’); task autonomy which measures the extent children are 
independent in the overall division of labour, and thus have a specific niche in the family 
mode of production (‘I can do things my own way in my work’); and workplace 
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participation (‘I have a fair say about things at work’). The significant results are 
presented in Table 6.8.  
 
Table 6.8: Workplace participation, task autonomy and control, by family work category, 
socio-demographic and selected work characteristics 
 
Model I 
Fair say 
Model II 
Do things 
own way 
Model III 
Take break 
Model IV 
Take days off 
Model V 
Change 
Work hours 
      
Family work type Self-provisioning 
0.35**(0.32) 0.74 (0.15)   2.36** (0.27) 
  Consort w parents 
0.18***(0.36) 0.35***(0.19)   1.83 (0.37) 
 Family owned 
production 0.40**(0.32) 0.53* (0.19)   2.15* (0.36) 
 Care work=ref      
Age Twelve 
 0.24*(0.60) 2.87**(0.32)   2.47** (0.31)  
 Thirteen 
 0.26*(0.58) 2.98***(0.30) 2.56** (0.30)  
 Fourteen 
 0.21**(0.59) 2.12*(0.30) 2.13* (0.30)  
 Fifteen 
 0.22*(0.60) 2.29*(0.32)  1.97* (0.31)  
 Sixteen =ref      
Gender Female  1.38*(0.12)  1.34* (0.13)  
 Male=ref      
Rurality Other metropolitan    0.66 (0.22)  
 Rural coastal    0.51** (0.22)  
 Rural inland    0.47***(0.21)  
 Sydney=ref      
Hours 6-10 hours a week 
  0.80 (0.15) 0.77 (0.14)  
  11-15 hours a week 
  0.68 (0.22) 0.55** (0.21)  
  16 hours plus a 
week   0.60* (0.21) 0.74 (0.20)  
 0-5 hours a week 
=ref 
   
 
 
Constant  8.09***(0.50) 5.57*** (0.43) 2.08 (0.44) 1.04 (0.42) 3.46 (0.71) 
       
Disagree=ref 
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
Model I - I have a fair say about things that happen at work 
Model II - I can do things my own way in my job 
Model III – I can take a break when I want to in my job 
Model IV – I am free to decide when I can take days off work 
Model V - Need to do something important, person I work for lets me change work hours 
Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
Hosmer and Lemeshow not significant for all models, indicating goodness-of fit 
Family Typology: Care work = reference 
Work-regularity: One-off = reference 
Hours worked: 0-5 hours = reference 
Work hours and regularity were analysed but not reported for ‘Task autonomy’ and ‘Workplace 
participation’ as they were largely non-contributory. See text below. 
 
Over three-quarters of family workers (n=1302, 76.0%) are able to take a break when 
they want to and just over two-thirds are free to decide when they can take days off 
(n=1104, 68.0%). Approximately 70 percent of family workers have some degree of task 
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autonomy in their work and just over 80 percent feel as though they have a fair say about 
things that happen at work. However, over 90 percent of workers are able to modify 
their work patterns if something important occurs (‘If I need to do something important, 
the person I work for lets me change my work hours’). This indicates that for most 
young workers and their ‘employers’ there is a clear differentiation between work and 
children’s own commitments. Most young people are therefore able to negotiate the basis 
on which they provide their labour. In most cases family work obligations are not 
altogether binding and many young people report significant latitude to negotiate the 
terms of their work. However, sizeable minorities of young people are unable to exercise 
any substantial degree of autonomy or control, suggesting that binding family obligations 
exist for these young people.  
 
Family economy category is clearly associated with different aspects of control and 
autonomy. What can be negotiated and controlled arises from the framework of everyday 
activities, related to the specific context in which work is undertaken. Young people in 
family owned production and household self-provisioning have greater ability to 
determine when they work, being 2.15 times and 2.36 times more likely to change their 
work hours compared to young people who undertake care work. The idea that these 
young people are a freely available labour source at the disposal of their parents is not 
entirely supported here. However, nor is our guiding hypothesis that control over work 
time is undermined by the dictates of the formal market. Instead, because the family 
owns the means of production, young people may be able to exert some control over 
when they work. A significant amount of latitude over task performance is particularly 
evident for care work. Care workers are able to exert the most task autonomy and 
contribute to workplace decisions, which in this context would approximate family 
decision-making in relation to the work tasks performed. While these young people are 
most expected to be available to provide their labour, they have the greatest autonomy in 
the way they use that labour. Care work contains an element of latitude over task 
performance that is generally not characteristic of formal labour market jobs because care 
work occurs outside of adult surveillance. However because the demand for care is 
driven entirely by adult requirements, has lower temporal autonomy. 
 
Consort workers are least likely to be able to contribute to work related decisions or 
exercise autonomy. Young people in consort work are less than five times as likely to 
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have a fair say about things that happen at work and approximately one-third as likely to 
be able to do things their own way in their work.  These young people are therefore 
experiencing the demands of the formal labour market, most likely having to work to set 
deadlines where discrete projects are involved, or to the pace set by the adult family 
member. It is quite likely that participating in this sort of work is a matter of choice in 
the first instance, unlike other categories of family-based work, where the work is part of 
the fabric of family life. However, the sources through which young people are able to 
exercise control and autonomy on the job are doubly curtailed by the authority of the 
adult they work with (usually their parents) and performance expectations that are part of 
work on the formal economy.  
 
Longer working hours also diminish work control. Young people who work 16 hours or 
more per week are 0.6 times as likely to take a break when they want to compared to 
those who work less than 5 hours per week, and those who work 11-15 hours 0.6 times 
as likely to take days off when they need to. Younger workers are more likely to be able 
to exercise control over work time than older workers, who are less able to determine 
when they take a break and what days they can take off. This is likely to be related to 
older workers being involved in different types of work within the family economy but 
also, like the formal and informal economies, a reflection of age-related expectations 
mean that older workers are required to meet more exacting work standards with greater 
responsibilities. However these expectations are also matched by an increased ability to 
exercise responsibility through task autonomy. Sixteen year olds are between four and 
five times more likely to be able to do things their own way at work, compared to 
younger workers. Female workers and workers from urban areas are also able to exert 
certain forms of control and autonomy compared to male and rural workers. Young 
women are 1.34 times more likely than males to be able to determine when they work 
and 1.38 times more likely to perform tasks their own way.  Young people from rural 
areas are less likely to take days off, which is consistent with our findings on work-time 
commitment. This may reflect the set and ongoing demands of agricultural work. 
Notably neither socio-economic status nor cultural and linguistic background has any 
relationship with aspects of control and autonomy in family work. The factors associated 
with control and autonomy are instead associated with age, and to a certain extent 
gender, rather than class or cultural background.  
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6.5.4.  Skill reproduction Security: Support and Skill development at Work 
Skill reproduction security within the family economy reflects, to a certain degree, the 
quality of interpersonal relationships within the family.  This is because practices 
associated with skill development and supervision within the family economy are 
generated through intimate and affective relationships between family members. 
However such practices can be differentiated from other expressions of intimacy because 
the relations occur in the context of achieving an economic objective. The inclusion of 
children at a very early age in family work is central to the transmission of skills 
(Appelbaum, 1984). Hence the acquisition of skills is different to typical norms of 
socialisation because it has immediate concrete value and provides concrete returns.  
 
As per Chapters Four and Five, six questions were used to measure work-related support 
in the family economy - ‘The tasks I have to do are clearly explained to me’ and I get the 
training I need to do my job’ measure task instruction; ‘When I do a good job, I get told 
I do a good job’ and ‘The person I work for takes an interest in the work I do’ measure 
supervision and feedback; ‘I can get help from the people I work with if I ask for it’ and 
‘I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my work’ measure support provided to 
young workers in doing their work. Two variables measure skill development from work 
‘I am gaining skills from the work I do’ and ‘The experience I get working will give me 
advantages in the future’. These variables measure young people’s assessments of 
whether their current work will provide them with skills or other qualities that will be 
advantageous into the future. These were modelled against family work context, 
demographic characteristics and other work characteristics. The results are presented in 
Table 6.9. Only statistically significant results are reported.  
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Table 6.9: Support at work by family work category and socio-demographic characteristics  
 
Model I 
Training to 
do job 
Model II 
Employer 
Interest 
Model III 
Get help if 
ask 
Model IV: 
Advice 
good/bad 
Model V: 
Told do a 
good job 
Model VI: 
Gaining 
Skills. 
Model VII: 
Future 
advantage 
Family work type        
Self-provisioning 1.55*(0.19) 1.84* (0.27) 1.63 (0.31) 1.71* (0.25)  2.47* (0.38)  
Consort work 1.77**(0.20) 1.34 (0.27) 1.80 (0.33) 1.30 (0.25)  3.29* (0.34)  
Family owned prodn 2.47***(0.16) 1.82** (0.20) 3.09***0.27) 1.66* (0.19)  2.16* (0.27)  
Care work=ref        
Age        
Twelve    3.04* (0.54) 9.59*(1.08) 4.74*(0.53) 4.94* (0.81) 
Thirteen    2.44 (0.50) 2.50 (0.86) 3.92*(0.48) 3.73 (0.75) 
Fourteen    0.98 (0.47) 0.82 (0.82) 2.71 (0.48) 2.29 (0.72) 
Fifteen    0.97 (0.49) 1.20 (0.87) 1.85 (0.50) 1.31 (0.75) 
Sixteen =ref        
Socio-economic status        
11-25th quantile   1.40 (0.39)     
26-50th quantile    1.16 (0.40)     
51-75th quantile    1.30 (0.38)     
76-90th quantile    3.63* (0.54)     
91-100th quantile    0.98 (0.47)     
0-10th quantile (most 
disadv.)= ref 
   
  
  
CALD        
Non-Anglo Australian 0.69* (0.17)       
Anglo-Australian=ref        
Rurality        
Metropolitan  0.57 (0.39)  0.71 (0.28) 0.58 (0.62)   
Rural coastal  0.32*(0.44)  0.77 (0.29) 0.22*(0.62)   
Rural inland  0.49 (0.44)  0.56* (0.27) 0.60 (0.65)   
Sydney=ref        
 Constant 1.44 (0.44) 10.33*(0.63) 2.52 (0.64) 3.45* (0.53) 1.68 (3.38) 2.67 (0.66) 2.95 (0.71) 
        
Reference category= disagree *Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
Model I: I get the training I need to do my job;  
Model II: The person I work for takes an interest in the work I do;  
Model III: I can get help from the people I work with if I ask for it;  
Model IV: I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my work;  
Model V: When I do a good job, I get told I do a good job;  
Model VI: I am gaining skills from the work I do;  
Model VII: The experience I get working, will give me advantages in the future 
a The reference category is for dependent variables is Disagree.; Intercept included in all models 
Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
 
Similar to representation security, family work category most consistently explains 
differences in skill reproduction security relative to other work conditions or the social 
position of young people. The more work is oriented towards the formal labour market, 
the more extensive employer interest and help seeking avenues are for young workers in 
the family economy. On most indicators, care workers are least likely to obtain support 
or training, while young people involved in household self-provisioning and family 
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owned production are most likely to feel they are obtaining various forms of support and 
useable skills through their work. Relative to care workers, all other workers are between 
1.5 and 2.5 times more likely to report that they receive adequate training in how to do 
their work. Levels of ongoing support are also more likely to be reported by young 
people involved in household self-provisioning and family owned production. In 
particular young people in family owned production are more than three times as likely 
to obtain help from the people they work with if they ask for it. Young people in 
household self-provisioning are 1.7 times more likely to obtain feedback about how they 
are doing their work. Young people who undertake household self-provisioning and 
work in family owned production are also 1.8 times more likely to obtain ongoing 
supervision and feedback. 
 
Similar findings are evident for skill acquisition. Young people involved in family-owned 
production are 2.16 times, self-provisioning workers 2.47 times and consort workers 3.29 
times as likely as care workers to obtain skills from their work. However, no differences 
are evident for work providing long term benefits according to family work category, 
most socio-demographic characteristics or other work conditions, which most likely 
indicates that few young people see their work in the family context as providing tangible 
benefits for future educational or career prospects. The only exception to this is age, with 
12 year olds being almost five times as likely to consider that their family work will 
provide future advantage The lack of training and support for care workers reflects the 
taken-for-granted nature of care work in the family sphere. Care work, typically done 
while parents are absent, provides fewer opportunities to learn through cooperative work 
alongside adult family members. For household self-provisioning, consort work and 
family owned production, young people are in general provided with the training and 
supervision required because forms of mutual support are critical to the successful 
conduct of the work. Invernizzi (2003) points out that cooperative work of this nature 
also facilitates a transfer of responsibility within the household, giving young people an 
altered status because of their contribution. However this is largely denied for young 
people who provide care work because of the devaluation of care work more generally. 
 
There are few other meaningful relationships between the social position of young 
people and skill reproduction security. Rurality has some affect. Young people from rural 
coastal areas are 0.32 as likely for the person they work for to take an interest in the work 
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they do and 0.22 times to be given positive feedback on their work. Young people from 
rural inland areas are also half as likely to obtain feedback as to how competently they are 
performing their work. We might anticipate that younger workers are more likely to 
receive greater levels of supervision and support than older workers who may be trusted 
to work with limited supervision. However this is true in only a limited sense with 
younger workers being more likely to obtain advice as to how well they are working and 
receive positive reinforcement for working well. Even here the parameter estimates are 
only significant for twelve year olds. Young people from upper middle class 
backgrounds, those most likely to be involved in family owned production, are three 
times more likely than other workers to obtain help in their work if they ask for it. Young 
people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds are less likely to obtain training 
to do their work effectively.  
 
6.6.  Relational embeddedness in the family economy 
As discussed in Chapter Two, as an ideal-type, family based work is organised around 
achieving collective aims and, because labour is sourced through kinship relations, 
premised on obligation to the family group. Studies that have addressed the importance 
of family labour have tended to stress the instrumental use of and reliance upon family 
labour for the success of family modes of economic production. On this basis, because 
family based work involves the use of intimate relationships to meet instrumental 
outcomes, such studies emphasise the possibility for the transgression of the private 
sphere by institutional motivations (Edgell, 2006, Lovell-Troy 1980; Ram and Holliday, 
1993). Viviana Zelizer (2002) describes this as a ‘hostile worlds’ view of the relationship 
between money and intimacy - that the social world is divided between spheres organised 
around competing and incompatible principles. Zelizer goes onto show that in response 
to ‘Hostile World’ arguments there has been a strong response which she labels the 
‘Nothing But’ response, that is intimate relations are ‘nothing but’ a special example of 
economic rationality or culture. For our own purposes, the ‘Hostile World’ and ‘Nothing 
But’ views present two contrasting explanations for the relationship between family work 
and attitudes towards that work. From the ‘Hostile Worlds’ view, the entry of 
instrumental means such as monetization (measured here through instrumental attitudes 
around the use of money) into the worlds of caring and parent-child relations depletes 
these relations of their richness (and therefore we would anticipate intrinsic attitudes, 
measured here through work resulting in self-reliance, enjoyment and social contribution 
would be diminished). From the ‘Nothing But’ view we would expect that either payment 
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would be unrelated to intrinsic orientations or alternatively  attitudes towards work 
would reflect the quality of relationships within the family, and therefore reciprocity and 
intimacy potentially facilitates intrinsic outcomes through work. Furthermore, the act of 
payment, rather than diminishing intrinsic attitudes, gives recognition to the work and 
can act as a marker of social status within the family economy, resulting in young workers 
taking a sense of pride in their work. In this respect payment valorises, rather than 
transgresses, intimate social relations (England, 2000). 
 
Two main lines of enquiry are pursued here. First, we examine the prevalence of 
instrumental attitudes within the family economy, and the degree such attitudes differ 
with category of work. We then examine degrees of altruism and the extent of intrinsic 
orientations on the family economy such as appreciation, recognition and approval 
through meeting family obligations. We would anticipate that work that is oriented 
towards exchange on the market would be more likely to exhibit instrumental attitudes. 
Conversely, work that is oriented towards use by the family would be more likely to 
exhibit intrinsic attitudes. The alternative, as mentioned, is that more formal conditions 
valorise intrinsic attitudes. Table 6.10 maps out these lines of enquiry and associated 
hypotheses, and how the variables that are used to measure these attitudes map to the 
hypotheses. 
 
Table 6.10: Concepts, hypotheses and measures: Analysing instrumental and intrinsic 
attitudes on the family economy 
Concept Hypothesis 
The entry of instrumental means such as monetization into 
the worlds of caring, parent-child relations potentially depletes 
these relations of their richness. 
 
Alternatively, family-based work emphasise reciprocity within 
symmetrical groups, based on logics of collectivity and may 
mean that young workers are treated with positive affect.  
 
The more work is oriented to exchange value, greater levels of 
instrumental attitudes; and more work oriented towards use-
value, greater levels of intrinsic and altruistic attitudes.  
 
 
 
Work Orientation 
Instrumental Attitudes:  
 control over income;  
 cover expenses;  
 covers discretionary wants  
 
Instrumental attitudes more evident in family owned 
production and consort work, because they are less embedded 
in the normal routines of family life and oriented towards 
exchange use on the market.  
 
Intrinsic Attitudes:  
 altruism;  
 responsibility;  
 build relationships;  
 social utility;  
 self-reliance;  
 enjoyment 
 
Care work and household self-provisioning exhibit greater 
levels of intrinsic attitudes because family members may be 
contributing their labour to common family projects, family 
interdependence may develop through an organic division of 
labour, contributing to a sense of usefulness among children. 
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The results are presented in the following sections. 
 
6.6.1.  Instrumental Orientations - Pay 
Three variables are used to measure ‘instrumental’ attitudes in the family economy. These 
are whether working provides control over income, allows the young person to cover 
their expenses or allows them to buy what they want. These measures are to a certain 
extent, epiphenomenal to the concept of an ‘attitude’ or ‘orientation’ in that the benefit is 
also a measure of the reason to work. However, as discussed in Chapter Three, the 
benefits obtained from working and the reasons to work, are related rather than disparate 
phenomenon that individuals can differentiate at different stages of the labour 
experience. All three variables measure the extrinsic orientations associated with 
individual payment and gain. They are the subjective counterparts of income as a 
measure of extrinsic rewards from work (Frey, 2002). The logistic regression models 
examining the likelihood of instrumental attitudes across family work category, socio-
demographic characteristics and other work characteristics are presented in Table 6.11. 
Again, only significant results are reported. 
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Table 6.11: Instrumental attitudes by family work type, socio-demographic and selected 
work characteristics 
 
Model I 
Control income 
Model II 
Cover expenses 
Model III 
Buy what I want 
    
Age Twelve 3.42*(0.62)  0.27 (0.84) 
 Thirteen 2.56 (0.58)  0.27 (0.83) 
 Fourteen 2.19 (0.56)  0.25 (0.82) 
 Fifteen 1.42 (0.61)  0.17* (0.84) 
 Sixteen =ref    
Rurality Metropolitan 
1.97 (0.49)  0.93 (0.33) 
 Rural coastal 
3.71* (0.47)  0.49* (0.35) 
 Rural inland 
1.53 (0.43)  0.68 (0.34) 
 Sydney=ref    
Hours 6-10 hours a week   1.75* (0.23) 
  11-15 hours a week   0.69 (0.33) 
  16 hours plus a week   1.27 (0.35) 
 0-5 hours a week =ref    
Regularity Casual   1.26 (0.31) 
  Regular   2.04* (0.34) 
 One-off=ref    
Remuneration type Monetary 
5.87* (0.77) 6.54*** (0.19) 4.41* (0.65) 
 Reward only 
1.11 (1.14) 3.27*** (0.23) 7.04 (1.28) 
 No pay or reward = ref    
Hourly rate 26-50th ($4.01-6.67) 2.71*(0.46)  1.03 (0.29) 
 51-75th ($6.68-12.00) 1.28 (0.35)  1.69*(0.26) 
 76-100th ($12.01-
highest) 
2.77*(0.42)  
2.14*(0.30) 
 0-25th percentile (lowest 
to $4.00)=ref 
  
 
 Constant  0.73 (1.07) 1.11 (1.10) 1.99 (0.99) 
     
*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
Model I - Working means I have some control over my own income. 
Model II - Working means I can cover some of my own expenses 
Model III - Working means I can buy what I want 
The reference category is: Disagree  
Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
 
Unlike the informal economy, where exchange-use attitudes are related to the social 
relations of work, family economy categories have little relationship with exchange use. 
When considered with other variables, the effects of family economy category are not 
statistically significant. Instrumental attitudes are therefore consistent across the family 
economy, and have more to do with work conditions and the social value of money for 
different groups of young people.  The strongest parameter estimates are associated with 
payment. Young people who are paid are almost six times as likely to be able to control 
their income, over six times as likely to be able to cover expenses and more than four 
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times as likely to buy what they want. Young people who are paid in the highest quartile 
of pay rates are also between 1.6 and 2.8 times to be able to buy what they want and 
control their income as a result of work (although young people who are paid moderately 
low pay rates are also 2.7 times as likely as those paid in the lowest quartile of rates to be 
able to control their income). However, social class is non-significant, indicating that 
instrumental attitudes are linked with monetisation but not economic need. Few other 
patterns are evident. Rural coastal workers are able to exert control over their income, 
indicating some level of individuated payment, but less likely to be able to buy what they 
want from their work. Sixteen year olds are most likely to be able to buy what they want, 
but the only significant difference is between fifteen and sixteen year olds. Conversely 12 
years olds are approximately three times more likely to indicate that work means that they 
can control their income, suggesting that family-based work may provide an introduction 
into paid work for the youngest workers in this study. Regular workers and moderate 
short hour workers are also approximately twice as likely to be able to buy what they 
want from working.  
 
Our findings suggest even though they may feel young people obliged to work for family; 
payment has a significant relationship with instrumental attitudes. Finch (1989) suggests 
that within kin relations the balance and direction of giving and receiving alters over 
time, young children receiving, with the expectation they will give when they become 
adults. The importance of pay in the results presented here suggests that with young 
people who work for family take a role in the interstices between the giver –receiver 
roles, as they give through their labour, but expect to receive something in return as 
workers, but also as dependants. This is more consistent with Zelizer’s (2002) and 
Nelson and England’s (2002) work on commodification of care, that argues against 
dichotomising views that position care and markets as antithetical. For the young people 
in the family economy, feelings of love, familial solidarity and obligation appear to exist 
alongside instrumental values of work providing capacity to spend and control money in 
an individualised way. The relationship between payment and intrinsic attitudes is 
examined in the next section.  
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6.6.2. Intrinsic Orientations  
In the previous section we found instrumental attitudes reflect pragmatic opportunities 
that arise from being paid. However to what extent are these instrumental attitudes 
tempered by altruistic or obligation attitudes?  
 
As per the previous two chapters, the variable “Working means I can help out at home 
financially’ is used as a measure of altruistic use of income. This is distinct from the 
utilitarian uses of income because it measures contribution to household, rather than 
personal, uses of income. Although a young person may expect specific modes of 
reciprocity from other household members in return for their work, financial 
contributions to the household are likely to contribute to generalized modes of 
reciprocity, with no expectation of immediate rewards. Rather young people who 
contribute income to their family may be doing so as part of a sequence of exchanges 
that are ongoing and ambiguous. Five other measures are used to operationalise non-
instrumental attitudes, which within the family economy are likely to reflect recognition 
of the value of work by parents and other significant adults. These variables include 
whether work provides a sense of responsibility, opportunity to build social connections, 
sense of social utility, self-reliance and enjoyment. Despite occurring within a context of 
obligation to family, through their work, young people may feel as though they are 
making a worthy contribution to the functioning of their family. This may be reflected in 
young people feeling they have greater responsibility and are doing something useful46. 
As for previous sections, logistic regression modelling was undertaken for each variable. 
Independent variables include family work category, socio-demographic characteristics 
and other work characteristics. Significant results are presented in Table 6.12. 
  
                                                          
46 For example Invernizzi’s (2003) study of child labour in Portugal and Peru, found that forms of mutual 
support within the family involved children taking responsibility for shared family projects, leading to 
overall improvements in family standard of living.  
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Table 6.12: Intrinsic work attitudes by family work type, socio-demographic and selected 
work characteristics 
 
Model I 
Help at home 
(altruism 
Model II 
Responsibility 
Model III 
Build 
relationships 
Model IV 
Something 
Useful 
Model V 
Self-reliance 
Model VI: 
Like work 
Family work type       
Self-provisioning 1.29 (0.16) 0.75 (1.50)   0.73 (0.38)  
Consort work 1.07 (0.17) 0.04** (1.16)   0.42*(0.44)  
Family owned prodn 1.47** (0.13) 0.26 (1.13)   0.49 (0.42)  
Care work=ref       
Age       
Twelve  6.24 (1.05)  9.29* (1.01)  5.32** (0.52) 
Thirteen  8.50* (0.97)  3.08 (0.77)  4.37** (0.49) 
Fourteen  12.82* (1.08)  2.19 (0.77)  3.95** (0.49) 
Fifteen  1.55 (0.93)  1.59 (0.79)  2.07 (0.50) 
Sixteen =ref       
Socio-economic status       
11-25th quantile 1.32 (0.33)      
26-50th quantile  1.06 (0.32)      
51-75th quantile  0.90 (0.30)      
76-90th quantile  0.50* (0.32)      
91-100th quantile  0.44* (0.39)      
0-10th quantile (most 
disadv.)=ref 
 
     
Gender       
Female 0.52*** (0.17)      
Male=ref       
Rurality       
Other metropolitan 0.99 (0.27)  1.04 (0.38) 1.26 (0.58)  1.16 (0.40) 
Rural coastal 0.43** (0.29)  0.38* (0.390 1.69 (0.63)  0.42* (0.40) 
Rural inland 0.63 (0.28)  0.63 (0.39) 6.43* (0.84)  0.82 (0.39) 
Sydney=ref       
Remuneration type       
Monetary  2.99** (0.33)  1.87* (0.30) 1.86* (0.22) 1.89** (0.19) 
Reward only  3.32* (0.49)  2.11 (0.41) 1.72 (0.29) 2.30** (0.26) 
No pay or reward = ref       
Hourly rate       
26-50th ($4.01-6.67)   2.01*(0.35) 0.33*(0.53)  1.46 (0.35) 
51-75th ($6.68-12.00)   2.33**(0.31) 2.32 (0.65)  1.31 (0.29) 
76-100th ($12.01-highest)   1.86*(0.32) 0.83 (0.54)  2.80**(0.34) 
0-25th percentile (lowest to 
$4.00)=ref 
 
   
 
 
Constant 1.21 (0.81) 19.88 (1.96) 1.95 (0.19) 1.04 (1.35) 5.45 (0.20) *** 0.28 (0.92) 
       
The reference category is: Disagree *Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 
Model I: Working means I can help out at home financially 
Model II: Work gives me a sense of responsibility 
Model III: Work gives me opportunities to build relationships 
Model IV: Work makes me feel I am doing something useful 
Model V: Working means I can rely on myself more 
Model VI: I like the things I do at work 
Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate. 
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According to our formality hypothesis, work oriented to use by the family should exhibit 
greater altruistic attitudes.  However the results do not fully support this hypothesis. 
Compared to care workers, young workers in family owned production are 1.5 times and 
those involved in household self-provisioning 1.3 times as likely to help out at home 
financially. However type of remuneration and level of pay are not significant, suggesting 
that collective contributions do not rely on monetization either valorising altruistic 
attitudes or crowding such attitudes out. We can only make sense of these results if we 
consider the concrete context of the work involved. Young people in family-owned 
production are self-consciously involved in income producing activities with their family, 
and thus understand that their activities directly contribute to household income. 
Something similar can be said for substantive forms of self-provisioning. Like family 
owned production, this type of work involves collective effort on the part of family 
members and can be directly linked to diminishing cash-outflows. Consort work on the 
other hand, which is most similar to care work in terms of levels of altruism, is reliant 
upon individual employment relations. Children who work in consort with family are 
involved in more conventional employer-employee relationships. Their work is not 
related to a household strategy and the remuneration they obtain is individualised. Unless 
these young people contribute their wages directly to household income, there would be 
no basis upon which they are contributing to family income. Care work, which is most 
privatised, may not be socially marked out as an activity that contributes economically. 
What this indicates is not that children use wages directly to help out at home, as an 
independent contribution to household income, but that their work is part of a 
household strategy whose direct purpose is to create income, which also helps explain 
why remuneration type and pay rate are non-significant. 
 
The previous section established that social class is not related to exchange use attitudes. 
In regards to altruistic attitudes, however, wealthier young people exhibit the lowest 
levels of altruistic attitude, with young people from the second most and wealthiest 
neighbourhoods being 0.50 and 0.44 times as likely to show altruistic attitudes. This 
suggests that poor and middle class families utilise their children to directly contribute 
income and assist in overall household functioning, whereas for wealthier young people, 
the conventional view that income from work is used for personal uses holds. Within 
wealthier families there is less need to use the income generated from young people’s 
work. In poorer households however, the reverse is likely to hold true, a finding that is 
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also consistent with the most disadvantaged households using family labour (see Section 
6.4.1).  Notably, young women are half as likely to exhibit altruistic attitudes, which again 
may be related to the undervaluation of care work.   
 
While care work is least associated with altruistic attitudes, because it is an activity that is 
not marked out as having economic worth, care workers are most likely to feel their work 
provides them with a sense of responsibility and self-reliance compared to young people 
involved in other categories of work. This suggests that the responsibilities involved in 
caring and the autonomy with which it is undertaken, differentiates care work from other 
types of work, which are more likely to be undertaken in conjunction with other family 
members. Therefore while care workers do not feel they are contributing to the 
household economy (our measure of altruism), the ongoing commitments and 
responsibilities of young care workers evidence modes of generalised reciprocity which 
are also related to feelings of self-reliance (Sahlins 1974). Finch (1989) calls the moral 
character of these relations ‘prescriptive altruism’ a form of ‘sharing without reckoning’. 
(1989: 303). This was particularly evident in the descriptions of collective and social 
reproduction care work in Section 3.2. Consort workers are 0.04 times as likely for their 
work to provide a sense of responsibility and 0.42 times as likely for the work to provide 
a sense of self-reliance. Consort workers are least able to exercise control and autonomy 
in their work, which may be an important factor in generating feelings of being 
responsible. Notably, other intrinsic qualities are not associated with family work 
category. 
 
Similar to our findings regarding altruism, money marks an activity as having social value 
and therefore being something worthy of recognition. The act of payment valorises 
intrinsic attitudes, receives greater support in these results. Young people who are paid 
and rewarded are approximately three times more likely to obtain a sense of 
responsibility and approximately twice as likely to enjoy their work. Young people who 
are paid are also almost twice as likely to feel they are doing something useful and feel 
self-reliant through work. Furthermore pay rates are associated with intrinsic attitudes. 
Compared to young people who are paid the lowest rates, other young people are 
between 1.8 and 2.4 times to be able to build relationships through work and for those 
paid the highest rates, 2.8 times as likely to enjoy their work.  
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Similarly intrinsic orientations are significantly associated with age. Younger workers, 
those fourteen years of age or less, display markedly different levels of intrinsic attitudes 
compared to young people fifteen years or older. Younger workers are more likely for 
work to provide a sense of responsibility and to enjoy the work they do. Twelve year olds 
are almost 10 times more likely to feel they are doing something useful through their 
work for family. For younger children, their engagement in family based work may be 
one of the first experiences through which they are obtaining a more ‘adult-like’ status, 
and therefore of feeling responsible and useful. The gratification gained through work 
can involve, on the one hand, pride at their achievement, and, on the other, approval 
from adults. Wihstutz (2007) found children used work responsibilities as a means to 
transcend the ‘childhood space of play’ to which they were ascribed. They were 
particularly proud when they experienced approval and were treated in a way that altered 
the hierarchical relationship between children and adults. This also corresponds with the 
findings on Representation Security, with younger workers being far more likely to be 
able to exercise control over their work. Family work obligations are also potentially 
stricter for older children than younger children, reflecting how parents and adult family 
members expect more from them. Additionally, rural inland workers are more likely to 
feel they are doing something useful through their work. This may be linked to how 
forms of substantive self-provisioning, that are more likely to be undertaken in rural-
inland areas can, as Nelson (1999b) points out carry access to other valued social and 
personal resources, such as opportunities to engage in sociability and receive public 
recognition of skills and abilities.  
 
6.7.  Conclusion to Chapter Six 
In mapping out family based work, we have discovered that a broad range of work 
activities take place that have the family as their hub, spanning from care work within the 
‘private sphere’ of the home to the operation of family businesses that are fully integrated 
into the ‘public sphere’ of the formal economy. The range of activities young people 
perform highlights the significant economic contributions young people make to their 
households, and from which adults benefit.  
 
Involvement in family work cannot be assumed to be positive nor can it be summarily 
depicted as exploitative either. Instead, objective conditions are influenced by the degree 
to which work is undertaken, especially whether work is undertaken for use or exchange. 
Across a range of work conditions there is a clear distinction between work oriented to 
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the family and work oriented to the market. For example, work oriented towards the 
formal market (family owned production and consort work) provides income directly to 
the individual who produced what is paid for. For work oriented towards the household, 
particularly care work, it is less likely that payment will be made at all, and if income is 
generated, most likely via household self-provisioning, payment is made to the family as a 
whole. That is, however they are divided up for consumption, the outputs of labour are 
conceptually indivisible and belongs to the household as a whole. In terms of work 
commitments, we find similarly that the nature of work structures the time commitments 
involved. Care work commitments are ‘on-call’ but the time expected translates into a 
system of exchanges, which are discrete, but over time are reciprocal, indeterminate and 
continuous, which constitute part of the fabric of family life. For family-owned 
production the demands are more onerous but regulated by the ongoing running of 
family businesses. The time patterns for household self-provisioning and consort work 
reflect discrete tasks-oriented work that can be differentiated from other family activities.  
 
Autonomy within family-based work can be used to indicate the degree of 
interdependence that children may experience through their work, and thus the degree 
other family members rely on them to perform the work independently. The exercise of 
autonomy and control by young people in the family economy brings into relief how a 
sense of mutual need and interdependence is established between parents and young 
people. However we also find that the exercise of autonomy and control in the family 
economy relies partly the formality of the work. Care work involves significant task 
discretion, household self-provisioning and family owned production involves capacity to 
control work time and pace because the family owns the means of production and the 
work is task-oriented. Consort workers are least able to exercise control because these 
young people are most exposed to the formal market in an individualised way.  
 
Young people’s work in the family economy is characterised by the coexistence of 
altruism and instrumentality. Family life, as manifested in the forms of work undertaken 
by young people investigated here, is characterised by a mix of motivations, some of 
which are traditionally identified with family life and others that are traditionally 
associated with market exchange. These motivations do not transgress some ideal-type of 
family life but reflect how different aspects of the same interpersonal relations are 
marked out with different practices, which are experienced as varied obligations, rights 
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and exchange.  Neither ‘Hostile Worlds’ or ‘Nothing But’ explanations adequately deal 
with the intersection of intimate relations and commodification of young people’s labour 
through pay which perhaps characterises the family economy more than the other 
economic contexts examined in this thesis. What we have found instead is that the 
various types of work on the family economy encompass both instrumental tasks and 
affective relations. We find that not only care work, but other forms of work performed 
by young people on the family economy are motivated by altruism and are associated 
with some intrinsic orientations. The monetisation of these tasks however, does not 
diminish the intrinsic aspects of the work, but for several intrinsic attitudes, marks out 
the activity performed by young people as something valuable. 
 
Means of marking out an activity as having social and economic value not only include 
pay and reward, but also disembedding the task from ongoing family practices (i.e. 
separating an activity from day-to-day routines) or highlighting how a task requires 
specialised skills. These ways of giving an act social status are often interconnected, in 
that tasks that are paid are often discrete and involve specialised skills. Young people in 
family-owned production are slightly more likely to believe they are helping out at home 
financially. Because these young workers are involved in income producing activities with 
their family, they are more likely to recognise that their work contributes to a household 
strategy whose direct purpose is to create income. A similar logic can be used to explain 
household self-provisioning, which involves a collective household strategy that saves 
money, rather than produces income directly. On the other hand, children who work in 
consort with family are involved in more conventional employer-employee relationships 
and are therefore likely to be paid directly. Their work is not necessarily related to a 
household strategy that is either income generating or saving. The remuneration they 
obtain is individualised, being their own. Care work, being socially devalued and 
privatised is least likely to be remunerated, and least recognised as making an economic 
contribution to the household.  
 
It is in this respect that we have ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the family economy. Those who 
are not paid are not only denied individual income but also the social recognition 
communicated through being paid. In the family economy, money reflects respect and 
gratitude for social contribution. Young people who perform work that can be marked 
out or which directly contributes in a collective manner are acknowledged either through 
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payment or social recognition as assets to their families. The marked contributions 
children make to the family economy, then, have the potential to affect their position vis-
à-vis adults within the family, as other than being a dependent, as Hungerland et al. 
(2007) point out. However this recognition is less likely to be experienced by young 
people involved in work that involves general obligations that most closely resemble the 
day-to-day functioning of the family, such as care work. Gender is perhaps most salient 
in this respect. Young people’s involvement in the family economy is as sex segregated as 
their parents' world of work, or perhaps more. The strong effect of gender on the type of 
work performed, regardless of the specific category in which such work is undertaken, 
suggests that the gender assignment of children's tasks is a powerful societal norm, which 
begins early in life. Young women dominate care work, are least likely to be paid and are 
paid less than males. Young women’s contributions are naturalised as part of the 
gendered division of labour, subsumed within the day to day functioning of the family as 
care work or regular self-provisioning, and are therefore not as visible. Young men’s 
work is instead marked out as distinct from the ordinary running of the household and 
therefore is seen to tangibly contribute financially. The distinctiveness of men’s work 
serves to justify a different economic value being attached to the activities of males and 
females.  
 
A significant feminist literature exists that point out the devaluation of care work, 
(England, 2005). Our results show that the devaluation of care work specifically, and of 
work oriented towards family-use more broadly, is also evident for young people. This is 
further compounded by the construction of children as dependent and economically 
useless. The qualities usually associated with care work are not those usually associated 
with childhood because childhood is constructed as a period of incompetence and 
irresponsibility. Teenagers must demonstrate maturity and responsibility if they are to 
move out of the stigmatised status of adolescent, and yet because adolescence is seen as a 
time of irresponsibility they are given few opportunities to demonstrate qualities essential 
for their admission as adults. This in part also explains the devaluation of care work 
undertaken by young people. While taking responsibility should result in being valued the 
taking on of this responsibility may not be recognised by adults and young carers 
themselves. Hungerland et. al (2007) suggest this transference of work responsibilities is 
legitimised by parents through the didactic benefits children obtain from this work (see 
also Zeiher, 2004). However the pedagogical benefits rarely correspond with the sort of 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
Chapter Six: The Family Economy  - 215 - 
work children identify as being serious activities through which they can exercise their 
capabilities. Their inferior status is instead cemented because this kind of work is not 
socially valued. While taking on many adult-like responsibilities, young people who care 
are often not given the opportunity to attain adult like rewards like pay. This disjuncture 
between the exercise of responsibility and how little carers receive in return can serve to 
lower acceptance or satisfaction with work. This may therefore explain why care workers 
feel responsible themselves, but are less likely to gain other rewards, either through pay, 
or social recognition. 
 
Parental employment patterns appear to enable and constrain different forms of family-
based employment also, especially work most oriented towards the formal market. The 
wealthiest young people are least likely to work in consort with their parents, who are 
likely to be professionals and therefore involved in work that provides few opportunities 
for young people. Upper-middle class young people are most likely to work in family 
owned production. Rather than being small-scale low-end enterprises, at least some of 
these family-owned businesses are middle-class enterprises, typical of petit bourgeois 
arrangements. We also find that there is some merit in arguments that suggest that lower-
income households engage in household self-provisioning out of economic necessity and 
also that that households who have more networks through paid employment, greater 
ownership of tools necessary for production, and greater capacity to purchase 
manufactured goods engage in household self-provisioning also. The significance of 
utilising young people’s labour is therefore not limited to working class or poor 
communities.  Nor is there a linear relationship that suggests that poorer families are 
more likely to use young people’s labour in more privatised, ‘hidden’ forms out of 
necessity and wealthier families in more public types of work.  
 
Age related notions of competence are also evident in the distribution of family-based 
work, with younger children being involved in private modes of work and older children 
in public modes of work. Older workers are less able to exercise control and task 
autonomy, and hence while their obligations are greater, are less able to exercise 
responsibility in their work compared to younger workers. As discussed earlier, for 
younger children, involvement in family based work may be one of the first experiences 
in which they can exercise meaningful levels of responsibility and autonomy. For older 
adolescents, family work may instead be experienced as a constraint on financial and 
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personal independence as they become to understand the limits of their parents’ reliance 
upon them. Questioning the family work contract may precipitate a move to pursuing 
work on the formal economy, with the attendant material and social rewards that work 
outside the family economy entails.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
In this final chapter we return to the key questions identified in the first chapter and more 
directly compare the three economies examined in the previous three chapters. Four key 
areas have been central to the analysis, and we return to each of these in turn. Firstly the 
relational definition of work that centers on the nature of appropriation is discussed and 
how the specifics of this appropriation delimit our framework of analysis. Only by 
explicating this framework can we make sense of the other three aspects of analysis - the 
structural factors that delimit and enable economic agency across each economy; the social 
distribution of different forms of work; and the extrinsic and intrinsic orientations evident 
across the economies. In so doing we assess how social relations influence the conditions, 
meaning and experience of work.  
 
The conception of economic agency that has underpinned the analysis and which is reflected 
in the structure adopted in this thesis is action constituted intersubjectively, that occurs 
within the parameters set by and enabled through structures of social space. This has been 
operationalised as having two elements: structural embeddedness- the socio-structural 
context that shapes the dispositions and choices of individual actors; and relational 
embeddedness - the immediate interpersonal and organisational context of work, which can 
be analysed in terms of forms of motivation, justification and understandings/meanings of 
action. These form the ‘rules’ or characteristics of the ‘field’ in which work occurs.  What 
this thesis has demonstrated is that agency is expressed through social fields of action, 
empirically represented as economies. Analysis of the three economies shows that social and 
economic structures define the economies children work in – the formal, informal and 
family based economies – and aspects of social integration and social group identification -–
namely gender, class cultural identity and age – are important in determining how work is 
experienced. These factors not only delimit children’s capacity to assert their agency, but 
enable action by providing the social environment that legitimates certain types of activities 
as work, and through interactions with other social actors in these specific social 
environments, make these activities meaningful as work.  
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By situating children as active subjects within processes of production across different 
economies a type of ‘de-objectification’ results that broadens our understanding of children’s 
agency and competence in several ways. The exercise of specific forms of agency depends on 
the field within which it is enacted. The meaning of agency is context-specific. Economic 
agency is not autonomy, but the possibilities for exercising agency are always in relation to 
the specific social environment and the broader socio-structural factors that determine that 
environment. This is perhaps crucial, because where agency is ascribed to children in 
economic discourse it is understood as the enactment of preference within constraint, which 
is merely a variant of neo-classical economic understanding of human action. Instead we 
have shown that structures both enable and constrain agency.   On the formal economy, the 
deployment of skill that arises out of a polarization of primary and secondary jobs, especially 
within the service sector, in large part determines the economic agency of young people. 
Within the informal economy, the nature of relationships within community, whether 
universal or particular, or strong and weak, partly determine economic agency. Within the 
family economy it is the degree to which work is oriented towards exchange-value or use-
value that determines the nature of economic agency. 
 
Relatedly agency is expressed in a diversity of ways – that is the content of agency is more 
than choice oriented towards the accomplishment of a purpose or results. Pointing out field 
specific motivating logics of action, such as reciprocity, altruism and instrumental action, 
challenges how children are constructed in economic discourse more generally, as costs, 
burdens, passive consumers and coerced cheap labour. This is because logics of action, such 
as reciprocity and altruism, are not ascribed to children in these typical constructions and in 
these constructions children are objectified. Children’s contribution to the family economy 
defies constructions of children as household costs to be accounted for within household 
budgeting. Furthermore the care work that children perform within families, as employees 
on the formal economy and within the informal economy shows that children are not only 
dependent ‘care burdens’, but also providers of care to others. The importance of intrinsic as 
well as extrinsic orientations means that children do not only work to consume. Furthermore 
we have shown commodification of work through payment also buttresses, rather than 
displaces, intrinsic orientations towards work. The value placed on enjoying work, not 
merely as providing future marketable skills, means that young people value work as 
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providing more than human capital. Despite the importance of age as an analytical category, 
a productivist and developmentalist orientation towards work is not evident in isolation 
from other goals and values.  
 
Specifically, we have attempted to understand children’s economic agency through an 
analysis of the work they perform. We have argued that an adequate conceptualization of 
children as economic agents has two elements – understanding the structures that delimit 
and define work environments (what we described as ‘structural embeddedness’), and how 
these social structures are experienced as interactions between individuals within these work 
contexts (what we described as ‘relational embeddedness’). The first element is examined in 
understanding the nature of appropriation and the social forces that have constituted and 
transformed these economies. The second element is assessed in understanding the 
distribution of intrinsic and extrinsic orientations across the economies. What bridges these 
elements is whether work acts as a form of social integration or division among different 
social groups of young people. The implications of these themes are discussed in this 
chapter, the discussion unfolding with a similar structure employed in the thesis overall. We 
initially discuss how the nature of appropriation defines the fields of economic action, before 
examining the specifics of structural embeddedness for the formal, informal and family 
based economies. We bring together the threads of the empirical analysis to examine the 
distribution of work opportunities and work securities across the different economies, 
before discussing the implications of our findings on work orientations for understanding 
economic agency. Returning to our initial research aims, we conclude by drawing out some 
implications of this thesis for the study of childhood and for future research. 
 
Appropriating Children’s Labour - Defining the fields of economic 
action 
In Chapter One we described that not only popular discourse, but also careful research 
studies of children’s work, often rely on restrictive definitions of work that capture some, 
but not all of the productive activities that children, like adults, perform. The work children 
perform includes, but is not confined to, conventional paid employment on the formal 
economy. Tasks performed in the household, on family farms, in the informal economy and 
as self-provisioning can all be productive work, even if they are undertaken outside the 
traditional paid wage relationship. We have shown that it is not the nature of the tasks that is 
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important, but the social field in which the tasks are undertaken that is most important. This 
thesis has detailed several of these fields, and shown that these social fields, defined through 
distinct sets of social interactions, partly determine what activities count as work, their social 
value and thus the meaning and experience of work for those involved. We have specified 
three distinct social fields in which children work, the formal, informal and family based 
economies.  
 
What is critical in identifying what fields and social interactions count as work is the nature 
of appropriation between the child or young person who provides their labour and the other 
party who utilizes that labour. While some tasks are specific to one context, what is more 
usual is that the same activity occurs across social contexts but takes on a different meaning 
depending on the nature of appropriation between the actors involved. An activity is defined 
as work when the activity occurs within the context of some relation of appropriation, which 
has a relevance to the satisfaction of human needs or other provision of services. Who can 
appropriate children’s labour is a question of structural embeddedness, determined by who 
has the power to purchase or demand labour within a specific social field. The interplay 
between individual-level exchanges around work activities and the structures that define the 
field (and therefore who can appropriate labour) is the nexus in which economic agency 
occurs. In the formal economy the relationship of appropriation is between the young 
person and market institutions, primarily formal workplaces and employers. In the informal 
economy economic transactions occur outside the formal market, and it is non-kin 
individuals and households based in communities that appropriate children’s labour. These 
relations range from strong and particularistic ties that are reliant upon pre-existing 
relationships (for example, friends and neighbours) to weak and universalistic ties where the 
young person offers their labour to anyone willing to purchase it. Within the family economy 
relationships of appropriation are limited to members of family and kinship groups. The 
strength of the kinship network obliges children to work.  
 
Although the nature of appropriation constitutes activities as work, and consequently the 
performance of the same or similar activities can be experienced differently depending on 
the nature of the appropriation, we have endeavored to use common standards of evaluation 
across different economies to understand work relations. This is a methodological process, 
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and in applying these common standards of evaluation, criteria that are used to assess job 
quality for adults have also been used to assess job quality for children. This relates to our 
second aim. The thesis has provided a detailed analysis of the characteristics of children’s 
work, including an analysis of the quality and conditions of work and the social distribution 
of work. Through our analysis of the underlying structural patterns across economies, the 
role of skills in the formal economy, the particularity of relationships in the informal 
economy and whether work is oriented towards use or exchange in the family economy, we 
have illustrated that the work children do is not so much a special category for analysis, but 
the social relations of work are particular for children because of their generational location. 
That is, we can take account of the specificity of the context of children’s work, the social 
relations between adults and children that impact on what work children perform and the 
conditions associated with that work, but nonetheless assess these conditions across contexts 
in a systematic way. In Chapters One and Two we specified the structural trends important 
for the formal, informal and family economies and the associated hypotheses for each 
economy relevant to structural and relational embeddedness. These were detailed and 
analysed in Chapters Four to Six. Table 7.1 addresses these hypotheses, summarising the key 
conclusions of the thesis. We discuss these conclusions in the following sections. 
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Table 7.1: Structural trends, hypotheses and key conclusions by type of economy and form of embeddedness  
The Formal Economy 
Socio-structural Embeddedness Relational Embeddedness 
Structural Trends Hypotheses Arising Key Conclusions Structural Trends Hypotheses Arising Key Conclusions 
Fragmentation of standard 
employment contract. 
 
Gains from growth in the 
knowledge economy reflected 
in skills polarization across 
the formal economy.  
Development of primary and 
secondary labour markets 
resulting in division between 
good and bad jobs across the 
economy.   
 
Tertiarization of economy 
(rise of service economy)  
 
Labour market segmentation 
in young people’s work exists 
according to skill level.  
 
Alternative role hypothesis: 
young people work in the 
secondary labour market 
because an alternative role of 
subsistence outside the labour 
market is available to them. 
 
Labour market segmentation is also evident for 
young people’s work with skills utilization central 
to young people’s experience of work on the 
formal economy. However young people are 
largely situated in elementary skill jobs. Therefore 
alternative role hypothesis is also supported, with 
most young people situated in work suitable only 
because an alternative role outside the economy is 
available to them, defined through their role as 
students and dependants within the family.  
 
Commodification of 
labour prioritises 
instrumental behaviour 
on the formal economy. 
Money payment acts as 
both incentive and 
reward. 
 
Formal economy is associated 
with instrumental behaviour. 
Given young people’s primary 
identification as consumers 
rather than producers, then 
consumption motivations are a 
primary rationale for young 
people to work. Alternatively a 
mix of motivations will be 
evident. 
High level of instrumental 
orientations. Reward and 
motivation highly correlated with 
evidence of class differentiation 
in extrinsic orientations. Act of 
monetary exchange also 
associated with intrinsic 
orientations. 
 
However consumption motives 
moderated by intrinsic 
orientations which are 
differentiated by class and skill 
level. Altruism related to 
economic background. Intrinsic 
orientations are highest in high 
skill jobs. Therefore mix of 
motivations evident.  
‘Post-class society’ hypothesis 
good and poor quality work is 
relatively evenly distributed 
across socio-economic strata 
Alternatively markers of social 
position, remain important 
explanatory categories and 
influence distribution of good 
and bad jobs. 
Post-class hypothesis supported, as the majority 
of young people work low-end elementary skill 
jobs in the service sector. However some 
evidence of labour market segmentation by 
gender and age, rather than class.  Evidence of 
gender differentiation of occupations and age 
based progression into formal economy. Young 
women more likely in service and young males 
more likely to perform trades.  Class does not 
differentiate because most young people in 
elementary skill jobs and barriers to entry into 
high skill jobs are not class specific but 
generalized across social groups.  
 
Skill level associated with 
differences in conditions for 
young people, consistent with 
dual labour market theory. 
High skill jobs associated with 
higher pay, more regular work; 
greater control and autonomy, 
and increased supervision and 
training. 
Despite ubiquity of elementary skill jobs, skills 
associated with condition trade-offs, rather than 
clear polarization between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. 
For high skill jobs less predictability in income 
and work-time security, but better conditions 
when obtained. For elementary skill jobs payment 
and hours are determined institutionally. Young 
people in high skill jobs more likely to have better 
Representation security and Skill reproduction 
security.  
… Table 7.1 continued next page  
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Table 7.1 continued. 
The Informal Economy 
Socio-structural Embeddedness 
 
Relational Embeddedness 
Structural Trends Hypotheses Arising Key Conclusions Structural Trends Hypotheses Arising Key Conclusions 
Boundaries of informal 
economy effectively 
defined by regulatory 
deficit. 
 
Informal economy either 
peripheral to or an 
alternative dynamic 
source of economic 
development.   
 
 
Marginality hypothesis: marginalized 
social groups are more likely to participate 
in the informal economy as a strategy to 
counteract decline in household 
purchasing power. As a survival strategy, 
young people from poorer communities 
are more likely to be involved in work 
organised through existing social 
networks, that is, as informal employees.  
 
Alternative social resource hypothesis: 
wealthier households are more likely to be 
involved in the informal economy as 
participation is reliant upon availability of 
human capital resources and social 
network ties Therefore higher levels of 
enterprise work in middle and higher 
income neighbourhoods. 
 
Associative work no class differentiation 
– related to shared identity. 
 
Mixed support for both the marginality 
and social resource hypotheses.  
Relational embeddedness interacts with 
class-based segmentation, with class 
differentiation according to strength of 
ties between exchangers Young people 
from poorer backgrounds are more 
likely to undertake work as informal 
employees. Wealthier young people 
more likely to be involved in enterprise 
work, undertaking work based on weak 
and universal ties.. Middle class young 
people are more likely to undertake 
associative work. 
 
Furthermore differentiation according 
to other social characteristics – females’ 
strong particular ties result in little 
diversity in work; males’ weak and 
universal ties result in greater diversity 
of work; age differentiation is also 
evident, with young - strong particular 
ties; older -weak and universal ties; and 
work in rural areas more embedded in 
community ‘gemeinschaft’ relations.   
 
Informal work is socially, 
culturally and geographically 
embedded. Individuals are 
motivated to engage in 
economic activities by a 
variety of goals, including 
utilitarian, communal and 
reciprocal goals. 
Conventions associated with 
orthodox market relations 
are either suspended or 
mixed with other 
motivations. 
 
Marginality hypothesis - informal 
work is a survival strategy of 
poorer households, then 
participation for economic 
reasons is more likely in poorer 
households. Wealthier 
households participate in 
informal economic activities for 
other reasons, because they find 
the work fulfilling and enjoyable 
for example.  
 
Because informal employee 
relations are predicated upon 
strong, particularistic ties 
hypothesise higher level of 
intrinsic attitudes for this type of 
work. For enterprise workers 
whose work relations are 
predicated upon weak universal 
ties hypothesise higher levels of 
instrumental attitudes. For 
associative workers hypothesise 
emphasis on symbolic rewards 
and non-instrumental 
orientations. 
Social relations of work effect 
extrinsic orientations, but social 
group membership is more 
important in determining intrinsic 
orientations.   
 
‘Informal employee’ relations, 
predicated upon strong 
particularistic ties, do not 
evidence greater levels of intrinsic 
attitudes but are least 
commodified. ‘Enterprise work’ 
predicated upon weak universal 
ties characterised by higher levels 
of instrumental attitudes. Reward 
and motivation are highly 
correlated. Hence marginality 
hypothesis is not supported – 
work for money is a generic 
experience even on the informal 
economy.  
 
Class differentiates intrinsic 
orientations, with young people 
from poorer neighbourhoods 
more likely to show altruistic 
orientations. Payment also 
valorizes intrinsic orientations to 
generate reciprocity. 
In the absence of formal 
regularity and 
institutional boundaries 
other normative 
structures operate, based 
upon weak or strong ties 
within social networks. 
Conditions are largely 
determined through 
enforceable trust and 
negotiation rooted in 
Worse conditions hypothesis: The lack of 
formal regulation and structural trends 
towards destandardisation of labour mean 
that conditions on the informal economy 
are poor, experienced as low pay rates, 
unpredictable hours, lack of support, 
control and effective representation. 
 
Some evidence that lack of formal 
regulation of labour standards translates 
into comparably poor conditions on the 
informal economy, especially work-time 
security, which is highly precarious.  
 
Work conditions differentiated for 
informal workers depending on the type 
of work performed. Because informal 
Effects of relational embeddedness 
largely consistent with hypotheses. 
Specifically income security is mediated 
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group membership. 
 
 
employee work is organised through 
known social networks, hypothesise that 
informal employees are more likely to 
perform unremunerated work, receive 
lower pay, and are less able to exercise 
control.  Enterprise workers, being more 
‘market‘ oriented, hypothesise are more 
likely to be paid, receive higher pay and 
have more control over their work. For 
associative workers, returns for work 
involve symbolic rewards.  Because of the 
rule-based nature of the work, 
hypothesise that they experience less 
autonomy and control in their work, but 
have more predictable work hours. 
by closeness of social ties, with closer 
social relations exerting discipline on 
payment and associative workers 
gaining symbolic rewards. High levels 
of autonomy reflects regulatory deficit, 
with exception of associative work and 
skill reproduction security, which are 
differentiated by organizational context. 
 
… Table 7.1 continued next page 
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… Table 7.1 continued. 
The Family Economy 
Socio-structural Embeddedness Relational Embeddedness 
Structural Trends Hypotheses Arising Key Conclusions Structural Trends Hypotheses Arising Key Conclusions 
Households have been 
transformed from producing and 
consuming units into consuming 
units as part of broad scale social 
changes associated with 
modernity.  
 
Cultural expectations about the 
value of children have 
correspondingly shifted, from 
being economic contributors to 
economic dependants. Children’s 
contributions to family life raise 
issue of balance between 
obligation and responsibility 
within the domestic sphere. 
 
Household productive activities 
embedded in continuum from 
use-value to exchange-value. 
 
 
Care work is more common in 
poorer households because of 
reliance on older siblings to 
provide care to reduce cash-
outflows for the purchase of care 
services. Consort work is reliant 
upon an adult family member 
being in formal employment, 
therefore more likely in areas of 
greatest employment. Poorer 
households, unable to meet their 
consumption needs via the formal 
market have higher rates of self-
provisioning. Capital intensity of 
establishing and operating 
businesses, require resources not 
generally available to poorer 
households, therefore family 
owned production more likely in 
wealthier households.  
 
Children contribute to the 
productive activities of 
households. Relationship between 
household as productive unit and 
formal economy is central. 
Productive activities are 
differentiated by use-value or 
exchange-value. 
 
Type of family work is dependent 
on the social position of the 
household, however not in ways 
hypothesized. Care work is 
common across the class 
spectrum and class differentiation 
is evident for self-provisioning – 
for poorer households because of 
the necessity to reduce 
consumption costs and for 
wealthier households to 
individualise products. 
 
Task segmentation is related to 
gender, age and cultural 
background. Gender 
differentiation reflects gendered 
socialization within the family. 
Age related progression is 
evident, with youngest working 
for use-value progressing into 
older workers undertaking 
exchange-value tasks. Cultural 
background is important for 
family owned production, with 
young people from minority 
cultural and linguistic 
backgrounds more likely to work 
in family-owned production. 
 
Family theorised either as a site 
where economic exchanges are 
humanized (and therefore 
interactions involving reciprocity, 
collectivity and obligation); or 
alternatively the entry of 
instrumentality into an arena of 
intimate social relations, such as 
monetization of caring and 
parent-child relations, depletes 
these relations of their richness.  
 
The more work is oriented to 
exchange value, the greater the 
level of instrumental attitudes; the 
more work is oriented towards 
use-value, the greater the level of 
intrinsic and altruistic attitudes. 
Therefore family owned 
production and consort work 
exhibit higher levels of 
instrumentality, and care work 
and household self-provisioning 
greater levels of altruistic 
orientation. 
 
Extrinsic orientations evident 
within the family regardless of 
exchange or use-value of work. 
Hence instrumental orientations 
are not more evident for work 
oriented towards the formal 
market.   
 
Intrinsic orientations are, 
however differentiated by class 
but also by type of work. Work 
that more evidently contributes to 
the ‘collective’ life of the 
household has higher levels of 
altruistic orientations. Payment, 
age and autonomy are also 
determinative of intrinsic 
orientations. 
 Formality hypothesis: Young 
people have fewer formal 
conditions in the family economy 
Conditions are differentiated by 
the extent work is oriented 
towards use or exchange. Some 
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compared to the formal economy, 
which translates into exploitation.  
 
The more work is oriented to the 
market the more formal the 
conditions. More ‘formal’ 
conditions for family-owned 
production and consort workers, 
less formal conditions for self-
provisioning and care work. For 
work oriented to family-use, work 
time and family time seamless and 
pay via non- monetary goods. For 
production oriented externally 
family-based obligations 
tempered by pay and work-time 
distinct from family time.   
 
Embeddedness hypothesis:  greater 
division between work and family 
is evident the more work is 
oriented towards the formal 
market. Greater demarcation 
between ‘work-life’ and ‘family-
life’ evident for production for 
the formal market (family 
businesses and consort work), 
and less where work is for use-
value for households (care work 
and household self-provisioning). 
 
support for formality hypothesis 
that the more work is oriented to 
the market the more formal the 
conditions. While least 
commodified economy, income 
security and skill reproduction 
security differentiated by 
orientation towards formal 
market. Work-time security and 
representation security are 
determined by level of 
embeddedness in family life. Care 
work is ongoing and family-
owned production involves long 
hours but at regular times. 
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Reconsidering Structural Embeddedness - How structures define arenas 
of economic action 
One of the aims of this thesis has been to explore whether the different economies children 
work in have different logics of social action, and the relationship between these different 
logics, work activities and work conditions. We have found that work experiences are 
embedded in socio-structural contexts that set the parameters and choices of individual 
actors. In the formal economy the fragmentation of standard employment, development of 
primary and secondary labour markets and tertiarisation of the formal economy has led to 
skills polarization in labour market opportunities for young people. The skill dimension of 
this fragmentation plays a large part in defining good and bad jobs.  In the informal 
economy the ‘regulatory deficit’ that defines this field raises questions about its structural 
role as either peripheral to, or as an alternative dynamic source of, economic development.  
The relational aspects of these two trajectories have more proximate consequences for 
young people. In the absence of formal rules, conditions are largely determined through 
other normative structures based upon weak or strong ties within social networks. In the 
family economy the transformation of the household and therein the productive capacity of 
children has resulted in households having an ambivalent relationship with the formal 
economy. However this ambivalence creates productive opportunities for households that 
can be understood as a relationship defined through use or exchange value. This in turn has 
a variety of implications for children’s work in the family economy.  We examine these issues 
in more detail below.  
 
The Formal Economy 
In the formal economy young people’s work is embedded in a field that has undergone 
fundamental structural change, with major implications for the work that young people can 
perform. From being relatively central to production processes, children and young people 
have been marginalized into a narrower range of work roles. This can be discerned across 
several dimensions. The standard employment relationship has in considerable part broken 
down, with the labour market becoming polarized between standard and precarious work 
with an associated development of dual labour markets. Jobs in the primary labour market 
are reserved largely for individuals whose main role is as employees. These jobs have, 
relatively speaking, better income security, work time security; representation security and 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion  - 228 - 
skill reproduction security and are filled by individuals who can most fully commit to these 
work opportunities – namely adult men.  Jobs in the secondary labour market are defined in 
large measure by decent work deficits – they are poorly paid, involve non-standard hours, 
have little permanency and provide few opportunities for career development. These jobs 
are therefore largely reserved for those who are not available or do not have the skills to 
obtain permanent work. This is the case for many women (although less so), migrant 
workers and young people who are locked out of the primary job market because of the 
increasing importance of educational qualifications as an entry requirement into the primary 
labour market. Additionally, the increasing importance of the service economy has resulted 
in greater heterogeneity in the types of work that people can do and the types of skills that 
are required. The skill requirements for this work reflect this heterogeneity and are also 
fragmented, with an increase in jobs requiring high-level skills and an increase in jobs that 
are either deskilled or are low skills jobs. Consequently, the skills fragmentation that has 
been associated with the increased importance of the service sector for the economy overall 
has not necessarily seen so much an upskilling in the economy, but a skills polarization 
between high and low skill jobs. This is the key form of fragmentation evident for young 
people in the formal economy - the application of skill is associated with a range of other 
conditions and associated experiences of job quality. 
 
Our starting hypothesis was that labour market segmentation in young people’s work exists 
according to skill level. The alternative hypothesis was that young people’s experience would 
instead be rather homogenous, reflecting that work is a secondary role for young people. 
What we found is that the fragmentation between primary and secondary labour markets 
means that young people are predominantly working in low-skill secondary labour market 
jobs. The effect of labour market segmentation on young people’s work opportunities is a 
more considerable influence on the type of work children perform on the formal economy 
than whether children are relegated to ‘children’s jobs’. The main division is therefore not 
between primary and secondary work, especially between stable and contingent employment, 
but whether contingency is experienced as providing the conditions for autonomy and 
creativity or whether it is experienced as insecurity or control. This second issue turns on the 
deployment of skill. We found that the exercise of skill significantly influences whether 
contingent labour is seen as an opportunity for autonomy, creativity, skill development and 
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future career prospects, or whether work is just a job done in complement with other 
activities for extrinsic rewards. We find evidence of both. Relative to the informal and family 
based economies, the greater diversity in types of work creates opportunities for more 
interesting types of work to be available for young people on the formal economy. However 
we also find that most young people are relegated to a limited number of low skill jobs, 
largely in the service sectors of the economy.  
 
The Informal Economy 
Unlike the formal economy where the deployment of skill and the nature of the task have an 
important relationship with conditions and economic agency, in the informal economy, the 
specific relational context in which work is performed is most important. As discussed in 
Chapter Five, the distinction between formal and informal economies hinges on the 
presence or absence of legal regulation. A number of consequences arise from this for young 
people. First, in the absence of formal laws, rules or regulations, other forms of social 
relations function to provide informal modes of regulation and prescribe rules of conduct. 
These relational contexts are perhaps the most important determinant of economic agency 
for young workers on the informal economy, helping constitute social networks and norms 
from which trust develops.  
 
These rules of conduct can be differentiated by whether strong and particularistic ties or 
weak and universal ties typify the relationship between the employer and employee. In the 
former this includes those workers we have described as informal employees, where the 
young person is employed directly by people known to them, what most closely resembles 
the idea of ‘disguised workers’. The latter describes those we have described as enterprise 
workers, involving the young person running their own small scale enterprise and offering 
their services more broadly, what most closely resembles the idea of ‘informal 
entrepreneurs’.   We also uncovered a third category of informal work that involves universal 
and strong ties – associative work – that includes work for third sector organizations. 
Organisational rules and affiliations structure this work and organizational commitment is 
generated from shared values or interests. These categories emphasise the relationship 
between young worker and ‘employer’, rather than the type of work undertaken. 
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The Family Economy 
Transformations in the formal and informal economies have also had a profound influence 
on the family as a social structure, with households to some degree transforming from a 
producing and consuming unit in pre-industrial societies into consuming units in industrial 
and post-industrial societies. However the division of the ‘public’ and ‘private’ is, as detailed 
by feminist economists and historians, not neat or clear. We have found that the ambivalent 
role household’s play in being both ‘public’ and ‘private’ translates into different work 
opportunities for family members, including children and young people. Children and young 
people are not merely economic dependants within their families but also economic 
contributors. The relationship between economic dependency and economic contribution is 
seen in a range of economic activity undertaken by children and young people with and for 
their families. Care work involves sustained personal interaction and support of other family 
members; household self-provisioning involves utilizing goods bought from the formal 
economy as household capital to produce more goods for consumption, normally by the 
household; working in consort with family involves young people working as employees 
with another family member where the means of production is owned by a non-family 
member, and therefore the young person’s employment status is an extension of the adult 
relative; and family-owned production where the young person works in a family owned and 
operated business, normally on the formal economy.  
 
Therefore the question is how we make sense of the range of economically productive 
activities that households undertake, and by implication how this structures the experience 
of work for young people. These activities can be categorised by examining their relationship 
with the formal economy, from use-value within the household, to exchange-value on the 
formal market. That is by being both within the domestic sphere and maintaining productive 
capacity, work activities can range from being oriented towards the needs of the family or to 
exchange on external formal markets.  
 
The Multiple Economies and Social Integration 
What are the implications of these structural trends for the opportunities work provides for 
different groups of young people? Does act work as a source of social integration or as a 
means of social exclusion for different groups of young people? Do different social groups 
obtain advantage because they are more likely to have access to better quality work? What 
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we have found is that participation in different types of work across and within economies is 
differentiated by social position, especially class, gender and age. For the formal economy 
this means examining whether the gains from growth in the service economy are equitably 
shared across society, indicative of a post-class society where risks are linked to life-course 
rather than class position (the post-class hypothesis); or whether skills polarization is 
associated with ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the economy, indicated in clear divisions in 
participation in work and different quality work, according to socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics. For the informal economy the question is whether socially 
marginalised groups participate in the informal economy to manage lack of other 
employment opportunities (the marginality or coping strategy hypothesis) or whether less 
marginalised groups also capitalize on the opportunities within the informal economy, in 
part because such opportunities are linked to participation on the formal economy.  Put 
another way, do social networks that drive the informal economy operate in different ways 
for different social groups, especially for young people from poorer or wealthier 
communities; in other words, is there an inequality in social networks available within poorer 
or wealthier communities?  Within the family economy the issue of social integration turns 
on whether different opportunities manifest in exchange or use-value; that is whether the 
household uses the work or whether the work is exchanged on the formal market, as the 
different types of work require different sorts of resources and create different opportunities 
for households and young workers.  In particular, are the differences in work opportunities, 
according to how it is oriented towards the formal market, different according to factors 
such as class, gender, age and cultural background? In different ways, across the three 
economies, we find that three key social characteristics are significant in structuring work 
opportunities – class background, gender and age. Rurality and cultural background also 
have some influence. 
 
Class 
On the formal economy the fragmentation of the labour market results in the majority of 
young people working in low skill jobs regardless of social class. Because these jobs have low 
entry-level requirements, barriers to accessing them are few, which mitigates class effects. In 
this sense the formal economy has less social closure than either the informal or family 
economies that have entry requirements defined through specific, and in the case of the 
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family strong and pre-existing, relationships. While there is some evidence of class based 
labour market segmentation, involving high skill jobs, the large number of elementary and 
intermediate skill jobs means that the class distribution of work on the formal economy is 
less important than other forms of social differentiation.  
 
Class plays a far more important role on the informal economy. While there is only 
provisional support for the hypothesis that working in the informal economy is a strategy 
used by poorer households, class effects are evident for different categories of work in this 
field. A combination of material conditions and the density of social networks establish 
different opportunities for the type of work performed for young people from different class 
backgrounds. Young people from wealthier areas undertake entrepreneurial work because 
they have greater access to practical resources and a local market willing to purchase services, 
both of which are required for successful conduct as entrepreneurs in the informal economy. 
Density of local networks is especially important for the work that young people from 
poorer neighbourhoods perform, where people known to them hire them as informal 
employees. Within these neighbourhoods there is some evidence of mutual aid under 
conditions of limited economic opportunities. What appears to differentiate work 
opportunities between more and less wealthy neighbourhoods is the strength of ties between 
the exchangers. While social networks seem most pertinent in providing work opportunities 
for young people from the least and most disadvantaged communities, middle class young 
people are most likely to engage in work opportunities provided by associative organizations, 
that are not reliant so much on knowing people, but sharing interests and values. For young 
people from middle class backgrounds, work on the informal economy involves pursuit of 
value-based identities. This has implications for both work conditions and attitudes towards 
work. 
 
In the family economy, class also plays an important role; specifically, poorer households 
utilise young people’s labour more so than wealthier households. However, as in the 
informal economy, what is most important is not the overall prevalence, but the class 
distribution of different types of work. Despite hypothesizing that care work may be more 
likely in poorer households, young people across the class spectrum share care 
responsibilities. Consort work and family owned production are most prevalent among 
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young people from middle income and lower-income communities, linked to adult labour 
market structures that generate opportunistic work for young people. Young people from 
poorest and wealthiest neighbourhoods are most likely to be involved in household self-
provisioning. While our data do not allow us to specify the exact reasons for household self-
provisioning, previous research (Gershuny 1979, 1983; ILO 2002, Pahl 1984, Sassen 1991) 
suggest that the reasons are likely to differ by socio-economic background. It is likely that 
poorer households, less able to meet their consumption needs via the formal market, reduce 
their demand for goods on the market and by undertaking certain types of household self-
provisioning, like essential household repairs,  to reduce costs.  For higher income 
households a greater proportion of household self-provisioning may be performed out of 
choice, reflecting a desire to individualise the end product or the pleasure of doing the work.  
 
Overall, what we find is that class effects are lived out through particular social networks at a 
community level, generating different opportunities for young people depending on their 
class position. In the formal economy, where we would expect class to be an important 
determinant of work opportunities, we find relatively little differentiation, because young 
people are marginalized from the labour market more generally. However in the informal 
and family economies, the links between social networks and value-identities have quite 
strong class effects. These effects are not so much seen in categories of ‘winners’ and 
‘losers’, but rather reflect and consolidate the economic opportunities already available to 
children and young people from different class backgrounds.  
 
Gender 
While class effects are evident in different ways across the economies, we find a relatively 
stark division of occupations between males and females across all the economies. Gender is 
a powerful social structure influencing the types of work that young males and females 
perform. Work in general occurs within a framework of generalised norms about masculinity 
and femininity that not only shape expectations about what is the appropriate behaviour of 
women and men but also can be seen in labor market segmentation and pay inequity 
between men and women. We can conclude that this is also the case for young workers. On 
the formal economy where policies outlawing gender discrimination are intended to redress 
gendered stereotypes and practices, we find significant gender differences. While outside the 
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ambit of this thesis, indirect discrimination, also apparent in the adult labour force, appears 
to occur at an early age in the form of socialised role differentiation practiced by employers 
and internalized by young workers.  
 
On the informal economy gender differences are highlighted in the differences in categories 
of work, between informal employees and enterprise workers. This has quite important 
implications for the experience that such work can offer. Being overrepresented as informal 
employees, young women are constrained in the work they can perform by the reciprocal 
relations that define this work. Young males, overrepresented as enterprise workers can, at 
least theoretically, pursue whatever sort of work they want limited only by the personal and 
material resources at their disposal. Empirically we see this in young males performing a 
much more diverse range of types of work compared to females.  What distinguishes the 
experiences of young men and women is where the onus of ‘choice’ lies between the 
employer and the employee. Informal employee work is largely demand driven, neighbours 
and friends seeking out the young person to perform work, resulting in females being 
overrepresented in traditionally feminised forms of work. For enterprise work the young 
worker offers services or goods more generally, which allows these workers to capitalise on 
skills they possess, resulting in young men performing a greater range of work.  Therefore 
work related social interactions both constrain and create opportunities for what is deemed 
appropriate work for males and females.  
 
In the family economy the content of work males and females are expected to perform is 
substantively different, with the gendered allocation of work tasks to children intertwined 
with socialization practices within the family from an early age. Young women are regarded 
as responsible for care work and young men involved in a broader range of activities. Here 
the distinction between the private sphere of care of others and the public sphere of working 
for family are intertwined and reinforce gendered notion of the private female and the public 
male. What is concerning about these results is that forms of economic socialization, of 
children learning to labour, also reveal highly gendered notions of masculinity and 
femininity. We therefore find some tentative evidence that gender role segregation in the 
adult labour market may have part of its foundation in the gender socialization of children.  
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While we can only speculate, these early experiences may have quite profound influences on 
economic socialization, influencing educational and labour market choices made by young 
males and females. Especially for work on the informal and family economy, the range of 
job tasks are constrained by the social relationship through which the work is undertaken. 
This not only means, therefore, that the range of work activities are constrained for females 
relative to males by the nature of social relations that define the work, but the ability to 
express autonomy is also constrained. This is an area requiring further analysis. 
 
Age 
One of the prevailing themes in the child work literature is that age based development 
primarily determines young people’s experiences of work. A focus on socialization has 
contributed to undervaluing young people’s work, contrasting with the adult world. While 
the focus on socialization outcomes and development in the majority of research has 
marginalized age as an analytical category in new childhood studies, we find that age is an 
important analytical category – there is an age-based differentiation of how work is 
experienced and the types of work that young people perform. We can observe two related 
dimensions that arise from the interaction between age and work. First, the results suggest a 
pathway of youth participation in the economy, from working in the family and informal 
economies, which are likely to be embedded in day to day practices, to working on the 
formal economy, which is a progression into more formally institutionalised economic 
practice. Second, within the informal and family economies, the more the work is oriented to 
external environments, the more likely older young people will be undertaking the work. The 
youngest workers are therefore more likely to undertake work as part of particularistic and 
strong social ties (i.e. as informal employees) and therefore potentially protective work 
environments. Older workers are involved in work that is premised on weak and universal 
ties (i.e. in enterprise work) that require more obvious forms of autonomy and initiative. In 
the family economy the more work is oriented towards use-value (and therefore embedded 
in family life) the more likely that younger workers will undertake this sort of work. 
Conversely the more work is oriented to exchange-value (and therefore embedded in the 
market) the more likely older workers will undertake this sort of work.  
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The ‘developmental capacities’ of children and young people do not determine age patterns 
observed around work (as the review of previous studies in Chapter One indicated), but 
children, young people and most likely the significant adults in their lives, appear to be 
making ‘sociological’ judgments about age-related work transitions. However implicated in 
these judgments are competing discourses around protecting children from work and moral 
development of children through work. Negotiating these two competing discourses has 
conventionally driven discussions around when children and young people might participate 
in the formal economy. But we find that children and young people work from quite an early 
age and this negotiated autonomy influences the type of work undertaken within each 
economy. Hence negotiated autonomy, arising from the negotiation between protection 
from work and moral development through work, influences not only the age that young 
people are likely to work on the formal labour market, but also the other economies and 
types of work within each economy.  
 
Other aspects of social integration- Rurality and Cultural Background 
Opportunities for young people to work are also associated with regional differences in 
economic development, with work in the formal economy a suburban experience and work 
in the informal and family economies more likely in rural and regional areas. These 
differences reflect broader patterns of economic development, specifically that formal 
economic development and opportunities to work have historically emerged within cities, 
with markets in large cities sufficiently developed to provide work for young people across 
the class spectrum. This can be seen in the broad range of elementary and service oriented 
jobs available in suburban areas. Informal work factors prominently as an economic activity 
among young people from rural areas, especially work reliant upon strong and particularistic 
ties, highlighting the importance of local networks in rural and regional areas in 
underpinning informal employment. Family-owned production and household self-
provisioning are also more likely in rural compared to urban areas. The development of 
informal and family based alternatives to the formal market helps explain the increased 
likelihood of enterprise work in rural areas which potentially is a low cost, low capital and 
local alternative that provides niche goods and products in an area. The availability of natural 
resources in rural areas is also a crucial basic input for many forms of household self-
provisioning and enterprise work.  With the exception of large-scale agribusinesses, the 
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smaller size of formal economies in rural areas, the importance of family-owned agricultural 
enterprises or family owned businesses that service rural communities appear to also provide 
employment opportunities for young people, which may explain the increased likelihood of 
family-owned production in rural areas. 
 
It is in work in economies where group membership provides the primary means of entry 
that cultural background plays a factor. For the formal economy we find no evidence of any 
relationship between cultural background and work on the formal economy and in the 
informal economy we find only minor effects. However, in the family economy, cultural 
background plays an important role in the utilization of young people’s labour, especially in 
family-owned production. In an environment where the substantive nature of the binding 
relationship determines who can and cannot work, in some of these circumstances shared 
cultural identity contributes to a sense of obligation among family members. As found in 
prior research, the more prevalent reliance on family labour for many businesses run by 
people from diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds is not only a strategy to reduce 
labour costs, but reflects the need for adults to rely on more intimate forms of labour, such 
as translating and mediating, in the conduct of business.  
 
However, while we have some evidence of that cultural background is a factor, it is one 
factor among several. As already noted, class, age, rurality and gender are also important in 
determining either whether young people work in the family economy and the type of work 
performed in the family economy. Cultural and linguistic background is only a relatively 
minor influence. This finding is important because it also highlights the ongoing necessity of 
questioning conceptual and common sense prejudices and understandings that surround 
young people’s work.  
 
Decent work and the multiple economies  
What has our comparative analysis of the three economies told us about young people’s 
work conditions? Our assessment of the structural contexts that shape the three economies 
has assisted us to identify the parameters for the analysis of work conditions. Despite 
examining the same conditions, we have identified quite distinct factors that influence work 
securities across the formal, informal and family economies. Within the formal economy, 
young people are involved in precarious forms of work. However the extent that this 
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precariousness is experienced as opportunity or cost varies for different groups of young 
people. Skill level also exerts a considerable influence over work conditions on the formal 
economy. On the informal economy, the lack of formal regulation and trends towards 
labour destandardisation places downward pressure on work conditions. However, because 
much informal work is based upon relational ties within social networks, conditions are 
largely determined through enforceable trust and negotiation rooted in group membership, 
which serve to build agreement around remuneration, work hours, control overwork and 
support in performing work. The relational context provides different constraints or 
opportunities for young workers. For the family economy, the ambivalent position of the 
household as having both productive capacity and being responsible for the private well 
being of individuals structures the type of work performed and work conditions. The degree 
work is oriented towards the formal market determines the sorts of conditions obtained by 
young people on the family based economy. These dynamics are evident in our examination 
of four work conditions or securities – income, work time, representation and skill 
reproduction security. We discuss each of these in turn. 
 
Work-time Security 
In the formal economy young people work with in different underlying structures from 
adults, structures that centre on work as an alternative role. Across the broader labour force, 
secondary labour markets and the associated contingent employment arrangements are 
mechanisms for employers to displace the impact of adjustment onto employees, especially 
low-skill workers. This is also evident for young people. Casual part-time work is the most 
common experience for young workers on the formal economy. However among young 
people, elementary skill jobs are comparatively regular. Labour market regulations provide 
some protection in terms of work-time regulation. Exposure to contingent and precarious 
work is more likely for high skill workers. The informalisation of high skill jobs and the 
application of skill serve as compensating conditions for other relatively poorer conditions.  
 
In the informal economy, the unregulated nature of work is also borne out in the high levels 
of as-needed work. However, unlike income security where the type of social relationship 
influences conditions, the lack of regulation has more general effects on work time security, 
with enterprise and informal employee work being equally precarious. This is because both 
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kinds of work are reliant upon demand generated from within social networks, which are far 
less predictable than demand generated in the formal economy. The main exception to this 
is associative work, which, because it is run through organizations, generates ongoing 
activity, commitment and work for young people.  
 
In the family economy, boundary maintenance between the public and private lives of the 
family is particularly expressed through work time security. The performance of work for 
young people in the family economy is either segregated from what children do with the rest 
of their time or, alternatively, is embedded with other everyday activities so that their work 
occurs in the context of family needs and circumstances, constituted as part of family life. 
This appears to be particularly the case for care work where work tasks and family life are 
largely indivisible, and the performance of such tasks is an expected part of daily obligations. 
The demands of family-owned production are more onerous but regulated, involving longer 
but more predictable hours. The time patterns for household self-provisioning and consort 
work suggest involvement in discrete tasks that can be differentiated from other household 
activities.  
 
Income Security 
Across all the economies income security is not only related to instrumental exchange of 
labour for money but is embedded in substantive aspects of the relationship between the 
young people who provide their labour and those who appropriate it. In the formal 
economy, skill is a major determinant of conditions, but in ways that both confirm and 
challenge the typical segmented labour market narrative. What we find is that the formal 
economy is divided into non-competing groups of workers: namely, a small number who 
provide niche or technical services and the majority of workers in elementary skill jobs 
located in ‘youth intensive’ sectors of the labour market. Institutional factors are the key 
determinant of pay for these jobs. In the Australian context this means the application of 
youth wages set by Awards, which govern pay and conditions at an industry level. For young 
people this results in some degree of pay equality in the elementary skill labour market. In 
contrast high skill jobs are subject to less stringent forms of regulation, with pay for high 
skill jobs likely to be negotiated less formally, for instance through individual or verbal 
employment contracts. Furthermore, the exercise of specialized skills, especially for young 
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workers, in unusual segments of the economy, also results in these young people working for 
non-monetary forms of remuneration, such as for experience, even though the work is 
located in the formal economy. These young people are not just working for the money 
(which is central for most young people in elementary skill jobs) but also because the work 
may be related to some type of personal interest or pursuit of a possible vocation. 
Consequently these young people may have a different expectation of conditions- it is the 
exercise of particular competencies that may be the rewarding aspect of the work. This is 
discussed further later in this chapter. However because these young people offer niche skills 
and therefore a specialized market position, when they are paid they are able to attract high 
levels of payment.  
 
The informal economy remains largely a cash based, rather than gift, economy. However the 
type of social relationship in which the work is embedded influences type and level of pay 
received by young workers.  The closer, or more particular, the relationship, the more likely 
the work will be unremunerated and when paid, pay rates are lower. So for informal 
employees, reciprocity based upon pre-existing relationships between buyers and sellers, 
such as friends or neighbours, lowers the price for this work. For enterprise workers, where 
the relationship is less mediated by social ties, the price for a good or service is set by other 
factors, such as the good or service being offered, capacity of buyer and seller to negotiate 
and the degree of local competition.  Enterprise workers, taking on this risk, also obtain 
greater rewards. For associative workers, who are most likely to work for non-monetary 
remuneration, real money is not used as an indicator of value, but instead associative 
workers are paid honoraria, in recognition of, not exchange for, services and expenses. 
Other forms of cultural capital are exchanged instead, relevant to the particular associative 
group. 
 
In the family economy we find that commodified relations (i.e. work for money) is most 
common where work is undertaken for exchange rather than use value, that is in consort 
work and in family owned production. The ambivalent position the household has in terms 
of production is symbolically marked by whether work is paid or not. The monetisation of 
different types of work within the family economy indicates a separation of internal family-
based production and work more directly engaged with the formal economy. However, 
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compared to both the formal and informal economies, a larger proportion of young people 
work for no money or for payment-in-kind. The effects of use-value compared to exchange-
value oriented work are also apparent. When we compare pay levels in the family economy 
with those in the formal and informal economies, the pay gaps are greatest for work 
involving obligation and the closest emotional attachment, care work and household self-
provisioning. Limits to the commodification of family relations, including those that revolve 
around work, are therefore apparent. Yet this also has the perverse effect of devaluing this 
kind of work. Families undertake a complex set of interactions that maintain a boundary 
between the public and private, in which the formality of work undertaken by the household 
plays an important part. The act of boundary maintenance that family members engage in is 
ongoing and the treatment of certain work activities compared to others maintains the 
division between the private life and the public life of the family. 
 
Representation Security 
Our analysis of work-time security has shown that the precariousness of young people’s 
work can be experienced as providing autonomy for young people or alternatively, can 
diminish work quality.  For example, high skill workers on the formal economy and 
enterprise workers on the informal economy may find that the irregularity of their work 
allows them autonomy and control over their work times. Yet whether work flexibility is 
experienced as autonomy for employees or as being controlled by employers goes to the 
issue of representation security, encompassing the level of control young people can exercise 
over their work schedules, work tasks and the extent they can participate in workplace 
decisions.  
 
On the formal economy, most young people have repetitive work, lacking in variety and 
done at a forced pace. However, skill and autonomy are closely related, with more complex 
tasks being reliant on the discretion of the worker for their effective performance. The 
benefits of task autonomy, work-time control and ability to set the daily pace of work are 
disproportionately obtained by young people in higher skill jobs, with less skilled jobs being 
more closely controlled by rules or close supervision. In this respect the insights of labour 
process theory are also relevant to young people’s work.  
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In the informal economy, work provides ample opportunity for task autonomy and control, 
especially for enterprise workers and informal employees, unlike the formal economy, where 
autonomy is traded off against regularity. For informal employees, and to lesser extent 
enterprise workers, the closeness of social relations facilitates negotiated control over work. 
Again this is largely because the work occurs outside the jurisdiction of formal laws and 
regulations. However, similar to work-time and income security, for associative workers, the 
institutional rule-based work environment means that these workers are less likely to be able 
to contribute to workplace decisions, exercise task autonomy and are less likely to be able to 
exercise control over when they work and the pace they work.  
 
Within the family economy the nature of family work obligations are not altogether binding 
and many young people report significant amounts of latitude to negotiate their work.  
However this is qualified by the extent that the work is undertaken for use or exchange. The 
lack of work-time control on the formal economy is not evident in the family economy for 
work that is most oriented to the formal market, family-owned production. However similar 
levels of autonomy are also evident for household self-provisioning. As the family owns the 
means of production, young people in family owned production and household self-
provisioning are able to exercise a certain degree of latitude over when they work and when 
they take breaks from work. Care work, since it is unsupervised has high task autonomy but, 
since it often revolves around parental work schedules, gives less autonomy over when the 
work can be carried out.  Consort workers experience similar limits on representation 
security as young people who work on the formal economy. They are least likely to be able 
to exercise control and autonomy, being under the direct authority of the adult that they 
work with and have to meet performance expectations similar to those on the formal 
economy, including employer set work times and tasks. 
 
Skill Reproduction Security 
Our analysis of skill reproduction security has indicated that what constitutes the training, 
supervision and support young people receive varies according to the economy that young 
people work in. In the formal economy this includes not only off-the-job training but work-
based learning and supervision. In the informal and family economies, however, skill 
reproduction security reflects the quality of interpersonal relationships beyond, for example, 
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formal training and supervision. This contrasts with more formal employment where 
supports are institutionalised through organizational practices. In the informal economy the 
quality of skill reproduction security reflects the social relations between the worker and 
employer as part of informal social networks. In the family economy skill reproduction 
security reflects relationships between family members that occur within the context of 
achieving an economic objective.  
 
This variation is reflected in patterns associated with skill reproduction security within each 
economy. In the formal economy, skill level also plays a central role in whether young 
workers receive training and supervision. In addition to being able to exercise greater 
discretion as to how the task should be done, young people in high skill jobs are also more 
likely to receive instruction and supervision. For these young people decision latitude is 
supported, rather than negated, through employer supervision. This is somewhat counter-
intuitive. Many elementary skill jobs, especially in the service economy are highly scripted 
and often involve induction to perform the work to specification. The training provided 
appears to be extensive. However young people in these jobs, relative to those in high skill 
jobs, indicate that these measures are not so much about promoting skill reproduction 
security, as they are about control over the work process. This is supported by our findings 
on representation security. Moreover, workers in high and intermediate skill jobs are using 
and developing skills that will potentially provide them with future occupational advantage 
beyond process skills obtained from ‘just having a job’. This holds less true for the majority 
of young workers who are in elementary skill jobs.  
 
In the informal economy, what is notable is that skill reproduction security is fairly common. 
Support and supervision are embedded in relationships of trust and reciprocity, which in 
turn make the economic exchange possible. However despite this the semi-institutional 
nature of associative work manifests in greater likelihood of support. Associative workers are 
most likely to get help from the people they work with if they ask for it; most likely to obtain 
ongoing feedback about how good or bad they are doing their work, are most likely to 
obtain the training they need to do their job and are also most likely to obtain skills from the 
work they do. These resources are part of the quasi-bureaucratic work environment of 
associative work and are aimed at maintaining commitment. However this is traded off with 
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lower levels of control and autonomy over work. This represents an important contrast to 
elementary skill work in the formal economy that is similarly subject to administrative 
organization, but where control over the labour process is experienced as discipline rather 
than support 
 
Within the family economy, differences in skill reproduction security are systematically 
associated with different modes of family based work. The more work is oriented towards 
the formal economy, the more extensive the support provided to young workers. Compared 
to the formal and informal economies, the extent of skill reproduction opportunity is more 
limited. However, no differences are evident for work providing long term benefits, which 
most likely indicates that few young people see their work for family context as providing 
future educational or career benefits.  
 
Economic agency across the three economies - Children as passive or 
active subjects … or something else? 
 
The early parts of this thesis highlighted how children have either been objectified in many 
existing analyses of children’s work, or alternatively children’s subjectivity through work has 
been overly voluntaristic, seeing agency in opposition to structure. The discussion of key 
work securities within the context of the structural determinants of work instead shows that 
social forces specific to the field influence children and young people’s economic agency. 
The features of these fields shape the experience of economic agency for individual actors, 
the definition of their activity as productive or not, and the conditions under which they 
perform these activities. We suggested in the early part of the thesis that, as ideal-types, each 
field would have its own logic of action, empirically reflected in different orientations 
towards work. We also suggested that working is not motivated only by the attainment of 
extrinsic rewards, such as money, but also less tangible benefits, such as respect and esteem, 
and in turn these less tangible benefits differ between the economies. As well as exchange 
orientations, obligation, altruism and reciprocity are also orientations associated with work 
that represent types of economic agency embedded in different social environments. What 
we have found, however, is that a mix of orientations exist in any particular setting even 
though certain orientations are more prominent in some economies than others. We found 
that even in the overtly instrumental exchange of money for labour, the act of payment is 
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associated with intrinsic orientations. Monetary payment acts as a ranking device and a form 
of valuation of individual and occupational status.  More generally because the capacity to 
work and purchase goods is an expression of a struggle to assert and express autonomy for 
young people, the decision to work cannot be viewed as the simple choice to consume but 
rather represents a necessary act on the part of many young people to participate in many of 
the ‘normal’ routines of being a young person. 
 
In the formal market we hypothesized that young workers would be motivated by extrinsic 
gains – to make money and to gain marketable skills. We hypothesized that, given young 
people’s primary identification as consumers rather than producers, consumption 
motivations would be a primary rationale for young people to work. In the informal 
economy, we hypothesized that work promotes and solidifies relationships of reciprocity 
within social networks. While there may be an expectation of instrumental exchange, such as 
money for work, conventions associated with orthodox market relations are either 
suspended or mixed with other motivations. Furthermore we hypothesized that orientations 
within the informal economy would also be different. Because informal employee relations 
are predicated upon strong particularistic ties we hypothesised that higher level of intrinsic 
attitudes will be displayed for this sort of work. For enterprise workers whose work relations 
are predicated upon weak universal ties, we hypothesised that higher levels of instrumental 
attitudes would be more evident. For associative workers, because the work expresses shared 
value commitment or interest, symbolic rewards and non-instrumental orientations would be 
stressed. For the family economy, because this work involves fulfilling expected kinship roles 
and norms, higher levels of obligation would be evident. However, because the family is 
involved in work for its own use and also for exchange, different types of orientations would 
be evident for different types of work. The more work is oriented to exchange, the 
instrumental attitudes will be; and the more work is oriented to internal use, the more 
intrinsic and altruistic.  
 
Instrumental Orientations 
In the formal economy, although skill plays an important role in determining who gets what 
sorts of conditions the relationship between conditions and instrumental orientations are 
linked. The extrinsic rewards from work are also the motivation to work on the formal 
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economy, much like the adult labour market. Young workers view pay as a pragmatic 
resource – those who are paid more have a greater capacity to purchase goods for 
themselves than those who don’t. However we also see class effects, with young people 
from lower middle-class and middle class backgrounds more likely just to ‘work for the 
money’. Because young people’s social position marginalises them from obtaining 
independent income, the income available to any young person depends upon factors within 
the household, particularly the level of disposable income and the way income is shared 
within families. It is unsurprising then that extrinsic motivations are more apparent for 
young workers from lower socio-economic backgrounds.  
 
In the informal economy, the way that work is configured relationally has an impact on 
exchange orientations towards work. Among enterprise workers the relative anonymity 
between buyers and sellers is evident in the overall tendency towards greater exchange 
orientations, compared to informal employees and associative workers. Conversely, informal 
employees are least likely to display utilitarian orientations because this work is conducted 
through particular social relations. Work reinforces the closeness of the relationship, and to 
be overly instrumental in such exchanges may transgress the more intimate relationships that 
exist between friends and neighbours. Furthermore, in the informal economy, class does not 
act as a differentiating factor, highlighting the importance of social networks across the class 
spectrum. Statistically associative work is similar to informal employees, but we can surmise 
that this may be because this work is based in trade of symbolic goods and rewards, such as 
recognition through acknowledgement of shared interests.  
 
On the family economy, while exchange of labour involves personal relationships that 
express social obligations and family affection, in many instances work is also performed 
with the expectation of some form of return, whether money or some other reward. 
Therefore a system of reciprocity also functions within family groups, in which young people 
exchange work for their family for some form of recompense. This is evident whether the 
work is oriented towards exchange or use value. Payment for family work is fairly common 
and that there is little evidence that payment depletes parent-child relationships. The 
persistence of instrumental orientations even among those who are paid the least shows how 
the act of payment confers symbolic rewards, something that also occurs within the formal 
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and informal economies. However the value given to work may be contested between 
parents and children, especially for care work.  
 
Intrinsic Orientations 
In the formal economy, instrumental orientations are associated with commodification, 
while intrinsic orientations are associated with social need. Young people from the poorest 
neighbourhoods are most likely to exhibit altruistic orientations, which also buttress feelings 
of self-reliance that can be generated through work, with young people from the poorest 
neighbourhoods also more likely for their work to provide them with a sense of self-reliance. 
The income that young people contribute to their families, especially in economically 
disadvantaged households, valorizes a sense of larger purpose for young people. This is an 
important finding because much research on young people’s work in developed economies 
suggests that young people, if they contribute at all, contribute only indirectly to the overall 
household economy by purchasing consumer items with their earnings, which parents would 
otherwise have to pay for. We also find that intrinsic orientations are influenced by the 
degree young people can exercise control at work in two respects. Firstly, intrinsic 
orientations are less prevalent among older workers, with younger workers more likely to 
view work as an avenue for social exploration beyond school and home. Older workers view 
work more skeptically. This is because the majority of older workers are in elementary skill 
jobs that have high responsibility and low autonomy. Secondly, higher skilled jobs are more 
likely to be associated with intrinsic orientations. While elementary skill jobs are relatively 
less precariousness and provide regular income, it is higher skill jobs that are associated with 
greater intrinsic orientations. These jobs provide greater enjoyment and sense of purpose. 
The strong relationship between skill and intrinsic orientations and the weak relationship 
between pay and intrinsic orientations suggests that incentive structures for work and pay are 
quite distinct. Young people might work for the money, but this is unrelated to other aspects 
of a satisfying job. 
 
In the informal economy, similar to the formal economy, young people from the poorest 
neighbourhoods exhibit the greatest levels of altruistic orientations. There is however no 
significant association between altruism and informal work category. Intrinsic work 
orientations are prevalent across within the informal economy, regardless of the relationship 
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between ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’. In the case of informal employees, close ties between people 
who already know each other, in the case of enterprise workers the ‘strength of weak ties’ 
between people who do not know each other very well and for associative workers the moral 
character of the work, play a comparable role in underpinning intrinsic work orientations in 
the informal economy. Despite this, payment functions as a medium, or ‘social glue’, in 
consolidating social relationships. Young people who are paid are more likely for their work 
to provide a sense of responsibility, social usefulness and enjoyment. Given the general 
inequalities in status and resources between young workers and adult purchasers on the 
informal economy, reciprocal exchange relations may be unequal, with one party feeling or 
being obliged to give more than the other. The respective resources of the giver and the 
recipient need to be taken into account when considering who has power in the exchange. In 
the case of a young worker and an adult purchaser the adult might be compelled by strong 
normative expectations to pay for the service provided, so as to maintain their superiority in 
the asymmetrical power relation. In so doing, payment may also act to redress this inequality 
and at the same time give recognition to the value of the work. Furthermore modes of non-
cash repayment are probably clear in adult-to-adult transactions, but adults may struggle as 
to how to reciprocate a favour provided by a teenager.  
 
Within the family economy it is family-owned production and household self-provisioning, 
rather than care work, which evidences higher levels of altruistic orientations. We can only 
make sense of these results if we consider the concrete context of the work involved. Young 
people in family-owned production are self-consciously involved in income producing 
activities with their family, and thus understand that their activities directly contribute to 
household income. Something similar can be said for substantive forms of self-provisioning, 
which involves a household strategy aimed at reducing costs around a specific project. 
Consort work on the other hand is reliant upon individual employment relations and the 
links to a collective household strategy are less clear. Care work, even that done by adults, is 
rarely recognized as making an economic contribution (Berk 1985, England 2005, Folbre 
2001). As in the informal economy, the act of payment marks an activity as having social 
value and therefore being something worthy of recognition. Payment is an explicit means 
through which the dependency relationship between adults and children can be partially 
altered into an exchange of equivalence. It acknowledges and values the work and in so 
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doing shows that the young worker is capable, competent and responsible enough to 
perform the work, without necessarily disrupting status relations between adults and children 
within the family.  
 
Final Reflections 
The comparative empirical analysis undertaken in this thesis and summarized in the previous 
sections of this conclusion has served two important functions. It has detailed the 
characteristics of children’s work in a modern capitalist economy, including the quality, 
conditions and social distribution of their work. It also provides the empirical vehicle to 
show how structural factors both delimit and enable children to assert their agency by 
providing the social environment that make possible certain types of activities. In its most 
apparent form, agency is the expression of a mix of socially embedded orientations. The 
analysis has intentionally proceeded from outlining broader economic and social processes 
to individual experience as expressed in orientations to work. The rationale for this method 
is to show that economic agency is an expression of relational embeddedness, which in turn, 
is in part determined by forms of structural embeddedness. While analysing children’s work 
as an example of how economic agency is expressed, this type of analysis could also be 
extended to other aspects of children and young people’s economic activities, such as 
consumption patterns. 
 
The starting premise of this thesis was that while the adult world of work has been subject to 
careful and rigorous analyses of politics, policy and structure, analysis of children and young 
people’s work, especially in developed economies, has not. Analysis of children’s work has in 
large part been either overly atomistic or structural. What we have endeavored to show in 
this analysis is instead that structural and relational embeddedness not only have a 
conceptual relationship, but are also concretely related in different ways across the three 
economies investigated in this thesis. However the specific ways structural and relational 
embeddedness are related is a matter of empirical investigation. Therefore the detailed 
analysis in Chapters Four, Five and Six, represents the operationalisation of our conceptual 
framework, but also populates our theoretical premises with empirical contours. These 
empirical contours undoubtedly will vary across social, geographical and historical space. 
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What this suggests is that we should not assume that our investigations are definitive, but 
require continuous questioning and updating.  
 
We see this variation in this study. The empirical analysis of the three economies shows that 
work conditions and orientations are organized quite differently across the three economies, 
reflecting the importance of skill on the formal economy, characteristics of social 
relationships on the informal economy, and whether work is oriented to internal use or 
exchange use for the family economy. It is this distinction that represents different forms of 
situated economic agency, embedded in quite distinct sets of social relations. These are 
specific examples of the interplay of the structural and individual, which move beyond the 
question of whether structures repress individuals or to what extent individuals can express 
their free will. Instead structures organize and facilitate individual behaviour, which in turn 
reproduces and alters structural relations over time.  Furthermore, this interaction generates 
different opportunities and experiences for different groups of young people. Work across 
the three economies has evident class, gender, age and cultural background distributions. 
Therefore agency is situated in at least two senses, by social structure and social position. 
 
This evidence also represents a powerful critique of developmental analyses of children and 
young people’s work. The reliance on age-based development as the basis for differentiating 
between good and bad work not only treats children as the objects of socialisation processes, 
but also overlooks a range of other factors that are equally or more significant in explaining 
the quality of work. Yet, our analysis also shows that age remains a valuable analytical 
category. We see quite evident age related patterns, which reflect the importance of age as a 
social, rather than developmental, category. This calls for a reconsideration of what role age 
should play in analysis of children and young people’s work. Instead of abandoning age as a 
developmental category, analysing the social function of age may provide ongoing critical 
insights into children and young people’s experience of a range of social phenomena.  
 
Methodologically this thesis has also shown that quantitative methods can take account of 
the multiple contexts and diversity of children’s work. In so doing work conditions have also 
been consistently assessed and a specific social universe has been mapped that has allowed 
us to identify the prevalence of different types of work and conditions across economies, 
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and inequalities between different social groups of young people. This has been done in a 
way that has allowed some degree of conceptual openness around the meaning of work and 
what activities count as work. However by viewing work through the prism of specific 
economic spheres work has been meaningfully differentiated from other activities. This 
combination of systematic comparison and conceptual openness has allowed us to identify 
quite important variation in the underlying explanatory dynamics for each economy.  
 
It is hoped that this investigation can assist develop future theoretical developments in this 
area. As usual for this sort of endeavor this thesis has raised questions as well as answering 
them. For instance while this thesis has indicated the conceptual link between structural and 
relational embeddedness, detailing the relationship between broader economic and social 
processes at one level, and individual experience is an area requiring ongoing empirical 
examination. Furthermore, qualitatively investigating the relationships between young 
workers and those who appropriate their labour will deepen and extend our understanding 
of the relationship between work orientations, relational and structural embeddedness. We 
would anticipate that such research may confirm, but also elaborate and challenge the 
conclusions drawn in this thesis. How extrinsic and intrinsic orientations are experienced on 
a daily basis, what the conceptual links between the two are and how orientations are 
generated out of the nature of social relations also requires separate investigation. 
Furthermore while the results suggest an age-related pathway around work, longitudinal 
research could test whether this pathway is evident robustly. This thesis has only provided 
some insight into these issues at a point in time. A more dynamic investigation would require 
further, and different types, of research to be undertaken. 
 
Finally, in the spirit of raising questions, we will end on one. How are the three economies 
distinct and related to the adult world of work? To this we can only provide a tentative 
response. Child and adult economies are interrelated, but in some important respects they 
are not the same. Instead they are best thought of interlocking social structures, related but 
independent. Young people’s work on the formal economy is highly integrated with the 
adult word of work. Yet what is perhaps interesting here are how adult sub-populations that 
have been defined as having an alternative role beyond that of employee, traditionally 
women, but also those with tenuous links with the formal labour market (retirees, newly 
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arrived immigrants, adults with few formal qualifications), share similar locations in the 
formal economy as young people. Hence young people’s work on the formal labour market 
is a particular case of a population who has an alternate role. Within the informal and family 
economies we also find instances where children and adults work together. Especially on the 
family economy, household self-provisioning, consort work and family-owned production 
are types of work where adults and children often work together for a common purpose. 
However there are certain activities where the work children and young people do is quite 
distinct from that of adults. We see this especially on the informal economy, where as 
informal employees or enterprise workers children and young people may be in competition, 
rather than work with, adults. Again the boundaries are more porous than seamless. Despite 
the continuities, the work children and young people do remains undervalued because 
children are undervalued as a social group, even though children make important economic 
contributions with and in parallel to the work adults perform.  
 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 253 - 
References 
 
Abebe, T. and Kjørholt, A. T (2009) ‘Social actors and victims of exploitation: Working 
children in the cash economy of Ethiopia’s South’, Childhood Vol.16(2), pp: 175-194. 
Abolafia, M. (1996) Making Markets: Opportunism and Restraint on Wall Street, Cambridge 
University Press, Massachusetts. 
Ahlander, N. and Bahr, K. (1995) ‘Beyond drudgery, power and equity: Toward an 
expanded discourse on the moral dimension of housework in families’, Journal of 
Marriage and the Family Vol. 57, pp. 54-68. 
Alanen, L. (2005) ‘Women’s studies/childhood studies: parallels, links and 
perspectives’, pp: 31-45 In J. Mason and T. Fattore (Eds.) Children Taken Seriously: In 
Theory, Policy and Practice, Jessica Kingsley, London. 
Anker, R., Khan, M.E. and Gupta, R.B. (1988) Women’s Participation in the Labour Force: 
A Methods Test in India for Improving its Measurement, International Labour Office, 
Geneva.  
Appelbaum, H. (1984) Work in Non-Market and Transitional Societies, State University of 
New York Press, Albany.  
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011a) NSW State and Regional Indicators, Dec 2010. Cat. 
No. 1338.1 . 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011b) Labour Force Australia, Detailed Cat. No 
6291.0.55.003. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2004) Socio-Economic Indexes for Australia (SEIFA), 
Australia 2001, Technical Paper. ABS Cat. No. 2039.0.55.001. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2003). Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union 
Membership, Australia, August 2001 data  cubes ABS Cat. No. 6310.0.  
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2001) Census of Population and Housing. ABS census 2001 
NSW Basic community profile. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (1997) Australian Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ASCO) Second Edition. ABS Cat. No. 1220.0. 
Balding, J. (1997) Young People in 1996, Schools Health Education Unit, Exeter 
University, Exeter.  
Barrett, G., Jones, T. and McEvoy, D. (1996) ‘Ethnic minority business: Theoretical 
discourse in Britain and North America’, Urban Studies, Vol. 33(4/5), pp: 783–809. 
Basu, K. and Tzannatos, Z.  (2003) ‘The Global Child Labor Problem: What do we 
know and what can we do?’, The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 17(2), pp. 147-173. 
Beamish, T. and Biggart, N. W. (2006) ‘Economic Worlds of Work: Uniting Economic 
Sociology with the Sociology of Work’, pp: 233-271. In M. Korczynski, R. Hodson 
and P. Edwards (Eds.) Social Theory at Work, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Beck, U. (2000) The Brave New World of Work, Polity, Cambridge. 
Becker, G. (1981) Treatise on the Family, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Becker, G. (1976) The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago. 
Beechey, V. (1987) Unequal Work, London, Verso. 
Bequele, A. and Boyden, J. (Eds.) (1988) Combating child labour, International Labour 
Office, Geneva. 
Berk, S. F. (1985) The Gender Factory, Plenum Press, New York. 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 254 - 
Bessell, S. (2009a) ‘Child Labor in Indonesia’, pp: 898-903. In Hindman, H. (Ed.) The 
World of Child Labor: An Historical and Regional Survey, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk NY. 
Bessell, S. (2009b) ‘Indonesian Children’s Views and Experiences of Work and 
Poverty’, Social Policy and Society, Vol. 8(4), pp: 527-540. 
Blair, S. (1992) ‘Children’s Participation in Household Labor: Child Socialization versus 
the Need for Household Labor’, Journal of Youth and Adolescence, Vol. 21(2), pp: 241-
258. 
Blair, S. and Lichter, D. T. (1990) On measuring the division of household labor. Gender 
segregation or sharing of housework? Paper presented at the 1990 American Sociological 
Association meeting, Washington, DC. 
Blatterer, H. (2009) Coming of Age in Times of Uncertainty, Berghahn Books, New York 
and Oxford. 
Blair, J.P. and Endres, C.R. (1994) ‘Hidden Economic Development Assets’, Economic 
Development Quarterly, Vol. 8 pp: 286–91. 
Blauner, R. (1964) Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker and His Industry, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Bøås, M. and Hatløy, A. (2008) ‘Child Labour in West Africa: Different Work – 
Different Vulnerabilities’ International Migration, Vol. 46(3), pp: 3-25. 
Boissevain, J. and Grotenbreg, H. ‘Culture, Structure and Ethnic Enterprise: The 
Surinamese of Amsterdam’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.9(1)  pp: 1-23.  
Boltanski, L. and Thévenot, L. (1999) ‘The Sociology of Critical Capacity’, European 
Journal of Social Theory. Vol. 2(3), pp: 359-377. 
Boockmann, B. (2010) ‘The Effect of ILO Minimum Age Conventions on Child Labor 
and School Attendance: Evidence from Aggregate and Individual Level Data’, World 
Development Vol. 38(5), pp: 679–692. 
Bosch, G. (2004) ‘Towards a new standard employment in Western Europe’, British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 42(4): pp: 617-636. 
Bourdieu, P. (2005) ‘Principles of Economic Anthropology’, pp: 75-89. In N. Smelser 
and R. Swedberg (Eds.) The Handbook of Economic Sociology (2nd Ed.), Princeton 
University Press: New Jersey. 
Bourdieu, P. (1998) Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action, Stanford University Press, 
California. 
Bourdieu, P. (1990) In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, Stanford 
University Press, California. 
Bourdillon, M.F.C. (2005), ‘Translating standards into practice: confronting local 
barriers’, pp: 221-257. In B. Weston (Ed.), Child Labor and Human Rights, Lynne 
Reiner, Boulder. 
Bourdillon, M.F.C. (2000), ‘Child labour and education: a case study from south-eastern 
Zimbabwe’, Journal of Social Development in Africa, Vol. 15(2), pp: 5-32. 
Bourdillon, M.F.C, White, B. and Myers, W.E. (2009) ‘Re-assessing minimum-age 
standards for children’s work’, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 
29(3/4), pp: 106-117.  
Boyden, J., Ling, B. and Myers, W. (1998). What Works for Working Children, Rädda 
Barnen, Stockholm.  
Bradley, H. (1989) Men’s Work, Women’s Work: A Sociological History of the Sexual Division 
of Labour in Employment, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Brannen, J. (1995) ‘Young People and their Contribution to Household Work’, Sociology, 
Vol. 29(2), pp:317-338. 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 255 - 
Brannen, J. (2005) ‘Mixing Methods: The Entry of Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches into the Research Process’, International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology Vol. 8, pp: 173-184. 
Braverman, H. (1974) Labour and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth 
Century, Monthly Review Press, New York. 
Brown, D. and Kulcar, L. (2001) ‘Household Economic Behavior in Post-Socialist 
Rural Hungary’, Rural Sociology, Vol. 66(2), pp: 157-180. 
Brown, R., Xu, X. and Toth, J. (1998) ‘Lifestyle options and economic strategies: 
Subsistence activities in the Mississippi Delta’, Rural Sociology,. Vol. 63(4), pp: 599-
623. 
Burns, D. and Taylor, M. (1998) Mutual aid and self-help: Coping strategies for excluded 
communities, The Policy Press, Bristol. 
Button, K. (1984) ‘Regional Variations in the Irregular Economy: a Study of Possible 
Trends’, Regional Studies Vol.18, pp: 385–92. 
Callus, R. and Lansbury, R. (2002) Working futures: the changing nature of work and 
employment relations in Australia, Federation Press, Leichhardt. 
Campbell, I. (1997) ‘Beyond Unemployment: The Challenge of Increased Precarious 
Employment’, Just Policy, No. 11, pp. 4-20. 
Campbell, R.R., Spencer, J.C. and Amonker, R.G. (1993) ‘The Reported and 
Unreported Missouri Ozarks: Adaptive Strategies of the People Left Behind’, pp: 30-
52. In T. Lyson and W. Falk (Eds.) Forgotten Places: Uneven Development in Rural 
America, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS. 
Castells, M. and Portes, A. (1989) ‘World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and 
Effects of the Informal Economy’, pp: 11-40. In A. Portes, M. Castells, and L.A. 
Benton (Eds.) The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries, 
The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD. 
Chakraborty, S. and Lieten, G.K. (2004) ‘What do child labourers do? Details of a rural 
district in Northeast India’, In G.K. Lieten (Ed.), Working Children Around the World, 
IREWOC Foundation & Institute for Human Development, New Delhi. 
Child, J. and Faulkner, D. (1998) Strategies of Cooperation: Managing Alliances, Networks and 
Joint Ventures, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Cichocki, S. and Tyrowicz, J. (2010) ‘Shadow employment in post-transition: Is 
informal employment a matter of choice or no choice in Poland?’, The Journal of Socio-
Economics, Vol. 39(4), pp: 527-535. 
Clark, A. (2010) Three Lectures on Post-Industrial Society, Springer, New York. 
Commission for the European Communities (1998) On Undeclared Work, COM (1998) 
219, Commission of the European Communities Brussels. 
Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care (2001) Measuring Remoteness: 
Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA) Revised Edition Occasional Papers, 
New Series Number 14 October 2001, Commonwealth of Australia. 
Cornea, A.G. and S. Danziger (1997) Child Poverty and Deprivation in the Industrialized 
Countries, 1945–1995, Clarendon, Oxford. 
Cornuel, D. and Duriez, B. (1985) ‘Local Exchange and State Intervention’, In N. 
Redclift and E. Mingione, (Eds.) Beyond Employment: Household, Gender and Subsistence. 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Corsaro, W. (1997) The Sociology of Childhood, Thousand Oaks, London.  
Cresswell, J.  (2004) Educational Research: Planning, Conducting, and Evaluating Quantitative 
and Qualitative Research, Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 256 - 
Crewe, L. and Gregson, N. (1998) ‘Tales of the Unexpected: Exploring Car Boot Sales 
as Marginal Spaces of Contemporary Consumption’, Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers Vol. 23(1) pp: 39–54. 
Cross, J. (1997) ‘Entrepreneurship and exploitation: Measuring independence and 
dependence in the informal economy’, The International Journal of Sociology and Social 
Policy, Vol. 17 pp: 37-62. 
Cunnien, K.A., Martin Rogers, N. and Mortimer, J.T. (2009) ‘Adolescent work 
experience and self-efficacy’, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 
29(3/4) pp: 164-175. 
Davidoff, L. (1976) ‘The rationalization of housework’, In D. Barker and S. Ilen (Eds.) 
Dependence and Exploitation in Work and Marriage, Longmans, Harlow. 
Davies, J. (1992) Exchange, Open University Press, Milton Keynes. 
Davis, C. (ed.) (1980) Rewriting Nursing History,  London: Croom Helm. 
Davis, L. E. (1966) ‘The design of jobs’, Industrial Relations, Vol.6, pp: 21-45. 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) Classification of Countries into 
English Proficiency Groups – Statistical Focus C96.1A 
www.immi.gov.au/statistics/publications/ep_groups/ep_groups.htm. 
Deener, A. (2009) ‘Forging distinct paths towards authentic identity: Outsider art, 
public interaction and identity transition in an informal market context’, Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography, Vol. 38(2), pp: 169-200. 
de Regt, A. (2004) ‘Children in the 20th-century family economy: From co-providers to 
consumers’, History of the Family Vol. 9, pp: 371–384. 
Devault, M. (1991) Feeding the Family: The Social Organization of Caring as Gendered Work, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  
Dore, R. P. (1973) British Factory, Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in 
Industrial Relations, University of California Press, Berkeley. 
Duncan, C.M. (1992) ‘Persistent Poverty in Appalachia: Scarce Work and Rigid 
Stratification,’ pp: 111-134. In C. Duncan (Ed.) Rural Poverty in America, Auburn 
House, New York. 
Edgecombe, E.L. and T. Thetford. 2004. ‘The Informal Economy: Making it in Rural 
America’, Microenterprise Fund for Innovation, Effectiveness, Learning and Dissemination 
(FIELD), The Aspen Institute: Washington D.C., 
http://www.fieldus.org/Publications/IE_Rural.pdf 
Edgell, S. (2006) The Sociology of Work: Continuity and Change in Paid and Unpaid Work, 
Sage Publications, London. 
Edmonds, E. V. and Pavcnik, N. (2006) ‘International trade and child labor: Cross-
country evidence’, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 68(1), pp: 115–140. 
Edwards, P. and Wajcman, J (2005) The Politics of Working Life, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford.  
Elkin, T. and McLaren, D. (1991) Reviving the City: Towards Sustainable Urban Development, 
Friends of the Earth, London. 
England, P. (2000) ‘Marriage, the Costs of Children, and Gender Inequality’, In L. 
Waite, C. Bachrach, M. Hindin, E. Thomson and A. Thornton (Eds.)  The Ties that 
Bind: Perspectives on Marriage and Cohabitation, Aldine de Gruyter, New York. 
England, P. (2005) ‘Emerging Theories of Care Work’, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 
31, pp: 381-399. 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 257 - 
England, P. and Folbre, N. (2000) ‘Reconceptualising Human Capital’, pp: 126-128. In 
W. Raub and J. Wessie (Eds.) The Management of Durable Relations, Thelathesis, 
Amsterdam. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Polity Press, 
Cambridge.  
Esping-Andersen, G. (2009) The Incomplete Revolution: Adapting to Women’s New Roles, 
Polity, Cambridge. 
Faulstich Orellana, M. (2001) ‘The Work Kids Do: Mexican and Central American 
Immigrant Children’s Contributions to Households and Schools in California’. 
Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 71(3), pp: 366-389. 
Faulstich Orellana, M., Dorner, L. and Pulido, L. (2003) ‘Accessing Assets: Immigrant 
Youth’s Work as Family Translators or “Para-Phrasers”’ Social Problems, Vol. 50(4), 
pp: 505–524. 
Fernandez-Aceves, M. and Blum, A. (2011) ‘Domestic economies: Family, work and 
welfare in Mexico City, 1884-1943’, Journal of Family History, Vol. 36(3), pp: 352-354. 
Fernandez-Kelly, M. P. and Garcia, A. M. (1989) ‘Informalization at the Core: Hispanic 
Women, Homework, and the Advanced Capitalist State’, pp: 247-265. In A. Portes, 
M. Castells and L. A. Benton (Eds.) The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less 
Developed Countries, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore. 
Fiege, E. (1990) ‘Defining and Estimating Underground and Informal Economies: The 
New Institutional Economics Approach.’ World Development, Vol.18, pp: 989-1002. 
Finch, J. (1989) Family Obligations and Social Change, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Finnegan, R. (1985) ‘Working Outside Formal Employment’, In R. Deem and G. 
Salaman (Eds.) Work, Culture and Society. Open University Press: Milton Keynes. 
Fitchen, J.M. (1981) Poverty in Rural America: A Case Study, Westview Press, Boulder. 
Florida, R. (2002) The Rise of the Creative Class. And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure and 
Everyday Life, Basic Books. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2001) Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can 
Succeed Again, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Folbre, N. (1994) ‘Children as Public Goods’, American Economic Review, Vol. 84, pp: 86-
90.  
Folbre, N. (1995) ‘‘Holding Hands at Midnight’: The Paradox of Caring Labor’, Feminist 
Economic, Vol. 1(1), pp: 73–92. 
Folbre, N. (2001) The Invisible Heart: Economics and Family Values, New Press, New York. 
Folbre, N. and Weisskopf, T. (1998) ‘Did father know best? Families, markets and the 
supply of caring labor’, pp: 171-205. In A. Ben-Ner, L. Putterman (Eds.) Economics, 
Values and Organisation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Frederiksen, L. (1999) ‘Child and Youth Employment in Denmark: Comments on 
Children's Work from their Own Perspective’, Childhood: A Global Journal of Child 
Research, Vol. 6(1), pp: 101-112. 
Frey, B. (1997) Not Just For the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Frey, B. and Stutzer, A. (2002) Happiness and Economics, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
Friedmann, G. (1955) Industrial Society: The Emergence of the Human Problems of Automation, 
Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois. 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 258 - 
Frost, M. (2000) Concepts of Space, Time and Work, in Indonesian Home-based Enterprises: A 
Case Study at Banyu Urip, Surabaya, Unpublished dissertation, Department of 
Geography, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle. 
Gager, C., Sanchez, L. and Demaris, A. (2009) ‘Whose time is it? The effect of 
employment and work/family stress on children’s housework’, Journal of Family Issues, 
Vol. 30(11), pp: 1459-1485. 
Gaillie, D. (2007) Employment Regimes and the Quality of Work, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Gaillie, D. (2003) 'The Quality of Working Life: Is Scandinavia Different?' European 
Sociological Review, Vol. 19(1), pp: 61-79. 
Gamlin, J. and Pastor, M. E. (2009) ‘Child labour in Latin America: theory, policy, 
practice’, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 29(3/4), pp: 118-129. 
Gershuny, J. (1979) ‘The informal economy, its role in post-industrial society’, Futures, 
February, pp: 3–15. 
Gershuny, J. (1983) Social innovation and the division of labour, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Gershuny, J. and Pahl, R. (1980) ‘Britain in the decade of the three economies’, New 
Society, 3 January. 
Glucksmann, M. (1995) ‘Why Work? Gender and the Total Social Organisation of 
Labour’, Gender, Work and Organisation, Vol. 2(2), pp: 63–75. 
Glucksmann, M. (2000) Cottons and Casuals: The Gendered Organisation of Labour in Time 
and Space, Sociology Press, Durham. 
Gouldner, A. (1960) ‘The norm of reciprocity: a preliminary statement’, Sociological 
Review, Vol. 25, pp: 161-182. 
Granovetter, M. (1985) ‘Economic action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91(3), pp: 481-510. 
Granovetter. M. (1973) ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 
78, pp: 1360-1380.  
Granovetter, M. and Swedberg, R. (eds.) (1992) The Sociology of Economic Life, Westview 
Press, Boulder. 
Green, D.L. (1990) ‘High school student employment in social context: Adolescents’ 
perceptions of the role of part-time work’. Adolescence, Vol. 25, pp: 425-434.  
Green, F. (2006) Demanding Work, Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Greenberger, E. and Steinberg, L. (1986) When Teenagers Work: The psychological and social 
costs of adolescent employment, Basic Books, New York.  
Guarcello, L., Rosati, F., Lyon, S. and Valdivia, C. (2005) Impact of Children’s Work on 
School Attendance and Performance: A Review of School Survey Evidence from Five Countries, 
International Labour Organisation, UNICEF, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Guillen, M., Collins, R., England, P. and Meyer, M. (2002). ‘The Revival of Economic 
Sociology’, in M. Guillen, R. Collins, P. England and M. Meyer (Eds.) The New 
Economic Sociology: Developments in an Emerging Field, Russell Sage Foundation, New 
York. 
Gullestad, M. (1992) The Art of Social Relations: Essays on Culture, Social Action and Everyday 
Life in Modern Norway, Scandinavian University Press, Oslo. 
Gutmann, P.M. (1978) ‘Are the Unemployed, Unemployed?’, Financial Analysts Journal, 
Vol. 35, pp: 26–7. 
Haavind, H. (2005) ‘Towards a multifaceted understanding of children as social 
participants’, Childhood, Vol. 12 (1), pp: 139–52. 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 259 - 
Hakim, C. (1988), ‘Homeworking in Britain’, in R. Pahl (Ed.) On Work: Historical, 
Theoretical and Comparative Approaches, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Hakim, C. (1996) Key Issues in Women’s Work: Female Heterogeneity and the Polarisation of 
Women’s Employment, Athlone, London. 
Hall, C. (1992) White, Male and Middle Class, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Hall, C. (1979) ‘The early formation of Victorian domestic ideology’, pp: 15-32. In S. 
Burman (Ed.) Fit Work for Women, Croom Helm, London. 
Hanson, K. and Vandaele, A. (2003), ‘Working children and international labour law: a 
critical analysis’, The International Journal of Children’s Rights, Vol. 11(1), pp: 73-146.  
Hart, K. (1973) ‘Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana,’ 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 11, pp: 61–89. 
Hartman, H. (1981) ‘The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a 
More Progressive Union’, pp: 1-41. In L. Sargent (ed.) Women and Revolution, Pluto, 
London. 
Haughton, G., Johnson, S., Murphy, L. and Thomas, K. (1993) Local Geographies of 
Unemployment: Long-Term Unemployment In Areas Of Local Deprivation, Aldershot, 
Avebury. 
Hazarika, G. and Bedi, A. S. (2003) ‘Schooling costs and child work in rural Pakistan’, 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 39(5), pp: 29-64.  
Hedges, J. and Barnett, J. (1972) ‘Working Women and the Division of Household 
Tasks’, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 94(4), pp: 9-14. 
Himmelweit, S. (2002) ‘Economic theory, norms and the care gap, or why do 
economists become parents?’, pp: 231-250. In A. Carling, S. Duncan and R. 
Edwards (Eds.) Analysing families: Morality and Rationality in Policy and Practice, 
Routledge, London.  
Himmelweit, S. (1995) ‘The Discovery of “Unpaid Work”: The Social Consequences of 
the Expansion of “Work”’. Feminist Economics. Vol. 1(2): pp. 1-19. 
Hobbs, S., Anderson, S. and McKechnie, J. (2009) ‘Exploring risks faced by child 
workers in Britain’, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 29(3/4), pp: 
176-185. 
Hobbs, S., Lindsay, S. and McKechnie, J. (1996) ‘The extent of child employment in 
Britain’, British Journal of Education and Work, Vol.9, pp: 5-18. 
Hobbs, S. and McKechnie, J. (2007) ‘The balance model reconsidered: Changing 
perceptions of child employment’, in B. Hungerland, M. Leibel, B. Milne and A. 
Wihstutz (Eds.) Working to be Someone, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London. 
Hobbs, S. and McKechnie, J. (1997) Child Employment in Britain: A Social and Psychological 
Analysis, The Stationary Office, Scotland. 
Hobbs, S., Stack, N., McKenchnie, J. and Smyllie, L. (2007), ‘Talking about work: 
school students’ views on their paid employment’, Children and Society, Vol. 2, pp. 
123-35. 
Hodson, R. and Sullivan, T. (2002) The Social Organization of Work, Wadsworth 
Publishing, Location. 
Hofferth, S. L. and Iceland, J. (1998) ‘Social capital in rural and urban communities’, 
Rural Sociology, Vol. 63(4), pp: 574–98. 
Honneth, A. (1996) The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, Polity 
Press, Cambridge. 
Hoyman, M. (1987) ‘Female Participation in the Informal Economy: A Neglected 
Issue’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 493, pp: 64–82. 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 260 - 
Hungerland, M., Liebel, B., Liesecke, A. and Wihstutz, A. (2007) ‘Paths to participatory 
autonomy: the meanings of work for children in Germany’. Childhood Vol. 14(2), pp: 
257-77. 
International Labor Organisation (2002) Decent work and the Informal Economy, 
International Labor Office, Geneva. 
International Labour Organisation (2006) The end of child labour: Within reach. Report of the 
Director-General, Global Report under the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work; Report I (B), International Labour Organisation, Geneva. 
Invernizzi, A. (2003) ‘Street-Working Children and Adolescents in Lima: Work as an 
Agent of Socialisation’, Childhood, Vol. 10(4), pp: 319-341. 
Jensen, A-M. (2009) ‘The value of children - fertility, personal choices and public 
needs’, Sociological Studies of Children and Youth, Vol. 12, pp: 195-220. 
Jensen, L., Cornwell, G. T. and Findeis, J. L. (1995) ‘Informal Work in 
Nonmetropolitan Pennsylvania’, Rural Sociology, Vol. 60, pp: 91–107. 
Jordan, B. (1998) The New Politics of Welfare: Social Justice in a Global Context, Sage, 
London. 
Jordan, B. and Redley, M. (1994) ‘Polarisation, Underclass and the Welfare State’, Work, 
Employment and Society, Vol. 8, pp: 153–76. 
Kabeer, N. (2003) ‘Deprivation, discrimination and delivery: competing explanations 
for child labour and educational failure in South Asia’, in N. Kabeer, G. B. 
Nambissan and R. Subrahmanian (Eds.) Child Labour and the Right to Education in 
South Asia, New Delhi, Sage.  
Kalleberg, A.L., Reskin, B.F. and Hudson, K. (2000) ‘Bad jobs in America: Standard 
and non-standard employment relationships and job quality in the United States’, 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 65(2), pp: 256-278. 
Katila, S. (2010) ‘Negotiating moral orders in Chinese business families in Finland: 
Constructing family, gender and ethnicity in a research situation’, Gender, Work and 
Organization, Vol. 17(3), pp: 297-319. 
Kawecka Nenga, S. and Baccam, T. (2010) ‘Stealing Peanuts and Coercing Energy 
Drinks: The Underground Economy of a Middle School Summer Camp’, Qualitative 
Sociology Review, Vol. 6(2), pp: 105-125. 
Kesteloot, C. and Meert, H. (1999) ‘Informal Spaces: the Geography of Informal 
Economic Activities in Brussels’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 
Vol. 23, pp: 232–51. 
Kibria, N. (1993) Family Tightrope: The Changing Lives of Vietnamese Americans, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton. 
Kloostermann, R., Van der Leun, J. and Rath, J. (1998) ‘Across the border: Immigrants’ 
economic opportunities, social capital and informal business activities’, Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 24(2), pp: 249–68.  
Kolakowski, L. (1978) Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth and Dissolution, 
Clarendon Press, Glasgow. 
Komter, A.E. (1996) ‘Reciprocity as a Principle of Exclusion: Gift Giving in the 
Netherlands’, Sociology, Vol.30, pp: 299–316. 
Kondo, D. K. (1990) Crafting Selves: Power, Gender and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese 
Workplace, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Korczynski, M., Hodson, R. and Edwards, P. K. (2006) ‘Introduction: Competing, 
Collaborating and Reinforcing Theories’, pp: 1-25. In M. Korczynski, R. Hodson, 
and P. K. Edwards (Eds.) Social Theory at Work, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 261 - 
Kirchhöfer, D. (1998) ‘Kinderarbeit – ein notwendiger Entwicklungsraum der 
Heranwachsenden. Ein Plädoyer für den Anspruch und das Recht der Kinder auf 
Arbeit’, DISKURS, Deutsches Jugendinstitut, February, pp: 64-71. 
Kus, B. (2010) ‘Regulatory governance and the informal economy: cross national 
comparisons’, Socio-Economic Review, Vol. 8(3), pp: 487-510. 
Laguerre, M. S. (1994) The Informal City, Macmillan, London. 
Lavalette, M. (1994) Child Employment in the Capitalist Labour Market, Avebury, Aldershot. 
Lavalette, M., Hobbs, S., Lindsay, S. and McKechnie, J. (1995) ‘Child Employment in 
Britain: Policy, myth and reality’, Youth and Policy. Vol. 13, pp: 1-15. 
Leonard, M. (2004) 'Children's Views on Children's Right to Work', Childhood: A Global 
Journal of Child Research Vol. 11(1), pp: 73-89. 
Leonard, M. (2003), ‘‘Children’s attitudes to parents’’, teachers’ and employers’ 
perspectives of term-time work’’, Children and Society, Vol. 17 No., pp. 349-60. 
Leonard, M. (2000) ‘Coping strategies in developed and developing societies: the 
workings of the informal economy’, Journal of International Development, Vol. 12(8), pp: 
1069-1085.  
Leonard, M. (1999) Play Fair with Working Children. A Report on Working Children in Belfast, 
Save the Children Fund, Belfast. 
Leonard, M. (1994) Informal Economic Activity in Belfast, Aldershot, Avebury. 
Leonard, M. (1998) Invisible work, invisible workers: The informal economy in Europe and the US 
Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
Levey, H. (2009) ‘Pageant Princesses and Math Whizzes: Understanding children’s 
activities as a form of children’s work’ Childhood ,Vol. 16(2), pp: 195–212. 
Levine, S. (2011) ‘The race of nimble fingers: Changing patterns of children's work in 
post-apartheid South Africa’, Childhood, Vol.18(2), pp: 261–273. 
Levine, S. (1999) ‘Bittersweet Harvest: Children, work and the global march against 
child labour in the post-apartheid state’, Critique of Anthropology, Vol. 19(2), pp: 139-
155 . 
Levison, D. (2000) ‘Children as Economic Agents’, Feminist Economics, Vol. 6(1): pp. 
125–134. 
Levitan, L. and Feldman, S. (1991) ‘For Love or Money: Nonmonetary Economic 
Arrangements Among Rural Households in Central New York’, Research in Rural 
Sociology and Development, Vol. 5, pp: 149–72. 
Lie, J. (1997) ‘The concept of mode of exchange’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 57: 
pp. 508-523. 
Liebel, M. (forthcoming) ‘Do children have a right to work? Working children’s 
movements in the struggle for social justice’. In K. Hanson & O. Nieuwenhuys 
(Eds.), Living Rights: Theorizing Children’s Rights in International Development, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge UK. 
Liebel, M. (2004) A Will of their Own: Cross-cultural perspectives on Working Children, Zed 
Books, New York. 
Liebel, M. (2003), ‘Working children as social subjects: the contribution of working 
children’s organisations to social transformations’, Childhood, Vol. 10(3), pp: 265-85. 
Liebel, M. (2001) Childhood and work, IKO, Frankfurt/Main, London. 
Liebel, M. The Economic Exploitation of Children. A Theoretical Essay towards a Subject-Oriented 
Praxis, Unpublished Manuscript, Berlin. 
Light, I., Sabagh, G., Borzorgmemr, M. and Dermartirosian, C. (1994) ‘Beyond the 
ethnic enclave economy’, Social Problems, Vol. 41, pp: 65-80. 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 262 - 
Lindbeck, A., Nyberg, S. and Weibull, J. (1999) ‘Social Norms and Economic 
Incentives in the Welfare State’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114(1), pp: 1-35.   
Lopez-Calva, L. (2003) ‘Social Norms, Coordination and Policy Issues in the Fight 
Against Child Labor’, in K. Basu, H. Horn, L. Roman and J. Shapiro (Eds.) 
International Labor Standards: History, Theory and Policy, Blackwell, Oxford.  
Lovell-Troy, L. (1980) ‘Ethnic Occupational Structures: Greeks in the Pizza Business’, 
Ethnicity, Vol. 8(1), pp: 82-95. 
Lowe, G. and Krahn, H. (2000) ‘Work Aspirations and Attitudes in an Era of Labour 
Market Restructuring: A Comparison of two Canadian Youth Cohorts’, Work 
Employment and Society, Vol. 14 (1), pp: 1-22. 
Lunt, P. and Furnham, A. (1996) Economic socialization: the economic beliefs and behaviours of 
young people, Elgar, Cheltenham. 
MacDonald, R. (1994) ‘Fiddly Jobs, Undeclared Working and the Something for 
Nothing Society’, Work, Employment and Society, Vol. 8, pp: 507–30. 
Maher, J., Lindsay, J. and Franzway, S. (2008) ‘The family time economy: toward an 
understanding of time, caring labour and social policy’, Work, employment and society, 
Vol. 22(3), pp: 544–552. 
Majumdar, M. (2001) ‘Child Labour as a Human Security Problem: Evidence from 
India’, Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 29(3), pp: 279- 304. 
Marshall, T.H. (1964) Citizenship and social class: and other essays, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Matthews, K. (1983) ‘National Income and the Black Economy’, Journal of Economic 
Affairs, Vol. 3, pp: 261–267. 
Mauss, M. (1966) The Gift, Cohen and West, London. 
Mayall, B. (1996) Children, Health and the Social Order, Open University Press, 
Buckingham.  
Mayblin, M. (2010) ‘Learning Courage: Child Labor as Moral Practice in Northeast 
Brazil’, Ethnos, Vol. 75(1), pp: 23-48. 
Maynard, M. (1985) ‘Houseworkers and their Work’, in R. Deem and G. Salaman (Eds.) 
Work, Culture and Society, Open University Press, Milton Keynes. 
Meagher, G. (2003) Friend or Flunkey? Paid Domestic Workers in the New Economy, UNSW 
Press, Sydney. 
Mehrotra, M. and Calasanti, T. (2010) ‘The family as a site for gendered ethnic identity 
work among Asian Indian immigrants’, Journal of Family Issues, Vol. 31(6), pp: 778-
807. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945) Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. by C. Smith, (1962) 
Humanities Press, New York. 
Mills, M. (2004) ‘Demand for flexibility or generation of insecurity? The 
individualization of risk, irregular work shifts and Canadian youth’, Journal of Youth 
Studies, Vol. 7(2), pp: 115-139. 
Mingione, E. (1983) ‘Informalization, restructuring and the survival strategies of the 
working class’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 7, pp: 311–39.  
Mingione, E. (1985) ‘Social Reproduction of the Surplus Labour Force: The Case of 
Southern Italy’, in N. Redclift and E. Mingione (Eds.) Beyond Employment: Households, 
Gender and Subsistence, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.  
Mingione, E. (1988) ‘Work and Informal activities in Urban Southern Italy’, In. R. Pahl 
(Ed.) On Work: Historical, Theoretical and Comparative Approaches, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford. 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 263 - 
Mingione, E. (1991) Fragmented Societies: A Sociology of Economic Life Beyond the Market 
Paradigm, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Misko, J. (2008) Combining formal, non-formal and informal learning for workforce development, 
National Centre for Vocational Education Research, Adelaide. 
Mizen, P., Bolton, A. and Pole, C. (1999) ‘School Age Workers: The Paid Employment 
of Children in Britain’, Work, Employment and Society, Vol. 13(3), pp: 423-438. 
Morrow, V. (1992) A Sociological Study of the Economic Roles of Children, with Particular 
Reference to Birmingham and Cambridgeshire, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Faculty of Social 
and Political Sciences, University of Cambridge.  
Morrow, V. (1994) ‘Responsible Children? Aspects of children’s work and employment 
outside school in contemporary UK’, pp: 128-143. In Mayall, B. (Ed.) Children’s 
Childhoods: observed and experienced, Falmer Press, London.  
Morrow, V. (1996) ‘Rethinking childhood dependency: children’s contributions to the 
domestic economy’, The Sociological Review, Vol. 44 (1), pp: 58-77. 
Morrow, V. (2010) ‘Should the world really be free of ‘child labour’? Some reflections’ 
Childhood, Vol. 17(4), pp: 435–440.  
Mortimer, J.T. (2003), Work and Growing Up in America, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Mortimer, J. T. and Finch, M. D. (1996) ‘Work, family and adolescent development’, 
pp: 1-24. In J. T. Mortimer, and M. D. Finch (Eds.) Adolescents, work and family: An 
intergenerational developmental analysis, Sage, Thousand Oaks. 
Mortimer, J. T. and Krüger, H. (2000) ‘Pathways from school to work in Germany and 
the United States’, pp:475-498. In M. Hallinan (Ed.) Handbook of the Sociology of 
Education, Kluwer Academic, New York. 
Nelson, M. (1999a) ‘Economic Restructuring, Gender, and Informal Work: A Case 
Study of a Rural County’, Rural Sociology, Vol. 64, pp: 26–35. 
Nelson, M. (1999b) ‘Between Paid and Unpaid Work: Gender Patterns in Supplemental 
Economic Activities among White, Rural Families’, Gender and Society, Vol. 13(4), pp: 
518-539. 
Nelson, M. (2004) 'How Men Matter: Housework and Self-Provisioning Among Rural 
Single-Mother And Married-Couple Families in Vermont, US', Feminist Economics, 
Vol. 10(2), pp: 9-36.  
Nelson, J. and England, P. (2002) ‘Feminist philosophies of love and work’, Hypatia 
Vol. 17, pp: 1-18. 
Nelson, M. and Smith, J. (1999) Working Hard and Making Do: Surviving in Small Town 
America. Berkeley, University of California Press, California. 
Nicholson, B. (1995) ‘Domestic production and the market: Where status and contract 
meet.’ Sociology, Vol. 29(2), pp: 221-239. 
Nieuwenhuys, O. (2000) ‘The household economy in the commercial exploitation of 
children’s work: the case of Kerala’, pp: 278-291. In B. Schlemmer (Ed.), The 
Exploited Child, Zed Books, London and New York. 
Nieuwenhuys, O. (1996) ‘The Paradox of Child Labor and Anthropology’, Annual 
Review of Anthropology, Vol. 25, pp: 237-251. 
Noelker, L., Ejaz, F., Menne, H. and Bagaka, J. (2009) ‘Factors affecting frontline 
workers’ satisfaction with supervision’, Journal of Ageing and Health, Vol. 21(1), pp: 85-
101. 
Oakley, A. (1974) The sociology of housework, Martin Robertson, London. 
Offe, C. and Hinrichs, K. (1985) ‘The political economy of the labour market’, in C. 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 264 - 
Offe (Ed.) Disorganised Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations of Work and Politics, 
Polity, Cambridge. 
Outhwaite, W. and Honneth, A. (2009) ‘Disrespect: The normative foundations of a 
critical theory’, Economy and Society, Vol. 38(2), pp: 360-367. 
Pahl, R. E. (1984) Divisions of Labour, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Pahl, R. and Wallace, C. (1985) ‘Household Work Strategies in Economic Recession’, in 
N. Redclift and E. Mingione (Eds.) Beyond Employment: Households, Gender and 
Subsistence, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Pahl, R. (1988) ‘Some remarks on informal work, social polarization and the social 
structure’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 12, pp: 247–67.  
Park Sun-Hee, L. (2000) ‘Between Adulthood and Childhood: The Boundary Work of 
Immigrant Entrepreneurial Children’, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. 45, pp: 114-
135. 
Park Sun-Hee, L. (2002) ‘Asian Immigrant Entrepreneurial Children’, pp: 161-177. In 
L. Trinh Vo and R. Bonus (Eds.) Contemporary Asian American Communities, Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia. 
Pickering, K. (2000) ‘Alternative Economic Strategies in Low-Income Rural 
Communities: TANF, Labor Migration, and the Case of the Pine Ridge Indian 
Reservation’, Rural Sociology, Vol. 65, pp: 148–67. 
Polanyi, K. (1957) ‘The Economy as Instituted Process’, in K. Polanyi, C. M. Arensberg 
and H.W. Pearson (Eds.) Trade and Market in Early Empires: Economies in History and 
Theory, Free Press, Glencoe. 
Polanyi, K. (1944) The Great Transformation, Octagon Books, New York. 
Pond, C. and Searle, A. (1991) The Hidden Army: Children at Work in the 1990’s, Low Pay 
Unit, London. 
Portes, A. (1994) ‘The Informal Economy and Its Paradoxes’, In N.J. Smelser and R. 
Swedberg (Eds.) The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ. 
Portes, A. (1995) The sociology of immigration. Essays on networks, ethnicity, and entrepreneurship, 
Russell Sage Foundation, New York. 
Portes, A. (1998) ‘Social capital: its origins and applications in modern sociology’, 
Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 24(1), pp: 1–24. 
Portes, A. and Haller, W. (2005) ‘The Informal Economy’, pp: 403-428. In N. Smelser 
and R. Swedberg (Eds.) The Handbook of Economic Sociology (2nd Ed.), Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Portes, A. and Sassen-Koob, S. (1987) ‘Making it underground. Comparative material 
on the informal sector in western economies’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 93(1), 
pp: 30–61. 
Presser, H. (1998) ‘Toward a 24 hour Economy: The U.S Experience and its 
Implications for Family’, in D. Vannoy and P.J. Dubeck (Eds.) Working in a 24/7 
Economy: Challenges for American Families, DeGruyter, New York. 
Propper, A. M. (1972), ‘The relationship of maternal employment to adolescent roles, 
activities, and parental relationships’, Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 34, pp: 
417-421. 
Punch, S. (2003) ‘Childhoods in the Majority World: Miniature Adults or Tribal 
Children’ Sociology, Vol. 37(2), pp: 277-295.  
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 265 - 
Qvortrup, J. (1994) ‘Childhood Matters: An Introduction’, in J. Qvortrup, M. Bardy, G. 
Sgritta and H. Wintersberger (Eds.) Childhood Matters: Social Theory, Practice and Politics, 
Brookfield, VT, Avebury. 
Qvortrup, J., Corsaro, W. A. and Honig, M-S. (Eds.) (2009)The Palgrave Handbook of 
Childhood Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Rafferty, M. and Yu, S. (2010) Shifting Risk: Work and Working Life in Australia. A Report 
prepared for the Australian Council of Trade Unions, Workplace Research Centre, 
University of Sydney [accessed at: 
http://www.rightsatwork.com.au/getattachment/9c420aaa-9533-418e-95d0-
ebd2d8447a22/Shifting-Risk-report.aspx. June 2011] 
Ram, M. and Holliday, R. (1993) ‘Relative merits: family culture and kinship in small 
firms’, Sociology, Vol. 27(4), pp: 629-48. 
Ravallion, M. and Wodon, Q. (2000), ‘Does child labour displace schooling? Evidence 
on behavioural responses to an enrolment subsidy’, The Economic Journal, No. 110, 
pp: C158-C175. 
Regini, M. (2000) ‘Between Deregulation and Social Pacts: The Responses of European 
Economies to Globalization’, Politics and Society, Vol. 28(1), pp: 5–33. 
Renooy, P. (1990) The Informal Economy: Meaning, Measurement and Social Significance, 
Netherlands Geographical Studies Association, Amsterdam. 
Robson, B. T. (1988) Those Inner Cities: Reconciling The Social And Economic Aims Of Urban 
Policy, Oxford, Clarendon. 
Rodgers, G. and Standing, G. (1981) Child Work, Poverty and Underdevelopment, 
International Labor Organization, Geneva. 
Rogoff, B. (2003) The Cultural Nature of Human Development, Oxford University Press, 
New York. 
Rovi, Sue (1997) ‘But are they exploited?: Industrial home workers in the 1990 New 
Jersey census’, The International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 17(3/4), pp: 63-
101.  
Rowthorn, B. (1974) ‘Neo-classicism, Neo-Ricardianism and Marxism’, New Left Review. 
July-August, pp: 14-47. 
Rubin, V. (1983) ‘Family work patterns and community resources: An analysis of 
children's access to support and services outside school’, in C. D. Hayes and S. B. 
Kamerman (Eds.) Children of Working Parents, National Academy Press, Washington. 
Russell Hochschild, A. (1983) The managed heart: commercialization of human feeling, 
University of California Press, Berkeley. 
Sahlins, M. (1974) Stone Age Economics, Aldine de Gruyter, New York  
Sanders, J. and Nee, V. (1996) ‘Immigrant self-employment: the family as social capital 
and the value of human capital’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, pp: 231-49. 
Sassen, S. (2010) ‘Global inter-city networks and commodity chains: any intersections?’, 
Global Networks, Vol. 10(1), pp: 150-163. 
Sassen, S. (1991) ‘The informal economy’, pp: 79-102. In J. Mollenkopf and M. Castells 
(Ed.) Dual City: Restructuring New York, Russell Sage, New York.  
Sassen-Koob, S. (1989) ‘New York City’s Informal Economy’, pp: 60-77. In A. Portes, 
M. Castells, and L. A. Benton (Eds.) The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less 
Developed Countries, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD. 
Schmid, G. (1995) ‘Is Full Employment Still Possible? Transitional Labour Markets as a 
New Strategy of Labour Market Policy’, Economic and Industrial Democracy, Vol. 16, pp: 
429-456. 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 266 - 
Schoenhals, M., Tienda, M. and Schneider, B. (1998) ‘The Educational and Personal 
Consequences of Adolescent Employment’, Social Forces, Vol. 77(2), pp: 723-762. 
Scoville, J. (2002) ‘Segregation in the Market for Child Labor: The Economics of Child 
Labor Revisited’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 61(3), pp: 713-723. 
Sibler, I. (1993) ‘Monasticism and the ‘Protestant Ethic’: Asceticism, Rationality and 
Wealth in the Medieval West’, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 44 (1), pp: 103-123. 
Silva, E. and Thistle, S. (2009) From Marriage to the Market: The Transformation of Women’s 
Lives and Work, Sage, London. 
Silver, B. J. (2003) Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Simons, T. and Ingram, P. (1997) ‘Organization and Ideology: Kibbutzim and Hired 
Labor’. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 42(4), pp: 784-813. 
Slack, T. (2007a) ‘Work, Welfare and the Informal Economy: Toward an 
Understanding of Household Livelihood Strategies’, Community Development, Vol. 
38(1), pp: 26-42. 
Slack, T. (2007b) ‘The contours and correlates of informal work in rural Pennsylvania’, 
Rural Sociology, Vol. 72(1), pp: 69-89. 
Slavnic, Z. (2010) ‘Political Economy of Informalization’, European Societies, Vol. 12(1), 
pp: 3-23. 
Smith, S. (1986) Britain’s Shadow Economy, Clarendon, Oxford. 
Smith, P., Kendall, L. and Hulin, C. (1969) Measurement of Satisfaction in Work and 
Retirement, Rand McNally, Chicago.  
Smyth, C, Blaxland, M and Cass, B, (2011) ‘“So that's how I found out I was a young 
carer and that I actually had been a carer most of my life”. Identifying and 
supporting hidden young carers’, Journal of Youth Studies, Vol. 14(2), pp: 145-160. 
Smyth, C., Cass, B., and Hill, T. (2011) ‘Children and young people as active agents in 
care-giving: agency and constraint', Children and Youth Services Review, Vol. 33(4), pp: 
509-514. 
Soiffer, S.S. and Herrmann, G.M. (1987) ‘Visions of Power: Ideology and Practice in 
the American Garage Sale’, Sociological Review, Vol. 35, pp: 48–83. 
Solberg, A. (1990) ‘Negotiating childhood: Changing constructions of age for 
Norwegian children’, pp: 123-140. In A. James and A. Prout (Eds.) Constructing and 
Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Studies of Childhood, Falmer, 
London.  
Solberg, A. (2001) ‘Hidden Sources of Knowledge of Children’s Work in Norway’, pp: 
108-120. In P. Mizen, C. Pole and A. Bolton (Eds.) Hidden Hands: International 
Perspectives on Children’s Work and Labour, Routledge Falmer, London. 
Song, M. (1997) ‘Children’s labour in ethnic family businesses: the case of Chinese take-
away businesses in Britain’, Ethnic and Racial Studies,  Vol. 20 (4), pp: 690-716. 
Song, M. (1999) Helping Out: Children’s Labor in Ethnic Businesses, Temple Press, 
Philadelphia.  
Spector, P. (1997) Job Satisfaction: Application, assessment, causes and consequences, Sage, 
Thousand Oaks, CA.  
Standing, G. (1999) Global labour flexibility: Seeking distributive justice, St Martins Press, 
New York. 
Standing, G. (2011) The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class, Bloomsbury, London. 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 267 - 
Steinberg, L. D., Greenberger, E., Garduque, L. and McAuliffe, S. (1982) ‘High school 
students in the labor force: Some costs and benefits to schooling and learning’. 
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Vol. 4, pp. 363-37. 
Stohs, J. (2007) ‘From Marriage to the Market: The Transformation of Women’s Lives 
and Work’, Journal of Comparative Family Studies, Vol. 38(2), pp: 366-367. 
Tancred, P. (1995) ‘Women’s Work: A challenge to the Sociology of Work’, Gender 
Work and Organisation, Vol. 2(1), pp: 11–19. 
Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie C. (Eds.) (2010), Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral 
Research (2nd Ed.), Thousand Oaks, Sage.  
Taylor, S. and Warburton, C. (2011) ‘The Contribution of Gifts to the Household 
Economy of Low-Income Families’ Social Policy and Society, Vol. 10(2), pp: 163-175. 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004) New risks, new welfare: The transformation of the European welfare 
State, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Thiel, D. (2010) ‘Contacts and contracts: Economic embeddedness and ethnic 
stratification in London’s construction market’, Ethnography, Vol. 11(3), pp: 443-471. 
Thomas, J.J. (1992) Informal Economic Activity, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Thorne, B. (1987) ‘Re-Visioning Women and Social Change: Where Are the Children?’ 
Gender and Society, Vol. 1(1), pp: 85-109. 
Thrall, C. A. (1978) ‘Who does what? Role Stereotyping, Children’s work and 
Continuity Between Generations in the Household Division of Labour’, Human 
Relations, 31, March. 
Tickamyer, A. and Bohon, S. (2000) ‘The Informal Economy’, in E.F. Borgatta and R. 
J. V. Montgomery (Eds.) The Encyclopedia of Sociology, MacMillan Reference, New 
York. 
Tickamyer, A. and Wood, T. (1998) ‘Identifying Participation in the Informal Economy 
Using Survey Research Methods’, Rural Sociology, Vol. 63, pp: 323–39. 
Tickamyer, A. and Wood, T. (2003) ‘The Social and Economic Context of Informal 
Work,’ pp: 394-418. In W.W. Falk, M.D. Schulman, and A. Tickamyer (Eds.) 
Communities of Work: Rural Restructuring in Local and Global Contexts, Ohio University 
Press, Athens, OH.  
Tilly, L. and Scott, J. (1978) Women, work and Family, Holt Rinehart and Winston. 
Tilly, C. (1996) Half a job: bad and good part-time jobs in a changing labor market, Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia.  
Tipple, G. (2006) ‘Employment and work conditions in home based enterprises in four 
developing countries: do they constitute ‘decent work’?’, Work, Employment and 
Society, Vol. 20(1), pp: 167–179. 
Tönnies, F. (1957) Community & society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft), Michigan State 
University Press, East Lansing. 
Towse, R. (2001) ‘Partly for the Money: Rewards and Incentives to Artists’, Kyklos, Vol. 
54, pp: 473-490. 
United States Department of Labor (2000) Report on the Youth Labor Force, U.S. 
Department of Labor, Washington. 
Valenzuela, A. (1999) ‘Gender Roles and Settlement Activities Among Children and 
Their Immigrant Families’, American Behavioural Scientist, Vol. 42, pp: 720–42. 
Van der Waal, J. and Burgers, J. (2011) ‘Post-Industrialisation, Job Opportunities and 
Ethnocentrism’, Journal of Urban Studies, Vol. 4(4), pp: 681-697. 
Van Maanen, J. and Barley, S. (1984) ‘Occupational Communities: Culture and Control 
in Organisations’, Research in Organisational Behaviour, Vol. 6, pp: 287-365.  
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 268 - 
Vogl, G. (2009) ‘Work as Community: Narratives of Solidarity and Teamwork in the 
Contemporary Workplace, Who Owns Them?’, Sociological Research Online, Vol. 14(4), 
August. 
Vosko, L., MacDonald, M. and Campbell, I. (Eds.) (2009) Gender and the Contours of 
Precarious Employment, Routledge, London. 
Waldinger, R. (1986) ‘Immigrant Enterprise: A Critique and Reformulation’, Theory and 
Society, Vol. 15(1), pp: 249-285. 
Waldinger, R. and Lapp, M. (1993) ‘Back to the Sweatshop or Ahead to the Informal 
Sector’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 17, pp: 6–29.  
Warren, T. (2011) ‘Researching the gender division of unpaid domestic work: practices, 
relationships, negotiations and meanings’, The Sociological Review, Vol. 59(1), pp: 129-
148. 
Watson, I. Buchanan, J., Campbell, I. and Briggs, C. (2003) Fragmented Futures: New 
Challenges in Working Life, Federation Press, Sydney. 
Wenger, E. and Snyder, W. (2000) ‘Communities of Practice: The Organizational 
Frontier’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 78, pp: 139-145. 
White, B. (1996) ‘Globalization and the child labour problem’, Journal of International 
Development, Vol. 8(6), pp: 829–839. 
White, L. and Brinkerhoff, D. (1981) ‘The Sexual Division of Labor: Evidence from 
Childhood’, Social Forces, Vol. 60(1), pp: 170-181. 
White, R. and Williams, C.C. (2010) ‘Re-thinking monetary exchange: Some lessons 
from England’, Review of Social Economy, Vol. 68(3), pp: 317-338. 
White, R. and Wyn, J. (2004) Youth and Society: Exploring the Social Dynamics of Youth 
Experience, Oxford University Press, Melbourne. 
Wight, V. and Raley, S. (2009) ‘When home becomes work: Work and family time 
among workers at home’, Social Indicators Research, Vol. 93(1), pp: 197-202. 
Wihstutz, A. (2007) ‘The Significance of Care and Domestic Work to Children: A 
German Portrayal’, pp: 77-86. In B. Hungerland, M. Liebel, B. Milne and A. 
Wihstutz (Eds.) Working to be Someone:  Child Focused Research Practice with Working 
Children, Jessica Kingsley Publishers: London.  
Williams, C. (2011) ‘A critical evaluating of competing conceptualizations of informal 
employment: Some lessons from England’, Review of Social Economy, Vol. 69(2), pp: 
211-237. 
Williams, C. (2009) ‘Formal and Informal Employment in Europe: Beyond dualistic 
representations’, European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol. 16(2), pp: 147-159. 
Williams, C.C. and Windebank, J. (1998) Informal Employment in the Advanced Economies: 
Implications for Work and Welfare, Routledge, London. 
Williams, C.C. and Windebank, J. (1999) A Helping Hand: Harnessing Self-help to Tackle 
Social Exclusion, York Publishing Services, York. 
Williams, C.C. and Windebank, J. (2000) ‘Self-help and mutual aid in deprived urban 
neighbourhoods: some lessons from Southampton’, Urban Studies, Vol. 37(1), pp: 
127–47. 
Williams, C.C. and Windebank. J. (2001) ‘Beyond Profit-motivated Exchange Some 
Lessons from the Study of Paid Informal Exchange’, European Urban and Regional 
Studies, Vol. 8(1), pp: 43-56. 
Williams, C.C. and Windebank, J. (2002) ‘The uneven geographies of informal 
economic activities: a case study of two British cities’, Work, employment and society, 
Vol. 16(2), pp: 231-250. 
Working the Multiple Economies: Children’s Work in a Developed Capitalist Economy 
 
References  - 269 - 
Williams, C.C. and Windebank, J. (2005) ‘Why Do Households Use Alternative 
Consumption Practices? Some Lessons from Leicester’, Community, Work, and Family, 
Vol. 8 pp: 301–20. 
Wilson, K and Portes, A. (1980) ‘Immigrant enclaves: an analysis of the labor market 
experiences of Cubans in Miami,’ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 86(2), pp: 295-319. 
Woodhead, M. (2009) ‘Child development and development of childhood’, pp: 46-61. 
In J. Qvortrup, W. A. Corsaro and M-S Honig (Eds.) The Palgrave Handbook of 
Childhood Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Woodhead, M. (2005) ‘Combating child labour’, pp: 267-292. In C. Jenks (Ed.) 
Childhood: Critical Concepts, Critical Concepts in Sociology, Vol. 2, Routledge, London. 
Woodhead, M. (2004) ‘Psychosocial impacts of child work: a framework for research, 
monitoring and intervention’, The International Journal of Children’s Rights, Vol. 12(4), 
pp: 321-77. 
World Movement of Working Children (2004) Final Declaration of the 2nd Meeting of the 
World Movement of Working Children and Adolescents, Berlin, Germany, April 19th to 2nd 
May 2004, available at: http://shop.rb.se/Product/Product.aspx?ItemId=4995471 
/WorkingchildrenFinalDeclarationBerlin2004.pdf (accessed 13 June 2011). 
Wright, E. and Singelmann. J. (1982). ‘Proletarianization in the American Class 
Structure’, in M. Burawoy and T. Skocpol (Eds.), Marxist Inquiries: Studies of Labor, 
Class, and States, Supplement to the American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 88, pp: 176-209. 
Yin, R.K. (2009) Case Study Research: Design and Methods Fourth Edition, Sage, London. 
Young, M. and Wilmott, P. (1975) The symmetrical family: A study of work and leisure in the 
London region, Penguin, Harmondsworth. 
Zeiher, H. (2004) ‘Hausarbeit – ein soziales Lernfeld für Kinder’. In B. Hungerland and 
B. Overwien (Eds.) Kompetenzenwicklung in Wandel, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 
Wiesbaden. 
Zelizer, V. (2002) ‘Kids and Commerce’, Childhood, Vol. 9(4), pp: 375–396. 
Zelizer, V. (1985) Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children, Basic 
Books, New York. 
Zhou, M. and Bankston, C. (1994) ‘Social capital and the adaptation of the second 
generation: the case of Vietnamese youth in New Orleans’, International Migration 
Review, Vol. 28(4), pp: 821-45. 
Ziebarth, A. and Tigges, L. (2003) ‘Earning a Living and Building a Life: Income- 
Generating and Income Saving Strategies of Rural Wisconsin Families’, pp: 316-338. 
In W.W. Falk, M.D. Schulman, and A. Tickamyer (Eds.) Communities of Work: Rural 
Restructuring in Local and Global Contexts, Ohio University Press, Athens, OH. 
Zuboff, S. (1988) In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power, Basic 
Books, New York. 
Zukin, S. and DiMaggio, P. (1990) ‘Introduction’, pp: 1-36. In S. Zukin and P. 
DiMaggio (Eds.) Structures of Capital: The Social Organization of the Economy, Cambridge 
University Press, New York. 
 
 Appendix A – 270 - 
Appendix A: Sample Characteristics 
 
Table A1: Sample Characteristics by Economy and Work Status 
 
Formal 
Economy (n/% 
within sample) 
Informal 
Economy 
Family 
Economy 
Total  
Not working 
Total 
Working 
Total Sample 
SEIFA 0-10th quantile (most disadvantaged) 231 (17.9) 65 (5.0) 232 (18.0) 761 (59.1) 528 (40.9)  1289 (12.3) 
  11-25th quantile 255 (20.9) 112 (9.2) 234 (19.1) 622 (50.9) 601 (49.1) 1223 (11.7) 
 26-50th quantile 633 (25.9) 341 (14.0) 509 (20.8) 960 (39.3) 1483 (60.7) 2443 (23.3) 
 51-75th quantile 777 (24.2) 436 (13.6) 577 (18.0) 1419 (44.2) 1790 (55.8) 3209 (30.6) 
  76-90th quantile 403 (28.0) 268 (18.6) 224 (15.5) 546 (37.9) 895 (62.1) 1441 (13.7) 
  91-100th quantile (least disadvantaged) 281 (32.0) 146 (16.6) 107 (12.2) 343 (39.1) 534 (60.9) 877 (8.4) 
        
Age (years) Twelve 197 (9.9) 227 (11.4) 414 (20.9)  1147 (57.8) 838 (42.2) 1985 (18.3) 
 Thirteen 353 (12.8) 414 (15.1) 618 (22.5) 1365 (49.6) 1385 (50.4) 2750 (25.4) 
 Fourteen 585 (20.8) 427 (15.2) 519 (18.4) 1286 (45.7) 1531 (54.3) 2817 (26.0) 
 Fifteen 1171 (44.4) 283 (10.7) 309 (11.7) 877 (33.2) 1763 (66.8) 2640 (24.3) 
 Sixteen 345 (52.6) 48 (7.3) 74 (11.3) 189 (28.8) 467 (71.2) 656 (6.0) 
        
CALD Non-Anglo Australian 681 (19.6) 233 (6.7) 633 (18.3) 1921 (55.4) 1547 (44.6) 3468 (31.7) 
 Anglo-Australian 2003 (26.7) 1179 (15.7) 1318 (17.6) 2988 (39.9) 4500 (60.1) 7488 (68.3) 
        
Rurality Metropolitan 465 (24.6) 284 (15.0) 290 (15.3) 854 (45.1) 1039 (54.9) 1893 (17.2) 
  Rural coastal 476 (28.0) 286 (16.8) 366 (21.5) 572 (33.6) 1128 (66.4) 1700 (15.5) 
  Rural inland 393 (24.0) 290 (17.7) 397 (24.3) 55 (33.9) 1580 (66.1) 1635 (14.9) 
  Sydney 1352 (23.4) 550 (9.5) 898 (15.6) 2968 (51.5) 2800 (48.5) 5768 (52.5) 
        
Gender Female 1070 (22.2) 779 (16.2) 907 (18.8) 2066 (42.8) 2756 (57.2) 4822 (44.3) 
 Male 1594 (26.3) 622 (10.3) 1031 (17.0) 2814 (46.4) 3247 (53.6) 6061 (55.7) 
        
 Total 2686 (24.4) 1412 (12.8) 1951 (17.7) 4950 (45.1) 6040 (54.9) 10999 (100.0) 
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